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C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002974 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2017 
TAGS: KN KS PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: SUBJECT:  ISSUES TO WATCH AT THE ROK-DPRK SUMMIT, 
OCT. 2-4 
 
REF: A. REF A - SEOUL 2481 -- PRESIDENT ROH'S NATIONAL 
        DAY SPEECH 
     ¶B. REF B - SEOUL 2906 -- NSA ADVISOR ON SUMMIT 
     ¶C. REF C - SEOUL 2887 -- UNIFICATION MINISTER ON 
        SUMMIT 
     ¶D. REF D - SEOUL 2529 -- FOREIGN/UNIFICATION 
        MINISTERS ON SUMMIT 
     ¶E. REF E - SEOUL 2694 -- HOW THE SUMMIT CAME ABOUT 
     ¶F. REF F - SEOUL 2648 -- NORTHERN LIMIT LINE AS 
        SUMMIT ISSUE 
     ¶G. REF G - SEOUL 2410 -- SUMMIT LIKELY TO BROADEN 
        ECON. COOP. 
     ¶H. REF H - SEOUL 2573 -- LEE MYUNG-BAK AGAINST SUMMIT 
     ¶I. REF I - SEOUL 2940 -- FORMER UNIFICATION MIN. ON 
        SUMMIT 
 
Classified By: AMB Alexander Vershbow.  Reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) President Roh Moo-hyun and his 300-person entourage of 
businesspeople, journalists and support staff will drive from 
Seoul to Pyongyang on the morning of October 2 for the second 
ROK-DPRK summit meeting with Kim Jong-il.  This is the first 
chance for Roh and Kim Jong-il to meet face to face.  The 
run-up to the summit has brought renewed discussion of 
fundamental issues dividing the two Koreas.  The large 
entourage (compared to 24 people accompanying President Kim 
Dae-jung in June 2000) means that new personal connections 
between elites on both sides could result.  The issues are 
substantive:  in the absence of an agreed agenda, the ROKG 
wants to focus on increased economic cooperation, peace and 
military confidence-building measures (CBMs) and humanitarian 
issues.  In an August 15 speech, Roh said the summit was for 
"further solidifying peace and stability on the Korean 
Peninsula while advancing common South-North prosperity" (ref 
A).  An ROKG official with substantial DPRK experience says 
that the DPRK's real intended audience is as much the U.S. as 
the ROK, with Kim Jong-il aiming to open the road to 
normalized relations with Washington by going through Seoul. 
 
¶2. (C) Clearly, there are good reasons to hold a second 
inter-Korean summit, and good reasons to watch its results 
carefully.  But on the eve of the summit, the ROK public 
appears to have very limited expectations of it and some 
anxiety about it, for a number of reasons:  their general 
dislike of President Roh (his mid-September approval rating 
was 19.5 percent); its delayed timing, now just 11 weeks 
before the ROK Presidential election, making it seem largely 
a political gambit; Roh's unnerving statements about 
downplaying denuclearization in favor of declaring peace, and 
offering the DPRK economic benefits without concern for 
reciprocity; and the fact that the first-time excitement from 
2000 is missing.  Stylistically, it does not help that Roh 
has agreed to view the propaganda-filled Arirang Festival, 
and is reported to be planning to give Kim Jong-il a home 
theater system in disregard of the spirit of UNSCR 1718. 
 
¶3. (C) The sense is that this summit will build on the status 
quo -- more economic cooperation -- rather than transform it 
through movement toward full denuclearization and other 
confidence-building measures.  We see likely outcomes as: 
 
Economic Cooperation:  Agreement in principle to build more 
Kaesong-like industrial parks and other infrastructure; 
possible announcement of ROK "chaebols'" intent to invest in 
the DPRK. 
 
Peace and Confidence-Building:  A statement in support of 
peace on the Korean peninsula and plausibly a call for an 
early start to four-party peace talks; possible agreement to 
discuss shared fishing areas near the Northern Limit Line in 
the West Sea; possible discussion of withdrawing guard posts 
in the DMZ. 
 
Humanitarian and other areas:  ROKG agreement to provide 
increased humanitarian assistance to the DPRK; DPRK offer of 
more family reunions; unlikely that there will be progress on 
post Korean War abductees. 
 
Denuclearization:  Support for Six-Party Talks likely to be 
 
mentioned. 
 
