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RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #3039/01 2741520
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 011520Z OCT 07
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 003039 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM EAID ECON ENRG OSCE EUN BO XH
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY: DAS KRAMER, AMB STEWART AND THE EU 
DISCUSSES NEXT STEPS ON BELARUS 
 
REF: A. BRUSSELS 2984 (NOTAL) 
 
     ¶B. BRUSSELS 1099 
 
Classified By: Classified By: USEU Political Minister Counselor Laurenc 
e Wohlers, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
Summary 
-------- 
1.(C) EUR DAS David Kramer and U.S. Ambassador Karen Stewart 
(Minsk) held back-to-back meetings on September 19 with the 
Friends of Belarus informal contact group and the EU Troika 
to review the current situation in Belarus and coordinate 
policy responses.  In both meetings, the sides broadly agreed 
to maintain pressure through sanctions on the Lukashenka 
regime and to increase the Belarusian people's exposure to 
the West. The EU acknowledged the imperative of Transatlantic 
unity and quick action in response to any major good (or bad) 
moves by Lukashenka with respect to the political opposition. 
 The Portuguese EU Presidency complained that Russia was "too 
much at ease" and that the West currently had no way to check 
Russian influence in Belarus.  EU officials and member states 
differed on whether the prescription for this problem was 
engagement with or isolation of the regime in Minsk.  END 
SUMMARY 
 
2.(SBU) During a September 18-19 visit to Brussels, EUR 
Deputy Assistant Secretary David Kramer and U.S. Ambassador 
to Belarus Karen Stewart held intensive discussions with EU 
institutions and member states on Belarus.  These included a 
Quad meeting at the US Mission to the EU on September 18 
(reported REF A), a  Friends of Belarus meeting hosted by the 
Lithuanian Mission on September 19, and a U.S.-EU Eastern 
Europe/Caucasus (COEST) Troika consultation on September 19 
hosted by the EU.  This cable contains a readout of the 
Friends meeting and the COEST discussions on Belarus.  Other 
COEST topics, including Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and the 
Southern Caucasus will be reported septel. 
 
--------------------- 
U.S.-EU COEST TROIKA 
--------------------- 
 
New U.S. sanctions 
------------------ 
3.(C) DAS Kramer provided the EU Troika with an overview of 
new U.S. sanctions against Belarus, including expanded visa 
bans and soon-to-be-announced asset freeze against 
state-owned enterprises.  The U.S. actions should have come 
as no surprise to the GoB.  Minsk had been warned in advance 
that its failure to release all political prisoners would 
trigger a commensurate negative reaction from the United 
States.  Ambassador Stewart reviewed recent negative domestic 
economic and political developments in Belarus. 
Privatizations and less-than-savory credit relationships with 
rogue states, such as Iran and Venezuela, signaled deepening 
economic strains in light of rising energy costs.  Power 
shifts in senior positions and crackdowns on dissidents 
indicated tensions among Lukashenka loyalists and clans in 
power around him. 
 
A Transatlantic To-Do List 
--------------------------- 
4.(C) DAS Kramer pointed out several areas in which the EU 
and United States should focus coordination over the next few 
months: 
-- Media programming: Kramer proposed establishing a small 
U.S.-EU expert working group to improve our efforts in this 
sector. 
-- Political Opposition:  Kramer stressed the need for 
U.S.-EU unity in response to any future good (or bad) moves 
by the regime, particularly on October 2 when the national 
parliament might consider prisoner amnesties.  An autumn 
visit to Washington and Brussels by Belarusian opposition 
leaders should also be considered. 
-- OSCE Diplomacy:  Kramer urged that the EU and United 
States block any future suggestion for and OSCE Vienna HOM 
trip to Minsk, as it would serve the interests of the regime, 
and not the OSCE. 
-- Economic Reform:  Kramer encouraged the EU to consider how 
to use existing tools to promote long-term institutional 
reform in Belarus, including perhaps through the EBRD, while 
being mindful that such efforts could ease the pressure we 
want to maintain on Lukashenka. 
 
