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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BRUSSELS 003248 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE ALSO FOR EUR/ERA, EUR/SCE, EUR/ACE 
PLEASE PASS TO USAID/EE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2017 
TAGS: PREL EAID ZL EUN
SUBJECT: U.S.-EU CONSULTATIONS ON W.BALKANS:  CONCERN OVER 
BIH, MOVEMENT ON KOSOVO, ENGAGEMENT WITH SERBIA 
 
REF: (A) BRUSSELS 3192 (B) BRUSSELS 3120 
 
Classified By: POL Enlargement Unit Chief V. Carver for reasons 1.5 (B/ 
D). 
 
SUMMARY 
- - - - 
 
¶1.  (C) EU and member state officials told EUR/SCE Director 
Chris Hoh, during the Oct. 24 U.S.-EU consultations on the W. 
Balkans (COWEB) and in separate meetings in Brussels, that 
they are reviewing the possible launch of an ESDP mission in 
Kosovo before a UDI and that a "critical mass" of member 
states will recognize Kosovo independence -- both of which 
will be made easier for member states if the EU is consulted 
closely on a timeline leading to a UDI.  Several contacts 
observed that Serbia may interrupt energy supplies to an 
independent Kosovo and that Moscow and Belgrade will force 
the closure of the OSCE mission there.  EU interlocutors 
expressed concern about Dodik's threats in BiH.  While 
stressing full support for HR Lajcak and the gradual 
escalation of Bonn Power measures, a few interlocutors 
questioned EU willingness to support very tough steps, 
including ultimately removing Dodik.  The Portuguese 
Presidency confirmed that it will raise BiH during the 
EU-Russia Summit Oct. 26.  All stressed the need to 
strengthen Serbia's European identity, predicted a quick 
initialing of an SAA with Serbia absent a negative assessment 
from Del Ponte following her upcoming Belgrade trip, and 
pointed to visa facilitation as one of the EU's strongest 
tools in strengthening EU-Serbia ties.  Several contacts 
expressed disappointment with the pace of reform in 
Macedonia, with some characterizing the political class there 
as "not mature."  The Commission noted it would not recommend 
a date in its Nov. 6 report for the beginning of formal 
accession negotiations with Skopje.  The EU views Montenegro 
and Albania as success stories, although more needs to be 
done in both countries on fighting corruption and organized 
crime.  Hoh also discussed Croatia, with the EU expecting a 
heightened pace of reform after the elections; EU officials 
also called for the continuation of the OSCE Mission in 
Croatia.  List of interlocutors in paras 22-23.  END SUMMARY 
 
 
 
KOSOVO 
- - - 
 
¶2.  (C) Council Secretariat Director for the W. Balkans 
Stefan Lehne underscored EU support for the troika process 
and for EU rep Ischinger's call to intensify the process. 
According to Lehne, EU FMs have expressed four major goals 
regarding  Kosovo:  (1) maintaining regional stability; (2) 
strengthening EU engagement, including via an ESDP mission; 
(3) resolving Kosovo while keeping Serbia on its European 
track; and (4) maintaining EU unity.  (He observed these 
goals are not always easy to reconcile with each other.) 
Lehne said there is little expectation that Kosovo Serbs will 
participate in the November 17 elections.  The EU has been 
sending "clear messages" to Belgrade that any organization of 
parallel elections by Kosovo Serbs would be a clear violation 
of UNSCR 1244.  Turning to the potential ESDP mission and the 
ICO, Lehne noted that the EU had extended the mandates for 
the preparatory teams for both through the end of March.  The 
EU, he emphasized, is "moving forward" on procurement and 
force generation as part of "prudent planning," which does 
not prejudge final status.  While questions remain regarding 
the legal basis, and the cooperation of the UNSYG will be 
essential, there is a "strong will" in the EU to deploy the 
missions. 
 
