VZCZCXRO2937
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0839/01 2911141
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181141Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8250
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0974
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000839 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: DISY CHIEF OPTIMISTIC BUT LAMENTS CANDIDATE'S 
SHORTCOMINGS 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA 827 
 
     ¶B. NICOSIA 771 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  DISY-backed presidential candidate Ioannis 
Kasoulides bests his competitors in smarts and moderation, 
but has failed to impress the Cypriot electorate with 
leadership skills and political savvy, bemoaned party chief 
Nikos Anastassiades in an October 16 meeting with the 
Ambassador.  Worse, Kasoulides possessed a stubborn streak 
and so far had ignored party-suggested course corrections. 
Nonetheless, the deficit shown in recent polls -- just four 
percent separated the three contenders -- might still be 
overcome, Anastassiades reasoned, should DISY succeed in 
enforcing party cohesion and bringing out the vote.  Cyprus 
direly needed new leadership, he argued, as President Tassos 
Papadopoulos's "stupid" policies had brought shame and 
embarrassment on the island, with the prospect of permanent 
partition now looming large.  An of-late flexible 
Papadopoulos sought movement on the July 8 process solely for 
electoral gain, Anastassiades warned; he urged the Ambassador 
and broader international community to remain wary.  Whether 
or not sincerity underpinned the President's efforts, the 
DISY chieftain doubted they would bear fruit.  Turkish 
Cypriots' strengthening economy and growing international 
visibility meant they no longer required a unified island to 
thrive, he concluded, and T/C leader Mehmet Ali Talat no 
longer appeared wed to a federal solution.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Candidate Bright, but Inexperienced and Stubborn 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶2.  (C) The Ambassador October 16 began a round of contacts 
with prominent party leaders by calling on Anastassiades.  He 
found the DISY boss as mercurial and animated as always, 
despite rumors he was suffering from a severe illness (NFI). 
Their conversation turned immediately to Cypriot presidential 
elections and the party's chances of returning to power 
behind favored candidate Ioannis Kasoulides.  Anastassiades 
was laboring mightily to convince the electorate that 
Kasoulides was both the race's smartest contender and its 
most moderate, the latter vital in securing the trust of 
Turkish Cypriots and the international community (Ref A). 
"Leadership" appeared a tougher sell, however; Anastassiades 
groaned over results from recent polls and focus groups that 
showed Kasoulides sorely lacking in that department. 
 
¶3.  (C) DISY higher-ups had urged the candidate to drop or 
bench the hitherto unknown thirty-somethings prominent in 
Kasoulides's entourage and recruit an eminence grise or two, 
but he so far had refused their counsel.  Further, Kasoulides 
had refused to engage a handful of sympathetic AKEL deputies 
whose endorsement would have buttressed his campaign.  With 
AKEL Secretary General Dimitris Christofias now in the race, 
these MPs were no longer viable targets for recruitment. 
Nearly ten years removed from elected Cypriot office -- 
Kasoulides served as foreign minister and currently sits in 
the European Parliament -- the DISY candidate had forgotten 
the basics of island politics, Anastassiades regretted. 
 
¶4.  (C) Not all news was gloomy; recent polls had delivered 
positives as well.  At 75 percent, DISY cohesion topped the 
major parties, Anastassiades trumpeted; it was his 
responsibility to ensure that figure hit 90 percent by 
election day.  Party officials had begun lobbying registered 
voters in earnest only days before, he revealed, and were 
focusing on areas where DISY fared weakest, such as the 
Paphos district.  The job looked difficult, as Papadopoulos 
had enjoyed recent success in "converting" groups 
historically DISY-leaning, such as the business elite and 
former EOKA (a celebrated anti-colonial guerrilla group) 
members.  Even 100 percent cohesion would not ensure victory 
or even passage into the second round, Anastassiades added. 
It was vital that Kasoulides take chunks from the AKEL and 
DIKO bases and convince a majority of Cyprus's 29,000 
eligible but unregistered voters to favor DISY. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Yet Competitors Facing Challenges As Well 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Ironically, Anastassiades hoped AKEL's cohesion rate 
-- hovering just below DISY's, but low for the historically 
obedient Communist force -- would rise.  Such an outcome 
favored Kasoulides, since every voter AKEL managed to return 
to its fold would have voted Papadopoulos, helping to propel 
 
NICOSIA 00000839  002 OF 003 
 
 
the incumbent President into the second round.  AKEL was 
changing, Anastassiades asserted, and could no longer count 
on the rank-and-file blindly heeding the leadership's voting 
instructions.  Further, he wondered whether voters would 
punish Christofias over the Communist leader's own lack of 
leadership; after all, Christofias in 2004 had shown little 
backbone in rubbishing the Annan Plan reunification effort, 
an initiative he publicly had supported for two years. 
 
