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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 004271 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2017 
TAGS: PREL KPKO MARR SU CT CD FR
SUBJECT: SUDAN/CHAD/C.A.R.:  FRENCH PUSHING HARD ON ALL 
FRONTS 
 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d 
). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  Romain Serman, an AF advisor at the French 
presidency, told us on October 16 that President Sarkozy 
remains personally engaged on Darfur-related issues and is 
pushing for rapid progress on UNAMID and, especially, 
MINURCAT.  Force generation and financial issues regarding 
MINURCAT are slowly being resolved, and the French hope for 
deployment to begin in November with the full military 
complement in place by mid-January 2008.  The French are 
concerned, however, that too many of the combat troops will 
be French.  Sarkozy is reported not happy with South Africa 
President Mbeki's change of heart on September 24, which did 
not allow the MINURCAT UNSC resolution to be adopted by 
heads-of-state at the September 25 Security Council meeting. 
Mbeki, UK PM Gordon Brown, and Sarkozy are to meet this 
weekend, when Mbeki and Brown will be in Paris to attend the 
championship match of the Rugby World Cup.  Serman reported 
that the French are becoming completely fed up with Darfur 
rebel leader Abdulwahid el-Nur's refusal to participate in 
the October 27 peace talks in Sirte, Libya, and are looking 
for ways to "punish" him, including cancellation of his 
present French visa, which is valid until December 28.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
MINURCAT/UNAMID 
 
¶2.  (C)  In a wide-ranging meeting on October 16 (other 
elements of which we will report separately), French 
Presidency AF advisor Romain Serman provided an update on 
Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic (C.A.R.).  He 
first noted that President Sarkozy remained highly engaged in 
the region's issues, always prompting his staff "to keep 
moving and to move faster,' with a good but not overbearing 
attention to details -- "what's happening with the 
helicopters we talked about yesterday?"  Serman said that 
France succeeded in accelerating EU action on MINURCAT, the 
EU-UN operation for Chad and C.A.R.  France had hoped that 
the EU would take action by October 23; the October 15 EU 
decision was most welcome.  France would like to keep 
deployment of MINURCAT and UNAMID roughly in parallel, so 
that the level of activity along the various borders mounts 
in step. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Serman said that force generation and funding issues 
were slowly getting resolved.  He said that MINURCAT's 
commander, Irish General Nash, had arrived in Paris this week 
and was beginning to function at MINURCAT's HQ near central 
Paris.  The French were pleased that EU "neutrals" such as 
Ireland and Sweden were offering military personnel for 
MINURCAT. 
 
¶4.  (C)  One problem, however, was that troop contributors 
were tending to offer support and rear-area units and not 
combat troops.  Serman said that a larger percentage of 
MINURCAT's combat troops looked to be French.  As they would 
be the most visible elements of MINURCAT, these French troop 
would give the impression that MINURCAT was a "French" 
operation, something the GOF did not want.  However, Serman 
indicated that the French could accept this if it meant 
allowing the operation to go forward. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Serman said that, if everything fell into place as 
planned, MINURCAT units could begin to deploy in November. 
French military planners have said that full deployment of 
the military component of the operation could be accomplished 
by mid-January 2008.  Deploying the Chadian police/gendarmes 
would take place differently -- the UN planned to train the 
800 Chadians in batches of 200 a month, with the first group 
to deploy in December and then periodically thereafter, with 
the full complement in place by March 2008. 
 
MBEKI BALKS ON MINURCAT RESOLUTION 
 
¶6.  (C)  Serman said that the French, including President 
Sarkozy, were not very happy with South Africa President 
Mbeki's change of heart on September 24 concerning the 
MINURCAT UNSC resolution.  The French had always hoped that 
the resolution would be adopted by the UNSC, sitting in 
heads-of-state format, on September 25, which would have sent 
a strong and clear message about the international 
community's commitment to Chad and C.A.R. within the context 
of the Darfur cluster of problems.  Instead, according to 
Serman, Mbeki wavered, saying that he could not vote publicly 
for the installation of a "white" military force in Africa, 
even though Chad President Deby and C.A.R. President Bozize 
had indicated that they would accept, and even would welcome, 
 
PARIS 00004271  002 OF 002 
 
 
such a force.  Mbeki's change of position meant that the 
resolution had to be adopted by the UNSC at ambassador-level 
on the morning of September 25, rather than by heads-of-state 
later that day, robbing it of much of its force.  Serman said 
that the French had not expressed their displeasure to Mbeki 
-- "he knows we're not happy about this, and we didn't need 
to tell him."  Serman noted that Sarkozy, Mbeki, and UK PM 
Gordon Brown would meet together this weekend, when Mbeki and 
Brown will be in Paris to attend the final match of the Rugby 
World Cup, with South Africa and England contesting the grand 
prize. 
 
ABDULWAHID EL-NUR 
 
¶7.  (C)  In contrast to the PKO military angle, political 
aspects related to Sudan and its neighbors were not going 
well at all, Serman remarked, noting the escalation of 
North-South violence, the risks to the CPA, and the prospect 
that the October 27 peace talks in Sirte, Libya, would amount 
to little because of the boycott of rebel leaders such as 
Abdulwahid el-Nur.  Serman said that the French government 
was reaching the limits of its patience with him, and that 
even Sarkozy had said that "if he doesn't cooperate, he must 
be punished."  Serman had little faith in Abdulwahid, 
branding him an opportunist more interested in preserving his 
self-anointed position as "leader" of the Darfur rebels 
rather than in doing anything constructive for his people or 
in terms of Sudan's and Darfur's many problems.  In Serman's 
view, Abdulwahid had become an opportunist, seeking money and 
the patronage of NGOs.  Not only was he personally not 
cooperating but he was using his influence to prohibit 
members of his Fur ethnic group in Darfur from sending 
representatives to Libya.  Serman said that only the Zaghawa 
in Darfur seemed to be preparing to attend the Sirte talks. 
Serman regretted that Abdulwahid was now wasting yet another 
opportunity to play a positive role. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Serman noted (with a tone of regret) that the GOF 
had recently extended Abdulwahid's visa, allowing him to 
remain legally in France until December 28.  Serman confided 
that the French were looking for ways to cancel his visa, but 
he admitted that there were certain legal problems stemming 
from the fact that the visa had just been extended.  His idea 
was that Jan Eliasson would declare, on the eve of the 
October 27 Sirte talks, that certain individuals (among them 
Abdulwahid) were not cooperating and were impeding the 
political dialogue.  On this basis, the UNSC could, perhaps 
in the form of a Presidential Statement, condemn Abdulwahid 
and the other recalcitrants, which could strengthen any 
action the French might take to cancel his visa.  Serman 
acknowledged that Abdulwahid was very crafty, as were his NGO 
supporters in France, and that being able to expel him in the 
short term might not be easy.  "But December 28 is a long 
ways off, and he can do a lot of harm between then and now," 
Serman mused. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶9.  (C)  Serman gave the impression that Sarkozy himself has 
ensured that momentum within the GOF to get MINURCAT and 
UNAMID up and running has continued these past few weeks. 
Developments have been less than ideal (e.g., the 
disproportionately large number of French combat troops) but 
the French appear ready to accept them and to keep moving 
forward.  We sense that French concern now is less focused on 
the two PKOs, which seem to be proceeding apace, but rather 
on the worsening state of the other issues in play -- the 
North-South/CPA problem and the increasingly fragile October 
27 peace talks in Libya.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
 
Stapleton