¶3.  (C) Portuguese Special Envoy for the W. Balkans Tanger, 
however, told Hoh during a separate meeting that some EU 
countries are "more hesitant" than a few months ago regarding 
moving forward on Kosovo, largely because Kosovo will have 
"huge consequences" for the region (Tanger specified Spain 
"because of Basque calls for a referendum" and Hungary, 
Romania, and Slovakia because of their large ethnic 
minorities).  Lehne stressed that the U.S. and the EU should 
continue to pressure the Unity Team to remain united.  Hoh 
underscored U.S. support for the troika process, emphasized 
the need for continued prudent planning, and noted the 
December 10 deadline for the troika's report to the UNSYG. 
Time, he noted, is not on the IC's side.  Further delays 
would lead to increased radicalization on both sides.  Hoh 
also stressed the need for the EU as an institution to meet 
the challenge of Kosovo and help manage the situation on the 
ground by solidifying and maintaining a resolute approach. 
 
 
BRUSSELS 00003248  002 OF 006 
 
 
¶4.  (C) In a separate meeting, Lehne told us that the ESDP 
Mission would "not be a problem," although much depends on 
the UNSYG.  The EU, he said, would be meeting in mid-November 
with DPKO to discuss how best to proceed, including 
identifying the legal basis for further action.  According to 
Lehne, UNSYG Ban had called Solana a few weeks earlier to 
advise that his (Ban's) room for maneuver was narrowing. 
Lehne said that, while the mission could "formally" report to 
the UNSR, it could not operationally be under a UN chain of 
command.  The ICO, a "creature of the Ahtisaari concept," 
could be established, perhaps at the invitation of the UNSYG. 
 Lehne added that member state recognition of Kosovo would be 
"more problematic."  Hoh strongly advised that the EU find a 
way to address these issues soon so that the IC can be ready 
to provide the Kosovars a clear roadmap with "a light at the 
end of the tunnel." 
 
¶5.  (C) Hoh reiterated U.S. support for the troika process in 
an October 24 meeting with Portuguese PSC Ambassador Pais and 
Slovenian PSC Ambassador Ipavic.  Pais noted that EU troika 
member Wolfgang Ischinger had briefed the PSC October 23. 
According to Pais, Ischinger stressed that Kosovo, under 
international administrative for almost 10 years following a 
near genocide, is a unique case.  Pais said the Portuguese 
Presidency sees "a reason for optimism," and "a measure of 
consensus" on the way forward, including the possible 
launching of an ESDP mission before a UDI.  The Presidency is 
considering setting the stage for this at the November 19 
GAERC, but could run into difficulties, given that the GAERC 
comes before the troika report to the UNSYG.  The EU 
continues to review how 1244 could serve as the legal basis 
for such a mission.  Tanger asked for USG legal experts to 
consult with the EU.  Hoh indicated we are doing so with EU 
members of the Contact Group and they should play the lead 
role in consulting with the rest of the EU on these issues. 
Pais said Portugal would try to send "strong signals" on 
Kosovo via the "ESDP effort." 
 
¶6.  (C) Pais noted that a continued OSCE mission in Kosovo 
could help support the rationale for "other organizations" to 
establish missions there.  In this regard, a "signal" from 
the U.S. regarding the continuation of the OSCE Mission in 
Kosovo would be helpful.  Ipavic agreed that launching an 
ESDP Mission before a UDI might be easier, but observed that 
it might be misinterpreted by the region.  Ipavic floated the 
possibility of an ESDP Mission and "then, the Montenegro 
scenario," whereby a referendum on independence would be held 
"after a certain period."  That said, she cautioned against 
"falling into the trap" of continued calls from Serbia for 
further delays.  In any case, Slovenia is prepared to call a 
special GAERC in January to discuss Kosovo and, presumably, 
move forward on individual recognition.  Hoh said that the 
U.S. and EU should be prepared soon to provide the Kosovo 
Albanians a clear roadmap and time-frame of anticipated 
actions; he reiterated that the troika's report to the UNSYG 
would conclude negotiations.  Regarding OSCE, he agreed on 
the mission's importance but noted that Russian signals were 
not encouraging.  We needed to be prepared that they and/or 
Belgrade could force its shutdown, even though its presence 
served to benefit Serb communities and in the past Milosevic 
himself had not objected to a robust OSCE presence in Kosovo. 
 