Given President Roh's recent rhetoric about not wanting to 
press Kim Jong-il on the nuclear issue, the danger is that 
the summit will send the message that the ROK is ready to 
move toward a peace agreement and greatly expand economic 
cooperation regardless of the DPRK's progress on 
denuclearization or in other areas.  But that danger is 
tempered by the calendar (Roh will have less than five months 
left in office as of October 4) and public skepticism. 
Moreover, as evidenced by a number of discussions with the 
Ambassador, there is a strong consensus among senior ROKG 
officials that Roh will stress the need for denuclearization 
as a prerequisite for increased economic cooperation or peace 
discussions (refs B, C, D and E).  However, how this issue 
plays remains to be seen, especially give uncertainty about 
the strength of Kim Jong-il's commitment to the Six-Party 
Talks.  End Summary. 
 
---------------------- 
SCHEDULE BUT NO AGENDA 
---------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) The agenda for the October 2-4 ROK-DPRK summit is not 
pinned down, because (as in 2000) no one on the DPRK side 
presumes to speak for Kim Jong-il.  Instead, the ROK has been 
informed only of the general timetable of meetings: 
 
Oct. 2:  President Roh and First Lady Kwon Yang-sook (in the 
Presidential sedan) and entourage (in buses) will drive from 
Seoul to Pyongyang via the western corridor through Kaesong 
(three hours).  Roh will walk 30-40 meters across the 
Military Demarcation Line with much media hoopla.  Pyongyang 
residents are expected to line the streets to greet Roh.  Roh 
will meet DPRK President of the Supreme People's Assembly 
(titular head of state) Kim Yong-nam, who will then host a 
state dinner (which Kim Jong-il may or may not attend.)  Roh 
and Kim will then watch the Arirang Festival. 
 
Oct. 3:  Roh is expected to meet with Kim Jong-il during most 
of the day.  Roh will then attend the Arirang Festival, 
likely with Kim Jong-il, and then Roh will host a dinner, 
which Kim Jong-il is expected to attend.  A joint statement 
may be worked out that night (in parallel with the June 2000 
summit). 
 
Oct. 4:  Roh will visit major industrial and cultural 
facilities, including the West Sea floodgate near Nampo; Kim 
may join.  Roh and Kim will have a farewell luncheon.  Roh 
reportedly plans to visit the Kaesong Industrial Complex 
(KIC) on his way home. 
 
¶5. (C) ROK Agenda:  We expect that there will be plenty of 
time for the two leaders to discuss various issues, mostly in 
one-on-one meetings.  If the 2000 summit is a guide, these 
closed sessions will have no set agenda, allowing each 
principal to bring up issues of concern.  In 2000, Kim 
Jong-il showed a range of emotions, from anger to sympathy, 
about everything the South Koreans (and Americans) were 
doing.  Our Blue House interlocutors have reminded us that 
Roh is quite different than Kim Dae-jung, and that he would 
not back down as easily.  Roh is also more detail oriented 
and there will be an agenda, at least in Roh's mind. 
National Security Adviser Baek Jong-chun told the Ambassador 
on September 19 that the ROKG was aiming for discussions and 
a joint statement that would be one-third economic 
cooperation, one-third peace regime and military 
confidence-building measures (CBMs), and one-third 
humanitarian, family reunion and unification issues (ref B). 
 
 
-------------------- 
ECONOMIC COOPERATION 
-------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) On the economic side, likely summit outcomes are ROK 
offers to improve the port of Nampo (which Roh and perhaps 
Kim will visit), possibly build an industrial park there, 
expand the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), and build 
highways, under the ROKG's heading of "social overhead 
capital" (shorthand for improving the North's infrastructure, 
either as a down-payment on eventual reunification, or as the 
route to mutual prosperity in the interim).  Other locations 
have been mentioned as possible sites for industrial parks: 
 
Haeju (near Kaesong), Sinuiju (near Dandong on the Chinese 
border), Wonsan and Najin (on the east coast), but it is 
likely that the leaders will agree to start in one area for 
now, and a Blue House spokesman recently cautioned 
journalists to use common sense in assessing possible 
cooperation projects.  President Roh, often the most 
forthcoming ROKG briefer on the summit, said on September 21 
that the two sides would agree to develop an industrial 
complex and a port in the North, and implied road 
construction as well by saying that he would "create jobs" 
for the Korea Expressway Corporation. 
 
