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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 146225 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV OVIP SR YI KV
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY BURNS, SEPTEMBER 27, 2007 MEETING 
WITH SERBIAN PRIME MINISTER KOSTUNICA AT THE UNGA 
 
 
Classified By: Under Secretary R. Nicholas Burns 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (U) Classified by: Under Secretary for Political Affairs 
Nicholas Burns, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶2. (U) September 27, 2007; 1:00 PM; New York, NY 
 
¶3. (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
---- 
Under Secretary Burns 
EUR DAS Rosemary DiCarlo 
EUR/SCE David Schroeder (notetaker) 
 
SERBIA 
------ 
Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica 
Ambassador Ivan Vujacic 
Minister for Kosovo Slobodan Samardzic 
Alexander Nikitovic, Chief of Staff 
 
¶4. (C) SUMMARY.  In his meeting with U/S Burns, PM Kostunica 
was unyielding and unchanged on Kosovo status stating that 
Serbia would never agree to Kosovo,s independence. 
Kostunica warned of &unpredictable consequences8 should 
Kosovo make a unilateral declaration of independence.  Burns 
urged Kostunica to take advantage of the opportunity provided 
by the Troika talks and expressed the USG,s determination to 
work through this difficult period to maintain a strong and 
productive relationship with Serbia.  On NATO membership, 
Kostunica said his party was against integration past the 
Partnership for Peace stage, but that the Serbian people 
would decide the issue in the future.  On cooperation with 
The Hague, Kostunica said that Serbia was doing all it could 
to arrest Ratko Mladic and agreed with Burns that arresting 
the PIFWC would bolster Serbia,s standing.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------ 
Kosovo 
------ 
 
¶5. (C) Kostunica met U/S Burns following a meeting with the 
Russians.  He was in a relaxed and pleasant mood, but his 
message on Kosovo was tough and unchanged.  He asserted 
(incorrectly) that there had been only two face to face talks 
with the Kosovo Albanians in two years; it was the lack of 
direct contact made compromise difficult.  He repeated his 
mantra that Serbia's proposal for autonomy would make the 
Albanians the most privileged minority in the world and was 
giving them 90 percent of what they wanted.  He said only the 
borders of a Serbia need to remain untouched.  &Why not test 
our proposal,8 Kostunica asked.  He noted that "I know we'll 
disagree" because Serbia's approach did not favor 
independence for Kosovo. 
 
¶6. (C) At several points, Kostunica complained that the 
Albanians had not approached the Troika talks seriously, 
because the USG had "promised them independence."  He said 
twice that "things would be different" had the USG told the 
Albanians to "be more serious."  He rhetorically questioned 
why the international community would not embrace Serbia's 
proposal which was in conformity with international law while 
the Albanian position violated international law.  He also 
remarked that the consequences stemming from a unilateral 
declaration of independence would extend beyond Kosovo and 
affect "other countries and minorities.8 
 
¶7. (C) Kostunica agreed with U/S Burns that partition of 
Kosovo would not work.  To the extent a positive note was 
sounded, Kostunica said the Kosovars, recent offer of a 
Treaty of Friendship was "quasi progress.8  But after 
expressing doubt about the Kosovar Albanians, capacity to 
keep their promise to support Ahtisaari-type protections for 
Serbs, Kostunica said,"we will see who is right and who is 
wrong." 
 
¶8. (C) U/S Burns urged Kostunica to make the most of the 
Troika talks over the next two months.  He said Serbia should 
consider having frequent high-level meetings with the 
Kosovars because, no matter the outcome of the Troika talks, 
the process would be beneficial in building trust and 
familiarity between the sides -) they are neighbors after 
all.  Burns noted that the USG has repeatedly urged the 
Kosovar Albanians to take the negotiations seriously for the 
same reason.  He added that we have told the Kosovar 
Albanians -- in every meeting -- that they will be judged by 
how safe Serbs in Kosovo feel.  Burns said that the 
supervised independence envisioned by the Ahtisaari plan 
promotes the same objective.  Similarly, the safety of all 
ethnic groups was a priority for KFOR. 
 
¶9. (C) U/S Burns expressed concern about rumors concerning 
 
secession in northern Kosovo.  All sides must avoid 
provocative acts.  Kostunica alleged that the Albanians had 
never kept their word on protecting Serbs and that the 
majority of Serbs in Kosovo lived in fear of Albanians.  He 
stated that Serbs who say they are not afraid have "strong 
material interests" for wanting to stay or had other 
interests with "corrupted UNMIK officials." 
 
------------------------------- 
Bilateral Relationship and NATO 
------------------------------- 
 
 
¶10. (C) U/S Burns stressed the USG commitment to a productive 
long term relationship with Serbia, noting its importance to 
the region and our strong economic ties.  He added that the 
coming months would be difficult but that the USG would try 
hard to preserve the relationship during this difficult 
period. 
 
¶11. (C) Kostunica ignored the overture and said instead that 
the USG should "rethink what is wrong with our proposal for 
Kosovar autonomy.  &If Kosovo became independent, there will 
be consequences, maybe unpredictable ones, for sure," he 
said.  Kostunica commented that Albanians already had a state 
and that a second Albanian state would cause regional 
instability.  He also claimed that that Serbia was much more 
a democratic society than the Kosovar Albanians who, he said, 
were rife with corruption and crime. 
 
¶12. (C) When asked about Sebia's intentions regarding NATO, 
Kostunica said that his party agreed to pursue PfP membership 
but that Serbia should go no further than that because of the 
NATO bombing in 1999 and the role of NATO in Kosovo.  As for 
future NATO membership, he and his party position were 
presently opposed, but that "Serbs in Serbia will decide in a 
proper way." 
 
 
---------------- 
ICTY Cooperation 
---------------- 
 
¶13. (C) U/S Burns stressed the importance of Serbian 
cooperation on warcrimes and of arresting and transferring to 
the ICTY remaining PIFWCs, especially Mladic and Karadzic. 
Referring to the recent upholding of an acquittal decision of 
an Albanian -- Fatmir Limaj -- Kostunica complained that 
there were apparently two scales of justice in the Hague -- 
one for Serbs one for Albanians.  He then said that Serbia's 
policy was to cooperate with ICTY in any event and that his 
government was doing "everything it could" to capture Mladic. 
 He maintained that there is no evidence Karadzic had ever 
been in Serbia.  Kostunica agreed with Burns that nothing 
could do more for Serbia's international standing than a 
Mladic arrest. 
RICE