VZCZCXRO4124
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHDO #0979/01 2820941
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 090941Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7134
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1062
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/TSA HQ WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 000979 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR DS, DSS, DS/T/ATA, AND DS/IP 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP ASHLEY BAGWELL AND SANJAY RAMESH 
STATE FOR EEB/TRA JOHN BYERLY, MEGAN WALKLET-TIGHE, AND WIN 
DAYTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2017 
TAGS: ASEC KSAC EAIR QA
SUBJECT: QATAR AIRWAYS U.S. FLIGHTS - GETTING SECURITY RIGHT 
 
Classified By: CDA Michael A. Ratney, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Barely two months after the inauguration of 
direct Doha to U.S. flights via Qatar Airways, an assessment 
by Transportation Security Administration (TSA) inspectors 
found several major areas of concern for the flights, 
including insufficient passenger screening, particularly for 
women, a lack of supervisor oversight, and questions over 
hold baggage screening.  The TSA team also observed wider 
problems at the airport, most notably lax screening of 
transfer passengers and an absence of screening for transfer 
baggage.  While these concerns may not have a direct impact 
on the U.S.-bound flights, they are a potential threat to 
European and other countries. 
 
¶2. (C) These problems are compounded by erratic security 
department management at Qatar Airways and the carrier's 
domination of the aviation sector, which leaves the Civil 
Aviation Authority relatively feckless.  The Ministry of 
Interior police have primary screening responsibility but are 
short-staffed and suffer from a lack of motivation.  Post has 
worked with TSA to engage the GOQ and carrier on multiple 
levels to highlight U.S. concerns and find sustainable 
solutions.  TSA has noted significant improvements in 
screening but the challenge remains ensuring sustainability 
when inspectors are not present.  Growing the carrier and 
police into full security responsibility will take time; 
using a private firm with police supervision to handle 
everyday screening may provide a short-term fix to ensure the 
security of U.S. flights. END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------ 
SCREENING PROBLEMS WITH U.S. FLIGHTS 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) Direct Qatar Airways flights from Doha to Newark (via 
Geneva) started in July, and from Doha to Washington-Dulles 
non-stop in August.  A TSA visit to observe and assist with 
the flights' start-up was extended to a three-week effort to 
help Qatar Airways and the police establish sustainable 
screening procedures.  TSA sent a two-person inspection team 
back to Doha in mid-September to conduct a 60-day follow-up 
assessment, during which it was clear that problems with 
passenger and baggage screening persisted.  TSA inspectors 
have remained in Doha to conduct daily observation of the 
direct Dulles flight and in several instances have intervened 
to correct screening inadequacies. 
 
¶4. (C) The TSA team found that sustainability of screening to 
U.S. standards was a major problem and specifically 
identified the following problems: 
 
-- The Ministry of Interior police have primary 
responsibility for screening but they suffer from staffing 
shortages and a lack of trainers, supervisors, and screeners 
familiar with U.S. and/or ICAO standards. 
 
-- Supervisor oversight is weak to non-existent and there is 
usually no intervention when police are not screening 
correctly. 
 
-- Screening of female passengers is often cursory or done 
incorrectly.  Female police screeners wear abayyas, making it 
harder to do proper screening. 
 
-- Screeners often allow contamination of baggage - i.e., a 
screened passenger accesses his/her luggage before it is 
screened, or a screened bag is given back to an unscreened 
passenger. 
 
-- The layout of the economy-class gate for the Dulles flight 
causes congestion which can lead to screening mistakes. 
 
-- The premier terminal (i.e. exclusive for first- and 
business-class passengers) gate for the Dulles flight 
currently utilizes a bus that has been transformed into a 
mobile checkpoint.  However, the metal in the bus and the 
heat from the outdoor environment render the metal detector 
and the X-ray machine useless.  This necessitates physical 
searches of all passengers and luggage, which are then 
subject to the same problems noted above. 
 
-- Checked baggage screening appears lax; for example, the 
TSA inspectors entered the baggage screening facility without 
 
SIPDIS 
notice and observed the ostensible baggage screener reading a 
 
DOHA 00000979  002 OF 004 
 
 
newspaper instead of watching the X-ray machine. 
 
