VZCZCXRO9059
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHNT #1853/01 2980937
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 250937Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8654
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 3383
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 9589
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 3999
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 3862
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1937
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2087
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TASHKENT 001853 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR OES/ETC, OES/PCI, OES/STC, SCA/CEN, EUR/ACE, 
DOE FOR NNSA, 
EPA FOR OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2017 
TAGS: KENV ETRD ENRG PREL TBIO ZK UZ
SUBJECT: (C) MY WAY OR NO WAY: UZBEKISTAN GETS DEFENSIVE ON 
TRANSBOUNDARY WATERS 
 
REF: TASHKENT 1608 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY ECON OFF B. OLSEN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D). 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  President Karimov,s speech at the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in Bishkek on 
August 16 was the clearest and most official statement of 
Uzbekistan,s position on the use of transboundary waters of 
Central Asia.  In an effort to legally justify its position, 
on September 4 Uzbekistan surprisingly acceded to two United 
Nations conventions governing the use of international 
watercourses.  Uzbekistan is citing the conventions to defend 
the status-quo regime on water sharing, a regime that favors 
the interests of Uzbekistan over those of upstream countries. 
 Meanwhile, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan reportedly are 
coordinating a strong push both domestically and 
internationally to attract foreign direct investment to build 
hydropower infrastructure and make the current water sharing 
regime more equitable.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The information sources for this cable include 
official statements and reliable press reports.  The regional 
ESTH LES is based in Tashkent, travels throughout the region 
and engages in extensive discussions with environmental 
experts.  The cable has been reviewed by Embassy Bishkek and 
Embassy Dushanbe. 
 
¶3. (SBU) At the SCO,s annual summit in 2007, energy 
cooperation was added as a priority to the agenda, 
demonstrating increased interest among its members, 
especially energy-hungry China and Russia.  While China and 
Russia are interested in increasing natural gas imports, the 
general new energy focus, including hydroelectric power, has 
brought to the foreground the long-standing transboundary 
water issues among Central Asian countries. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Given the importance of agriculture, namely cotton, 
to Uzbekistan,s economy, Uzbekistan does not want to alter 
the current water-sharing regime that allows water to flow 
freely downstream in the spring and summer.  Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan thus far have failed to equitably trade water for 
power or receive compensation for their seasonal energy 
losses.  Both possess enormous hydropower generating 
potential, but are unable to meet domestic electricity demand 
in the winter.  Energy imports from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan meet some needs during the cold months, but 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have not been able to negotiate a 
consistent supply of energy at fair prices with Uzbekistan. 
 
Karimov,s Watery Offense 
------------------------ 
 
¶5. (SBU) At the summit, President Karimov repeatedly quoted 
passages from two United Nations (UN) conventions to defend 
his position in support of the status quo.  (Note: Soon after 
the summit the Uzbeks acceded to the two water conventions 
(on September 4).  End note.)  He cited the 1997 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses and the 1992 UN Economic 
Commission for Europe,s Convention on the Protection and Use 
of Tran-boundary Watercourses and International Lakes.  At 
the 2007 UN General Assembly, UNGA, in September, Foreign 
Minister Norov made similar points, devoting the first half 
of his speech to transboundary water issues and the rights of 
downstream countries. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Karimov cited the conventions, saying that measures 
should be taken by upstream countries to mitigate the 
consequences or compensate the affected countries.  Karimov 
noted technical feasibility studies for hydropower projects 
in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan should be examined by third 
parties to protect downstream users and the environment.  If 
this is not done, he warned, the planned projects would 
negatively affect the lives of tens of million people, worsen 
the water supply and accelerate an ecological catastrophe of 
the shrinking Aral Sea. 
 