¶7.  (C) Separately, Romanian PSC Ambassador Ardeleanu told 
Hoh that the Serbs perceive that the dissolution of the 
ex-Yugoslavia will not end with Kosovo, but will continue 
with other parts of Serbia seeking independence, e.g. 
Vojvodina and Sandzak.  Ardeleanu said a "unilateral 
solution" to Kosovo will not serve as a good example, even if 
it is "not a precedent."  (Carl Hallergard of Solana's 
Private Office noted in a separate meeting that both Ukraine 
and Georgia have expressed "complaints" to the EU regarding 
how Russia will manipulate the Kosovo example.  He added that 
some non-permanent members of the UNSC also continue to have 
reservations regarding Kosovo independence.)  Ardeleanu 
continued that "some sort of agreed solution" must be found. 
In this vein, more pressure must be placed on the Kosovo 
Albanians, he concluded.  Hoh and the Italian and UK 
representatives pushed back, noting that all are supporting 
the troika process, but that chances of it resulting in a 
negotiated solution remain slim.  Hungarian PSC Ambassador 
Kos stressed the need for incentives for Serbia, particularly 
to help pro-democracy forces there offer the Serbian 
population concrete and positive results of the Euro 
integration process.  Kos and the Italian representative 
cautioned that the West could lose Serbia "for a number of 
years" if the Radicals came to power as a result of Kosovo 
independence.  Kos also expressed concern about the potential 
"disaster" of a refugee flow of Kosovo Serbs to Vojvodina 
after final status. 
 
BRUSSELS 00003248  003 OF 006 
 
 
 
¶8.  (C) During an October 24 meeting, ICR-designate Peter 
Feith expressed concern over possible retaliatory measures 
from Belgrade in light of final status, including power 
supply cuts. Feith also noted the "build-up" of Serb parallel 
structures in northern Kosovo.  According to Feith, Ischinger 
has suggested that UNMIK or the Contact Group should raise 
this with Belgrade, given that it contradicts the spirit of 
Belgrade's pledge not to engage in unhelpful rhetoric or 
provocative actions during the troika process.  Turning to 
other concerns, Feith noted "some nervousness" among NATO 
allies that some troop contributing countries will withdraw 
forces from Kosovo.  He also noted the possible closure of 
the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (which Hallergard termed 
"likely"), reasoning that even a several-month extension 
would be better than immediate closure.  Feith expressed 
cautious optimism that the ESDP Mission would proceed and 
that a critical mass of member states would recognize an 
independent Kosovo, despite the fact that some countries, 
"including Italy," are a bit shaky.  Feith noted that more 
discussion is needed with the UN over the ESDP Mission, 
including the possible double and triple hatting of the EUSR. 
 
 
SERBIA 
- - - 
 
¶9.  (C) Tanger noted that Kostunica's continued manipulation 
of the Kosovo issue for internal political reasons, as well 
as news of ethnic clashes and disputes within the Serbian 
Orthodox Church, are worrisome.  Tanger urged that the IC 
continue its contacts with Tadic and the armed forces, but 
also increase its dialogue with Kostunica. Lehne stressed 
that the EU is trying to keep Serbia's SAA process as 
separate from the Kosovo issue as possible.  Member states 
would be as "forgiving as possible" regarding Serbian 
behavior after final status, in the hope that Belgrade would 
quickly emerge from its post-final status sulk.  Separately, 
Pais reported that Ischinger had told the PSC that "Serbia 
wants to play the victim."  Pais regretted that the EU has 
few tools in addition to the SAA ("too little and too late" 
in Pais' view) to help Serbia save face.  Hoh agreed on the 
need to keep Serbia's Euro-Atlantic vision in sight and urged 
the EU to consider additional and creative ways to 
demonstrate that a modern, multi-ethnic, and democratic 
Serbia remains welcome in Europe, including the prospect of 
fast-track membership along with clear redlines on matters of 
principle like war crimes cooperation and regional stability. 
 
 
¶10.  (C) According to Mirel, if there is "good" cooperation 
from Serbia with ICTY (still dependent, at least partially, 
on an assessment from Del Ponte after her upcoming visit to 
Belgrade), the Commission will initial an SAA with Belgrade 
"within days."  Slovenian MFA Director for the W. Balkans 
Grobovsek strongly endorsed this approach to help "anchor" 
Serbia to the West.  The EU will then continue to discuss how 
it will determine the parameters of "full cooperation" from 
Serbia with ICTY, in the expectation of signing an SAA after 
such cooperation has been achieved.  A few member states, 
such as Belgium and The Netherlands, reportedly continue to 
insist that "full cooperation" means the arrest and transfer 
of Mladic to The Hague.  Hallergard observed that Belgium and 
The Netherlands also want to demonstrate to their publics 
that there are "no cheap tickets" regarding EU enlargement. 
According to Mirel, most other member states support the 
"Gotovina approach," whereby "full cooperation" translates 
into actions that will lead to Mladic's arrest and transfer. 
 
