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DE RUEHCH #1301/01 2981214
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P 251214Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY CHISINAU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5852
INFO RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 4234
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0532
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3248
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2355

C O N F I D E N T I A L CHISINAU 001301 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2017 
TAGS: OSCE PBTS PREL PINR MD
SUBJECT: TRANSNISTRIA OPTS TO DEAL WITH MOLDOVA -- FOR NOW 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michael D. Kirby for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  In a reversal of earlier policy, 
Transnistria's Foreign Minister Valery Litskai said at an 
informal 5 plus 2 gathering that he was open for dialogue 
with Chisinau and praised President Voronin's initiatives on 
Transnistria.  Litskai said Transnistria was prepared to 
resolve the thorny issues dividing the two sides, including 
demilitarization of the region, and called on Chisinau to 
work out specific projects.  Litskai said Transnistria only 
wanted veto powers over unilateral changes to Transnistria's 
future status.  The Russian envoy tried to lower expectations 
of a breakthrough and argued the 5 plus 2 format was 
irrelevant for the time being.  The next informal meeting 
between Moldovan and Transnistrian negotiators is scheduled 
to take place by November 10, and the likely date for 5 plus 
2 talks would be November 19, if Litskai-Sova talks are 
successful. 
 
Litskai: Transnistria ready for serious talks 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) At an informal three-hour 5 plus 2 dinner in Odessa 
October 23 on the margins of an OSCE Confidence-Building 
seminar, Transnistria's "Foreign Minister" Valery Litskai was 
uncharacteristically polite and open to a serious dialogue. 
Litskai welcomed President Voronin's initiatives and 
characterized his earlier public rebuttals as 
politically-motivated PR.  He emphasized the timing was 
propitious for unprecedented thawing because the situation on 
the ground had improved and Transnistria no longer faced an 
economic blockade and a possible melt-down of its financial 
system. 
 
¶3. (C) In a private conversation, Litskai asked whether the 
US continued to support a federal solution of the conflict. 
Litskai explained economic and security guarantees, including 
Russian military presence, were less important than a veto 
power over unilateral changes of Transnistria's status in a 
reunified Moldova.  He emphasized Tiraspol did not want to 
stymie Chisinau's economic or foreign policy but needed an 
institutional arrangement that would prevent Chisinau from 
"swallowing" the region. 
 
Sova: Moldova will work with Tiraspol 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Moldova's Minister for Reintegration Vasile Sova (who 
by mutual agreement sat next to Litskai at the table) praised 
Transnistria's open-mindedness and said the GoM would 
establish seven task forces to promote President Voronin's 
initiatives.  He pledged that specific project proposals 
would be worked out for Transnistria.  Litskai promised 
prompt feedback and called for more active involvement of 
Transnistrian and Moldovan parliaments in order to build a 
lasting foundation for the eventual political solution of the 
conflict.  (Note: Last week Moldovan Parliamentary Speaker 
Lupu proposed inter-parliamentary contacts.  End Note.)  Sova 
and Litskai are scheduled to meet again by November 10 to 
discuss specific projects drafted by the GoM's working groups. 
 
Litskai: demilitarization not an issue 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Litskai pointed out that the Moldova region could be 
demilitarized rapidly provided civilian retraining programs 
 
for Transnistrian servicemen and external guarantees were in 
place.  Litskai argued the command staff could speedily work 
out a schedule for destroying military hardware and 
emphasized neither Moldova nor Transnistria needed their 
armies because they faced no military threats.  He added that 
Transnistria's military capacity is shrinking each year as 
older officers retire without trained younger ones to take 
their places.  Finally, he noted that the Transnistrian youth 
are uninterested in serving in the military and are 
constantly seeking shorter terms when compelled to serve. 
 
¶6. (C) Litskai was quite open when he said the there was no 
need for either the Moldovan or the Transnistrian forces to 
have sophisticated weapons.  Rifles, he said, were enough. 
He noted that one of the factors working in favor of 
potential future demilitarization was that no one had been 
providing either side with weapons.  In the long-run, Litskai 
suggested that Transnistria could get on just fine with a 
1,000-person strong gendarmerie and the Moldovan side could 
have a similar force of some 2,000 to 4,000. 
 
Transnistria wants assistance 
----------------------------- 
¶7. (C) Litksai said Western countries made a big mistake by 
shunning Transnistria before and lavished praised on the 
Ambassador's suggestion to include Transnistria in the MCC 
program.  He said his office could issue a call for aid to 
Transnistria's farmers if the US was willing to provide it. 
 
Nesterushkin: 5 plus 2 framework irrelevant 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Russian Envoy for Transnistrian talks Valery 
Nesterushkin said at a breakfast the next day that he was 
taken aback by Litskai's "overtures."  Nesterushkin tried to 
lower expectation of a breakthrough, saying similar thawing 
led nowhere on previous occasions.  Nesterushkin added that 
the 5 plus 2 negotiating framework was hanging in the balance 
and was irrelevant for the "bilateral" talks between Moldova 
and Transnistria, which seemed to be gaining momentum.  He 
said that the 5 plus 2 should not meet any time soon because 
it had nothing to discuss at this stage.  Despite 
Nesterushkin's hope to disband Q)- or freeze -- the 5 plus 2, 
the Spanish Chair said it would send an invitation to the 
parties to participate in a 5 plus 2 meeting, which might 
again be "informal."  In response to DAS Kramer's suggestion 
that the invitation await the results of the next 
Sova-Litskai meeting, the Spanish said a letter might be 
forthcoming which would ask for a 5 plus 2 if the 
Sova-Litskai confab went well.  At the end of the informal 
talks at breakfast, the Spanish said they would likely ask to 
hold talks on November 19 in Madrid if the Sova-Litskai 
discussions went well. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9. (C) Transnistria's political leadership is seeking not to 
lose its grip on power now that it is faced with pressure 
from business elites which benefit from EU's trade 
preferences that only Moldova can provide.  Voronin's 
enticing offers go far to facilitate Transnistria's exports 
and accommodate its grievances.  With the prospect of 
economic collapse caused by the Russian suspension of aid and 
exacerbated by a serious drought, Transnistrian business 
interests are loath to reject Voronin's proposals out of 
hand.  Litskai's overtures may be designed to test the ground 
for a dQtente and possibly a more serious dialogue between 
Chisinau and Tiraspol.  Smirnov now faces more restricted 
room for maneuver and may now have to accommodate his 
domestic constituency and consider Moldova's offers. 
 
¶10. (C) That Nesterushkin looked genuinely surprised by the 
extent of Litskai's willingness to find common ground on key 
issues suggests that Russia may be an important target of 
Litskai's message.  Transnistria's new-found openness to 
Moldova could be meant as a powerful signal to Russia to 
resume aid and stop harassing the regime.  Next week, Litskai 
will be in Moscow for talks with the MFA, which may be 
decisive in determining the direction of next steps, and a 
meeting of "foreign ministers" from Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia.  The Ambassador plans to meet with Litskai in 
Tiraspol after his return from Moscow. 
 
¶11. (C) We are witnessing events unfolding rapidly with new 
momentum.  However, optimism should be tempered by the fact 
that Litskai is known to change his positions rapidly, and 
dangle concessions in front of everyone to buy time.  The 
Transnistrians may feign willingness to compromise but just 
drag their feet until after presidential elections in Russia, 
rather than rely on promises from a lame-duck regime.  Even 
if Litskai and the Transnistrians are serious about 
cooperating with Chisinau, one should not underestimate the 
Moldovan Government's ability to mess things up. 
 
KIRBY