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FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000540 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2017 
TAGS: EAGR ECON PGOV PHUM PREL SENV LO
SUBJECT: SMER: NOT A SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 
 
REF: A. A) BRATISLAVA 389 
     ¶B. B) BRATISLAVA 462 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Prime Minister Robert Fico's Smer party has 
introduced a range of measures this year to reduce public 
input into government decision making processes and otherwise 
curb the rights of individuals within society.  Though Smer 
labels itself as a social democratic party, its civic 
governance initiatives have been designed to either promote 
connected business interests or appeal to nationalist 
tendencies.  Stakeholders that might be considered 
'center-left' in another context -- such as environmental 
groups, open society advocates, social liberals, and human 
rights advocates -- have been antagonized or ignored.  Smer 
has not been hurt politically by this approach; rather, it 
has bolstered the party's popularity with its target audience 
of middle-income, middle-aged, socially conservative Slovaks. 
End Summary. 
 
Image versus Reality 
-------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Since the current ruling coalition was formed last 
summer, Bratislava elites have worried that Slovakia would 
slide toward socialism (Smer), nationalism (SNS), 
authoritarianism (HZDS) and corruption (all of the above). 
Local media coverage of each party reflects these 
pre-conceived notions, meaning that Smer Minister of Labor 
Viera Tomanova's big government policy proposals and minor 
scandals dominate the headlines, while other Smer proposals 
fly under the radar.  In practice, Smer has made only 
cosmetic changes to economic policy, mostly because business 
interests from within Smer or concerns from coalition 
partners weaken the proposals drafted by Smer's social 
democratic wing before they ever get to Parliament. 
Tomanova's labor code reform proposal was reduced to a shell 
of itself before passage (reftel A) and her social insurance 
reform package is headed to a similar fate (reftel B). 
Meanwhile, Smer has been more effective quietly advancing the 
type of civil governance policy proposals expected from SNS 
or HZDS. 
 
Closing Open Society (Smer, not HZDS) 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Smer has been quite active and increasingly creative 
in its efforts to reduce access to public information.  In 
February, Smer MP Edita Angyalova introduced a party-backed 
amendment to restrict Slovakia's freedom of information laws 
so that the government would only have to respond to 
"reasonable requests."  The proposal ignited immediate, vocal 
opposition, including indications by coalition partner HZDS 
that it would not support the bill, which caused Angyalova to 
withdraw her initiative.  Angyalova later explained that the 
Smer-appointed Director of the Tax Office, Richard Sulaj, 
drafted the bill in order to limit information requests. 
NGOs and opposition parties expect a more organized 
legislative attempt this fall to limit freedom of information 
(FOI) laws, this time with buy-in from HZDS.  These fears 
appeared to be confirmed in late August when Minister of 
Justice Stefan Harabin (HZDS) announced he would introduce 
legislation this fall amending FOI laws "to help blind 
people."  In September, coalition partner spokesman Rafael 
Rafaj (SNS) praised Harabin's initiative, saying it would 
allow space for a "needed re-evaluation of FOI laws." 
 
¶4. (C) Learning from the public spectacle created by the 
Angyalova bill, in mid-2007 Smer began quietly tucking 
amendments to curtail public input and access to information 
into broader highway construction, forestry and nature 
protection bills considered and subsequently passed by 
Parliament.  Provisions within each bill amended statutes 
that require relevant state agencies to respond to 
information requests by individual citizens and interest 
groups, inserting language that allows the government to 
identify stakeholders who can formally request information. 
These bills also eliminated statutes that allow citizens and 
groups to file administrative claims when the government is 
not following proper procedures, replacing them with 
provisions that will only allow administrative claims by 
individuals already harmed by a government action.  President 
Gasparovic signed the highway construction and forestry laws 
earlier this year but declined to sign the nature protection 
law for unrelated reasons.  Gasparovic's veto of the nature 
protection law was overturned in September, with many 
opposition politicians voting with the coalition.  This fall, 
the Ministry of Environment is preparing similar legislation 
regarding waterways and waste management. 
 
Not a Bunch of Crunchy Tree Huggers 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Smer's initiatives to limit public input in the 
governance process often benefit connected business 
interests.  Since Smer's social democratic platform precludes 
introducing legislation designed to create a generally more 
favorable business climate, the party supports business 
through ministerial rulemaking and contract awards -- and the 
less publicly known about the details, the better.  This 
governance model can be seen across the ministries, but 
environmental issues make a particularly good case study 
since the GOS has recently revised several key laws.  Smer's 
major environmental policymakers include: 
 
- Dusan Munko, State Secretary, Ministry of Environment, also 
owner of an exotic species import-export company (see 
paragraph 11); 
- Peter Ziga, State Secretary, Ministry of Economy, 
responsible for alternative energy development policy, also 
owner of a wood-trading company. 
- MP Marian Zahumensky, who resigned as Ministry of 
Agriculture State Secretary in November 2006 due to 
corruption concerns but who maintains his seat in Parliament, 
where he has shepherded passage of major environmental policy 
reforms. 
 
