VZCZCXRO5831
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDIR #0063/01 2951253
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 221253Z OCT 07
FM IRAN RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0184
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0134
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0168
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI 0177

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000063 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/22/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PMASS PREL PINR IR
SUBJECT: ABRUPT RESIGNATION OF IRAN'S TOP NUCLEAR NEGOTIATOR MAY 
SIGNAL HARDENING REGIME POSITION 
 
 
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CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian Burns, Director, Iran Regional Presence 
Office, Dubai. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
1.(C) Summary: The abrupt resignation of Ali Larijani as 
Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) on 
 
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Oct 20 is being read by many observers as a move to forestall 
any compromises on the nuclear issue, despite the assertion of 
the government spokesman that Iran's nuclear policy will remain 
the same.  One Iranian-American political analyst said the move 
indicates that Iran is confident of its position and does not 
perceive a credible threat from the US.  An Iranian political 
science professor noted that the move will have implications for 
conservatives in the 2008 Majles elections.  Larijani's 
replacement as SNCS Secretary and chief nuclear negotiator is 
Saeed Jalili, the Deputy Foreign Minister for European and 
American affairs, who has been described as devout and 
ideologically in line with President Ahmadi-Nejad.  Jalili also 
reportedly served as director general of the Supreme Leader's 
office from 2001-2005. 
 
2.(C) Summary cont'd: It remains to be seen whether the change 
was initiated by Supreme Leader Khamenei, who may feel that 
Larijani was becoming too compromising a negotiator, or by 
President Ahmadi-Nejad, in a bid to increase his control over 
nuclear policy.  It is notable that neither Khamenei nor 
Ahmadi-Nejad has made any public comments about Larijani's 
resignation.  Larijani will remain on the SNSC as one of the 
Supreme Leader's representatives.  It is not clear whether he 
will continue to have a role in Iranian nuclear policy, or 
whether he intends to run in the 2008 Majles elections or 
position himself to challenge Ahmadi-Nejad for the presidency 
again in 2009.  End summary. 
 
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Timing of resignation unexpected 
 
----------------------------------------- 
 
3.(U) Iranian government spokesman Elham announced the 
resignation of Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) 
Secretary Ali Larijani on October 20.  The fact of the 
 
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resignation was unsurprising-the rivalry between Larijani and 
President Ahmadi-Nejad is well known-but the timing was 
unexpected.  The announcement came only days after a meeting 
between Russian President Putin and Supreme Leader Khamenei, on 
the sidelines of a summit of Caspian Sea countries in Tehran. 
Larijani, who was reportedly not present at the Khamenei-Putin 
meeting, told state-run news IRNA on Oct 17 that Putin had 
presented a special view about Iran's nuclear program during the 
meeting and that Iran would study the view proposed by Putin. 
However, the following day President Ahmadi-Nejad directly 
contradicted Larijani, denying that Putin had proposed anything 
regarding the nuclear program.  In the resignation announcement, 
government spokesman Elham said that Larijani had submitted his 
resignation several times in the past, and that Ahmadi-Nejad had 
finally accepted it on this occasion. Elham said that Larijani 
resigned for "personal reasons" and to pursue other political 
activities. 
 
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Replacement announced simultaneously 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
4.(U) On the same day that Larijani's resignation was announced, 
presidential advisor Mojtaba Samareh Hashemi also announced the 
appointment of Saeed Jalili as Larijani's successor.  According 
to press profiles of Jalili, he is a veteran of the Iran-Iraq 
war and a close friend of Ahmadi-Nejad.  Jalili was reportedly 
born in 1965, has a PhD in Political Science (NFI) and served as 
director general of the Supreme Leader's office from 2001-2005. 
After the 2005 presidential elections, he became and advisor to 
Ahmadi-Nejad, and in September 2005 became Deputy Foreign 
Minister for European and American Affairs.  Jalili has been 
described as devout ideologically in line with the president. 
 