¶7. (C) The idea -- which Roh and Kim can apparently agree on 
-- is for the summit to set such projects in motion, making 
it politically difficult for a new administration to stop 
them. (Leading candidate Lee Myung-bak's foreign policy 
advisor grumbled to us that Roh was trying to undercut Lee's 
chance, assuming he wins the election, to take a fresh look 
at South-North engagement, ref H.)  It is not clear whether 
these projects will be pitched as contingent on 
denuclearization.  The Blue House is asking the National 
Assembly to increased funding for cross-border projects from 
USD 540 million this year to USD 810 million in 2008.  Former 
President Kim Dae-jung also said that the summit would bring 
agreement to sell goods made in the KIC in North Korea. 
 
¶8. (C) Significantly, ROK "chaebols," 18 of whose CEOs are 
included in the delegation, could also agree in principle to 
invest in North Korea.  For example, press reports suggest 
that Posco steel company may propose a steel mill in the 
North, and Daewoo may consider a ship-building facility. 
Many other ideas have surfaced, such as an agreement to mine 
construction-grade sand from the Imjin River near the DMZ 
(ref G).  The ROK private sector appears to be jumping on the 
bandwagon:  the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
announced that 50 Korean companies plan to establish a 
South-North Korean Economic Cooperation Forum in October to 
coordinate with the North on private business projects.  For 
Roh, private investment agreements would be ideal because 
they meet the mutually beneficial criterion (or else 
companies would not agree to invest) and, assuming they are 
not subsidized, won't take taxpayers' money, which is 
difficult for Roh to promise so late in his term. 
 
¶9. (C) Details of both public and private projects would have 
to be worked out at subsequent meetings.  MOU officials tell 
us  that the ROKG wants to begin such meetings right away, 
starting with economic ministerial meetings in October. 
 
¶10. (C) But bold private investment plans as mooted in the 
press may be getting ahead of reality.  As a cautionary note, 
Hyundai Asan Vice President Jang Whan-bin recalled to us that 
many ROK companies attempted investments in the North after 
the June 2000 summit euphoria, but most never bore fruit or 
went bankrupt because of DPRK caprice (such as arbitrary 
border closings), unreliable supply chains, and North 
Koreans' lack of purchasing power.  There is still no 
evidence that the North is prepared for fundamental economic 
and regulatory restructuring.  One test, assuming projects 
are agreed in principle at the summit, will be whether the 
DPRK allows on-site feasibility studies. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
PEACE REGIME, CBMs AND DENUCLEARIZATION 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) In September 11 comments, President Roh irked many 
South Koreans, not to mention many people outside Korea, not 
only by saying a peace agreement as his main priority for the 
summit, but by simultaneously downplaying denuclearization as 
"a hill we already climbed," and an area where he did not 
want to "pick a fight."  The latter possibility -- that Roh 
may miss the chance to emphasize the centrality of 
denuclearization and seek Kim Jong-il's commitment to it -- 
is more of a concern than the former -- where Roh seems eager 
to declare the end, peace, without fully considering the 
means, step-by-step progress on CBMs, including 
denuclearization. 
 
-- Denuclearization 
 
¶12. (C) National Security Advisor Baek, several Ministers, 
Blue House officials and others have assured the Ambassador 
 
and other Emboffs that Roh will stress the need for 
denuclearization as a prerequisite for increased economic 
cooperation or peace discussions (refs B, C, D and E).  For 
example, MOU Minister Lee Jae-joung told the Ambassador on 
September 18 that President Roh would stress that the 
Six-Party Talks need to succeed; that the summit was intended 
to "help them succeed" (ref C).  Having seen the negative 
editorial reaction to his September 11 comments on 
downplaying the need for denuclearization ("incoherent babble 
from a person responsible for the security of the country," 
according to the dean of conservative columnists Kim 
Dae-joong called the remarks) and likely to have ministers 
stress the importance of checking the  denuclearization box 
in pre-summit countdown sessions, we assess that Roh will 
raise the subject.  However, he may take an indirect 
approach, as he did in his August 15 speech, saying that the 
Six-Party Talks were taking care of denuclearization, so 
denuclearization could be seen as on track (ref A).  The 
Ambassador again underlined USG concerns about this issue in 
an October 1 meeting with Deputy NSA Yun byung-se, who is 
part of President Roh's delegation. 
 
-- Peace Regime 
 
¶13. (C) On the peace regime issue, despite President Roh's 
exaggerated rhetoric, we assess that a likely outcome of the 
summit is an aspirational statement along the lines of the 
2000 joint statement's call for the "achievement of 
reunification."  In this case, the call would be for 
"achievement of peace."  Roh and Kim could also call for an 
early meeting of the four relevant parties (the two Koreas, 
the U.S and China) to discuss peace, since the ROKG has 
stressed its interest in such talks beginning by the end of 
2007, but the ROK public seems to understand that 
denuclearization and confidence-building must come first. 
 