5.(C)  Ambassador Stewart highlighted possible opportunities 
for Lukashenka to improve relations with the West.  In 
particular, we hoped for the release of all political 
prisoners through a general amnesty to be considered by 
parliament on October 2.  In the event that the regime 
released some, but not all political prisoners, the United 
States urged that the EU stick to its current hard line 
policy on sanctions and contacts.  The Belarusian security 
 
BRUSSELS 00003039  002 OF 003 
 
 
apparatus' handling of a political opposition protest (March 
for Europe) on October 14 could also help us gauge the 
regime's intentions toward relations with the West. 
 
EU:  How to Counter Russian Influence? 
--------------------------------------- 
6.(C) Marcelo Curto, Portuguese Ambassador to Russia and 
COEST Coordinator for the Portuguese Presidency expressed 
concern that Russia was "too  much at ease" and that the US 
and EU "had no game to play" in Belarus.  Although 
Lukashenka's increasing unpopularity was all to the good, the 
West currently had no way to check Russian influence in 
Belarus.  Curto acknowledged that pressure on the regime was 
necessary, but preferred increased engagement and exposure to 
the West rather than isolation. 
 
7.(C) Curto, who is accredited to both Moscow and Minsk, 
opined that the Russia-Belarus Union project was "really 
dead" and that Russia had adjusted its strategy toward 
Lukashenka accordingly.  Specifically, Russia was using 
energy as a weapon to exert greater control over Belarus and 
provide for a "smooth anschluss."   Russia's construction of 
a new Baltic pipeline to divert oil to other countries (and 
away from Belarus) demonstrated both a new bilateral policy 
and an intention to exert strategic influence over the entire 
region.  Curto believed that Moscow saw no alternative to 
Lukashenka for the moment and, perhaps would not/not wish to 
seek one in any case.  Moscow preferred a situation in which 
Lukashenka was controllable and the opposition divided. 
Russian officials enjoyed the fact that Lukashenka had, 
unwittingly, turned dissident Alexander Kozulin into a 
"political martyr." 
 
Energy, exchanges, and assistance 
--------------------------------- 
8.(C) Madeleine Majorenko, European Commission Deputy Head of 
Unit for Belarus, explained that the EU had postponed energy 
talks with Belarus as a result of the latest wave of 
political arrests there.  The talks would likely be 
rescheduled for December or January in Minsk.  The Commission 
currently had 5 million euro to allocate in CY 2007 money and 
the same amount for 2008.  Project funding priorities for 
Brussels included energy efficiency, regulatory reform, 
education (e.g., European Humanities University) and HIV/AIDS 
prevention.  Commission officials shared U.S. concerns about 
privatization issues in Belarus.  On the positive side, 
Majorenko noted that the GoB had recently solicited World 
Bank and IMF assistance to improve financial transparency in 
public accounting and to assess the state of the banking 
sector.  The U.S. delegations agreed to look into this matter 
with World Bank contacts as well. 
 
9.(C) Ambassador Stewart outlined U.S. efforts to help Minsk 
to improve its dismal physical security of nuclear 
facilities.  The Commission urged the U.S. and EU to monitor 
Minsk's development of a long-term nuclear fuel purchase 
strategy with a view toward avoiding possible attempts to 
play western countries off of each other. 
 
------------------ 
Friends of Belarus 
------------------- 
10.(C) At the second Friends of Belarus meeting convened in 
Brussels this year by the Lithuanian Permanent Mission, EU 
officials and PSC Ambassadors compared notes with DAS Kramer 
and Ambassador Stewart on policy and programming toward 
Belarus.  A tour de table revealed common concern over 
creeping Russian influence in Belarus' strategic sectors. 
However, there were shades of difference between EU member 
states and institutions on how best to influence officials 
below the very top layer of the Lukashenka regime. 
 
