VZCZCXRO8176
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSM #1239/01 2781538
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 051538Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2764
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 001239 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SW AF CY BM IR IZ YI SU CD
SUBJECT: SWEDEN'S POLITICAL DIRECTOR ON IRAQ, IRAN, 
AFGHANISTAN, CYPRUS, KOSOVO, BURMA, SUDAN, AND CHAD 
 
REF: A. HELSINKI 753 
     ¶B. NICOSIA 754 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert Silverman, reason 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
Summary and Comment 
------------------- 
¶1.  (c) During an October 4 tour d'horizon, MFA Political 
Director Bjorn Lyrvall reviewed Sweden's meetings on the 
margins of the UNGA and its activities and views on key 
issues: 
 
-- Afghanistan.  Sweden is considering a proposal from the 
Finns for the Finns to take over command of the Mazar e 
Sharif PRT.  No decision has been taken on this switch, nor 
on whether it would entail a decrease of Swedish troops.  DCM 
said he hoped it would not involve a decrease of Swedish 
troops. 
 
-- Iraq.  Sweden has been approached by France and the UK 
about joining a three-way effort to get the EU more involved 
in Iraq; increasing the EU role in Iraq is on the October 15 
GAERC. 
 
-- Iran.  Sweden wants to wait for a decision in the UNSC on 
a third resolution before supporting EU sanctions. 
 
-- Kosovo.  The Troika-led process should be credible and 
allowed to play itself out.  This will promote necessary EU 
unity in taking a position later. 
 
-- Cyprus.  Sweden is pushing for a renewed UN effort 
following the February presidential elections. 
 
Comment:  Sweden had declared its intention to double its 
troops in international deployments, from the current 850 to 
as many as 2,000.  At the same time, potential defense budget 
cuts may put strain on some deployments -- possibly including 
the PRT in Afghanistan.  Sweden has not yet made that 
decision, according to Lyrvall.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
Afghanistan 
----------- 
¶2.  (c) DCM noted that we had heard that Sweden was 
considering a reduction of its troops in Iraq (ref A). 
Lyrvall said no decision had been taken yet.  Sweden was 
working in close cooperation with its Nordic partners, and 
particularly Norway and Finland.  Lyrvall said the Finns had 
told Sweden they were considering greatly increasing their 
contribution to the Mazar e Sharif PRT and asked about the 
possibility of Sweden handing off the command of the PRT to 
Finland.  Lyrvall said this could possibly be done with no 
reduction of troops by Sweden, but emphasized again that no 
decision had been taken.  DCM urged Sweden not to decrease 
its troop strength. 
 
Iraq 
---- 
¶3.  (c) DCM inquired on follow-up to the successful visit of 
FM Bildt and Lyrvall to Iraq.  Lyrvall said Sweden had been 
approached to join what could become a French, British, 
Swedish initiative on strengthening EU involvement in Iraq. 
This followed on the Bildt and Kouchner visits to Iraq.  In 
response to the DCM's query, Lyrvall said Sweden would like 
to see the appointment of an EU Special Representative on 
Iraq, but the time was not right.  Iraq was on the agenda at 
the GAERC. 
 
Iran 
---- 
¶4.  (c) Lyrvall said the EU had discussed in New York the 
prospect of EU sanctions against Iran, and were expecting a 
report from French FM Kouchner in this regard.  Lyrvall said 
Sweden had "no big appetite" for sanctions against Iran, 
particularly in view of the prospect of a third UNSC 
resolution on Iran that could clarify next steps.  In 
Sweden's view, the UNSCR should precede sanctions.  To be 
effective, sanctions needed stronger international support. 
Otherwise, the Iranians would simply shift their purchases to 
other sources.  Lyrvall noted that Swedish trade with Iran 
was down to one-third the level of 2005.  He said this slack 
had been taken up by exports to Iran from others.  Iran had 
continued to be able to supply itself, but from other 
sources.  (Comment:  It was clear that Sweden's reservation 
on sanctions against Iraq owed much to its threatened 
commercial interests there.  In 2006, Sweden's exports to 
Iran totaled about 540 million USD, with the major items 
being power generating machinery, telecoms, chemical 
products, including pharmaceuticals. and trucks and busses. 
End Comment.) 
 
Kosovo 
 
STOCKHOLM 00001239  002 OF 002 
 
 
------ 
¶5.  (c) Sweden was waiting to see what the Troika could 
achieve, Lyrvall said.  We should not prejudge the outcome. 
Lyrvall said that following the November elections, the 
prospects would be more clear.  He emphasized, however, that 
the December 10 deadline was for the CG report to be 
presented.  "We will still see what we do on the 11th," he 
said.  It was important that the process leading up to the 
report and following it be credible; this was necessary not 
only for the Serbs and the Russians, but to make the EU come 
together.  If there was a credible perception that "we tried, 
but failed," Sweden hoped the EU would unite. 
 
Cyprus 
------ 
¶6.  (c) Lyrvall said Foreign Minister Bildt had, on the 
margins of the UNGA, discussed with other interested 
countries (U.S., Denmark, Finland, Italy, UK, The 
Netherlands, Poland, Greece) and UN USYG for Political 
Affairs Lynn Pascoe Swedish proposals intended to revive a 
"Gambari process" in Cyprus after the February presidential 
elections.  These proposals would include sending a UN 
assessment mission, invitations from the UNSYG, and the 
appointment of a new Special Representative of the Secretary 
General.  If the elections resulted in a new president, 
something even bolder could be considered. 
 
Burma 
----- 
¶7.  (c) Lyrvall reviewed the activities of the international 
community in regard to Burma and noted that the issue of EU 
sanctions is on the agenda of the October 15 GAERC.  He said 
Sweden was awaiting further information on the practical 
impact of sanctions, including those on timber, metals, and 
luxury items.  He said it was important to work out what 
could be done in concrete terms, and that the EU should work 
jointly with the US on actions on Burma. 
 
Sudan/Chad 
---------- 
¶8.  (c) Sweden as part of the UN mission was awaiting the 
green light from the African Union to deploy the joint 
Swedish/Norwegian engineering battalion.  The design of the 
Chad mission was still being discussed; Sweden anticipated 
contributing 200 troops. 
 
EU Presidency 
------------- 
¶9.  (c) DCM said we hoped to work closely with the Swedes in 
the run-up to their EU presidency in the second half of 2009, 
particularly in connection with Sweden's focus on global 
climate change.  Lyrvall expressed Sweden's deep appreciation 
for Ambassador Wood's and the Embassy's working on fostering 
bilateral cooperation on alternative energy.  He said the GoS 
would work with us on how to take forward this dialogue as 
Sweden prepared for its presidency. 
WOOD