¶6. (C) In the High Tatras - Slovakia's natural showpiece, 
still recovering from the 2004 windstorm that destroyed 
13,000 hectares of trees - Smer officials have consolidated 
control over nature protection policy and squelched 
dissenting views.  In March, after a bitter three-year 
intragovernmental debate on post-windstorm zoning practices, 
Munko and his appointee Jan Mizerak assumed control of 
national parks and forest protection services.  Munko and 
Mizerak promptly fired all park directors nationwide, 
including Tatra NP Director Tomas Vancura and Deputy Director 
Juraj Svajda (both recent USG IV program participants), who 
were skeptical of forest removal plans in windstorm-affected 
areas.  Shortly thereafter, the Ministry began downsizing 
staff, scheduling for gradual elimination the positions of at 
least 60 of the 140-plus state forestry employees (mainly 
rangers or inspectors) who had signed a technical statement 
in late 2006 opposing the Ministry's proposal for forest 
removal in the Tatras.  On May 23, the GOS announced its new 
zoning plan, which would open many areas of the recently 
cleared areas in the Western Tatras for new ski resorts and 
other development. The European Union responded with a 
statement declaring that Slovakia's plan had been illegal due 
to lack of scientific peer review and an adequate public 
comment process. 
 
¶7. (C) Protests against the government's Tatra policy, though 
mild, have moved the government to take strong steps to crack 
down on dissenters.  In June, park officials assessed 
unprecedentedly high trespassing fines (1000 to 3000 USD per 
person) to 64 protestors demonstrating peacefully on park 
grounds.  In August, the government approved Ministry of 
Environment-backed legislation that will require the faces of 
demonstrators to be fully visible so that they can be 
identified.  The legislation contains other provisions that 
would enable officials to threaten or punish protest 
organizers on the basis of vaguely defined breaches.  For 
example, if an event is deemed to lack a sufficient number of 
organizers, hefty fines may be imposed.  Also, as a means of 
restricting access, in August the government passed 
legislation to require bicycles to stay on cleared, 
designated paths, which do not exist in the contested Ticha 
Dolina area or most of the Tatras. 
 
¶8. (C) The direct beneficiaries of GOS Tatra policy include 
political appointees such as State Secretary Ziga and major 
financial backers of Smer.  While Ziga was serving as 
chairman of an Economy Ministry committee that recommended 
the eventually adopted zoning changes, his wood trading 
company, Taper, received from the Ministry of Agriculture an 
estimated 30 percent increase in wood harvesting allowances 
from the Tatras.  Ziga never recused himself as owner of the 
company before obtaining the contracts, which, according to 
Transparency International, were not open to competitive 
bidding.  Rezoning in the Western Tatras will also allow J&T 
Finance, a major developer in the Tatra region (and in 
Bratislava), to go ahead with plans to build a new ski centre 
in the previously undeveloped Brestova-Salatin area.  Of the 
major investment groups in Slovakia, J&T has been most 
careful to cultivate a fruitful relationship with Smer. (For 
example, one of the J&T directors, Robert Hancak, was named 
General Director of the Economic Section at the Smer-run 
Ministry of Interior.)  Also, rumors of increased Russian 
investment in the Western Tatras are widespread, but concrete 
information is hard to come by.  In any case, media coverage 
of Smer's policies in the Tatras or the beneficiaries is 
nearly non-existent. 
 
Foreigners, Religions, and Minorities (Smer, not SNS) 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶9. (C) Private media outlets -- which are almost uniformly 
hostile to Fico and biased against him -- have much more 
eagerly followed the governing coalition's treatment of 
minorities.  Journalists tend to focus, however, on the 
buffoonish antics of SNS leader Jan Slota of the Ministry of 
Interior's ugly mismanagement of the Hedviga Malinova case. 
As a result they have provided very limited coverage of 
Smer-led legislative initiatives with a nationalist 
character.  In May, with little public fanfare of opposition, 
Parliament passed new legislation to strongly tighten 
Slovakia's citizenship requirements.  The law lengthens 
residency requirements for most applicants to eight years, 
requires fluency in the Slovak language, and withdraws the 
requirement for Ministry of Interior investigations to be 
completed within a year - meaning citizenship applications 
can be bureaucratically suspended in perpetuity.  The new law 
takes effect in October. 
 
