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Viewing cable 07SARAJEVO2294, BOSNIA - GOVERNMENT LAUNCHES NATIONAL JUSTICE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07SARAJEVO2294 2007-10-26 17:53 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Sarajevo
VZCZCXYZ0014
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHVJ #2294/01 2991753
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 261753Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7278
INFO RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SARAJEVO 002294 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
EUR/SCE (STINCHCOMB), EUR/ACE (TEFFT, DUNN), S/WCI 
(WILLIAMSON, LAVINE), INL FOR KIMMEL; DOJ PASS TO OPDAT 
KARL ALEXANDRE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KJUS BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - GOVERNMENT LAUNCHES NATIONAL JUSTICE 
SECTOR REFORM STRATEGY 
 
REF: A. SARAJEVO 1625 B. SARAJEVO 2073 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- PLEASE TREAT ACCORDINGLY. 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) Early in his tenure, High Representative Miroslav 
Lajcak indicated that he would focus greater OHR attention on 
the justice sector.  His preoccuption with police reform and 
now the current poltiical crisis with Republika Srpska (RS) 
meant that he has not devoted as much time to the issue as he 
had planned.  Nonetheless, Lajcak has urged government 
officials to adopt and implement a national strategy to 
address the sector's shortcomings, which the BiH Ministry of 
Justice published on October 1 and expects to finalize in the 
next two months.  Lajcak will also present to the October 
30-31 Peace Implementation Council a rule of law paper that 
addresses justice sector issues.  Justice sector reform 
remains important to Bosnia's development as a stable, 
functional state.  However, given the current political 
climate, much-needed justice sector reform is likely to be 
postponed, if not derailed altogether. END SUMMARY. 
 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
2. (U) Between 2000 and 2005, Bosnia,s justice sector 
underwent major reforms intended to establish key 
institutions and modern legal practices.  High Representative 
Paddy Ashdown imposed legislation that created the State 
Court in 2000 (though the Court did not become operational 
until 2002), and created the Independent Judicial Council 
(IJC) to coordinate international community efforts in the 
justice sector.  With IJC,s assistance, in 2003 the Bosnian 
government established the State Prosecutor,s Office and 
instituted national Criminal and Civil Procedure Codes, which 
replaced the inquisitorial with an adversarial system.  In 
2004, the IJC created the High Judicial and Prosecutorial 
Council (HJPC), responsible for appointing, evaluating, and 
disciplining judges and prosecutors.  It also established 
mechanisms to vet judges and prosecutors; regulated the legal 
profession; established special chambers for war and 
organized crimes in the criminal division of the courts and 
in prosecutors, offices; revamped internal court 
administration; and reappointed the entire BiH judiciary. 
 
3. (U) While far-reaching, these reforms left intact a 
fragmented justice sector with four overlapping but distinct 
jurisdictions (State, Republika Srpska, Federation and Brcko 
District).  Today the judicial system lacks a hierarchical 
structure, harmonization of legal codes and practices, and a 
state Supreme Court empowered to render final opinions on 
legal disputes.  There are two entity supreme courts 
(Federation, RS), along with an appellate court for Brcko 
district, and 14 seperate ministries of justice (BiH, the 
Federation,s ten cantons, and the RS).  The country also has 
three separate bar exams, three professional judges and 
prosecutors, associations, two defense bars, and two 
judicial and prosecutorial centers.  The State Court and 
Prosecutor,s Office have authority only over competencies 
specifically granted to them, such as war crimes, 
inter-entity financial crimes (organized crime, and 
corruption), and terrorism and other crimes against the 
State.  As a result, the State Court can not review the 
decisions of other courts nor can the State Prosecutor,s 
Office exert authority over other prosecutors, offices in 
areas outside of their competencies. 
 
