VZCZCXYZ0005
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTU #1345/01 2761544
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 031544Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3960
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T TUNIS 001345 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA A/S DAVID WELCH AND DAS GORDON GRAY FROM 
AMBASSADORS FORD, GODEC AND RILEY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2032 
TAGS: PREL ECON KPAO KMPI PINS PTER SCUL XI
SUBJECT: THE WAY AHEAD IN THE MAGHREB 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROBERT F. GODEC; reason 1.4 (b) & (d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (S) On Friday, September 14, we (Ambassadors Ford, Godec 
and Riley) met in Tunis to review developments in Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia, assess US policy, and chart a way ahead. 
 While our three countries are different in important ways, 
they all face a difficult challenge from extremists and need 
to accelerate progress on democracy.  Based on our 
discussions, we offer three principal recommendations: 
 
-- The North African countries represent almost half of the 
population of the Arab world and high-level Washington 
engagement, particularly from the most senior State 
Department officials, is critical to advancing US foreign 
policy goals.  We urge the Secretary to visit the region. 
 
-- The threat of extremism is real and growing, particularly 
from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).  Nevertheless, 
we have adequate resources from Washington and from EUCOM for 
military and counter-terrorism assistance (assuming resumed 
adequate FMF funding for Tunisia and approval of the Tunis 
1206 proposal). 
 
-- To reduce extremism, however, and to deepen ties, Tunisia 
and Algeria need significantly more resources, especially 
funding, for education programs, greater public affairs 
outreach, and small but useful levers to secure faster 
economic reform. 
 
We look forward to another Maghreb COM meeting following the 
NEA COM session in December. 
 
End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) On Friday, September 14, we (Ambassadors Ford, Godec 
and Riley) met at Embassy Tunis to discuss our three 
countries, US policy and the way ahead.  Members of the Tunis 
country team participated in many of the sessions. 
 
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Countering Extremism 
-------------------- 
 
¶3. (S) Extremism, and particularly the threat from AQIM, is a 
growing challenge in each of the countries.  In Algeria, 
security has slowly deteriorated over the past year, 
especially with the appearance of suicide bombers.  The GOA's 
hold on power is not threatened, but the violence  will 
continue.  Morocco and Tunisia also face a significant risk 
of extremist attacks. 
 
¶4.  (S) The roots of extremism in the countries vary.  In 
Algeria, AQIM is recruiting young, unemployed men, who move 
to the mountains for training and attacks while a smaller, 
more educated cadre (most likely irreconcilable) recruit and 
maintain an urban support network.  Many join for jihad in 
Iraq but end up involved in terrorism inside Algeria.  In 
Tunisia, the pool is broader, with some educated Tunisians, 
particularly those living abroad, choosing to join al-Qaeda. 
In Morocco, there is also a significant challenge from 
individuals and small groups carrying out independent 
terrorist acts. 
 
¶5.  (S) We agreed that there is excellent cooperation among 
our political, regional affairs and defense attache offices. 
Cooperation among the GOT, GOA and GOM, however, has been 
intermittent.  Algeria engages with each of its neighbors 
carefully and usually at a very operational level, rather 
than planning broad, joint strategies.    Moreover, the three 
governments have little interest in having the US Government 
act as a catalyst for cooperation among the three states. 
This will limit the prospects for the RSI process and TSCTP, 
although we may find niches in areas like Sahelian 
cooperation.  The combination of counter-intelligence 
paranoia, limited administrative capacity and protocol 
sensitivities means that we can only move at a measured pace 
in expanding regional military and intelligence 
relationships.  Proposing small, practical information 
exchanges, however, will help build more trust (but it will 
always be an uphill battle).  A focus, for example, on 
al-Qaeda,s use of the Internet at the upcoming NAS 
conference would be useful. 
 
