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C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003024 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2017 
TAGS: PROG PREL PGOV KS KN
SUBJECT: MOFAT READOUT OF NORTH-SOUTH SUMMIT: ROH "WENT TO 
BAT" FOR U.S. 
 
 
Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow.  Reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) In an October 5 meeting with the Ambassador, Vice 
Foreign Minister Cho Jung-pyo said that the ROK had reached a 
comprehensive agreement on the future direction of 
inter-Korean relations during the North-South Summit.  Peace, 
inter-Korean economic cooperation, and reconciliation were 
the major takeaways for the ROK.  An agreement on the need 
for a peace regime to replace the Armistice and Kim Jong-il's 
public commitment to pursue denuclearization through the 
Six-Party Talks were also major achievements.  The Northern 
Limit Line (NLL) was not discussed, though a proposal by Roh 
to turn disputed areas in and around the West Sea (Yellow 
Sea) into a joint fishing area was accepted by Kim Jong-il, 
with details to be worked out by Defense Ministers following 
ROK coordination with the United Nations Command/U.S. Forces 
Korea (UNC/USFK).  Cho emphasized that President Roh made 
clear that further inter-Korean economic cooperation would be 
dependent on progress on the nuclear issue in the Six Party 
Talks.  The two, Roh told Kim, would have to be mutually 
reinforcing structures.  The Ambassador welcomed Kim 
Jong-il's commitment to implement the Six-Party Talks 
agreements, but reiterated the U.S. position that a peace 
regime to end the Korean War could only follow complete 
denuclearization.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------- 
Denuclearization 
---------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Cho said that Roh "went to bat" on the nuclear issue 
on behalf of the U.S., stressing that progress in 
inter-Korean economic cooperation efforts would be contingent 
on progress in the Six Party Talks.  In response, Kim Jong-il 
reportedly called in Kim Gye-gwan, Vice Foreign Minister and 
lead DPRK negotiator for the 6PT, to report on the status of 
the 6PT.  VFM Kim cited a lack of U.S. action on the State 
Sponsors of Terrorism list and Trading with the Enemies Act, 
as well as its insistence that the DPRK address the Japan 
abductees issue, as the major roadblocks to the 
implementation of 6PT agreements.  Kim Jong-il said that the 
DPRK had given its best effort in order to reach an agreement 
for the second phase, and that all parties should carry out 
their commitments specified in the October 3 Six Party 
agreement as soon as possible.  Cho pointed out that Roh 
ultimately obtained a commitment by Kim Jong-il to resolve 
the nuclear issue through the Six Party Talks in accordance 
with the September 19, 2005 and February 13, 2007 agreements. 
 
 
¶3. (C) The Ambassador thanked the ROKG for its efforts in 
extracting a public promise from Kim Jong-il to denuclearize, 
noting Kim Jong-il's signature and public statement 
committing to denuclearization.  Cho stated that the ROK had 
tried to include the denuclearization pledges of the 1992 
North-South Basic Agreement and the October 3 6PT agreement 
in the summit's Joint Declaration, but had been unable to 
persuade the DPRK to include this language.  The DPRK, 
however, said the October 3, 2007 agreement was part of the 
February 13, 2007 agreement. 
 
------------ 
Peace Regime 
------------ 
 
¶4. (C) VFM Cho said that Roh raised the need for the two 
Koreas to take the lead on peace regime discussions, but also 
emphasized that peace regime efforts would be contingent on 
progress in the DPRK's denuclearization efforts.  Roh 
conveyed President Bush's remarks that he had "already made 
his decision" on pursuing a potential peace treaty with the 
DPRK, and emphasized that Kim Jong-il should make the most of 
this opportunity.  Kim was receptive to Bush's statement, and 
expressed a desire to hold a U.S.-DPRK summit.  Kim agreed in 
principle to work toward a peace regime, and asked about 
U.S.-ROK discussions on a potential declaration to end the 
Korean War. 
 
¶5. (C) Cho Byung-jae, Director General of North American 
Affairs, said that the "three or four directly related 
parties" language on peace regime was suggested by Roh, but 
did not explain why.  Only the U.S., DPRK, and ROK should 
negotiate the strictly military portions of a peace 
agreement.  The DPRK agreed that the two Koreas should play 
"leading roles" for the peace regime discussions, so there 
was no question that the ROK would be included in both the 
three and four party discussions.  DG Cho stated that Kim and 
Roh agreed in principle on the need for a future summit 
meeting, including the U.S. President, to officially end the 
Korean War.  This would be different from a peace treaty, DG 
Cho said.  DG Cho later called the Embassy to retract his 
statement that the "three or four" language had been 
President Roh's idea.  Cho said that the ROK had wanted the 
"directly related parties" language from the September 19, 
2005 6PT agreement, but the DPRK had held firm on the "three 
or four parties" language.  Another MOFAT DG told Pol M/C 
that the "three or four parties" language was proposed by 
Roh.  COMMENT: Post believes that this indicates that Roh 
was, in fact, the first to raise the "three or four parties" 
language.  DG Cho was probably cautioned after the meeting 
with the Ambassador for revealing this point, which was 
probably why he retracted his statement almost immediately. 
END COMMENT. 
 
