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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 003120 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/ERA AND EUR/SCE 
PLEASE PASS USAID FOR EE/AA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2017 
TAGS: PREL EAID EUN KV
SUBJECT: EU AND KOSOVO:  MOVING TOWARD REALITY 
 
Classified By: POL W. BALKANS/ENLARGEMENT UNIT CHIEF VINCENT CARVER FOR 
 REASONS 1.5 (B/D). 
 
SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C) EU and member state officials are increasingly 
recognizing the strong likelihood that Kosovo will become 
independent without a UNSCR and that launching an ESDP 
mission is vital to decreasing instability in the region. 
Some EU contacts believe member states may still wobble if 
Belgrade presents a last-minute conciliatory deal; they 
report that the EU still has not decided whether to adopt the 
ESDP mission ahead of, or after, the recognition of Kosovo's 
independence by most member states.  Meanwhile, the 
Commission has budgeted 62 million Euros for assistance to 
Kosovo for the coming year.  Several contacts cautioned that 
many European officials view the U.S. as railroading Kosovo 
independence with the potential for increasing stability in 
Serbia as the result.  When rebuffed, they offered no 
plausible alternative to Kosovo's independence.  END SUMMARY 
 
FACING REALITY:  "ROLLING STONES" TOUR WILL NOT PRODUCE 
COMPROMISE 
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¶2.  (C) Michael Giffoni, Council Secretariat Deputy Director 
for the W. Balkans, told us recently that few EU and member 
state officials believe the Troika approach will result in a 
deal between Belgrade and Pristina.  He stressed, however, 
that the theater of "leaving no stone unturned" is critical 
for some member state governments to deflect domestic 
political attacks.  This "Rolling Stones" approach will also 
help the majority of member states push the approval of an 
ESDP mission despite the strong reluctance of Cyprus, Greece, 
and Romania to such a mission without the blessing of a UNSCR. 
 
¶3.  (C) Contacts from several member states agreed with 
Giffoni's analysis -- the Troika approach has bought the EU 
and member states both time and political cover, often to 
address domestic critics.  Most of our working level contacts 
see a post-December 10 scenario that includes continued 
deadlock at the UN because of Russian intransigence, a UDI by 
Pristina, and subsequent recognition by most -- but not all 
-- member states.  While several contacts continue to call 
for strengthened legal arguments for recognizing Kosovo 
absent a UNSCR, they also acknowledge that if the political 
authorities in capitals favor recognition, they will find an 
acceptable legal formula. 
 
 
BUT NO GUARANTEE OF EU ACTION IMMEDIATELY AFTER A UDI 
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¶4.  (C) While most of our contacts covering Kosovo are much 
more optimistic than they were even a few months ago about EU 
"unity" on implementing the nearly two years of "prudent 
planning" with the actual establishment of the ICO and the 
ESDP mission, none are staking their careers on such an 
outcome in the immediate aftermath of a UDI.  An Italian 
Mission rep warned that some member states may wobble if 
Belgrade produces a last-minute "reasonable" compromise.  He 
quickly noted, however, that Italy and other members of the 
Quint must insist on respect for the December 10 deadline. 
Many of our contacts, including the Portuguese Mission's 
Chair of the COWEB working group, have stressed the 
desirability of U.S. pressure on Kosovo to wait for "at least 
a few weeks" after December 10 to allow for discussions in 
New York before issuing a UDI.  They assure us that the EU 
could then proceed confidently with formalizing the ESDP 
mission and most member states would recognize Kosovo's 
independence. 
 
¶5.  (C) ESDP contacts appear more sanguine about prospects 
for obtaining agreement -- or at a minimum, no outright 
vetoes, on the mission, if only because EU paralysis after 
December could strike a major blow against ESDP more broadly. 
The 1,800-strong civilian mission will be by far the largest 
ESDP undertaking to date and we are seeing growing 
recognition here of the EU's responsibility to police its own 
backyard, despite continued rumblings in some capitals about 
the mission's legality.  The Head of Mission-designate, 
retired French General Yves de Kermabon, and EU planners here 
and in Pristina, have told us they want to have the personnel 
selected, hardware procured, and operational plans informally 
in place by December in order to be ready to either launch 
the mission as planned or be able to make any necessary 
changes efficiently.  Getting the necessary member state 
approvals for these steps is pushing reluctant countries 
 
BRUSSELS 00003120  002 OF 003 
 
 
forward, albeit in increments.  Those countries that have 
remained holdouts (Cyprus, Greece, Slovakia, Romania, and to 
a lesser extent lately, Hungary) likely will bargain for 
something in return for their eventual "constructive 
abstentions" on the ESDP mission.  One contact noted that 
such backroom deals likely would be brokered by FMs or even 
PMs just weeks before December 10. 
 