 
TASHKENT 00001853  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶7. (C) Comment: Karimov's statement is self-serving.  With 
more reservoirs to hold water, water usage would become more 
efficient as water would be released when needed.  The living 
standard of the Tajiks and Kyrgyz would improve as they would 
have better access to electricity and heating.  More water 
released in the winter to create electricity would result in 
more water reaching the Aral Sea and less being siphoned off 
for crops, as is currently done, thus improving the water 
supply of those living near the Aral Sea.  Uzbekistan's 
policies (both Soviet and post-Soviet) account for the 
majority of man-made adverse effects on the Aral Sea.  Recent 
expert commentary suggests there is no hope of restoring the 
"southern" (Uzbek) Aral Sea to its 1960's level, but rather 
that the best that can be hoped for is to stabilize the 
current annual losses and keep the sea at its existing, 
vastly reduced level.  Even this, an American scientist 
remarked, is not possible without dramatic improvements in 
Uzbek irrigation and water management techniques, practices 
which are far from being enacted.  End comment. 
 
¶8. (C) Karimov further defended his argument by citing 
relevant rules and procedures of the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank, which require prior consent of all 
concerned countries before international water projects are 
approved.  (Note: In September, the Head of the World Bank 
told the DCM the GOU had warned the Bank to proceed very 
cautiously on offering any support for major dam projects 
(reftel).  End note) 
 
The Upstream Defense 
-------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) The Tajik Government aims to finish its Soviet-era 
hydropower projects and build new ones.  In 2004, Russian 
Aluminum (RUSAL), Russia,s giant aluminum producer signed a 
deal to finish the Rogun power station on the Vakhsh River, a 
major tributary of the Amu Darya.  Later that year, the 
Russian company United Energy Systems started construction of 
Sangtuda-1, and Iran started construction of the Sangtuda-2 
power station, both on the Vakhsh River.  In August 2007, 
Tajikistan and Afghanistan agreed to jointly construct the 
Dashtijum hydropower plant on the Pyandj River.  It should be 
noted that the Rogun project has not progressed since 2004, 
Sangtuda 2 is behind schedule, and only Sangtuda 1 is on 
schedule.  So while there is a swirl of activity on 
hydropower projects in Tajikistan, there is not uniform 
progress.  Similarly, the Kyrgyz Parliament voted in June 
2007 to allow private investment in the unfinished Kambar-Ata 
1 and 2 hydropower projects.  Kyrgyzstan plans to establish a 
joint venture with Kazakhstan and Russia to build these 
hydropower stations, estimated to cost USD 2.5 billion. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Upstream hydropower projects aim not only to make 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan energy exporters, but also to 
secure greater influence in regional politics.  Once these 
power stations are operational, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 
should be able to better mitigate winter energy shortages, 
meet domestic energy demands and export excess electricity to 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and China.  These stations will 
allow for the long-term control and manipulation of the flows 
of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya by upstream countries.  This 
is exactly what Uzbekistan wants to prevent. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) Uzbekistan can be expected to take further steps to 
hinder the implementation upstream of hydro energy 
infrastructure.  Media reports and comments from Tajik 
Government officials in recent months suggest that 
Tajikistan,s move to terminate a deal with Russian RUSAL 
over the height and type of Rogun dam was caused by Uzbek 
interference.  Uzbekistan's meddling is rumored to be the 
cause of the Chinese dropping finance for the construction of 
a Tajik hydropower plant on the Zarafshan River.  (Note: 
While Uzbek interference may be a factor, but Tajik 
Government failure to improve the investment climate in 
 
TASHKENT 00001853  003 OF 003 
 
 
Tajikistan has certainly also hindered Rogun and other 
projects.  End note). 
 
¶12. (C) The Uzbeks' use of international law in public 
discourse demonstrates their increased concern over Tajik and 
Kyrgyz efforts to harness water energy, a god-given resource 
in Karimov's view.  In its typical balancing game, Uzbekistan 
has taken the issue to an international forum.  The Uzbeks 
feel the pinch by the Tajiks and Kyrgyz and are trying to use 
international conventions to defend the current water regime. 
 Uzbekistan historically has been reticent to join 
international and regional organizations.  This new move may 
provide a partial legal basis for Uzbekistan to maintain the 
status quo.  However, if Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan do not 
have access to reliable energy supplies, or if water 
cost-sharing agreements are insufficient and/or ignored by 
neighbors, then both countries could well argue that they are 
obliged to produce energy domestically through water 
resources.  Transboundary water issues will continue to 
plague this region until the parties develop enough trust or 
see enough mutual interest to sit down together and negotiate 
a regional water management scheme--something that still 
appears to be far down the line. 
NORLAND