¶6.  (C) Papadopoulos's armor showed chinks as well, 
Anastassiades claimed.  A faction of the President's DIKO 
party, followers of former President Spyros Kyprianou, likely 
would throw their votes elsewhere.  Former AKEL MP and 
Foreign Minister Yiorgos Lillikas, now coordinating 
Papadopoulos's campaign, actually was helping AKEL cohesion 
by engaging in public spats with his one-time colleagues. 
EUROKO head and Papadopoulos sycophant Dimitris Syllouris had 
troubled mainstream voters by questioning the viability of a 
bi-communal, bi-zonal federal model, the preferred Cyprus 
Problem solution for thirty years.  The President, despite 
projecting an air of inevitability around his re-election, 
was not invincible, Anastassiades contended. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Under Current Leader, to Hell in a Handbasket 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Papadopoulos was driving the country to disaster but 
whistling all the way, Anastassiades decried.  International 
court decisions favoring the "breakaway Turkish Cypriot 
state," sea connections between "occupied" Famagusta and 
Syria, "TRNC" officials receiving VIP treatment in Italy and 
Germany -- all were negative developments occurring on 
Papadopoulos's watch, yet the President continued to insist 
all was well.  His nearly complete control over Cypriot media 
permitted such hubris, the DISY leader regretted, as 
disagreement with Government policies morphed into heresy in 
most editors' hands, and Papadopoulos critics labeled 
"Turk-lovers." 
 
¶8.  (C) A rash of scandals -- each leading back to the 
President, his family, or Tassos Papadopoulos and Associates, 
a law firm seemingly ripped from a John Grisham manuscript -- 
revealed the underlying rot.  The latest "scandal of the 
century," which Anastassiades himself broke in early October, 
concerned Cyprus's efforts to abandon heavy fuel oil for 
natural gas to fuel its electricity generators (Ref B).  His 
investigation into shell companies established by 
Papadopoulos cronies to reap sweetheart deals implicated 
primarily Lillikas and the President's son Nicholas, but the 
architects had covered their tracks so smartly as to preclude 
effective prosecution.  Should the deal eventually 
materialize, Anastassiades warned, Cyprus stood to lose 
hundreds of millions of pounds in higher fuel costs and 
European Union fines, while those in on the scam would make 
millions. 
 
¶9.  (C) "In any European (sic) country, these guys would face 
prison, and the Government would be forced to resign," 
Anastassiades bellowed.  But not Cyprus.  Not only was 
Papadopoulos still in power, but the latest polls -- taken 
after the scandal had broken -- put him Number 1 in fighting 
corruption.  "Unthinkable," he fretted. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
July 8 Agreement:  Don't Throw President a Bone 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶10.  (C) Recent Papadopoulos proposals on opening the Ledra 
Street crossing point and reinvigorating the July 8 Agreement 
were pure window-dressing designed to provide the President 
an electoral jump-start, Anastassiades ventured.  The 
President would contend it was unwise to replace the Greek 
Cypriot leader during delicate Cyprus Problem negotiations. 
"But a dog can't straighten his tail," the DISY chief 
chuckled, translating the Greek "leopard can't change his 
spots" euphemism.  The minute Papadopoulos won re-election, 
he was certain the proposals would drop off the table. 
 
¶11.  (C) Anastassiades implored the Ambassador and his P-5 
colleagues not to take the bait.  The United States sought no 
role in the presidential campaign and favored no particular 
candidate, the Ambassador responded.  Yet we could not NOT 
welcome an initiative that sought to resuscitate the moribund 
July 8 arrangement, which both sides and the UN had inked and 
continued to support, at least publicly.  Great care would be 
exercised in drafting and delivering the U.S. public message, 
he promised. 
 
NICOSIA 00000839  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
-------------------------------- 
T/Cs Turning Away From Solutions 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) The Turkish Cypriots might even welcome a 
Papadopoulos re-election, Anastassiades glumly asserted.  In 
recent months he had witnessed a change in T/C attitudes, 
beginning with Talat's.  The T/C leader no longer seemed 
wedded to a bi-zonal, bi-communal reunited Cyprus, 
Anastassiades speculated, but rather was sounding more like 
long-time separatist Rauf Denktash.  If Turkish Cypriots now 
favored partition, five more years of Tassos would play into 
their plans. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶13.  (C) For a year we have witnessed varying degrees of 
friction between party leader Anastassiades and 
standard-bearer Kasoulides; based on this latest 
get-together, discord still exists.  Six, even three months 
ago, lower-level DISY officials hinted the party would dump 
the candidate were a more electable candidate to come 
forward.  Unable to identify that individual, however, 
Anastassiades and company grudgingly have marshaled their 
forces behind Kasoulides.  We wonder if they committed too 
late, however.  Further, while DISY cohesion rates have risen 
in past elections, 90 percent seems a bridge too far.  Close 
contacts report that Papadopoulos -- aided by wealthy and 
well-connected wife Fotini -- has made great inroads with the 
island hoi polloi whose votes DISY historically owned. 
Kasoulides's advancement into the second round therefore will 
depend on him scoring high with the undecideds and 
successfully scrounging for dissatisfied DIKO and AKEL 
voters.  Anastassiades's detective work on the natural gas 
and similar debacles should have netted his candidate a few 
votes from this pool.  This being Cyprus, however, if a 
scandal doesn't involve the Annan Plan or broader Cyprus 
Problem, the likelihood of it tarring an incumbent and 
effecting his downfall is scant. 
SCHLICHER