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HEADLINE Missile plan causes “uncertainty” in Russia, says Moscow

SUMMARY Russia’s deputy foreign minister and a leading US State Department official have a private meeting in Moscow. The minister, Sergei Kislyak, warned that a plan to fit conventional warheads onto nuclear weapons would cause “uncertainty” in Russia as Moscow would not know if the weapon was nuclear or conventional. 

Thursday, 18 October 2007, 13:44
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 005060 
SIPDIS 
SIPDIS 
EO 12958 DECL: 10/13/2017 
TAGS PREL, PARM, MARR, MNUC, KACT, KNNP, IR, RS 
SUBJECT: ACTING U/S ROOD’S MEETING WITH DFM KISLYAK: 
GLOBAL INITIATIVE, GNEP/ANGARSK FUEL CENTER, INDIA 123, POST-START
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary. In a meeting October 11 on the margins of the missile defense and 2 2 discussions in Moscow, Acting Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security John Rood and Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak agreed on the need to encourage key countries to join the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (Global Initiative), shared concerns over India’s position on concluding an IAEA safeguards agreement, and discussed differences over a post-START Treaty arrangement. Kislyak stressed that, without an agreement on the substance of a post-START arrangement, transparency and confidence-building measures were irrelevant. Kislyak also described efforts to get Canada and European countries to join the Angarsk Nuclear Fuel Center, and agreed that the ISTC should be transformed into a general scientific center. Discussion of Iran septel.  End summary.
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
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¶2. (C) Rood told Kislyak that Spain had offered to host the next meeting of the Global Initiative. Kislyak responded favorably, noting that Spain had influence in the EU, Middle East and Latin America. He reported that he would be traveling to Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela in twelve days’ time, and would encourage them to join the Global Initiative (Rood suggested he leave Venezuela out). Rood said that so far, the U.S. had not gotten positive responses from Argentina or Brazil, and welcomed Kislyak’s efforts to encourage them to join. Kislyak noted that Brazil continued to find excuses why they could not respond, but stressed that Brazil was the key. If Brazil could be brought in, Argentina and others were more likely to follow.
¶3. (C) Noting that 62 countries had joined the Global Initiative, Rood said while numbers were important, the U.S. and Russia should focus their attention on getting key countries to join. South Africa was important, but they were also not responding positively. Kislyak said Russia had contacted them at least twice, and would continue to do so. The South Africans had told Kislyak that they were not against the idea of working with the U.S. and Russia on combating nuclear terrorism, but they wanted to participate in the negotiations and not simply be given a completed plan of action.
¶4. (C) Rood stressed the need to deepen the substantive work of the group. He suggested that the U.S. and Russia urge key countries to sponsor activities. He urged Russia to join the U.S.’s efforts to get China to take the lead on one or two activities. He added that the U.S. would like to add exercises, preferably field exercises not just tabletop ones, to the group’s activities. He recommended that an expert group on exercises be established. Kislyak said the GOR would be more comfortable with the idea if they knew what kind of exercises they could offer. He undertook to discuss the concept of an experts’ group on exercises with other Russian agencies.
India and 123 Agreement
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¶5. (C) Kislyak and Rood discussed the likelihood of the Indian Parliament approving the 123 Agreement. Rood expressed concern at India’s delays in negotiating the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. He urged Russia to emphasize to the GOI that the safeguards needed to be the accepted 66-Rev 2 safeguards, and not conditioned on guaranteed fuel deliveries. Noting that Russia had ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol on October 3, Kislyak agreed, saying there needed to be elements that were not voluntary in the safeguards agreement. He said he was concerned India would push the issue off for six or more months, and would not feel in a rush to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
Post-START
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¶6. (C) Rood said the U.S. and Russia had a long-term task to determine how to solve our differences over a post-START Treaty arrangement, and a present task to meet our Presidents’ remit to complete a document on a post-START arrangement by the end of the year. Noting that the U.S. and
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Russia did not have many substantive differences on transparency and confidence-building measures (CBMs), he urged that the U.S. and Russia focus on reaching agreement on issues where we were close, and noting the major areas where we differed for Ministers. He said that the START Treaty had been concluded when Russia and the U.S. were hostile to each other. We had needed limitations to restrain each other. These circumstances no longer applied. The U.S. and Russia were no longer engaged in an arms race or competition, The U.S. arsenal was at the lowest level since the 1950’s, so such limitations were unnecessary. By contrast, the Moscow Treaty had been concluded after the end of the Cold War, and both sides had agreed that the focus on operationally-deployed strategic nuclear warheads was the proper standard. The START Treaty had been a Cold War instrument. The U.S. did not have any arms control agreements with friendly countries, nor did the U.S. have any agreements regarding deployments of strategic weapons outside of national territory with any other country. The U.S. was not even pursuing such agreements with China.