NATIONAL JUSTICE SECTOR STRATEGY KICKS OFF 
------------------------------------------ 
 
4. (U) While the government and the international community 
remained focused on police and constitutional reform, justice 
sector officials, pressured by the international donor 
community, have been preparing an ambitious strategy to 
address systemic shortcomings in the justice system.  The 
idea for the initiative stemmed from a March 2006 donor 
conference in Brussels, where the international community 
pledged support for a comprehensive strategy led by the 
Ministry of Justice.  In September of that year, Justice 
Minister Barisa Colak signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
with the British Ambassador to devise and implement the 
project.  With technical and financial assistance from the 
British government, the Ministry established a steering group 
comprised of the country,s top justice officials to provide 
 
 
political support and guidance to the process.  It also 
created a Sector for Strategic Planning, Aid Coordination, 
and European Integration (SSPACEI) to coordinate activities. 
SSPACEI, in turn, formed working groups made up of 
representatives from all levels of government to devise the 
strategy. 
 
5. (SBU) From December 2006 to September 2007, the working 
groups drafted a strategy based on five pillars: judicial 
reform, execution of criminal sanctions, access to justice, 
support to economic growth, and development of a well-managed 
and coordinated sector.  Despite initial obstruction from RS 
representatives opposed to efforts to strengthen the State at 
the expense of the entities, the working groups stayed on 
schedule, and on October 1, published a draft 2008-2012 
strategic work plan with 63 recommendations.  Working group 
representatives agreed on all but four recommendations 
regarding constitutional issues that give the state authority 
over competencies now held by the entities.  The Ministry is 
consulting with stakeholders during the next two months, and 
hopes that the State, two entities, and Brcko district will 
adopt the strategy by year,s end. 
 
THE FIVE PILLARS 
---------------- 
 
6. (U) Under the first pillar, Judicial System, the working 
groups tackled the three most crucial issues facing the 
sector: creating a Supreme Court, harmonizing codes and 
practices, and bolstering the judiciary,s independence. 
They recognized the need to harmonize the country,s 
disparate codes and practices, but disagreed on whether to 
form a single body of legal codes and practices.  Because 
they also disagreed on the best structural mechanism to 
create to ensure harmonization, they offered policymakers the 
option of creating a Supreme Court or forming a permanent 
panel of court presidents.  This panel would exchange views 
on court rulings and publish joint but non-binding positions 
to guide the courts.  The working groups also proposed 
shoring up judicial independence by granting the HJPC the 
right to appoint the Constitutional Court,s six national 
judges (who are currently appointed by entity parliaments) 
and consolidating the country,s fourteen justice sector 
budgets (State, the Federation,s ten cantons, and the RS). 
Consolidating the budget would make financing less 
susceptible to political pressure and allow a more efficient 
use of resources.  The working groups recommended creating a 
single budget or separate budgets for the four jurisdictions. 
 
 
7. (U) In addition, the working groups considered measures 
aimed at increasing the courts, efficiency and 
accountability and professionalism of judges, prosecutors, 
and other staff.  They suggested administrative measures that 
would reduce the current case backlog (as of December 31, 
2006) of 1.9 million cases, 1.2 million of which involves 
small value claims, mostly non-payment of utility bills. 
They endorsed strengthening bar exams and expanding new 
performance standards that would give more weight to the 
complexity of cases taken on by judges and prosecutors, 
rather than the number of cases completed.  The working 
groups also called for greater transparency in disciplinary 
procedures and more specialized training for judges and 
prosecutors. 
 
8. (U) Regarding the second pillar, execution of criminal 
sanctions, the working groups considered steps to better 
manage the country,s fourteen prisons and to address 
inequalities in relation to laws, levels of staffing and 
funding, conditions, and treatment.  Currently, prison 
wardens manage their individual prisons with limited 
resources as best they can and are not accountable to 
ministries of justice, which in turn lack needed input to 
make informed decisions about prison operations.  As a 
result, the country,s prisons are dilapidated and 
overcrowded, with most nearing full capacity, given the 
limited use of alternative non-custodial sanctions and the 
ineffective use of conditional release.  Some are also below 
international standards, regarding accommodation, health 
care, and special treatment for female prisoners, juveniles, 
mentally incapacitated, and other special needs prisoners 
(See Ref A).  To address these problems, the working groups 
recommended passing new legislation to harmonize criminal 
sanctions, developing a conditional release system and use of 
alternative sentences, improving the physical conditions of 
prisons, advancing the health care system, and providing 
 
 
training for prison staff, among other measures.  However, 
they disagreed on how to administer the system -- whether to 
establish a single prison administration system or one for 
each of the four jurisdictions. 
 
