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UNCLAS TOKYO 004574 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR I/RF, PA/PR/FPC/W, IIP/G/EA, EAP/PD, R/MR, 
EAP/J, EAP/P, PM; 
USTR FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
TREASURY FOR OASIA/IMI; 
SECDEF FOR OASD/PA; 
CP BUTLER OKINAWA FOR AREA FIELD OFFICE; 
PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO JA
SUBJECT: TOKYO MEDIA REACTION - SIX-PARTY TALKS 
 
 
LEAD STORIES: All Monday morning Japanese dailies gave 
front-page coverage to a provisional six-party accord 
on North Korea's disablement of three nuclear 
facilities within this year, as well as UN Special 
Emissary to Burma Gambari's meeting with opposition 
leader Aung San Suu Kyi in Rangoon on Sunday. 
 
¶1. "Vague Accord Will Create Problems for Future" The 
conservative Sankei editorialized (10/1): "There is a 
high possibility that the provisional six-party deal 
will create problems for the future, given that the 
definition of disablement, as well as its scope and 
procedures, remains vague and limited. Although 
disablement is supposedly to take place by year's end, 
it is unclear whether this means that it will start or 
be completed by then. Regrettably, the situation as it 
stands will allow North Korea to buy time.... The 
September 2005 six-party joint statement saying that 
'the DPRK committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons 
and existing nuclear programs' must not be forgotten. 
The Bush administration's initial goal of realizing 
complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization 
appears to have disappeared. Just prior to the latest 
round of the six-party talks, allegations surfaced that 
North Korea had transferred nuclear technology to 
Syria. This demonstrates serious flaws in Washington's 
soft line toward the DPRK. While Assistant Secretary of 
State Hill has stated that the ultimate goal is 
complete denuclearization, there is no guarantee that 
this goal will be achieved." 
 
¶2. "Has Roadmap for Disablement Been Completed?" An 
editorial in the top-circulation, moderate Yomiuri 
commented (10/1): "It is important to create a firm 
roadmap for the implementation of the 'next steps.' 
Leaving the agreement open to interpretation is 
unacceptable, as North Korea will stall or look for 
loopholes in the denuclearization process.... Nuclear 
disablement does not mean nuclear dismantlement. 
Disablement is aimed at laying the foundation for the 
third stage in the denuclearization process by creating 
a situation in which North Korea cannot easily resume 
its nuclear programs. Negotiations in the third stage 
will be the most difficult, as they are intended to 
have North Korea surrender its nuclear weapons and 
plutonium. This is something that directly affects 
Japan's security. Despite the recent deal, there are no 
grounds for optimism that it will serve as a stepping 
stone toward the next stage." 
 
¶3. "Dialogue and Pressure Still Needed" The business- 
oriented Nikkei editorialized (10/1): "The provisional 
six-party accord is insufficient, as it specifies only 
three facilities subject to disablement. A combination 
of dialogue and pressure is essential for North Korea's 
complete denuclearization and a resolution of the 
abduction issue.... Prime Minister Fukuda has referred 
to the necessity for dialogue, but pressure is 
sometimes necessary to get the DPRK to take actions. In 
this regard, it was appropriate for the GOJ to decide 
on a six-month extension of its economic sanctions on 
the DPRK." 
 
DONOVAN