VZCZCXRO4521
OO RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSF #1183/01 2751523
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021523Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4363
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 001183 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KV SR BG
SUBJECT: BULGARIANS NERVOUS OVER KOSOVO UDI 
 
REF: SOFIA 1119 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  Our recent high-level contacts with 
Bulgarian leaders on Kosovo reveal increased nervousness over 
a likely UDI in December, some softening of opposition to 
partition, and a clear reluctance to be in the early group of 
European states that would recognize Kosovo post-UDI. 
Bulgaria has been a strong supporter of Ahtissari and early 
resolution of status, but shares our pessimism over the 
likelihood of any happy ending before December 10.  Given the 
harder lines taken by Athens and Bucharest, we need to keep 
Sofia better plugged in to our evolving strategy and tactics 
to ensure Bulgaria's their resolve -- as a key NATO/EU player 
in the Balkans -- does not drift.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  The Ambassador met PM Stanishev and President 
Parvanov on successive days (Sept. 26 and 27), inter alia to 
discuss U.S. views and preview possible Kosovo developments. 
The Ambassador underscored that we continue to support the 
Troika process, but believe prospects for success are slim. 
We had been prepared to recognize Kosovar independence in 
June, but the President was persuaded to wait after 
discussions with our European partners, including Bulgaria. 
But clearly Russia was not prepared to engage constructively; 
the Kosovars should not be expected to wait forever.  If 
there is no resolution by December 10, we need to be prepared 
for Kosovo to declare independence very soon thereafter.  The 
U.S. would be prepared to recognize Kosovo, and we believed 
that major EU powers -- France, the UK and Germany would 
follow suit.  Partition was not an option, and KFOR would 
need to stay engaged. 
 
PM Stanishev : EU unity is the key 
 
¶3.  (C)  The PM said he was not an optimist that we could 
achieve the best outcome, which would be an internationally 
recognized solution that would allow us to overcome the 
differences within NATO and EU allies.  In this respect, he 
urged the United States to "be as persuasive as possible" 
with the major EU players -- there was no desire within 
Europe to repeat the experience of 2003, with "old and new 
Europe" at odds.  Stanishev agreed there was no will in 
Moscow to look for a workable compromise; the Russians are in 
a win-win situation from the point of view of their own 
short-term interests. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Partition was the worst outcome; "we can partition 
and partition every Balkan country until eternity."  In 
Serbia, there was no willingness to discuss status, and they 
were putting no effort into the debate on standards.  But the 
EU needed to develop a strategy for Serbia -- even though 
everyone recognized they would not become EU members soon -- 
with a focus on things like economic assistance, humanitarian 
contacts, and visa facilitation.  Europe would pay a high 
price for failure to be proactive on Serbia, because there 
are enough radicals and extremists both in Serbia and Kosovo. 
 It was important for Bulgaria to keep communications lines 
open with Belgrade, and thus it "would be difficult to be 
among the first" to recognize Kosovo 
 
President Parvanov:  Could Partition "Lessen the Blow"? 
 
¶5.  (C)  President Parvanov made similar points -- with an 
important divergence on the issue of partition.  He stated 
matter-of-factly that it would have been better to recognize 
Kosovo independence in May/June; whatever the consequences 
then, it would have been less painful than what is now 
shaping up.  He recalled his meeting with Putin at the June 
energy summit in Zagreb (two weeks after President Bush 
visited Sofia) when Putin was quite hard.  Since then, the 
Kostunica-Tadic relationship and internal Serbian politics 
had yielded no genuine movement on the Serbs part.   For 
Bulgaria, independence outside of a UNSCR would be hard to 
support; Bulgaria would not be among the first to recognize 
an independent Kosovo.  Bulgaria remains a strong KFOR 
supporter. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Noting increased European indecisiveness and 
hesitation, and making a brief reference to Ischinger's 
musings on partition, Parvanov said mixed signals make a 
solution harder.  In Serbia, there are some voices for the 
partition of Kosovo; while many do not believe partition may 
be possible or feasible, they can accept it.  Russia, too, 
would accept such a division, Parvanov stated flatly.  What 
motives the Russians have, in addition to those they state 
openly on Kosovo, are open to interpretation.   Perhaps if 
some Serb municipalities in Kosovo can "save face," it could 
lessen the blow in Serbia.  But the overall situation was 
hard.  Parvanov recalled his discussion with Kostunica where 
 
SOFIA 00001183  002 OF 002 
 
 
he had threatened to break off diplomatic relations with any 
country that recognized Kosovo; Parvanov counseled against 
doing something Serbia would regret. 
 
Comment 
 
¶7.  (C)  The Bulgarian position on Kosovo has been steady: 
resolve status sooner, rather than later; support the 
Ahtissari plan; keep lines to Belgrade open and offer 
concrete European incentives.  None of this has changed.  But 
as the Troika process grinds on and the likelihood of a UDI 
in December increases, their opposition to partition looks to 
be softening a bit.  Both the President and FM Kalfin 
(reftel)  have now both discussed partition with us as a 
conceivable (if undesirable) outcome.  Also, it appears that 
without some prodding from us -- ideally backed up with 
encouragement from Berlin, Paris or London -- Sofia will see 
no advantage to joining an early wave of EU countries to 
recognize, post UDI.   With Romania and Greece likely to 
resist recognition for as long as possible, the advantage of 
keeping at least one NATO/EU member in the Balkans close to 
us is evident.  Putin's likely visit to Sofia in January will 
also influence the Bulgarian calculus, unhelpfully.  We 
recommend that Sofia be made a stop on any diplomatic swings 
planned through the region in the coming weeks/months as we 
approach the endgame in the Troika process.  End Comment. 
 
Beyrle