VZCZCXRO6156
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO
DE RUEHKO #4658/01 2770618
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 040618Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8250
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 3540
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 7199
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 4261
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 4319
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1307

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 004658 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR TONG; USTR FOR BEEMAN AND MEYERS; PARIS FOR USOECD; 
DOC FOR 4410/ITA/MAC/OJ/NMELCHER;TREASURY FOR IA/DOHNER, 
HAARSAGER POGGI, CARNES, AND WINSHIP; STATE PLEASE PASS TO 
FEDERAL RESERVE SAN FRANCISCO/A. MAEDA AND FEDERAL RESERVE 
BOARD/J. KOHLI;BERLIN PASS TO FISHER; BANGKOK PASS TO THORIN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2017 
TAGS: EFIN KPRV JA
SUBJECT: GOING POSTAL: INTRODUCING THE WORLD'S LARGEST BANK 
 
REF: A. TOKYO 4555 
     ¶B. TOKYO 2716 
     ¶C. TOKYO 1916 
     ¶D. TOKYO 967 
     ¶E. TOKYO 894 
 
Classified By: Charge d,Affaires Joseph R. Donovan for reasons 1.4 b/d. 
 
Introduction 
---------------- 
¶1. (SBU) Yucho, Japan,s postal bank, is the world,s largest 
bank, with total assets of 222 trillion yen ($1.9 trillion) 
and FY 2007 net income of 300 billion yen ($2.6 billion). 
As Yucho,s privatization began on October 1 (ref a), its 
sheer size and first steps into new banking businesses 
promise a significant impact in Japanese and global 
financial markets. 
 
A Bank is Born 
-------------- 
 
¶2. (U) On October 1, Japan Post dissolved and its functions 
were doled out to successor companies under the Japan 
Post Services Holding Company (JPSC).  The new successor 
companies are to be subject to the same laws and regulations 
that govern their respective private industries.  A 
government corporation will be established as a repository 
of the pre-privatization savings accounts held by Japan 
Post. The government will continue to guarantee the existing 
postal savings obligations and the funds in these 
grandfathered accounts will be placed in government bonds. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Yucho,s traditional business model had been quite 
simple: channeling savings back to the government to finance 
either directly or indirectly Japanese fiscal policy.  The 
most popular postal savings product were the teigaku chokin, 
a ten-year time deposit account with no early withdrawal 
penalty after six months.  Yucho has also offered passbook 
savings and other time deposits and, since October 2005, 
investment trusts.  However, Yucho has never had a lending 
facility. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Since inception, Yucho has not paid any deposit 
insurance premiums or taxes, has not been subject to 
capital requirements, has had a government guarantee on its 
deposits, and historically has set its interest rates for 
savings deposits higher than banks.  For these reasons, the 
existence of Japan Post has been criticized by the private 
sector, which pointed to Japan Post,s unfair competitive 
advantages. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Yucho,s privatization is expected to increase 
competition in the banking sector as the bank seeks to offer 
products and services now offered by private banks.  A likely 
outcome of Yucho,s new status is a privatized postal bank 
with little or no government support that has to diversify 
its offerings and asset base.  The plan is to eliminate 
market 
distortions and subsidized competition to promote the 
efficient allocation of funds within the Japanese economy. 
However, risks and questions remain. 
 
But What Kind of Bank? 
---------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Observers and other financial market participants 
are wondering about Yucho,s business model.  Mortgage 
finance, 
loans to small and medium enterprises, and finance for public 
works projects have all been posited as possible business 
activities.  However, there are questions as well as to how 
Yucho can successfully enter these already highly competitive 
areas on a meaningful scale and where it will find the needed 
expertise.  There are also questions as to whether the GOJ 
will allow market forces to operate.  There are concerns a 
financial system already characterized by overcapacity may 
end up with excessive competition and risk taking, perhaps 
weakening other financial institutions, including the 
regional banks and cooperatives, if not Yucho itself. 
 
TOKYO 00004658  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶7. (C) One fear is Yucho will continue to be implicitly 
or explicitly backed by the government and, by using its size 
and the resulting unfair competitive advantages, lead to 
problems for the regional banks.  Many of the concerns the 
USG has repeatedly expressed regarding a level playing field, 
raised most often in the context of the Postal Insurance 
Company, are designed to ensure that government backing does 
not aid what would already be a tough competitor in this 
"strong bank" scenario. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Any new business areas or activities for Yucho must 
be recommended by the Postal Services Privatization Committee 
(PSPC).  However, as the financial services regulator, the 
Financial Services Agency (FSA) can deny an application if it 
deems Yucho does not have the competence to enter into the new 
area.  Japan Post issued an outline of its implementation 
plan 
that included new business areas that Yucho might enter, 
including offering foreign currency deposits, mortgages, 
business loans, project finance, receivables financing, and 
credit cards.  The document states Yucho would seek to 
begin these businesses promptly after privatization. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Earlier this spring, an FSA contact indicated that 
a range of new business might be considered, with varying 
likelihoods of approval.  He suggested the bank was likely 
to ask for liberalization of risk management tools.  He gave 
hedging operations to limit interest rate risk on the bank,s 
large portfolio of JGBs as one possible area that could meet 
with easy approval.  More difficult would be loans to small- 
and medium-sized enterprises.  He indicated entry into this 
field could face fierce opposition from Japanese regional 
banks, 
which would be directly affected by such a move.  Technically, 
however, such opposition should not be a factor in the 
decision. 
 