¶14. (SBU) President Roh's emphasis on peace is consistent 
with the original announcement of the summit. The August 8 
joint ROK-DPRK announcement called for "...a new phase in the 
quest for peace on the Korean Peninsula, common prosperity of 
the Korean nation and unification of the homeland." 
 
¶15. (C) ROKG officials appear to be in synch with the 
"shared...recognition that denuclearization of the North is 
necessary for launching negotiations for establishing a peace 
regime on the Korean Peninsula" from President Bush's 
September 7 meeting with President Roh.  For example, MOU 
Minister Lee Jae-joung told the Ambassador on September 18 
that in his peace regime discussions, Roh would not go beyond 
the "U.S.-ROK consensus" as established at their meeting in 
Sydney (ref C). 
 
¶16. (C) Even so, President Roh's September 11 comments -- 
that a peace declaration or the beginning of negotiations 
should constitute the core agenda items at the summit -- 
suggest that he wants to lean much farther forward on 
establishing peace.  Politically that tracks with the 
conventional wisdom that Roh sees the summit as a high-stakes 
gamble, wanting voters to stop focusing on the economy and 
instead focus on prospects for peace, to renew enthusiasm for 
the beleaguered liberal camp.  Roh also consistently seems to 
want to accentuate the positive in approaching the North, 
stressing the importance of trusting the North.  He would 
rather agree on peace than disagree on the difficult details 
of CBMs. 
 
¶17. (C) But ROK reaction to Roh's peace trial balloon has 
been harsh.  Foreign Minister Song Min-soon appeared to 
deliberately walk back Roh's comments on September 13, saying 
that, "Peace does not come all at once.  A sudden declaration 
of the end of the Korean War would only bring chaos to the 
current condition that is devoid of peace."  Roh's first 
Minister of Unification Jung Se-hyun, who will be among Roh's 
delegation, told us to disregard any talk of a peace 
declaration because it would only be empty words (ref I). 
Editorials urged Roh to go back to his August 15 speech, in 
which he said that the summit would focus on implementing 
existing agreements, including the 1992 Basic Agreement, 
which is full of CBMs.  For example, a September 14 editorial 
in the conservative JoongAng Daily said, "Bypassing the North 
Korean nuclear issue, which still has a long way to go, and 
discussing a peace treaty and the formal end of the Korean 
War are unrealistic and have no meaning.  They could give the 
 
wrong impression that Seoul accepts the North's nuclear 
capabilities." 
 
-- CBMs 
 
¶18. (C) Some ROKG officials suggest Roh's peace rhetoric will 
be complemented by an emphasis on CBMs.  Secretary to the 
President for National Security Park Sun-won said that Roh 
will pursue concrete CBMs, starting with a mutual withdrawal 
of guard posts from the DMZ (ref E).  Press reports suggest 
that President Roh may present the withdrawal of guard posts 
as a means of truly demilitarizing the DMZ and turning the 
DMZ into a "peace zone."  It is clear that such steps would 
require consultations with UNC, which, contrary to press 
reports, has not yet occurred. 
 
¶19. (C) Extended discussion of CBMs at the summit is 
unlikely.  ROK Defense Minister Kim Jang-soo will join Roh's 
delegation, against the better judgment of many retired 
generals, and his inclusion suggests that the ROKG will again 
seek North-South Defense Minister talks soon after the 
summit, if the North agrees, to discuss the details of 
possible CBMs. 
 
-- NLL 
 
¶20. (C) Apart from the above guard-post proposal, the summit 
is not expected to include broad discussion of CBMs -- which 
are seen as key for real progress toward peace.  But there 
has been much discussion of what has long been a DPRK sore 
point:  the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea (ref 
F).  The issue is important because disagreement over the 
NLL, which the North insists is illegitimate and needs to be 
renegotiated to give its ships direct access to the port of 
Haeju, has prevented repeated rounds of military-to-military 
talks from making progress, and, in 1999 and 2002, led to 
military clashes.  In connection with the last round of 
working-level mil-mil talks in Panmunjom in mid-July, the 
DPRK's official media service KCNA again said that that 
South's insistence on maintaining the NLL was the "root cause 
of confrontation." 
 