¶7. (C) Kislyak said Russia had a much more substantial problem with the U.S. proposal than Rood’s characterization indicated. The main problem was that there was no agreement on the substance of a post-START arrangement, and without such an agreement, there was nothing to “hang” transparency and CBMs on. Transparency and CBMs have never existed by themselves; their intent is to ensure certainty that the commitments of an agreement are being applied. The U.S. proposal to continue the Moscow Treaty and add transparency measures does not meet the GOR’s understanding of the remit from the Presidents: it does not include START-limited items, and it does not take into account the impact on the arms control environment. According to Kislyak, the U.S. proposal would allow both sides to do whatever they wished and would create a vacuum in arms control. The START limitations provided reliability and predictability. They gave comfort to both sides that nothing would be done to threaten each other’s strategic interests. For Russia, with the exception of bombers, all strategic weapons are considered nuclear. Without clarity and specificity, Russia would presume that any strategic weapon approaching Russian territory was nuclear.
¶8. (C) Noting that some in offices on both sides of the Atlantic had not grown out of a Cold War mentality, Kislyak said the U.S. was sending mixed signals about its views toward Russia. While Russia did not believe the U.S. was preparing for war, a program such as Prompt Global Strike and reliance on non-nuclear strategic weapons and missile defenses caused uncertainty in Russia. Perhaps they were not intended to be hostile to Russia, but it was not clear. Russia wanted an arrangement that provided that clarity.
¶9. (C) In response to Rood’s question, Kislyak acknowledged that Russia wanted a post-START arrangement to apply to conventional forces. Rood said Russia should be encouraging the U.S. and other states to move away from reliance on nuclear weapons. Kislyak disagreed, saying a reliance on non-nuclear weapons would make a country more likely to use them, whereas nuclear weapons acted as more of a deterrent on countries’ use. Rood responded that conventional weapons played a role in deterrence, in some cases making it easier to hold at risk and thereby deter certain adversaries.
¶10. (C) Kislyak said that Russia was seeking to get China, France and the UK to join Russia in reducing the number of strategic nuclear weapons. Rood said the U.S. would do this as well, but irrespective of arms control agreements.
Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation Initiative
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¶11. (C) Rood said the U.S. was very committed to the Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation Initiative, and had received only positive feedback from other countries. The U.S. wanted to develop ways the U.S., Russia and other lead countries could help beneficiary countries pursue nuclear power without spreading sensitive technologies. The U.S. was also looking at financing options, recognizing that currently the IMF, World Bank, and other banks do not now lend for nuclear power. The USG was also looking at ways the U.S. could participate more fully in fuel supply and takeback.
¶12. (C) Kislyak responded that the GOR does not have
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problems with the concept of the initiative, but was in the middle of reorganizing its nuclear industry, and so would not be able to move forward until the reorganization was complete, perhaps in a month or so. The new entity would be an organization like Gazprom. It would take on the work the nuclear agency had done but would be a corporation with some government structures overseeing it.
¶13. (C) Kislyak said Kazakhstan was very involved in the effort. The Kazakh President’s announcement at the UN General Assembly about revising the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) had not been at Russia’s instigation. Kislyak said he believed the Kazakhs did not mean to undermine the NPT, but now that Kazakhstan had large reserves of uranium, it had its own role to play in the nuclear arena, and wanted to be heard.
GNEP/Angarsk Fuel Center
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¶14. (C) Kislyak reported that Russia had approved the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership’s (GNEP) Statement of Principles. He said Russia had invited Canada to join the Angarsk fuel center, but they had never responded. He noted that Canada had been a customer of Russia for enrichment purposes for 25 years, and the relationship had worked very well. He said he thought Canada may want to develop their own enrichment capability, and may be concerned about reliability and predictability. Kislyak said that Russia could do enrichment more economically and noted he had told the Canadians that membership in the Center would ensure reliability and predictability. He urged the U.S. to encourage Canada to join the Russian Center.
¶15. (C) Kislyak added that China and France were considering cooperating together on reprocessing of uranium and were lukewarm on joining the Center. He noted that Japan had said non-proliferation would be one of its principal topics for its G8 chairmanship, and it planned to continue the non-proliferation working group during its chairmanship. Kislyak said he was concerned that Japan’s non-proliferation initiatives were too closely linked to the situation with North Korea’s nuclear program. T Senior Advisor Timbie said that the U.S. had laid out ideas for implementation of the July 3 Declaration to Japan. Japan was supportive, but did not want to be considered a “little brother.” Rood added that the UK was conflicted over being openly supportive because it still had domestic concerns over nuclear power.
Georgian HEU/ISTP
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¶16. (C) Rood said the U.S. had the political approvals to provide Russia with the sample of Georgian Highly Enriched Uranium it had requested, but needed GOR assurances of peaceful use, security, etc. Kislyak said he did not expect any difficulty getting such assurances, but it would require the Prime Minister’s signature, and this matter had been referred to his office.
¶17. (C) Both sides agreed that, since the core mission of the ISTC to give job opportunities to former nuclear weapons scientists had been advanced in a significant way, it should be modernized and should transition to new tasks. Kislyak noted that the Center was seen as a model in the scientific community and he would like to see it become a purely scientific center, but he needed to develop ideas on what its mission should become. Rood agreed to work with Russia to do so.
¶18. (U) Acting U/S Rood has cleared this cable. Burns