Contact Policy 
-------------- 
11.(C) As in the COEST meeting, DAS Kramer reviewed U.S. 
coordination priorities on Belarus, including the rejection 
of any future calls for an OSCE Ambassadors visit to Minsk. 
Moreover, the United States was displeased by the Georgian 
Interior Minister's recent visit to Minsk and talk of 
"strategic partnership," and suggested discouraging Tbilisi 
in this regard.  The UK highlighted the importance of 
maintaining vigilance in the EU's policy of limiting contacts 
with senior Belarusian officials.  In this regard, the UK rep 
accused the European Commission of "crossing the line" by 
inviting Belarusian DFM Voronetsky to speak at a high level 
Commission event on the European Neighborhood Policy.  Latvia 
on the other hand, called Voronetsky's appearance a "success" 
for EU policy, and said it was considering inviting him to a 
November 23 Conference on the Baltics and ENP.  The UK, 
Poland, Germany, and France encouraged more careful thinking 
about who the West could and should seek to positively 
influence in the Bel 
 
BRUSSELS 00003039  003 OF 003 
 
 
arusian government.  For this purpose, the UK advocated 
increased information sharing between the U.S. and EU Heads 
of Missions in Minsk. 
 
A Wider EU Visa Bans? 
--------------------- 
12.(C) The Friends meeting stimulated positive EU discussion 
of the current Belarus visa ban list.  Lithuania and a 
Council Secretariat Policy Unit official wondered aloud why 
the EU could not expand the current visa ban list to include 
family members.  German and French PSC Ambassadors 
tentatively offered support for further consideration of the 
idea.  The Polish Ambassador noted that while sanctions 
tended to "underperform" they were essential to maintaining 
EU credibility toward the regime.  At the same time, the 
evidentiary requirements for visa bans could become more 
severe given the recent successful court challenges of EU 
sanctions in a terrorism financing case. 
 
More Support for Civil Society 
------------------------------ 
13.(C) Many Friends (Sweden, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, France, 
Lithuania, Germany, and EU Commission reps) advocated 
increasing people to people exchanges between Belarus and the 
West.  With a view toward strengthening opposition unity, DAS 
Kramer said that the United States was considering inviting a 
group of Belarusian opposition leaders to Washington soon 
after the October 14 Europe Day March in Minsk.  EU 
participants agreed to Kramer's suggestion to add a Brussels 
stop on the same itinerary.  As in the COEST Troika, Kramer 
candidly noted that Western media broadcasting to Belarus was 
an area ripe for improvement and suggested a working group to 
address the issues.  Sweden and Poland were also looking at 
military-to-military contacts with Belarus. 
 
EU Visa Facilitation 
-------------------- 
14.(C) The Swedish PSC Ambassador complained that increased 
EU visa fees (60 euros up from 35 euros) in the Schengen zone 
would make travel to the West more difficult for average 
Belarusian citizens.  He urged the Commission and Member 
States' Ministries of Interior to find a "loophole" to allow 
reduced fees.  Hugues Mingarelli, the Commission Deputy 
Director General for Eastern Europe retorted hat the 
Commission had already notified membe states there it was up 
to individual member states to take such action and that no 
legal or political action at the community level was 
required.  France and Germany believed that differentiation 
in EU visa issuance policy was needed, including adding names 
to the visa ban list and providing easier access to the EU 
for ordinary citizens.  France underscored the importance of 
sending "the right message at the right moment." 
 
More on Energy 
-------------- 
15.(C) Mingarelli noted that the Commission was interested in 
continuing its dialogue and technical assistance in the 
energy sector.  The Commission was particularly concerned 
about the impact on EU member states in the event of a 
collapse of the Belarusian energy transport grid. Mingarelli 
cautioned that any expansion of the EU visa ban not cut off 
EU contact with such individuals.  The EU was currently 
trying to include the Belarusian consumer union as well as 
energy officials in a dialogue on energy sector reform 
issues.  Poland noted that the Commission's current 
"unbundling" proposals to address the Gazprom problem in the 
EU's own internal energy market could complicate the EU's 
energy agenda with Belarus.  He added that it might be 
necessary to wait until after Russian Presidential elections 
to see what, if any, changes on the ground, might take place. 
 
 
¶16. (U) This message has been cleared by DAS Kramer and 
Ambassador Stewart. 
GRAY 
.