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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 002246 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM NU
SUBJECT: REAL OPPOSITION, OR AN END TO CHECKS AND BALANCES? 
 
REF: MANAGUA 2185 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli, reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
Summary 
- - - - 
 
¶1.  (C) Some members of the Liberal Constitutional Party 
(PLC) appear to be on the verge of joining forces with the 
pro-democracy Liberal Alliance of Nicaragua (ALN) party, 
headed by Eduardo Montealegre, despite that fact that under 
its leader, former President and convicted felon Arnoldo 
Aleman, the PLC provides support to the Ortega government. 
We have obtained a draft copy of a "Manifesto" that senior 
members of both parties plan to release at a press conference 
on October 4, announcing the creation of a new "National 
Unity Alliance."  At the same time, Aleman has empowered a 
group of his loyal PLC supporters to negotiate with the 
Sandinista Front for National Liberation (FSLN) a plan for 
constitutional reform that would convert Nicaragua's 
presidential system into a parliamentary democracy.  The 
intent of this new "Pacto" between Aleman and Ortega is to 
find a way to neutralize the current, at least theoretical, 
checks and balances on presidential power and keep Ortega in 
charge after his term of office expires in 2011.  Post 
believes that the October 4 release of the democratic 
"Manifesto" is an important and positive step towards a 
brighter democratic future in Nicaragua, but the opposing 
forces of caudillismo, led by Ortega and Aleman, will do 
their utmost to stymie this development.  End summary. 
 
National Unity at the Cost of PLC Division? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (C) An up-beat Eduardo Montealegre told the Ambassador on 
September 26 that the process of "unity" talks with members 
of the PLC was progressing well.  In addition to a number of 
the smaller Nicaraguan opposition parties, Montealegre named 
several prominent PLC members who were participating in the 
talks, including:  former Vice-President and Presidential 
candidate Jose Rizo, former PLC Party Chairman Jose Antonio 
Alvarado, Chairman of the National Assembly Defense Committee 
Enrique Quinonez, and Chief PLC Whip Maximino Rodriguez. 
These talks appear to have been reasonably successful, and we 
have obtained a copy of the document the group plans to 
release on October 4, entitled a "Manifesto to the Nation - 
Unity for Nicaragua." 
 
¶3.  (C) The "Manifesto" includes broad language about 
overcoming personal and sectarian interests to protect 
democratic principles.  It specifically cites as a threat the 
attempts to perpetuate the current Ortega regime.  The 
document also notes the irresponsible actions of President 
Ortega in his speeches and in his goal of allying Nicaragua 
with undemocratic regimes.  To combat these dangers and keep 
Nicaragua on a democratic path, the "Manifesto" promises to 
establish a "National Unity Alliance."  One of the stated 
objectives of this "Unity Alliance" would be to establish 
procedures to identify candidates for the November 2008 
municipal elections. 
 
¶4.  (C) However, the leading PLC members who are negotiating 
with the ALN are not representing their party.  Rodriguez 
made clear to us on October 1 that he and his party 
colleagues were engaged in these discussions with the ALN on 
an individual basis, because of personal conviction, not as 
representatives of the PLC.  In fact, in response to public 
disclosure of Rizo's and Alvarado's involvement in these 
discussions, Aleman publicly denounced Rizo on October 1. 
According to Aleman, the PLC is not kicking Rizo and Alvarado 
out of the party; rather they are "automatically 
self-excluding" themselves.  Aleman also told the press that 
the PLC is not threatened with divisions. 
 
What We Need is a Prime Minister? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5.  (C) Montealegre's greatest preoccupation when he met with 
the Ambassador was not the personal attacks against him over 
the CENI issue, nor the internal arguments among the ALN's 
fractious group of Deputies (reftel).  Montealegre's main 
concern was the news that Aleman was negotiating with Ortega 
on proposed constitutional reforms.  In the September 23 
edition of the weekly journal "Confidential," Supreme 
Electoral Council Magistrate Rene Herrera, a close confidant 
of Aleman who played an important part in negotiating 
previous Aleman-Ortega deals, leaked to the press that there 
were ongoing negotiations focused on converting Nicaragua 
into a parliamentary democracy. 
 
