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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 004183 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2017 
TAGS: PREL UNSC KPKO SU CT CD FR
SUBJECT: SUDAN/CHAD/C.A.R.:  UPDATE ON FRENCH VIEWS TOWARDS 
UNAMID AND MINURCAT 
 
REF: A. STATE 136068 (NOTAL) 
 
     ¶B. PARIS 4084 (NOTAL) 
     ¶C. USEU TODAY (OCTOBER 4) 
 
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Andrew Young, 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  France now agrees to carry out joint 
demarches with the U.S. and the UK regarding contributions to 
the UNAMID mission for Darfur (refs A and B), but only/only 
with respect to non-EU potential donors.  The French will 
demarche EU members separately, taking into account the need 
for contributions to MINURCAT in Chad and the Central African 
Republic.  The French have extended Darfur rebel leader 
Abdulwahid el-Nur's visa through the end of the year but are 
becoming increasingly exasperated with his refusal to 
compromise on any issue, even after several meetings with 
Foreign Minister Kouchner.  DAS-equivalent Christine Fages 
told us on October 4 that progress on MINURCAT was proceeding 
steadily within the EU, although she was not able to say when 
it would deploy and did not offer many details.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C)  We met separately on October 4 with MFA AF 
DAS-equivalents Helene Le Gal and Christine Fages.  Le Gal is 
responsible for East and Central Africa, which includes 
Sudan, and Fages is responsible for West Africa, which 
includes Chad and the Central African Republic (C.A.R.), 
consistent with long-standing MFA practice.  Le Gal and Fages 
provided updates on their respective sectors. 
 
UNAMID/SUDAN 
------------ 
¶3.  (C)  Le Gal said that France had modified its position 
with respect to the U.S. request (ref A) that the U.S., UK, 
and France jointly demarche a number of countries to seek 
contributions for the UNAMID mission in Sudan.  We had 
previously reported (ref B) that the French had declined to 
join in this effort, preferring separate demarches in 
consideration of the priority France has placed on building 
the MINURCAT mission in Chad/C.A.R.  Le Gal said on October 
4, however, that France now agreed to carry out the joint 
demarche with the U.S. and UK, but only with respect to the 
non-EU countries listed in ref A.  She said that French 
Embassies in the non-EU countries had been instructed to work 
with U.S. and UK counterparts to make the joint demarche on 
host governments.  She said that it was possible that some 
French Embassies had already contacted U.S. and UK Embassies 
in the countries involved and had begun the process. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Le Gal said that France would work with EU potential 
donors separately, as part of the GOF's efforts to obtain 
contributions not only for UNAMID but also for the MINURCAT 
mission in Chad and C.A.R.  She indicated that France's 
leadership role in MINURCAT and its needs required a 
balancing between it and UNAMID in terms of French treatment 
with EU partners. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Le Gal said that the French were becoming 
increasingly frustrated with Darfur rebel leader Abdulwahid 
el-Nur's refusal to cooperate or to show any willingness to 
compromise on any issue.  "If anything, he's getting worse," 
Le Gal observed.  She said that Abdulwahid had meet several 
times in recent weeks directly with Foreign Minister Bernard 
Kouchner, with the latter trying without success to obtain 
Abdulwahid's agreement to attend the upcoming Libya peace 
talks, among other things.  Le Gal reported that Abdulwahid 
continued to view himself as the key to resolving the Darfur 
crisis and, as such, expected everyone else to bow to his 
will. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Le Gal said that there was some regret on the French 
side for having allowed Abdulwahid to come to France about a 
year ago.  The purpose then was simply to allow him to 
consult with the French.  Now, he has ensconced himself well 
in Paris and has become "a bit of a darling" for NGOs 
interested in Darfur, notably the "Urgence Darfour" 
 
PARIS 00004183  002 OF 003 
 
 
organization, which has adopted him as Darfur's true leader 
and which injected itself into French domestic politics when 
it held well-publicized Darfur-related rallies during the 
French presidential campaign this past spring.  All of this 
had contributed to Abdulwahid's considerable ego, Le Gal 
commented, and exacerbated his more negative tendencies.  Le 
Gal said that Abdulwahid seemed now to think that he was not 
only the sole leader capable of resolving the Darfur crisis 
but also the only person who could deal with all of Sudan's 
many other problems.  She said he was kidding himself if he 
thought that he could assume power in Khartoum -- "the 'Arab' 
Sudanese will never let that happen."  John Garang might have 
been able to do so, but not Abdulwahid, Le Gal noted. 
 
¶7.  (C)  When asked about Abdulwahid's residency status in 
France and to what degree France viewed this as leverage over 
him, Le Gal said that his visa was being renewed on a 
three-month basis and that it had just been renewed for a 
period extending to the end of 2007.  She said that there had 
been discussion about whether to renew it but that the GOF 
concluded that it might be better to have him in France, 
where the French could exercise some control over him and 
continue to urge him to be more accommodating, rather than 
have him leave France for "who knows where to do who knows 
what."  Le Gal indicated that the French were willing to put 
up with him despite his increasingly erratic ways. 
 
MINURCAT/CHAD/C.A.R. 
-------------------- 
¶8.  (C)  Our initial introductory courtesy call on October 4 
with newly-arrived DAS-equivalent for West Africa Christine 
Fages provided an opportunity for an update on MINURCAT. 
Exhibiting a very brisk and to-the-point manner, Fages said 
that the process of establishing MINURCAT was going well. 
She declined to go into much detail but said that EU partners 
were fully on board politically and that she expected the EU 
to adopt an "action commune" in short order, a requirement 
before the EU could engage in an activity such as MINURCAT. 
The "action commune" would allow for more detailed planning 
and the development of a CONOPS, along with more technical 
EU-required aspects of the operation.  Force generation 
("always complex") was the other immediate concern.  Fages 
said that several countries had committed troops and support 
services, although she declined to specify the countries or 
what they had agreed to provide.  (See ref C for details 
derived from EU sources.) 
 
¶9.  (C)  Fages confirmed press reports (e.g., Paris daily Le 
Monde, October 4) stating that MINURCAT's general HQ would be 
located at Mont Valerien, near Paris.  (Le Monde also 
reported that Irish General Patrick Nash would likely head 
the operation from Mont Valerien, with French General 
Jean-Philippe Ganascia commanding in theater.) 
 
¶10.  (C)  Throughout the discussion, Fages (whose previous 
assignment had been at France's mission to NATO), praised the 
"excellent cooperation and support" the U.S. had provided 
concerning MINURCAT.  She brushed over earlier differences on 
the funding of the Chadian gendarmes who are to participate 
in the operation and said that money would eventually be 
found to fund their activities.  Fage said that the Chadian 
gendarmes were one of the key elements of MINURCAT, for 
without them, Chad President Deby would have never accepted 
MINURCAT.  Fages said that Deby was thinking ahead -- after 
the mission he would have a cadre of relatively well-trained 
and well-equipped gendarmes that would be a valuable asset. 
 
¶11.  (C)  Fages said that the French had had no problems with 
C.A.R. regarding MINURCAT, and observed that C.A.R. President 
Bozize undoubtedly welcomed an international presence in 
northeastern C.A.R., given his problems in the northwestern 
part of his country. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
PARIS 00004183  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
 
Stapleton