¶6. (C) The Ambassador replied that an end-of-war declaration 
and a peace treaty were essentially the same idea, in the 
U.S. view, and that the U.S. would be unlikely to support an 
interim summit meeting to declare an end to the Korean War. 
The Ambassador stated that a final agreement on a peace 
regime, including a peace treaty, would be possible only 
after complete denuclearization by the DPRK, as President 
Bush had stated in Sydney.  The Ambassador expressed his 
appreciation that this was made clear to Kim Jong-il by 
President Roh, but urged the ROK to make this clear publicly 
as well, lest there be any perception of U.S.-ROK differences 
on the subject. 
 
--------------- 
Security Issues 
--------------- 
 
¶7. (C) VFM Cho confirmed that the Northern Limit Line (NLL) 
would remain unchanged from the current status quo. 
President Roh had proposed the "West Sea Peace Area" as a way 
of shifting the dialogue on the issue from a military one to 
an economic one.  After Kim Jong-il sought input from his 
defense-related advisors, he agreed to the principle of 
transforming the disputed West Sea area into a special 
economic zone, Cho said.  The details of the idea, including 
the logistics of NLL crossings by civilian ships, would be 
further fleshed out during the meeting of the Defense 
Ministers in November.  The ROK would actively consult with 
the UNC/USFK before the meeting. 
 
¶8. (C) Cho noted that the two sides agreed to the termination 
of hostilities, the use of dialogue in settling disputes, 
mutual nonaggression, and opposition to war on the peninsula. 
 Further demilitarization of the border areas, including 
 
guard post pullbacks, were not discussed.  The DPRK also made 
no mention of the U.S. Forces Korea or the Ulchi Focus Lens 
exercise. 
 
-------------------- 
Economic Cooperation 
-------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) President Roh conveyed his goal of transforming 
inter-Korean economic cooperation into a long-term and 
reciprocal relationship to Kim Jong-il.  Roh emphasized that 
the DPRK had to work to reduce barriers to the business 
community, and ensure military cooperation on joint economic 
projects.  Progress on the nuclear issue had been taken into 
consideration and was reflected in the expansion of joint 
economic projects with the DPRK.  Roh also stressed that 
DPRK-Japan and DPRK-U.S. relations needed to improve in order 
to allay investor concerns about the economic climate of the 
DPRK. 
 
--------------------------- 
Inter-Korean Reconciliation 
--------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) VFM Cho stated that the ROK had made progress on the 
issue of North-South family reunions, but not on ROK 
abductees or POWs.  The 2000 North-South Joint Declaration 
remained the authoritative statement on unification, so the 
two summit heads simply reaffirmed those points on 
unification.  Roh told Kim that the South Korean public did 
not want a sudden Germany-style unification, but rather a 
gradual unification of the two Koreas. 
 
---------------------- 
Atmosphere of Dialogue 
---------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) VFM Cho believed that the overall atmosphere of the 
summit discussions was very quiet and businesslike.  The 
atmosphere of the Day 1 sessions between Roh and Kim Yong-nam 
was "rigid," as Kim Yong-nam adhered strictly to the party 
line during discussions.  During the morning session of the 
second day, there were noticeable disputes between Roh and 
Kim Jong-il, though by the afternoon most of the issues had 
been smoothed out.  In particular, Kim was displeased by 
characterization of the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) as 
an effort to "open" and "reform" DPRK society.  Cho said that 
Kim Jong-il cancelled the offer to extend the summit by one 
day after most of the issues had been resolved during the 
second day's afternoon session. 
 
-------------- 
Future Summits 
-------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Roh told Kim Jong-il he wanted North-South summits to 
be held once a year.  Kim Jong-il wanted them "as frequently 
as necessary."  Kim Jong-il opposed calling for "regular" 
meetings in the declaration, emphasizing that the 
relationship between the two Koreas was not of the 
state-to-state variety.  When Roh invited Kim Jong-il to 
visit Seoul, Kim Jong-il proposed that Kim Yong-nam, the 
titular head of state, visit instead, and that Kim Jong-il 
might visit after the "relevant conditions" were met. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶13. (C) It was clear that MOFAT was left out of the loop on 
the summit planning, and the debriefing to the Ambassador -- 
a recitation of canned talking points -- showed their lack of 
access to the more substantive meetings.  Other MOFAT 
contacts told Post that Foreign Minister Song had objected to 
the language of "three or four" related parties to a 
potential peace regime, but that phrase ultimately made its 
way into the official Joint Declaration.  Still, the repeated 
emphasis on denuclearization by President Roh, and the 
subsequent commitment in the Joint Declaration by Kim 
Jong-il, are solid achievements for MOFAT.  END COMMENT. 
VERSHBOW