¶6.  (C) The main intent of these reforms appears to be the 
creation of a Prime Minister position.  Montealegre told the 
Ambassador that the fact that the National Assembly showed 
some muscle to stop the President's effort to create 
Citizen's Power Councils (CPCs) was a wake-up call for Ortega 
about the National Assembly's ability to check presidential 
power.  Montealegre suggested also that since neither Ortega 
nor Aleman can reasonably expect to serve another 
presidential term, the creation of Prime Ministerial post 
could provide them with a vehicle to perpetuate their power. 
 
¶7.  (C) On October 1, Aleman told the press that the he had 
established a "commission" to consider constitutional reforms 
and negotiate with the FSLN.  The named members of this 
"commission" include several of Aleman's key political 
lackeys:  Herrera, Supreme Court Justice Ivan Escobar, 
National Assembly Executive Council Member Wilfredo Navarro, 
National Assembly Economic Committee Chairman (and former 
Foreign Minister) Francisco Aguirre and PLC Assembly Deputy 
Oscar Moncada.  Aleman and Ortega are both gearing up their 
respective political machines to push for constitutional 
reform.  Other political heavyweights, for example, National 
Assembly President Rene Nunez and Supreme Court Justice 
Rafael Solis, have been filling the airwaves and national 
press with their support for a parliamentary system "because 
it would be closer to the people." 
 
¶8.  (C) Moncada confirmed to us on October 3 that a process 
of negotiation has begun with FSLN, and acknowledged that the 
FSLN's goal is to keep Ortega in power.  Moncada could not 
clearly state how constitutional change would benefit the 
Liberals; his bottom line comment was that it didn't really 
matter what the constitution looked like in Nicaragua, 
because it would still be the same small group of governing 
class elite that was in charge, no matter how the system is 
organized.  He argued that since the FSLN was not going 
disappear, the point of negotiating with the FSLN was to 
search for a practical mechanism of coexistence. 
 
¶9.  (C) This talk of constitutional reform causes even 
stalwart PLC members some doubt.  On September 28, PLC Deputy 
Carlos Noguera expressed his concern to us that creating a 
parliamentary system is not a simple tweak to the 
constitution but a wholesale departure from historical 
national precedent, a fundamental change in the body politic. 
 "It's not easy.  It's a radical change," he opined. 
Rodriguez echoed these comments to us, noting that the 
current Constitution -- written by Ortega in 1987 and 
subsequently amended -- is flawed and unwieldy, but "now's 
not the time to change it."  Constitutional reform requires a 
super-majority in the National Assembly of 56 votes (in two 
successive years), so, for such a vote to succeed, Aleman 
would need to deliver to Ortega approximately three-quarters 
of the PLC's National Assembly votes. 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
¶10.  (S) The October 4 release of the democratic camp's 
"Manifesto" may be the start of an important process of 
peeling away non-Alemanista elements of the PLC in favor of a 
united democratic opposition.  It also would be a meaningful 
addition if other anti-Pacto forces join this movement, for 
example the anti-Ortega Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS). 
 However, we believe that it is indicative that the PLC 
members who are talking with Montealegre are freelancers, not 
acting on behalf of the party.  For now, it appears that 
Aleman continues to hold sway over the PLC party machinery, 
despite the dissenting grumbles from the PLC political base. 
 
¶11.  (S) We agree with Montealegre that a sustained 
Ortega-Aleman push to change the constitution could represent 
a real danger.  If Aleman can continue to control a 
sufficient number of PLC members to help Ortega secure the 
super-majority needed to create a Prime Ministerial post, the 
Ortega-Aleman power and corruption "Pacto" will continue to 
hold the balance of power in Nicaragua for many years to 
come.  Our best hope for keeping this from coming to pass 
will be to watch the development of the new "Unity Alliance" 
(or whatever the anti-Pacto democratic group decides to call 
itself) and stand prepared to help as we can. 
TRIVELLI