¶6.  (C) On resources, we agreed that we have sufficient 
funds, personnel and training on the C/T front from the State 
and Defense departments.  (NB.  This assumes a resumption of 
adequate FMF funding for Tunisia and approval of the 
Mission,s 1206 proposal.)  We do not, however, have the 
resources or engagement needed on other issues that matter, 
including educational programs, economic/commercial 
opportunities and public diplomacy broadly.  In particular, 
Tunisia and Algeria need additional funding for education and 
other outreach programs.  We are missing opportunities to 
attack the root problem of extremist ideologies. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Pressing for Democratic Progress 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S) Our countries continue to face fundamental challenges 
on the road to democracy.  Algeria is stagnant, and there is 
little sign of a wider democratic opening in prospect. 
Tunisia is making painfully slow progress on opening up and 
needs further encouragement and pressure.  Morocco is making 
some headway, with the King recognizing the importance of 
change, but challenges remain, particularly economic.  In 
Algeria and Tunisia, the word "drift" best captures the 
current state of affairs.  The citizens of the Maghreb are 
frustrated by this drift and long for progress.  Algeria and 
Tunisia are both led by aging leaders in poor health who 
appear unwilling to give up power.  In the case of both 
President Ben Ali and President Bouteflika, a clear message 
delivered by senior Administration officials about the 
importance of permitting "public debate," allowing the 
development of a genuine, democratic opposition, and 
"alternance of power" is important.  This message may be best 
delivered while appealing to the two men's sense of their 
future legacies. 
 
¶8.  (C) In Morocco, thanks to USAID, MEPI and the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation (MCC), the US Government has many 
programs to promote democracy.  Algeria, largely through 
MEPI, also has small programs with the Parliament, the 
Justice Ministry and NGOs to eke out incremental reform and 
boost reform advocates.  The GOT,s tight restrictions makes 
programs in Tunisia far more problematic, although the 
Mission continues to seek opportunities.  In Tunis, support 
from the Europeans (particularly the French) for our Freedom 
Agenda goals is important, and we have made some headway in 
securing cooperation in recent months. 
 
------------------------------ 
Economic/Commercial Challenges 
------------------------------ 
 
¶9.  (C) Each of the countries faces significant economic 
challenges, albeit with important differences.  While 
creating jobs is the first challenge in each country, the 
governments are addressing the problem in different ways.  In 
Algeria, with officials sitting on a pile of petro-dollars, 
the GOA shows little interest in leaping forward on economic 
reform.  Morocco and Tunisia, however, are responsive to 
business concerns and are working hard to attract investment. 
 Tunisia has had some success in stepping up the real GDP 
growth rate over the last year, and creating more jobs, but 
needs to do better yet.  Morocco had a good year economically 
in 2006-07, but 2007-08 promises to be very challenging. 
 
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MCC and FTAs 
------------ 
 
¶10.  (C) Although there are differences in the numbers, the 
US-Morocco FTA may not have increased Moroccan exports as 
much as expected.  Nevertheless, GOM officials acknowledge 
and welcome the increase in US investment.  The MCC has made 
an important difference there.  While Tunisia technically 
qualifies for the MCC, the GOT has so far demonstrated little 
interest.  Embassy Tunis has, however, provided a wealth of 
information to the GOT on the MCC, highlighting that Morocco 
and Jordan now have programs, and underscoring the 
extraordinary opportunity Tunisia is missing. 
 
¶11.  (C) The visit by EEB P/DAS Dibble to Tunisia and Algeria 
was welcomed by the two governments and underscores the 
importance of an economic policy dialogue.  In Tunisia, the 
GOT appears ready to reinvigorate our TIFA with a view to 
possible FTA discussions.  Follow up discussions in Algeria 
indicate the GOA would also welcome a TIFA Council meeting 
but the agenda would need to be defined carefully in advance 
to maximize its utility.  There are areas where the Algerians 
are willing to work on reform, such as the dilapidated 
financial sector.  The US Treasury Department has an expert 
team engaged and we need to make sure it has the resources 
needed to help Algerian reformers advance their agenda.  With 
the Algerians we should also pursue a determined discussion 
 
at a technical level about WTO membership.  The Algerians 
haven't yet made the political decision to implement the 
necessary reforms, and they are stuck in the mode of thinking 
that they can somehow escape.  They need to hear repeatedly 
that there is no other way. 
 