 
¶11.  (C) During both the COWEB consultations and separate 
meetings, EU officials pointed to visa facilitation beginning 
in 2008 and the beginning of discussions on visa 
liberalization as some of the EU's main tools in 
demonstrating Brussels' commitment to Serbia's European 
future.  Hoh expressed concern over developments in Serbia 
and stressed the need to continue to engage Belgrade, 
including through strengthening civil society, public 
outreach, and encouraging business ties and investment camp. 
Hoh also noted Belgrade's unhelpful role in BiH, Montenegro, 
and Macedonia.  He stressed the need for Serbian cooperation 
on suspected war criminals as well as U.S. support for the 
EU's SAA process and urged the EU to review how it can 
further tie Serbia to the West. 
 
BiH 
- - 
 
¶12.  (C) Hoh characterized Dodik's recent statements as 
 
BRUSSELS 00003248  004 OF 006 
 
 
serious and unprecedented challenges to the High Rep and his 
use of Bonn Powers.  The IC must stand firmly behind Dayton 
implementation, including support for Lajcak, with 
consequences for Dodik, Belgrade, and any other actors who 
obstruct Dayton and jeopardize regional stability.  Hoh asked 
the Portuguese Presidency to raise the EU's deep concern on 
these issues with Putin during the EU-Russia Summit October 
¶26.  Tanger said the Portuguese plan to do so.  Mirel 
acknowledged that, given the impasse over police reform (and 
therefore the EU's inability to sign an SAA with Sarajevo), 
the EU is "a bit lost" on how to influence BiH.  All agreed 
that the OHR should not be terminated next year if the 
situation in BiH continues to deteriorate.  Hoh did not 
disagree but noted that such a decision need not be taken 
until next year. 
 
¶13.  (C) Lehne noted that he had spoken with Lajcak just 
before the COWEB began.  Lajcak observed Dodik's Janus-faced 
nature of Dodik -- reasonable in private yet confrontational 
in public.  Lajcak told Lehne that his October 28 meeting 
with BiH political leaders might be an opportunity to deflate 
the current crisis.  Tanger stressed that the EU would 
deliver a "strong message" on support for Dayton at the 
October 30-31 PIC in Sarajevo.  He cautioned that Lajcak may 
face a "lose-lose" scenario if he imposes decisions which are 
then unheeded on the ground. Speaking during a separate 
meeting, Tanger voiced his opinion that the EU "won't go for 
sanctions against democratically elected officials" in BiH. 
Lehne, also in a private meeting, said he did not see an 
alternative to Lajcak's strategy.  The issue, Lehne stressed, 
is escalation.  He noted that it is "not totally clear" if 
the IC is prepared to "go all the way" and remove Dodik as 
well as Silajdzic.  Hallergard, too, warned of the risk of 
the IC's not being able to sustain announced actions.  In any 
case, Lehne added, the IC must help rebuild the authority of 
the High Rep; otherwise, the situation in BiH will be even 
worse later -- a sentiment echoed separately by Enlargement 
Commissioner Rehn's advisor on BiH, Helene Holm-Pedersen. 
 
 
MACEDONIA 
- - - - - 
 
¶14.  (C) EU officials expressed disappointment with the pace 
of reforms in Macedonia, with Hallergard characterizing 
actions by various political actors in Macedonia as "a chain 
of mistakes."  Even the incoming Slovenian Presidency, which 
called for "a conditional date for a date" to begin formal 
accession negotiations with Skopje, lamented the "lack of a 
political culture" there.  That said, the Slovenes praised 
Macedonia's role regarding Kosovo.  Slovenian 
head-of-delegation Grobovsek said Slovenia is encouraging 
Skopje to be constructive, avoid provocations, and remain 
attuned to Greek public opinion on the "name issue." 
 
