VZCZCXRO4120
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMD #1987/01 2911716
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181716Z OCT 07 
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3630
INFO RUCNCFE/CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE
RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0222

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001987 
 
SIPDIS 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y - ROUTING INDICATOR 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR EUR, ALSO FOR WHA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2017 
TAGS: OSCE PARM PREL SP KV CU
SUBJECT: EUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRIED'S OCTOBER 15 MEETING 
WITH SPANISH FM MORATINOS 
 
 
Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION HUGO LLORENS; REASON: 1.5(B) and 
 (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  A/S Fried and CDA Llorens met October 15 
with Spanish FM Miguel Angel Moratinos.  A/S Fried briefed 
Moratinos on 2 2 talks on CFE and missile defense, including 
the possibility of major progress on CFE in time for the OSCE 
ministerial Spain is hosting in November.  A/S Fried prepared 
Moratinos for the next steps in Kosovo, and although 
Moratinos clearly continues to hope for an agreed solution, 
he said Spain would "support EU consensus" on the issue 
should the Troika fail.  On Iran, Moratinos said Spain was 
supporting the French and UK approach.  Moratinos offered 
whatever help Spain could provide on the upcoming Middle East 
peace conference.  On Cuba, he insisted to a skeptical A/S 
Fried that Spain,s engagement with the regime could help 
promote democratic transition.  Finally, Moratinos reiterated 
his interest in meeting with the Secretary sometime before 
the OSCE ministerial.  End summary. 
 
CFE and Missile Defense 
----------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) A/S Fried briefed Moratinos on the October 12-13 
U.S.-Russian 2 2 Ministerial.  He explained that the U.S. had 
presented the Russians with a creative proposal on CFE that 
went beyond the parallel action paper.  He said the proposal 
included a number of ideas for additional steps on Georgia 
and Moldova.  He cautioned that there was still much to be 
done.  These ideas had yet to be discussed in detail with the 
Georgians and the Moldovans, although that would happen 
quickly.  A/S Fried said he was headed from Madrid to 
Brussels to brief NATO Permanent Representatives.  He noted 
the U.S. was waiting for the Russian response and warned the 
initial positive Russian reaction could change. 
Nevertheless, he wanted Moratinos to be aware of the details 
since if all went well, this could have a profound and 
positive impact on the OSCE ministerial Spain will host at 
the end of November. 
 
¶3. (C) Moratinos was quick to grasp the potential benefit to 
Spain, the OSCE Chairman in Office, of such a positive turn 
of events, and to offer Spanish support with Moldova and 
Georgia.  He mentioned that he had visited Moldova and 
Transnistria and had discussed the issue with Russian FM 
Lavrov (he mentioned that he had a testy meeting with a 
gloomy Igor Smirnov in which he finally told Smirnov that he 
was not going to stay and waste time with him.  According to 
an amused Moratinos, that broke the ice and they then had a 
substantive conversation.)  Moratinos offered to send 
Spain,s envoy on Georgia there if the U.S. thought it could 
be helpful. 
 
¶4. (C) A/S Fried described the "joint regional architecture 
proposals" on missile defense that had been shared with the 
Russians in Moscow.  He noted that the Russians seemed to 
have been taken off balance by the forthcoming nature of this 
proposal and not ready to respond other than to acknowledge 
that this was a constructive offer.  He emphasized that the 
U.S. was being flexible and trying to include the Russians in 
a cooperative MD system to the extent practicable. 
 
Kosovo 
------ 
 
¶5. (C) A/S Fried said the U.S. supported the Troika effort 
but that everyone had to recognize what was likely to happen 
after December 10 and prepare for it.  He stressed that 
Europe and the U.S. needed to continue to support Kosovo 
post-independence.  Walking away would be disastrous.  A way 
must be found, for example, to continue the OSCE mission 
functions there, perhaps under another (UN or EU) umbrella. 
A/S Fried explained that French, German, Italian, British, 
and American lawyers had looked carefully at UNSCR 1244 and 
concluded that it was not inconsistent with independence and 
would continue to provide a mandate for the NATO and EU 
presence in Kosovo even after independence.  Javier Solana 
had expressed the same view at the Secretary's "Transatlantic 
dinner" with EU foreign ministers in New York during the 
UNGA.  Moratinos said Spain had not lost hope for the Troika 
process.  He noted that a Kosovar declaration of independence 
and the absence of a new UNSCR would makes things difficult 
for Spain and Europe.  A/S Fried cautioned against hoping for 
a miracle while failing to prepare for what was most likely 
to happen.  He emphasized that the U.S. looked for Spain,s 
support as OSCE CIO.  Moratinos said Spain would not "create 
problems" for the U.S. or EU on Kosovo, and Spain would fall 
in line with EU consensus.  However, he cautioned that Cyprus 
 
MADRID 00000000  002 OF 002 
 
 
might stand the way of EU consensus.  He said a creative 
approach would have to be found to deal with the Cypriots. 
 
Iran 
---- 
 
¶6. (C) Moratinos said Spain was backing France and the UK on 
Iran.  He noted the Spanish mission in Brussels had issued a 
statement in support of their position.  Spain supported 
dialogue but also sanctions if dialogue failed.  Moratinos 
said a UNSCR would be best, but if Russia and China made that 
impossible, then a united stand by Europe and the U.S. was 
the next best thing.  He said we needed more sticks and more 
carrots with Iran. 
 
MEPP 
---- 
 
¶7. (C) Moratinos said Spain hoped the U.S. conference would 
be successful and that Spain was ready to use its good 
offices to support the effort.  He mentioned that Spain had 
good contacts with the Palestinians and would be willing to 
approach them if the U.S. thought it could help. 
 
Cuba 
---- 
 
¶8. (C) While noting that both countries expressed their 
support for a democratic Cuba, A/S Fried said the U.S. 
disagreed profoundly with Spain,s approach.  He stressed 
that Spain needed to be careful lest it inadvertently 
facilitate a transition from one dictator to another.  He 
urged that Spain reach out openly to the dissidents. 
Moratinos replied that he had spoken publicly and privately 
during the Secretary,s June visit of Spain,s support for 
democracy in Cuba.  He claimed the differences with the U.S. 
were tactical but that our approaches could be complementary. 
 He said Spain sought to encourage those within the regime 
who wanted transition.  He said the transition was already 
underway and that all power had passed from Fidel to Raul 
Castro.  He asserted that there were some in Raul,s circle 
who at least wanted to begin to open the economy, and Spain 
wanted to help them.  He said Spain was supporting human 
rights and democracy in Cuba and did not want to cause the 
U.S. problems there.  He urged that Spain and the U.S. 
maintain a constant dialogue on Cuba.  A/S Fried agreed to 
dialogue but urged that Spain maintain a principled position. 
 
Appointment with Secretary 
-------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Moratinos said he hoped for a half hour appointment 
with the Secretary in Washington sometime before the November 
29-30 OSCE ministerial.  A/S Fried replied that would try. 
(Note:  Embassy Madrid has discussed various options with 
Moratinos, Chief of Staff, and it appears November 6-7 is 
the best window.  End note.) 
 
¶10. (U) A/S Fried cleared this cable. 
AGUIRRE