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O 012147Z OCT 07
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 138413 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2017 
TAGS: OVIP FRIED DAN UNGA PREL PGOV MOPS NATO MARR KPKO NL
AF, ZL 
SUBJECT: (U) EUR A/S FRIED,S SEPTEMBER 25, 2007, MEETING 
WITH  DUTCH POLITICAL DIRECTOR PIETER DE GOOIJER 
 
 
Classified By: 1. (U) Classified by: EUR Assistant Secretary of State 
Daniel Fried, Department of State.  Reason 1.4 (b and d) 
 
¶2.  (U) September 25 2007, 11:45 a.m., New York 
 
¶3.  (U) Participants: 
 
United States 
A/S Dan Fried, EUR 
Elaine Samson, EUR(Notetaker) 
 
Netherlands 
Political Director Pieter de Gooijer 
Dutch UN Mission Political Officer Jules Gerzon 
 
¶4. (C) SUMMARY.  Afghanistan and Kosovo dominated the 
meeting.  The Dutch are committed to remaining in 
Afghanistan, 
but to obtain their coalition government,s approval, there 
must be political, military, and financial solidarity and 
burdensharing among allies.  On Kosovo, the Dutch expressed 
uncertainty that there is sufficient legal basis to continue 
KFOR if Kosovo makes a unilateral declaration of independence 
(UDI).  A/S Fried strongly disagreed and noted that lawyers 
from the Quint were developing a position that UNSCR 1244 
remains in effect even if Kosovo makes a UDI. Fried 
explicitly 
warned that the United States would not replace forces if 
European nations pulled out of KFOR, and the Europeans will 
bear the blame for the baleful consequences of loss of 
international support for Kosovo if Kosovo falls apart. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
----------- 
Afghanistan 
----------- 
 
¶5. (C) The Netherlands is very concerned that no substantial, 
concrete contributions to the International Security 
Assistance 
Force (ISAF) are forthcoming from other NATO member 
countries. 
De Gooijer reaffirmed that the Netherlands made a military 
commitment when it decided to send troops to Afghanistan, and 
to stay when NATO assumed command of ISAF, but it never 
intended 
to be responsible for finding replacements and additional 
resources to help in Afghanistan.  Dutch internal 
decisionmaking 
by all the factions in the coalition government is prepared 
to 
continue Dutch participation and support in Afghanistan, but 
only if there is political, military and financial solidarity 
and burdensharing with other allies.  For the Christian 
Democrats 
to be able to justify their continued support, the Dutch 
participation has to be different from what they are doing 
now. 
Minister of Development Cooperation Bert Koenders is working 
to 
increase the development element of the Dutch mission. 
 
¶6. (C)  Nevertheless, the perception in the Netherlands is 
that 
it is doing more than other allies.  The Dutch have 
identified 
several elements of their mission that other countries could 
take on, such as:  battlegroup; protection of camps; 
Apaches and F-16s; PRTs; 2 OMLTs, and a hospital. 
Other countries need to make significant contributions to 
enable 
the Dutch government to generate enough support within the 
coalition to approve a continued presence.  De Gooijer said 
that 
since February 2007 the Dutch have met with NATO SACEUR, 
the French, the Germans and others, and only the Slovaks have 
said they are considering sending 150-200 engineers. 
De Gooijer noted that he had talked to French FM Kouchner 
last week about providing two or three OMLTs, and Kouchner 
promised to promote it with the Defense Minister.  De Gooijer 
asked A/S Fried to speak to NATO SACEUR and urge him to come 
up 
with more proposals for additional contingents. 
(Fried did so later that day.)  The Dutch are even reaching 
out 
to non-NATO partners, and have approached Singapore to 
provide 
a hospital.  The Netherlands was considering asking the 
Indonesians to provide a hospital, but the Australians 
didn,t 
support that idea.  Italy has not made any specific 
proposals, 
nor has Spain or Turkey. 
 
¶7. (C) A/S Fried suggested approaching Georgia to increase 
their presence in Aghanistan, since they are decreasing their 
contingent in Iraq (and are asking for a Membership Action 
Plan 
(MAP) at the upcoming NATO summit in Bucharest.)  De Gooijer 
was open to talking to the Georgians, but asked what they 
could 
do on the ground in Afghanistan?  He noted that the actual 
capabilities of national contingents was very important, 
since 
they would be supporting each other and needed to be able to 
count on their abilities.  Fried suggested that the Georgians 
might be capable of providing force protection.  De Gooijer 
indicated the Dutch feel forced to consider what other 
alternatives there might be, including using the NATO 
Response 
Force (NRF), but that there was a lot of reluctance to use 
NRF. 
 
------ 
Kosovo 
------ 
 
¶8. (C) De Gooijer commented that the GONL is concerned that 
if Kosovo makes a unilateral declaration of independence 
(UDI), 
there would not be a legal basis for a continued peacekeeping 
operation (PKO), or that if a Kosovo UDI was not recognized 
by a number of countries, there would not be a strong enough 
basis for a ESDP or NATO PKO.  A/S Fried disagreed strongly, 
noting that U.S., UK, French, German and Italian lawyers have 
been consulting, and believe that even if Kosovo declares 
independence, UNSCR 1244 remains in effect.  Fried explicitly 
told the Dutch that Kosovo is a European as well as a U.S. 
problem, and that if European nations pulled out their troops 
after a UDI, the United States would not replace them and 
sustain KFOR.  A European pull-out of KFOR or failure to 
support the ESDP Mission would have real consequences. 
People would die.  After all the talk of European unity and 
ESDP, 
it would be unconscionable for Europe to let this problem 
in its own backyard fall apart. 
 
¶9. (C)  A/S Fried told the Dutch the U.S. has great 
confidence in Ischinger and Frank Wisner, and it may be 
possible to find some face-saving formula Serbia would 
accept. 
Fried advised De Gooijer that if nothing is resolved by 
December 10 when the current negotiating period ends, the 
Netherlands should be prepared to move forward.  The ESDP 
mission should go ahead.  KFOR will remain, and it is 
critical 
that KFOR,s legitimacy not be questioned.  The EU cannot 
allow a few members to prevent the EU from acting positively. 
 
De Gooijer asked that the U.S. share its legal thinking with 
the skeptical EU members.  If the legal reasoning for 
continuing KFOR and UNSCR 1244 was strong enough for other 
countries to accept, even if they did not completely agree 
with it, it would decrease the number of EU members who would 
not want to recognize an independent Kosovo to a manageable 
number. The building of an EU consensus might be able to 
keep them in line. 
RICE