¶15.  (C) Hoh noted that the pace of economic reform was well 
ahead of that of political reform.  Macedonia's weak efforts 
to implement the May accord and its machinations over the 
language law, minorities committee, and Judicial Council, as 
well as the poor co-habitation between the president and the 
prime minister, do not augur well.  Hoh characterized U.S.-EU 
cooperation on the ground as improved and suggested further 
coordination, including on approaches to privatization. 
Tanger observed that there is very little the EU can do 
regarding Macedonia and ICTY.  Separately, Ipavic admitted 
that the EU "does not know how to push" Skopje forward, but 
will continue to tell Macedonia that it must reach out to its 
Albanian minority.  Ipavic noted that Greece is indicating 
that it may be "very difficult" and may block a NATO 
invitation to Macedonia over the name issue.  Hoh stressed 
the need to keep the name issue on the Nimetz track and under 
the radar screen, adding that no decision has yet been taken 
on NATO invitations. 
 
ALBANIA 
- - - - 
 
¶16.  (C) Hoh highlighted Tirana's significant progress on 
political and economic reforms as well as PM Berisha's 
helpful role in the region, particularly on Kosovo. 
Organized crime and corruption remain serious concerns, which 
President Bush raised during his visit to Tirana earlier this 
year.  Mirel characterized Albania as "almost the only quiet" 
country in the region.  Mirel and the incoming Slovenian 
presidency noted the "smooth" implementation of the December 
2006 interim agreement and the positive presidential election 
process.  EU officials agreed that Tirana is playing s 
helpful role in the region, particularly in urging Kosovo 
officials to cooperate with the international community on 
 
BRUSSELS 00003248  005 OF 006 
 
 
final status. That said, Mirel observed that Tirana will need 
to demonstrate a "track record," and continue to fight 
corruption and organized crime.  Likewise, Mirel added, it 
will have to expand judicial reforms. The Slovenes called for 
speedy ratification of by member states of the SAA, saying it 
would serve as an incentive to the Albanians to implement 
reforms fully. 
 
 
MONTENEGRO 
- - - - - - 
 
¶17.  (C) According to COWEB interlocutors, Montenegro, like 
Albania, has made "very good" progress on reforms, allowing 
the EU to sign an SAA with Tirana October 15.  The broad 
support in Montenegro, including support from minority and 
opposition political parties, for the new constitution was a 
further "positive sign" of its political maturity.  Likewise, 
its relationship with Serbia and its position on Kosovo are 
welcome.  As with Albania, Montenegro, too, has to expand its 
anti-corruption and anti-crime measures.  Grobovsek 
characterized rumors that Montenegro wants to apply soon for 
formal candidate status as reflecting too high expectations, 
while Mirel termed the level of Russian investment in 
Montenegro "worrying."  Hoh agreed that Montenegro has made 
tremendous strides and said that EU visa facilitation could 
be one method of providing concrete rewards for political 
maturity.  He noted that the source of investment is not 
worrisome in itself; rather, officials should concentrate on 
ensuring that investment is clean and without political 
conditions.  Hoh added that Serbia's new dual citizenship law 
was a source of concern and an issue to which the 
international community should pay attention. 
 
CROATIA 
- - - - 
 
¶18.  (C) Hoh also consulted separately with EU, Portuguese, 
and Slovenian officials on Croatia (as a candidate country 
whose accession negotiations have begun, Croatia is not 
included in COWEB).  Commission Unit Head for Croatia David 
Daly urged the U.S. to support the continuation of the OSCE 
Mission there, largely to help monitor refugee returns and 
restitution but also war crimes follow-up.  He and others 
argued that the Croats have fallen far short of their own 
goals and continued international expertise and pressure are 
necessary.  This issue spills over into completing the 
resettlement agenda in Bosnia and Serbia as well, Daly said. 
Hoh noted the need for continued international implementation 
throughout the country.  Washington had concluded, however, 
that continuing the full-fledged OSCE mission would be 
overkill.  Would not the EU accession process, he asked, be 
the means to work this issue?  Daly and others thought the EU 
would not be able effectively to pursue the issue and argued 
for some continued OSCE presence in Croatia.  According to 
the Slovenes, Croatia is playing a positive regional role, 
although it still has "border issues" to resolve with its 
four immediate neighbors.  Our EU interlocutors noted that 
they expected the pace of reform implementation in Croatia to 
pick up after this year's elections. 
 
