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FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LA PAZ 002873 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/EPSC FAITH CORNEILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2017 
TAGS: ECON PGOV AGR PREL EPET BL
SUBJECT: WINE AND GAS IN TARIJA:  ONE FLOWS FREELY 
 
REF: A. LA PAZ 2791 
 
     ¶B. LA PAZ 2777 
 
Classified By: Acting Ecopol Chief Brian S. Quigley for reasons 1.4 (b) 
 and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  (SBU)  The Department of Tarija forms the southern base 
of the so-called half moon, a grouping of departments 
resistant to the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) agenda.  It 
is home to both vineyards and almost all of the major 
Bolivian gas fields.  As a result, Tarija may be the 
wealthiest of all Bolivian departments, but it also provides 
an excellent example of the economic and political strains 
caused by MAS policies and practices.  While gas production 
remains stagnant and pipeline construction to the region 
stalled, local leaders worry about their future prosperity. 
On the political side of things, national government attempts 
to centralize resources has strengthened local sentiment for 
autonomy, but even in Tarija the MAS is adept at exploiting 
political divisions within the opposition. End Summary. 
 
-------------------- 
Concerned Prosperity 
-------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  Tarija enjoys a per capita GDP rate almost four 
times the national average of US$1,100.  Additionally, both 
department and municipal governments have more resources than 
ever before (due to local tax collection, gas royalties, the 
Direct Hydrocarbon Tax (IDH), and even Venezuelan checks). 
This year the prefect initiated a program which provides free 
health care for all its citizens.  In September Mayor Oscar 
Montes received a million dollar commitment from Venezuela to 
construct a new wing on the hospital (and a check for 
US$468,543 to initiate the project).  When asked about 
controls over the money, the mayor insisted that once he 
accepted the check, it entered the local budget and was 
subject to government accountability. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Tarija, like much of Bolivia, is enjoying the boom 
times of high consumer demand (ref A).  This prosperity is 
illustrated by the high demand for labor.  A day laborer in 
Tarija earns about double the national average of about US$4 
a day, and skilled craftsman are difficult to find, in part 
due to their immigration to Spain.  The president of the 
local chamber of commerce Julio Kohlberg, who is also the 
general manager of one of the largest wineries in the country 
(Kohlberg), said that the demand for labor was not just a 
local phenomenon; he had lost workers to the mines, where 
wages have risen some four times higher than the national 
average.  Moreover, a tradition of seasonal migration from 
the highland altiplano to the Tarija for harvest may be 
threatened.  Overall, however, he admitted that domestic wine 
sales been never been so strong and, in fact, they had just 
signed a contract for export to the Washington D.C. area, 
home to an estimated 300,000 Bolivians. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  The dark cloud that hovers over the region is that 
productive investments are lacking.  The economic advisor to 
the prefect estimated that 70% of investment over the past 
year was in construction.  As in much of the economy, 
activity centers around consumption and construction of 
non-productive assets.  Reasons for lack of private 
investment include:  central government threats, lack of 
legal protection, and the pervading climate of uncertainty. 
This is most evident, and foreboding for Tarija, in the gas 
sector. 
 
---------------------------- 
Where's My Nationalized Gas? 
 