MEANWHILE, THE COMMISSION CONTINUES FUNDING 
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¶6.  (U) European Commission (EC) assistance to Kosovo has 
been provided since 1998 under a variety of instruments, 
including regular technical assistance, humanitarian aid, 
exceptional financial support, and financing to Pillar IV of 
UNMIK.  Since 2000, the CARDS program has been the main 
financial instrument for Kosovo, with programs mainly 
implemented by the European Agency for Reconstruction.  To 
date, EU assistance, including from member states, amounts to 
2.6 billion Euros.  Of this amount, EC assistance accounts 
for almost 1.6 billion Euros. 
 
¶7.  (U) Beginning soon, EC assistance for Kosovo will be 
funded via the new Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) and 
will help pay for EU and EC support for final status as well 
as for developing Kosovo's weak economy.  The EU will devote 
more resources for programs aimed at good governance, 
reforms, and fiscal sustainability.  The draft 2007 
assistance program will be discussed by the EC and member 
states at an October 22 meeting.  Funding of 62 million Euros 
has been proposed for assistance, with the lion's share 
concentrated in:  capacity-building for developing 
EU-compatible legislation and policy (6 million Euros), rule 
of law promotion (7 million Euros), developing an enabling 
economic environment (11 million Euros), transportation 
infrastructure (8 million Euros), and support for local 
government and decentralization (12.4 million Euros). 
Additional funding is expected for higher education and the 
Customs and Fiscal Assistance Office.  Kosovo will also 
benefit from the European Initiative for Democracy and Human 
Rights. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The Commission's Multi-annual Indicative Planning 
Document for Kosovo 2007-09 noted that 64.7 million Euros had 
been budgeted for 2008.  We understand that the Commission 
has requested a doubling of that figure from the Council and 
European Parliament for microfinance and other activities, 
but no decisions have been made. 
 
VIEWS ON EFFECTS ON SERBIA 
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¶9.  (C)  While all of our working level contacts note that 
Serbia's accession prospects are not formally linked to 
Kosovo, most acknowledge that the EU and member states must 
take Belgrade's actions regarding Kosovo into account when 
deciding policy vis-a-vis Belgrade.  Several contacts 
continue to fret that a UDI will strengthen the RS in Serbia. 
 Many contacts see the initialing of an SAA with Serbia, 
likely to take place in late October or early November, as 
one way to try to soften the blow of an independent Kosovo 
and recognition of it by most member states.  Likewise, 
contacts see visa facilitation as a method of trying to 
strengthen the attraction of the EU to the Serb professional 
and student classes.  A few contacts have voiced concern more 
about the possibility that Serb paramilitary forces could 
cause trouble in northern Kosovo than about any formal Serb 
reaction to Kosovo's independence.  Brussels has assured us 
it is seized with how to manage Serbia post-December 10, but 
has offered few specifics on any damage control policy. 
 
Still hoping for a miracle? 
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¶10.  (C/NF) Though our contacts speak with growing confidence 
when they say the EU will be "ready" after Dec 10, there 
remains plenty of unease with a process that many perceive as 
beyond their control.  At working levels, this manifests 
itself in griping from a number of both EU and member state 
officials that the U.S. has "railroaded" the final status 
process.  We have rebuffed such accusations -- noting that 
President Ahtisaari is a committed EU champion and that both 
we and the EU consulted with him closely on this process -- 
but this mindset is deep-seated in some parts of the EU.  The 
unease is also manifest in the universally high marks that 
Ischinger has received here.  Ischinger's frequent personal 
appearances at the PSC and repeated references to his role as 
the "EU's representative" have played very well here, 
particularly with non-Quint member states.  The good news, 
 
BRUSSELS 00003120  003 OF 003 
 
 
according to several contacts, is that Ischinger has 
succeeded in making non-Quint member states feel more 
included in, and therefore more committed to, the process. 
(A Hungarian contact attributed his government's softening 
stand directly to Ischinger's role.)  The potential bad news 
is that hopes for a last minute miracle solution have not 
gone away.  Indeed, a Quint member state contact worried to 
us that Ishcinger's emphasis on "leaving no stone unturned" 
may have inadvertently raised hopes in the member states that 
a last-minute miracle solution may yet be possible. 
Ambassador Wisner's and DAS DiCarlo's upcoming visit to 
Brussels offers another opportunity to help solidify the EU's 
resolve to support a realistic final status for Kosovo. 
GRAY 
 
.