OTHER ISSUES 
- - - - - - 
 
¶19.  (SBU) Hoh raised with both Lehne and Mirel U.S. 
objection to incorporation of former EUMM personnel into OHR 
staff in Sarajevo.  They indicated the numbers of affected 
staff had been reduced and this arrangement was needed to 
provide smaller EU governments with political reporting from 
BiH.  Hoh questioned why this task could not be addressed in 
other ways.  He noted that Washington had made clear its 
concerns about the dual-hatting the EUSR and the High Rep and 
the need to keep OHR staff focused on the immediate 
priorities for Dayton implementation and BiH viability.  With 
PIC members paying the substantial support costs for EUSR 
staff (and the U.S. paying close to one fourth of these 
costs), OHR and the EU at least owed an explanation to the 
PIC.  (Hoh told Lehne privately that Lajcak had said he did 
not request or want this staff, but Lehne said he had heard 
the opposite from Lajcak.) 
 
¶20.  (C) Rehn advisor Holm-Pedersen, noting she was speaking 
"informally," asked if the U.S. could provide the Commission 
a briefing on our assessment of Serbia's cooperation with 
ICTY.  Hoh said we would consider this. 
 
¶21.  (U) In an aside, Pais noted the paucity of photographs 
of the U.S.-EU-Russia Troika ambassadors all together.  Such 
photos, he said, are worth a thousand words in conveying the 
 
BRUSSELS 00003248  006 OF 006 
 
 
message of unity. 
 
COWEB PARTICIPANTS 
- - - - - - - - - 
 
¶22.  (U) The following participated in the U.S.-EU Troika 
COWEB consultations in Brussels Oct. 24: 
 
Portuguese Presidency: 
 
Ambassador Antonio Tanger, Special Envoy for the W. Balkans 
Jose Pedro Machado Vieira, Deputy Special Envoy for the W. 
Balkans 
Claudia Ribeiro, MFA 
Alexandra Bilreiro, Portuguese Mission to the EU 
Carolina Ramos da Costa, Portuguese Mission to the EU 
 
Incoming Slovenian Presidency: 
 
Ambassador Bojan Grobovsek, MFA Director for W. Balkans 
Damijan Sedar, Slovenian Mission to the EU 
Marko Makovec, Slovenian Mission to the EU 
 
European Commission: 
 
Pierre Mirel, DG Enlargement Director for the W. Balkans 
Franz Cermak, DG Enlargement, Deputy Unit Chief for Policy 
Coordination 
Alenka Zajc Freudenstein, DG Relex, U.S. Desk 
 
Council Secretariat: 
 
Stefan Lehne, Director for W. Balkans 
Johanna Stromquist, Serbia Desk Officer 
Sabina Stadler, BiH Desk Officer 
Anna-Maria Boura, Kosovo Desk Officer 
Terkel Petersen, Albania and Macedonia Desk Officer 
Lothar Jaschke, Kosovo Desk Officer 
 
U.S.: 
 
Christopher Hoh, EUR/SCE Director 
Laurence Wohlers, USEU Polmincouns 
Holly Schwendler, USEU PolMiloff 
Vincent Carver, USEU Poloff 
 
OTHER INTERLOCUTORS: 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶23.  (U) In addition to consulting with the EU Troika, 
EUR/SCE Director Hoh had separate discussions with: 
 
-- Stefan Lehne, Council Secretariat Director for W. Balkans 
 
-- Carl Hallergard, Private Office of High Rep Solana 
 
-- Pierre Mirel, Commission Director for W. Balkans 
 
-- Helene Holm-Pedersen and Myrian Verger, Advisors to 
Enlargement Commissioner Rehn 
 
-- Portuguese PSC Ambassador Pais and Slovenian PSC 
Ambassador Ipavic 
 
-- Portuguese Special Envoy for the W. Balkans Tanger 
 
-- Romanian PSC Ambassador Ardeleanu, Hungarian PSC 
Ambassador Kos, Fabrizio Di Michele, Italian Mission, and 
Lance Damm, UK Mission 
 
-- Peter Feith, ICR-designate 
 
-- Joao Pedro Antunes, Portuguese MFA Enlargement; Alenka 
Jerak, Slovenian MFA European Affairs; Gabriele Scaramucci, 
Council Secretariat Enlargement; and David Daly, Commission 
Enlargement Unit Chief for Croatia 
 
¶24.  (U) EUR/SCE Director Hoh has cleared this message. 
GRAY 
 
.