¶21. (C) The ROK has consistently: (1) offered to enter into 
negotiations on implementing the 1992 Basic Agreement as a 
whole, which calls for military CBMs to be implemented prior 
to discussion of the NLL; and (2) failing that, offered to 
establish joint fishing areas around the NLL, which it argues 
is mutually beneficial because these would prevent 
third-country (Chinese) vessels from entering the rich 
fishing grounds, as they do now.  The DPRK has steadfastly 
refused both, arguing (since the 1990s) that the NLL is 
illegitimate. 
 
¶22. (C) The DPRK has grounds to assert that the NLL 
negotiations should continue, but conveniently ignores that 
it accepted the NLL in the 1992 Basic Agreement. Chapter 2, 
Article 11 says that areas for non-aggression should 
correspond with "areas that have been under the jurisdiction 
of each side until the present time," and the NLL was in 
effect when that agreement was signed.  One of the annexes to 
the Basic Agreement, the "Protocol on The Implementation and 
Observance of Chapter 2..." says that: "Discussions regarding 
the South-North sea demarcation line of nonaggression shall 
continue."  But it also states that, "Until the sea 
demarcation line has been finalized, the nonaggression areas 
of the sea shall be those that have been under the 
jurisdiction of each side until the present time." (Art. 10). 
 
¶23. (C) Shortly after the summit was announced, MOU Minister 
Lee raised eyebrows, and started a round of press 
speculation, when he implied ROKG flexibility about the NLL, 
telling a National Assembly hearing that the NLL was 
established for "security reasons not for territorial 
reasons."  An interagency squabble followed, with the 
Minister of Defense Kim Jang-soo and others asserting that 
the NLL was in fact territorial and was not up for 
discussion.  MOU Minister Lee told the Ambassador on 
September 18 that the issue had been overly politicized in 
the press, that the ROKG did not plan to raise the issue, but 
that if the DPRK raised it the ROKG would again offer to 
establish joint fishing grounds (ref C). 
 
----------------------------- 
 
HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER ISSUES 
----------------------------- 
 
¶24. (C) The ROKG will likely offer humanitarian assistance 
that press reports have said could exceed USD 1 billion. 
Heavy rains (cited as the reason for delaying the summit from 
August 28-30 to October 2-4) have called attention to the 
DPRK's poor agricultural and economic conditions, but lack of 
access means that no foreigner has a clear sense of overall 
humanitarian conditions there.  In any case, in connection 
with its increased budget request for inter-Korean projects, 
the ROKG is also asking the National Assembly for a 14 
percent increase in its humanitarian aid budget for the North 
for 2008, which would bring the total to about USD 60 million 
per year.  This does not include the usual 400,000 tons of 
rice aid each year, which is technically a loan.  MOU 
officials were irritated earlier this year when President Roh 
decided to suspend rice assistance until the DPRK made 
progress on denuclearization, so one goal at the summit may 
be to increase "no strings" aid to the North. 
 
-- Family Reunions 
 
¶25. (C) President Roh does not appear to be going to 
Pyongyang to ask the DPRK for many concessions, but one thing 
he is likely to ask for, and perhaps receive, is increased 
family reunions.  The Koreas have held 15 rounds of family 
reunions since August 2000 (an outcome of the June 2000 
summit) involving over 13,000 people.  But the waiting list 
is long: over 90,000 in the ROK, many elderly.  The problem 
has been the DPRK's willingness to allow these events to take 
place.  The two sides agreed at ministerial meetings in March 
to resume construction of a reunion center in Mt. Kumgang, 
and there are video reunion facilities in Seoul and 
Pyongyang, so physical capacity is not the problem. 
 
-- Abductees 
 
¶26. (C) There are an estimated 480 post Korean War abductees, 
mostly fishermen, in the DPRK, a far larger number than the 
15 Japanese abductees that have become a major Japan-DPRK 
issue.  But the DPRK has never officially acknowledged 
holding abductees (though ROK contacts tell us that DPRK 
officials do acknowledge it privately) and there is little 
evidence that President Roh will push on this issue. 
 
--------------------------- 
SKEPTICAL, CONCERNED PUBLIC 
--------------------------- 
 
¶27. (SBU)  President Roh seeks to use the summit to ramp up 
engagement with the North during his remaining time in 
office, but polls suggest he is out of step with the ROK 
majority.  In a recent INR Office of Research poll in the 
ROK, 53 percent of that 1,500 adults interviewed thought that 
the summit was "merely a tactic to influence the December 
presidential election," while 62 percent thought it would 
"divert attention" rather than "provide momentum" (25 
percent) on the DPRK nuclear issue.  In the same poll, 35 
percent of respondents thought that economic cooperation 
should be linked "closely to North Korean actions and its 
posture toward the South" (i.e., reciprocity) compared to the 
29 percent who favored (unconditional) reconciliation and 
increased economic cooperation; a hefty 30 percent preferred 
to "withhold all economic cooperation until the North has 
stopped developing nuclear weapons." 
 