-- Aircraft search teams usually only do a cursory check.  On 
a recent day when the TSA team observed aircraft search 
procedures, the carrier's team took over an hour searching 
the aircraft.  However, when TSA examined the carrier's 
training records, they found that on all other days the team 
completed their search in less than half that time. 
 
------------------------------ 
WIDER ISSUES WITH DOHA AIRPORT 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (C) Although screening for the U.S. flights is 
problematic, Doha International Airport as a whole faces much 
wider security issues.  The most serious concerns noted by 
the TSA team and Emboffs include: 
 
-- Transfer passengers often receive only cursory screening 
or are not screened at all.  For example, on several days TSA 
witnessed police officers waving large numbers of transfer 
passengers through the metal detectors. 
 
-- Originating passenger baggage is screened in the general 
terminal area and then given back to the passengers, allowing 
for contamination of the baggage. 
 
-- Transfer baggage not going to the United States is not 
screened. 
 
-- Security screening of liquids, gels, and aerosols per ICAO 
mandate is rarely initiated or enforced. 
 
------------------------------------ 
BUREAUCRATIC AND MANAGEMENT DISARRAY 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) Based on Post's observation of the aviation sector, 
security appears to be an afterthought for both the GOQ and 
the carrier.  The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) employs only 
one security advisor (a British expatriate formerly with 
ICAO) but he is not empowered and in fact has never met the 
Chairman of the CAA.  While the CAA legally has an overall 
aviation role, Qatar Airways has control over the airport and 
together with the police makes the decisions and appears to 
have the prerogative in setting standards.  Post has been 
unable to schedule a meeting with the CAA Chairman for over 
two weeks; it is unclear if this is due to typically 
lethargic Qatari scheduling or if he is specifically trying 
to avoid a meeting. 
 
¶7. (C) Qatar Airways CEO Akbar Al-Baker, who dominates not 
only airline management, but the airport and CAA as well, 
wants to see the success of U.S. flights and has strong 
ambitions to expand the carrier into a world-class airline. 
However, he has a well-deserved reputation for capriciousness 
and micromanagement.  The most problematic aspect of the 
carrier's security program is its complete lack of any 
credentialed, trained, and committed security managers. 
Qatar Airways employed a former British DATT in Doha as a 
security advisor for a six-month period but did not renew his 
contract when it expired in August.  This advisor believes he 
was brought on to help the carrier through the TSA approval 
process and relieved once the carrier believed that hurdle 
had been cleared. 
 
¶8. (C) The carrier's security portfolio is currently held by 
an Indian expat named Benny Thomas who, for reasons that are 
unclear, appears to have the favor of Al-Baker.  Post 
believes Thomas exerts a poisonous influence within the 
carrier.  For example, the former British DATT accused him of 
corruption (e.g., selling or doling out financially lucrative 
security slots on the Amiri flights to carrier employees) and 
incompetence (e.g., sharing his restricted access to TSA's 
webboard system with uncleared coworkers).  Moreover, a 
carrier employee recently approached a TSA inspector to say 
that Thomas had told carrier staff to raise the level of 
their security operations while TSA was in Doha, but that 
things could go "back to normal" once the team departs.  In 
meetings with embassy and TSA representatives, Thomas has 
consistently downplayed TSA concerns and sought to excuse 
specific failings. There are several lower-ranking 
third-country nationals who show motivation and knowledge of 
proper screening procedures, but Post believes the carrier's 
security management will continue to be impaired until Thomas 
 
DOHA 00000979  003 OF 004 
 
 
is removed. 
 
-------------------------- 
EMBASSY AND TSA ENGAGEMENT 
-------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Given the concerns outlined above, Post has worked 
closely with TSA to impress upon Qatari officials the gravity 
of the security situation and work with Qatari interlocutors 
to find sustainable ways to bring screening for U.S. flights 
up to standard and improve the overall aviation security 
posture.  TSA has noted significant improvements in screening 
but the challenge remains ensuring sustainability when 
inspectors are not present.  Post's specific efforts include: 
 
-- Charge, RSO, and a member of the TSA inspection team met 
with Minister of State for Internal Affairs (defacto Interior 
Minister) Sheikh Abdulla Bin Nassir Bin Khalifa Al Thani and 
separately with Director of Airport Police Brigadier Nasser 
Ahmed Al-Malki to convey U.S. concerns and press for improved 
police staffing and engagement.  Sheikh Abdulla visited the 
airport on October 4 to observe flight operations and TSA 
representatives have noted increased police responsiveness 
since then. 
 