5.(U) Some conservative MPs and newspapers have criticized 
Jalili's appointment, complaining of his comparative lack of 
experience.  Conservative newspaper Hamshahri wrote that 
although the resignation will not change Iran's policies, "it 
will influence the course of the talks.  The absence of a 
skilful diplomat in the talks will have serious repercussions." 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000063  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Other conservative newspapers, including Resalat, Jam-e-Jam, and 
Keyhan, praised Larijani in editorials and commentaries. 
Expediency Council Secretary Mohsen Rezai called Larijani's 
tenure "successful and productive" and that he "successfully 
foiled many threats using his acumen and acting within the 
framework of his mandate from the Leader."  MP and Majles 
Research Center director Ahmad Tavakoli (reportedly a cousin to 
Larijani) said he was "saddened" by Larijani's resignation, 
adding that Larijani's status and power to attain the rights of 
Iranians was more than that of a "deputy foreign minister with a 
low profile." 
 
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Changes in nuclear policy? 
 
--------------------------------- 
 
6.(C) Government officials have asserted repeatedly that the 
resignation will not result in any changes in Iranian nuclear 
policy.  However, several observers and analysts have commented 
that the change indicates a hardening of Iran's negotiating 
position.  Two Iranian businessmen separately told IRPOff that 
Larijani was likely perceived as too flexible, suggesting that 
Larijani had become more compromising during the course of his 
nuclear talks with the EU.  One Iranian-American political 
analyst who was based in Tehran said that the resignation means 
that Tehran is confident of its position on the nuclear issue 
and does not perceive a credible threat. 
 
7.(C) It remains to be seen whether the change was initiated by 
Supreme Leader Khamenei, who may feel that Larijani was becoming 
too compromising a negotiator, or by President Ahmadi-Nejad, in 
a bid to increase his control over nuclear policy.  It is 
notable that neither Khamenei nor Ahmadi-Nejad has made any 
public comments about Larijani's resignation.  Larijani will 
remain on the SNSC as the Supreme Leader's representative, but 
this is likely simply a face-saving gesture.  The foreign 
ministry spokesman also confirmed that Larijani, along with 
Jalili, will meet EU foreign policy chief Solana as planned Oct 
23 in Rome.  Beyond the Oct 23 meeting with Solana, it is not 
clear whether Larijani will have any further role in Iranian 
nuclear policy. 
 
¶8. (C) Larijani's resignation and apparent abrupt diminution in 
status mirrors the similar fate of Iran's preceding SNSC 
secretary and chief negotiator on the nuclear program, Hassan 
 
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Rowhani.  Rowhani was similarly defrocked in July 2005, a 
sensitive juncture in negotiations with the EU-3, and replaced 
in both capacities by Larijani.  According to press reports at 
the time, Rowhani submitted his resignation to Supreme Leader 
Khamenei just prior to the inauguration of president 
Ahmadi-Nejad the following month.  Under Rowhani, Iran had 
voluntarily suspended nuclear enrichment for two years during 
negotiations with the EU-3.  Observers speculated that Rowhani, 
who was close to Khamenei and generally considered a trusted 
conservative pillar of the regime (much like Larijani), was 
removed for being too accommodating in nuclear negotiations. 
 
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Election implications 
 
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¶9. (C) The political analyst also suggested to IRPOff that 
Larijani may have voluntarily resigned in order to disassociate 
himself from nuclear policy and avoid being blamed for any 
serious repercussions, particularly in advance of the 2008 
Majles elections.  The analyst suggested that by resigning 
Larijani disassociated not only himself, but also the 
traditional conservatives, from the more radical Ahmadi-Nejad. 
The analyst was not optimistic, though, about Larijani's chances 
of winning the 2009 presidential election, if he decided to run. 
 An Iranian political science professor said the resignation 
should be viewed in the context of the Majles elections.  He 
suggested that the conservatives needed an insider to "play the 
role of opposition," a tactic which he said was successful for 
them in the past.  The professor said that in the 2005 
presidential election, Larijani strongly criticized Khatami-era 
compromises with the IAEA, while Ahmadi-Nejad's comments were 
somewhat more moderate.  It is not clear yet whether Larijani 
intends to run in the Majles elections in March, or to challenge 
Ahmadi-Nejad for the presidency again in 2009.  Conservative 
groups have had difficulty coalescing to create an electoral 
strategy, and Larijani may be a figure that traditionalists and 
moderate conservatives could rally around in the run up to the 
 
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March Majles elections. 
BURNS