¶28. (SBU) Other opinion polls point to discomfort with Roh's 
"why worry?" approach to the nuclear issue, and lack of 
interest in the summit.  In a September 20 Munwha Ilbo poll, 
38 percent thought that the DPRK nuclear problem should be 
the main issue for the summit, followed by a peace 
declaration (26 percent) and inter-Korean economic 
cooperation (17 percent).  Legislators returning from the 
"Chusok" holiday reported that constituents' eyes glazed over 
when the summit was mentioned.  The Blue House was reported 
to be concerned about low public interest in the summit, and 
considering adding more photo-op activities to draw an 
audience.  That concern may account for the decision to have 
Roh to walk across the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) on 
October 2. 
 
-------------------------- 
 
COMMENT: LIMITED PROSPECTS 
-------------------------- 
 
¶29. (C) The ROK's public's skepticism is justified, we think, 
because there is a mismatch between this second summit's 
potential significance -- putting all of the inter-Korean 
issues and irritants on the table for the leaders to discuss 
-- and the limited time and political credibility that 
President Roh has available.  For example, President Roh 
appears eager to talk about peace, but has not talked about 
the series of detailed CBMs that would make a peace 
declaration meaningful (although his August 15 speech 
suggested the summit could focus on CBMs, ref A).  Nor does 
he appear prepared to look Kim Jong-il in the eye and tell 
him that the North's nuclear weapons programs must go.  In a 
sense, this approach is not a surprise because Roh and other 
progressives believe that any engagement with the North is 
good engagement, and that insisting on reciprocity would hold 
back progress. 
 
¶30. (C) On the DPRK side, it's plausible that Kim Jong-il is 
seeking to maximize the economic gains from the South while 
minimizing any concessions or changes in behavior.  Roh's 
track record tells Kim that this approach will work with 
President Roh.  There is also a high-handed aspect to the 
North's pre-summit behavior:  leading up to the summit, ROKG 
officials were reportedly not even sure which meetings Kim 
Jong-il would deign to attend. 
 
¶31. (C) While we cannot expect breakthroughs from this summit 
-- because it's late in the day for President Roh, and 
because there's no hint that Kim Jong-il is prepared for 
practical CBM discussions -- the summit could still have 
significant outcomes that are relevant for the USG. 
-- First, the summit could, despite President Roh's 
half-hearted approach, result in Kim Jong-il making a 
statement in favor of denuclearization that would indeed 
support the Six-Party Talks process; or language to that 
effect could be included in a joint statement.  We have made 
best efforts to put this issue at the top of the ROKG's 
agenda. 
 
-- Second, as the Roh administration has emphasized, the 
meeting could help regularize such meetings.  The next ROK 
President is likely to want to meet with Kim Jong-il early on 
(Note: Candidate Lee Myung-Bak has said he would seek such a 
summit if elected. End Note), and we can expect that the DPRK 
will agree since it appears serious about seeking more 
economic cooperation with the South. 
 
-- Third, if DMZ guard posts and the NLL are discussed, the 
summit could lead to renewed efforts to work out mutually 
agreeable CBMs, such as those listed in the 1992 Basic 
Agreement.  This will require consultation with UNC and USFK, 
and it could be to the USG's benefit to encourage a 
step-by-step CBM process. 
 
-- Fourth, the summit could encourage Kim Jong-il to 
undertake some of the reforms needed to allow ROK "chaebol" 
conglomerates to consider investing in the North. 
 
-- Finally, the summit can be seen as a DPRK effort to reach 
out to the U.S.  The Director of the Peace Regime Building 
Team at MOU, Kim Ki-woong, who has visited North Korea 20 
times and met with North Korean officials over 150 times, 
told us that his DPRK interlocutors stress their overriding 
goal of improving relations with the U.S.  According to Kim, 
Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill's June visit to 
Pyongyang was a signal that DPRK leaders had been waiting 
for.  So the DPRK leadership then approved a summit with the 
Seoul as a step on the road to normalized relations with 
Washington. 
VERSHBOW