LA PAZ 00002873  002 OF 003 
 
 
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¶5.  (C)  As most Bolivian gas originates in Tarija, the 
department has been active in promoting its use.  Currently 
however, industries running on gas are only operating at 70% 
of their capacity.  According to the local chamber of 
commerce, this is costing the businesses US$30,000 a day or 
nearly one million per month.  Moreover, a new ceramics 
factory sits idle for lack of gas in the local market (Note: 
It is ironic that much of the gas imported to Brazil goes to 
ceramic factories which, in turn, are internationally 
competitive because the less expensive gas gives them a 
competitive edge over diesel fired plants.  Moreover, in a 
recent victory for Petrobras the amount of gas put in the 
pipeline to Sao Paulo has increased from 30Mmcd to slightly 
over 31Mmcd. Bolivia argued that the maximum contractual 
obligation of 30Mmcd was what needed to be shipped; however, 
gas is burned at the pumping stations to power the product 
through the line and it appears that Brazil has successfully 
argued that 30Mmcd needs to be ultimately delivered not 
merely put in the system.  According to Jorge Luiz Kauer, 
General Manager of Transierra (a pipeline operator), 
shipments to Argentina have now fallen below 1Mmcd, far below 
the minimum contractual obligation of 4.6Mmcd. End Note). 
Two new small diameter pipelines are scheduled to be 
completed well behind schedule in November, but even with 
this additional gas Tarija will only be able to meet current 
demand.  It is not until a third, wider diameter pipeline is 
constructed that Tarija can contemplate boosting its gas 
consumption.  Despite the prefect's optimism that this 
pipeline will be constructed next year, most industry experts 
have serious doubts. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Investment plans for the sector over the coming year 
are generally limited to maintaining current production 
levels.  Additionally, there certainly has been no further 
action on a US$450 million gas separation plant for the 
department which was promised with much fanfare during the 
visit of Presidents Kirschner and Chavez in August.  One 
Petrobras geologist did confide that the company would 
conduct new exploration (the first and only report of new 
exploration by any major company), but only as a necessity to 
meet its own contractual obligations.  Meanwhile, consumers 
in Tarija are likely to go without.  In addition to 
industrial uses, the prefect has actively promoted the use of 
Vehicular Natural Gas (GNV) and much of the city fleet has 
been converted to GNV use.  In this Tarija is not alone; 
nationwide the number of vehicles using GNV has risen from 
4,364 in 1998 to over 63,000 in 2006.  With no current excess 
supply, and little hope of short term production increases, 
growing demand will not be met nationwide. Despite its 
rhetoric that the domestic market comes first, the national 
government, via the national oil company (YPFB) may soon be 
deciding which regions get the GNV they demand and which 
don't:  not a good scenario for Tarija. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Politics: United Up Front, Bickering In Back 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  Both the Prefect Dr. Mario Cossio and the Mayor 
Oscar Montes enjoy strong local popularity.  Both are also 
set to vigorously defend their respective share of the Direct 
Hydrocarbon Tax (IDH), which is under threat from the 
national government (ref B).  According to these respective 
leaders, the IDH represents around 50% of the municipal 
budget, while it accounts for only about 4% of the department 
budget.  Opposition to the central government's plans does 
not come without a cost however.  The state's representative 
in La Paz, Hugo Carvajal, said that all doors to the 
ministries were shut and the department's Secretary of 
Economic Development, Ernesto Farfan, said that they had been 
"placed in the refrigerator" by the Morales Administration. 
 
 
LA PAZ 00002873  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶8.  (C)  Opposition is also likely to take a personal toll. 
Both the department's planning minister and secretary of 
economic development have been accused of corruption by 
Minister of the Presidency Quintana and both thought that 
such personal attacks were likely to continue.  The prefect 
has approved the construction of an East/West highway across 
the state and even budgeted for their 30% share of the 
project, but there is no movement at the national level to 
come up with their proposed 70% share. (Note:  Tarija also is 
likely to suffer from the poor construction and oversight of 
the North/South highway link to Potosi and the heartland of 
the country.  Recently the contract with the Brazilian firm 
working on the project was canceled over accusations of 
shoddy construction. The project is likely to linger in legal 
limbo for the foreseeable future. End note). 
 
¶9.  (C)  The united front against the central government 
masks intense personal dislike and rivalry between the mayor 
and prefect.  This rivalry does not escape the MAS, who have 
proven adept at exploiting divisions among the opposition. 
Reynaldo Bayard, President of the Civic Committee, asserted 
that when the mayor and prefect are fighting, support for the 
MAS is likely to rise up to 10%.  He further bemoaned the 
lack of an effective communication system to combat MAS 
rhetoric (which has an official radio network across the 
state).  Finally, unofficially, contacts in both the Senate 
and local organizations admitted that they didn't trust 
Cossio and that he was trying to centralize too much local 
power.  Publicly, however, they all felt it was more 
important to unite behind the banner of an autonomous Tarija 
than to criticize his governance. 
 
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Comment 
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¶10.  (C)  Leaders in Tarija are content to allow Santa Cruz 
to play the lead role as the department of opposition. 
However, the economic and social situations in each 
department vary significantly, and Tarija should not be 
underestimated when it comes to defending its own interests. 
End Comment. 
GOLDBERG