9. (U) The remaining pillars focused on the following: the 
need for free legal aid and public access to information, the 
detrimental effect that lengthy court proceedings has on 
commerce and trade, and the need to establish a 
well-coordinated sector.  To address these problems, the 
working groups recommended creating a free legal aid system 
nation-wide, increasing access to information from the courts 
and prosecutors, offices, continuing land registry reform, 
and expanding the use of mediation.  For example, they 
pointed out that donor-funded pilot initiatives to test 
commercial mediation in the Basic Court of Banja Luka and the 
Municipal Court of Sarajevo resolved 340 commercial disputes, 
freeing up assets worth KM 18 million (approximately 13.748 
million USD).  The woking groups also suggested strengthening 
the BiH Ministry of Justice's coordinating role, establishing 
strategic planning and development capacities in the justice 
ministries, and creating mechanisms to coordinate with donors 
and to support harmonization with EU directives and 
practices. 
 
HIGH REP LACJAK LENDS SUPPORT 
----------------------------- 
 
10. (SBU) Unlike his predecessor, HR Lajcak has taken an 
active interest in the justice sector and has had dialogue 
with politicians, justice sector officials, and donors on the 
need for reform.  During a September 6 speech to a joint 
session of Parliament, he expressed support for the justice 
sector strategy, declaring that it needs to be finalized and 
adopted as soon as possible.  He bluntly told politicians 
that their support for the strategy should not include 
"political interference in the structure and the operation of 
the judiciary, motivated solely by selfish and short-term 
private objectives."  On September 28, HR Lajcak held a 
Steering Board meeting with justice sector officials to 
discuss efforts to tackle the officials, stated priorities, 
reiterating the need to adopt the strategy quickly.  He will 
also present to the October 30-31 Peace Implementation 
Council a rule of law paper that addresses justice sector 
issues.  Lajcak's plans to engage more proactively in the 
justice sector, however, have been postponed by police reform 
and the current political crisis with the RS. 
 
BUT MUCH MORE WORK LIES AHEAD 
----------------------------- 
 
11. (SBU) Embassy contacts remain guarded about the draft 
strategy,s roll out.  They praise the progress made by the 
working groups, surprised that the working groups managed to 
reach consensus on 59 of 63 recommendations put forth. 
Still, contacts maintain that the working groups, efforts 
were largely the result of prodding by the UK, noting that 
national representatives were often absent at meetings.  They 
also question the BiH government,s ability to carry out the 
project absent significant international involvement.  They 
pointed out that SSPACEI is under-staffed and ill-equipped to 
coordinate the project properly, that the Assistant Justice 
Minister in charge of the project is frequently on trips 
abroad, and that the persistent squabbling and gamemanship 
among top justice sector officials would divert attention 
away from the process or impede it altogether.  They fear 
that, unless the international community lobbies for the four 
governments to adopt and implement the justice sector 
strategy, the strategy may become little more than a 
well-intentioned paper exercise. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
12. (SBU) We welcome the long overdue initiative by the BiH 
Ministry of Justice to reform the justice sector, though it 
is unfortunate that it, along with many other reforms, are 
likely to remain hostage to the deteriorating political 
climate here.  If the strategy were adopted and implemented, 
it would advance our goal of ensuring that Bosnia is a stable 
and functional state.  However, it is worth noting that RS 
representatives obstructed the working groups' efforts for 
months before eventually signing on to the draft strategy. 
Given the current political crisis, RS judicial officials 
could withdraw their support for it altogether.  If this were 
to occur, efforts to reform the justice strategy would suffer 
 
 
a significant setback, as it would likely take a long time to 
rebuild the trust that developed within the working groups 
and to get the initiative back on track. 
ENGLISH