¶10. (C) The government has also tightened standards for 
religious registration.  In March, Parliament amended 
registration procedures to require that 20,000 members must 
provide statements of faith in order for the religion to be 
officially registered and recognized.  (Previous law only 
required 20,000 signatures of citizens willing to support 
registration.)  The new law took effect May 1.  While 
unregistered religions are still allowed to practice freely, 
registration permits the right to form a legal entity, open a 
bank account, purchase propety for a place of worship, and 
officiate legally-binding wedding ceremonies, among other 
duties.  Also, the government is obliged to pay the salaries 
of clergy within a registered religion.  While Smer's 
eagerness to restrict religious group registration can be 
viewed as an extension of its socialist, non-religious past, 
the Chief of Staff at Parliament's Human Rights Committee 
indicated to Poloff that Catholic church officials made a 
specific request to Smer to introduce this legislation.  In 
her view, Smer readily complied since they see conservative 
Catholics as a target voter group.  Catholic officials were 
unhappy at recent regislation of the church of Latter Day 
Saints and the Bahai, among others. 
 
Why They Succeed 
---------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Smer has succeeded with most of the above-described 
measures because coordination between opposition parties, 
journalists, and organized civil society -- so prevalent on 
core economic policy -- is dramatically weaker on other 
issues.  Nor is the public engaged in a sustained manner. 
Within Parliament, SDKU concerns itself primarily with 
protecting its 2002-2006 economic reforms and the weaker 
opposition parties follow suit.  Given the lack of attention 
to secondary issues, even SDKU -- Slovakia's most technically 
skilled party -- frequently votes on bills presented by Smer 
without fully understanding the consequences.  For example, 
in June Zahumensky passed a bill that included a provision to 
enable trade in products of endangered species, explicitly 
breaking Slovakia's international obligations to the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
(CITES).  The bill, encouraged by State Secretary Munko for 
his own private benefit as an exotic species importer, was 
quietly vetoed by President Gasparovic the following month. 
While environmental groups have documented this situation for 
Poloff, the media never covered the issue and opposition 
politicians did not understand the bill until it had already 
reached Gasparovic's desk.  Opposition parties have voted on 
other occasions this year for provisions they would have 
opposed but did not properly understand, including 
legislation on intellectual property rights (only in 
committee) and highway construction.  Note: Parliament passed 
Munko's bill again on September 11. End Note. 
 
¶12. (C) The government's social and law-and-order initiatives 
stir up almost no dissent in Parliament, since KDH tends to 
agree with Smer, SMK is only watching out for direct assaults 
against ethnic Hungarians, and SDKU rarely puts up organized 
resistance even though its voters tend to be increasingly 
socially liberal.  For example, the May bill restricting 
religious registration passed 108-1, with only Human Rights 
Committee Chairman Laszlo Nagy (SMK) voting against.  The 
citizenship requirements bill was passed with only four votes 
in opposition (all from SDKU) and many abstensions (mostly 
from SMK). 
 
¶13. (C) Journalists and civil society, in turn, get little 
information from opposition parties on civil governance 
issues.  One SITA journalist who covers Parliament told 
Poloff that she gets an almost-daily stream of calls and 
press releases from SDKU, business groups, and conservative 
NGOs about tax, labor, and pension policy, but couldn't find 
anyone from any party who could comment on nature protection 
law or the Tatras.  Journalists and interested NGOs obtain 
information primarily from other contacts, such as sources in 
Ministries, friends in the business community, or 
non-partisan parliamentary committee staff.  For example, the 
NGO Ekopolis learned about the exotic species trading bill 
from a friend at the Ministry of Agriculture the week after 
the legislation had been passed in Parliament. 
 
Effect on Smer 
-------------- 
 
¶14. (C) While Smer is widely derided by Bratislava liberals 
and small-government conservatives for its creeping 
authoritarian tendencies, Fico's civil governance proposals 
have been well received by his primary target audience of 
domestic business interests and socially conservative, 
middle-aged Slovaks from outside Bratislava.  Furthermore, 
Smer's unwillingness to enact major economic policy changes 
suggests that it understands that the party's real audience 
is at least moderately prosperous and not inclined to strong 
social democratic positions.  In fact, a recent IVO poll 
indicated that Smer voters enjoyed the second highest incomes 
among Slovakia's six major parties, behind only SDKU.  By 
appealing to middle-income Slovaks seeking economic and 
cultural security, Smer can gradually pick off voters from 
the dying HZDS and KDH parties and inch ever closer to 50 
percent party preference.  In this context, Fico sees no need 
for his "social democratic" party to support positions on 
social and civic governance issues that modern center-left 
parties have adopted throughout Europe, even though polls and 
anecdotal evidence suggest that support for such stances is 
growing in Slovakia.  Smer is content to ignore progressive 
voters, letting most of them flock to SDKU, which will at 
some point face a conflict between its liberal and 
conservative wings.  Meanwhile, Smer continues to develop as 
a cohesive party for middle Slovakia -- a party that is 
arguably in more ways right-wing than left-wing. 
 
VALLEE