¶12.  (C) The Arab Maghreb Union has just established a 
private employers organization which might prove a good 
vehicle to encourage further progress on Maghreb-wide 
integration and reform.  Nevertheless, regional integration 
will remain slow. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Securing Help on Our Regional Issues 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶13.  (C) The Maghreb countries can provide valuable support 
to the United States on a range of regional challenges, 
including Iraq, Iran, and the Palestinians.  We must engage 
with the three countries, however, on each issue and in 
different ways.  Morocco is likely to remain the most forward 
leaning on assisting the United States, as the result of 
closer ties generally and in an effort to secure our support 
on the Western Sahara.  Tunisia will continue to provide 
quiet support, but is unlikely to lead.  Algeria's 
leadership, stuck in their 1970s world view, will rarely be 
forward leaning, although we might occasionally secure quiet 
help on individual issues. 
 
¶14.  (C) The continuing struggle between Algeria and Morocco 
over the Western Sahara will hang over all we try to do with 
them.  Even if solved, however, Algeria and Morocco are 
unlikely to be close anytime soon.  The animosity between the 
two has historical roots that will continue to impede 
regional integration. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Public Affairs: Winning Hearts and Minds 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (C) We agreed that public affairs engagement is critical 
to progress on US foreign policy objectives in the region. 
The missions in Algeria and Tunisia, in particular, need more 
resources to support education programs, including: 
 
--  ACCESS for underprivileged high-school students to study 
English, a means by which they themselves believe they can 
advance economically; 
 
-- English language programs through Amideast in cities such 
as Sfax, Tunisia; 
 
--  e-math type programs that introduce IT skills to primary 
school students; 
 
--  High-school linkage programs which teach relevant 
computer and English-language skills as well as reach out to 
the most important target group in terms of limiting 
extremism; 
 
--  University partnership programs that again teach highly 
marketable computer and English language skills in addition 
to more technical subjects via long-distance learning. 
 
Despite a clear and important opening in this area, and 
requests from both posts, we do not have adequate funding for 
these programs.  It is reasonable to ask host governments to 
contribute resources to expanded programming, but we need to 
put resources on the table ourselves to extract movement from 
these Jurassic bureaucracies. 
 
¶16.  (C) Making better use of the media is essential.  In 
each of the countries, television is the key, but it is the 
regional satellite channels that are the most important.  We 
need to pay the most attention possible to the al-Jazeera 
station in Rabat, and there are other Maghreb-oriented 
satellite networks being established, often in France.  (Ford 
appeared on the Rabat al-Jazeerah newsbroadcast in a live 
interview on September 23 and got plenty of subsequent media 
coverage in Algeria September 25.)  We must seek new ways to 
get our message on to these channels.  To influence local 
elites, we could do more with other regional media, notably 
Jeune Afrique, which is widely read by influential officials 
in each of the countries.  Better use of the Internet offers 
another avenue of access, especially to younger people.  IIP 
has started doing this, but our posts should start ensuring 
that our messages get published on locally generated web and 
blog-sites (without having to check with Washington first). 
 
------------------------- 
High-Level Engagement Too 
------------------------- 
 
¶17.  (C) Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya together have a 
population of roughly 85 million people, nearly half of the 
Arab world.  Its proximity to our NATO allies and its energy 
resources make it strategically very important.  Since the 
diminution of the Algerian civil war, however, it has not 
garnered great US Government attention.  The relative 
stability, as we have outlined above, is not pre-destined to 
endure.  In these protocol-conscious countries, high-level 
engagement is essential to getting messages across 
effectively. In that regard, we welcome the decision by Under 
Secretary Burns to meet with the Arab Maghreb Union Foreign 
 
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Ministers in New York. 
 
¶18.  (S) We also urge other high-level engagement.  The 
single, best step we could take would be a visit by the 
Secretary of State.  In each country, the Secretary would 
 
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find ample ground to encourage greater cooperation on 
regional issues and on domestic challenges, notably to 
advance democracy and to combat extremism.  While a visit by 
the Secretary would not be a &magic bullet8, it would 
underscore for the leaders in each country the deep US 
commitment to the region and it would advance our most 
important, and most difficult, goals for the region.  Beyond 
a visit by the Secretary, it will be important to find 
additional ways to engage with the region in a sustained way 
at a high level. 
 
¶19.  (C) In the end, we are struck as much by the differences 
among Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco as by the similarities. 
While they share a common religion and language, they are in 
many ways more different than alike.   In addressing the 
challenges of the region, we must tailor country-specific 
responses.  If we do so effectively, we can help each of them 
emerge stronger, more stable, more democratic and more 
prosperous.  A successful Maghreb would help us across the 
entire broader Middle East. 
GODEC