-- TSA and Embassy officers have met several times with 
Al-Baker, including some very blunt conversations about the 
implications of not improving airline security practices, and 
have used his influence and enthusiasm for the U.S. flights 
to motivate the police.  One area of progress is that TSA and 
Al-Baker appear to have convinced the police to begin using 
regular uniforms for female screeners, which should make 
their attire more suited to their duties. 
 
-- TSA and Econoff have worked closely with the CAA's 
security advisor to highlight security problems and encourage 
the authority to exercise its oversight and investigative 
authorities. 
 
-- TSA and RSO, through the auspices of the ATA program, are 
pursuing expedited training courses including "Airport 
Security Management II" and "Quality Control in Civil 
Aviation Security." 
 
-- TSA inspectors have conducted several training sessions 
for police supervisors and screeners, and for carrier 
personnel. 
 
-- Econoff and DATT met with the British DATT in Doha to 
highlight the vulnerabilities inherent in the lack of 
transfer screening (British Airways has several flights per 
day between Doha and the UK).  British Ministry of Transport 
officials recently conducted their own assessment of the 
airport and found many of the same problems.  The British 
representative will be making a follow up visit by the end of 
the year which will allow for further scrutiny and pressure 
on the GOQ.  Econoff is following up with other European 
countries with direct flights from Doha to try to widen the 
front of countries pressuring the GOQ for change. 
 
-- TSA Administrator Kip Hawley called and wrote a letter to 
Al-Baker to underscore U.S. concerns. 
 
------------------------------ 
POST THINKING ON A WAY FORWARD 
------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) Direct Qatar Airways flights to the United States 
help foster the growing U.S. business ties with Qatar and are 
an important and tangible boon to the bilateral relationship. 
 Al-Baker has recently shown a preference for U.S. aircraft 
and the present all-Airbus fleet will be diversified starting 
this November when the carrier begins to take delivery of 
Boeing 777s.  The flights are also an important political 
showpiece for the Amir and a key component of Qatar Airways' 
expansion plans.  Clearly, the GOQ at the highest levels 
wants these flights, and they are important to the U.S as 
well.  The dilemma is that security just has not been an area 
of concern for the GOQ and the carrier.  Post's Qatari 
interlocutors are beginning to get the message that this is a 
serious USG concern with potential major ramifications. 
However, due to the primary role of the Qatari police in 
airport security - and the requirement that those police be 
trained, motivated, and competent - Qatar has reached the 
limits of what money can buy.  Further, Al-Baker's mercurial 
 
DOHA 00000979  004 OF 004 
 
 
management style has created a carrier whose operations are 
"held together with sticky tape," in the words of the British 
former advisor.  In sum, Qatar's aviation woes extend far 
beyond what the U.S can affect by working around the margins 
on U.S. flights only. 
 
¶11. (C) Post's primary concern remains ensuring the security 
of U.S. flights.  Post and TSA representatives concur that 
further training via ATA and TSA-specific programs is 
important though unlikely to be fully effective given the 
sustainability and staffing issues noted above.  Post's 
efforts thus far have centered on two areas.  First, the 
police need to provide a dedicated team of trained screeners 
and supervisors for U.S. flights and develop a training 
program with personnel that meet U.S. and ICAO standards.  We 
continue to press this message with Qatari interlocutors and 
support the TSA team as they work to identify and train 
proper staff.  Second, until the GOQ and carrier achieve a 
more comprehensive level of security awareness, they should 
employ a private security firm to handle screening.  There 
are several firms that meet ICAO standards which could 
quickly deploy to Doha.  Al-Baker appears to favor this idea 
but the police are obviously reluctant due to their primary 
role in screening.  Post and TSA will continue to work to 
press a compromise that would give immediate control to a 
professional company but allow the police the chance to grow 
into the role of screening. 
 
¶12.  (U) TSA Representative Dan Furlong and TSA Inspector 
Edward O'Loughlin cleared this message. 
RATNEY