¶10. (SBU) An example of an attempted foray by Yucho into a 
new business area played out in recent press articles. 
Press reports indicated Yucho was preparing to enter the 
mortgage market and was soliciting regional bank partners 
to join in this venture.  In a meeting with the regional 
banking supervisory office at FSA, an official there called 
the press reports inaccurate, and said FSA was not prepared 
to approve mortgages as a new product offering at this point. 
However, he continued, Yucho might be allowed to act as an 
agent in offering products of the regional banks.  In 
the end, all but one regional bank, Suruga Bank, declined 
Yucho,s offer of a business tie-up in the mortgage area, 
with press reports suggesting the result stemmed from 
regional banks viewing Yucho as more of a threat than 
an opportunity. 
 
¶11. (SBU) One PSPC member we talked with seemed more 
optimistic about possible approvals for expansion into new 
businesses.  Both FSA and PSPC are concerned about the 
level of talent currently at Yucho.  Most Yucho employees 
have worked for the bank for their entire careers and 
therefore have little or no experience with 
anything more than the relatively unsophisticated products 
Yucho currently offers.  The PSPC member suggested Yucho 
might look at tie-ups with firms having the required 
technical expertise.  He specifically mentioned Goldman Sachs 
and Morgan Stanley, though this specificity was likely 
calculated to appeal to his American audience.  However, a 
range of views exists, and another PSPC member consistently 
has asserted the view that Japan Post should focus on 
shrinking its balance sheet, rather than a major expansion 
of activities. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Most American observers have concentrated on the 
privatization of the postal insurance company, probably 
because the new company will compete directly with U. S. 
companies already well established in the Japanese insurance 
market.  The Yucho privatization has received less attention 
because most American banks and other financial institutions, 
with the notable exception of Citigroup (which has an 
agreement 
 
TOKYO 00004658  003 OF 003 
 
 
with Yucho allowing Citibank savers to use Yucho ATMs), do 
not 
have retail banking operations in Japan and are not directly 
affected by the privatization.  Concerns that have been raised 
include a desire by securities firms to be allowed to compete 
on asset management service provision to the bank, and a 
desire 
to have equal access to the postal network. 
 
But What if Yucho Turns Out to be Less Than its Former Self? 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶13. (C) A different fear might be called a "weak bank" 
scenario.  Under this model, the new Japan Postal Bank does 
not have the expertise to enter the various potential lending 
markets, but feels pressure to do so anyway in order to show 
a 
viable business strategy to potential investors before the 
eventual IPO.  Inexperienced loan officers turn out to be 
unable to poach clients from the regional and city banks and 
so make ill-advised loans to marginal borrowers.  Given the 
difficulty in developing new products and showing growth in 
the 
short time line currently proposed, a number of observers 
find 
this scenario credible, at least in part, because of the lack 
of experience now found in the bank.  To counter such a 
problem, 
it might be that the GOJ, through the holding company, 
continues to be involved, limiting outside access to the 
postal 
network and thus to Yucho,s depositors until Yucho proves 
itself a viable entity. 
 
¶14. (SBU) One PSPC member acknowledged that Yucho cannot be 
viewed as a purely private player before 2017 and promised 
the PSPC would be proactive as opposed to reactive like the 
FTC on anti-monopoly type issues.  However, when asked about 
his interpretation of the terms level playing field and user 
convenience, he stated he was concerned that regional 
players are making anti-competitive arguments and that it 
was important to protect consumers.  Arguably, he added, 
far from needing to wait until 2017 and full privatization, 
a level playing field requires the postal bank be permitted 
to enter into a full range of services in order to compete 
with existing banks.  In other words, the danger might not be 
that the new mammoth postal bank will destroy other banks, 
but rather the other way around. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶15. (C) The size, scope and political history of Japan 
Post,s privatization leave no room for anything less than 
complete success.  Japan,s policymakers seek to structure 
the privatized bank as a viable enterprise and increase 
competition for the benefit of consumers.  Some observers, 
however, express concern Japanese policymakers will create 
either a strong postal bank that enjoys preferential 
treatment with the ability to overpower its competitors, 
or a weak bank that will struggle to meet its service 
obligations, create market instability, and perhaps ultimately 
need a government bail-out.  The PSPC, charged with 
shepherding the new Japan Post, will have to steer a middle 
course to ensure a successful privatization.  The committee 
is likely to face significant pressure from existing banks 
and other financial institutions to limit the range of new 
business the postal bank will be allowed to enter.  At the 
same time, many in government  want a successful and early 
IPO, the revenues from which will probably go to reduce 
Japan,s high public debt load.  Striking a balance between 
these competing interests will be a difficult enterprise 
without precedent. 
DONOVAN