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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000573 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2017 
TAGS: NATO PREL MPOS KVIR
SUBJECT: FORMER KFOR COMMANDER OPTIMISTS ON KOSOVO, BUT 
STRESSES NEED TO PREPARE FOR ANYTHING 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Richard G. Olson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Outgoing KFOR Commander Lieutenant General 
Roland Kather (Germany), gave his final briefing to an 
informal meeting of the NAC in an expanded session with all 
KFOR troop contributing nations.  General Kather emphasized 
that the situation in Kosovo, while currently quiet, 
nevertheless remains fragile and unpredictable.  Kather said 
that while not technically falling under his mandate, the 
difficulties of security can not be separated from the 
economic and social issues facing Kosovo.  He further 
highlighted KFOR's decision to plan for all post December 10 
possible contingencies.  Kather voiced his opinion that 
taking a neutral stand between the parties in Kosovo was 
crucial to KFOR earning and keeping respect in the region. 
The General commented that there were a few flaws in KFOR and 
the intelligence situation was highlighted as needing 
improvement.  Allies roundly lauded Kather for his work over 
the last year as KFOR Commander.  Most also voiced various 
concerns and questions for future stability in Kosovo and the 
surrounding regions as the December 10 deadline approaches. 
 
------------------------------- 
KATHER'S YEAR AS KFOR COMMANDER 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) General Kather's review of the last year reflected 
his own admission that he was "an optimist."  While admitting 
that there were improvements that need to be made, Kather was 
clearly proud of his work in KFOR and the force itself. 
Kather began by noting that while economics and social policy 
were not under his mandate, he believed they were an 
essential piece of the security equation that could not be 
ignored.  He noted the unemployment rate in Kosovo as being 
between 40 percent to 80 percent at any given time, so most 
of the money in the economy was not being produced in Kosovo. 
 Rather, most of the money in the economy was from 
remittances and organized crime.  Kather said he took a broad 
approach to security decisions which included an awareness 
and of the impact of the economic situation. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Kather also said that he told his successor of the 
importance of continuing a broad approach.  He noted that 
most countries had given up their caveats and he was 
generally given flexibility, which was important to 
successfully complete his missions,and helped him to execute 
his missions impartially.  That approach meant engaging in 
activities around Kosovo that were not directly related to 
security (such as building a school and facilitating civil 
society programs), which helped make KFOR's presence in the 
region both more acceptable and more welcome to the general 
population. 
 
¶4.  (C)  General Kather also made clear his belief that 
certain improvements were needed in KFOR, led by the need for 
improved intelligence. 
 
¶5.  (C)  In regards to the future, Kather noted the necessity 
for "prudent military planning to stay on task."  He said 
that there did remain open questions.  First, what to do 
about inadequate staffing of the civilian-military 
organizations?  Second, what would be the framework for 
future training of a new Kosovo Security Force?  In regards 
to the second question he noted his belief that the framework 
nations should take over the responsibility of dealing with 
it.  Finally, he commented that the structure he had put in 
place had been exceedingly helpful.  He had a task force of 
16,000 and no one was responsible for the North or South or 
Central areas, they were simply all just responsible for 
Kosovo, a message that resonated with both the forces and the 
people of Kosovo.  He ended by noting that he hoped for the 
best, but it is important to plan for the worst.  The best 
outcome would be a continued dynamic and clear vision among 
the international community which will be able to maintain 
quiet and calm regardless of what happens after December 10, 
and the worst would be a unilateral declaration followed by 
Kosovar Serbs fleeing across the borders and mass chaos. 
 
------------------------------------- 
ALLIES: CONGRATULATIONS AND QUESTIONS 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  Allies unanimously offered congratulations to 
General Kather on a job well done before asking him follow up 
questions to his comments. 
 
USNATO 00000573  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶7.  (C) In response to questions regarding Serbia's role and 
his relationship with Serb armed forces, the General noted 
that he had developed a good relationship with their armed 
forces.  He noted that it is likely that the decision whether 
Kosovar Serbs will stay in Kosovo after December 10 or not 
will likely be handed down from Belgrade.  His sense was that 
most want to stay but that they will follow Belgrade's 
decision.  Nevertheless, Kather made a point of saying that 
in his opinion, most Kosovar Serbs are becoming frustrated by 
the lack of clarity that exists regarding the immediate 
future.  In addition, he commented that most are not even 
paying attention to the politics as they are much more 
concerned about day to day necessities, such as feeding their 
families.  He concluded discussion on the issue by noting 
that he personally did not believe there would be a mass 
exodus and that, if there was one, it might be more for show 
with people returning later on. 
 
¶8.  (C) He noted in response to some Allies' comments that he 
believed cooperation with the EU was vital and that even 
improbable scenarios (such as the possibility of chaos 
developing on the Macedonian border) could not be excluded no 
matter how unlikely, and should be prepared for. 
 
¶9.  (C) The General responded that while he does not expect 
standing armies of Serbia or other nations to interfere and 
begin conflict in a unilateral declaration of independence 
scenario, he said that there was a concern over the 
operations of paramilitary groups doing so.  Again, he 
referred back to his belief that it was necessary to prepare 
for anything. 
NULAND