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INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 9398
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JAN LIMA 5490
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 6092
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 007325 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2107 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR CO
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BROWNFIELD'S 26 SEPTEMBER MEETING WITH 
MOD SANTOS 

Classified By: Ambassador William R. Brownfield 
Reason: 1.4 (b,d) 

------- 
Summary 
------- 

¶1. (C)  Ambassador Brownfield met with Minister of Defense 
(MOD) Juan Manuel Santos and Vice MoD Juan Carlos Pinzon on 
September 26.  Santos raised the need for agreement on GOC 
sharing of intelligence with Israeli defense contractors, as 
well as Colombia's request that its priority military 
purchases be fast-tracked through the Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS) process.  Santos noted current GOC assistance to the 
war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan but emphasized competing 
domestic priorities.  The MoD conveyed the GOC's concern for 
Venezuelan arms build-up and agreed to dialogue with the USG 
before reacting.  The Ambassador raised the USG-GOC joint 
imperative to draft a nationalization plan to transfer U.S. 
assets and funding to Colombia.  End Summary. 

------------------- 
Intel with Israelis 
------------------- 

¶2. (C)  MOD Santos opened with the subject of Israeli 
contractors now advising Colombia on counterterrorism 
operations and asked what the Colombian military needed to do 
in order to share intelligence with them.  The Ambassador 
promised to discuss this subject with the new Israeli 
Ambassador.  The Ambassador said the challenge of sharing 
intelligence classified "US-COL ONLY" with the Israelis 
required a formal solution between our Embassy in Tel Aviv 
and the GOI.  Santos said he would press the Israeli 
government to resolve this issue. 

--------------------------------- 
Trainers for Iraq and Afghanistan 
--------------------------------- 

¶3. (C)  Turning to the October 2 - 3 visit of Secretary of 
Defense Gates to Colombia, the Ambassador asked the GOC 
position on providing trainers to assist in the war and 
counternarcotics efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The MOD 
noted Colombia was already providing counterdrug officers to 
Afghanistan, and he stressed the GOC must "keep its eye on 
the ball," i.e. on Colombia's own internal conflict. 

----------------------- 
Concern about Venezuela 
----------------------- 

¶4. (C)  The Ambassador requested that the MoD consult with 
the USG if at any point Colombia felt obliged to react to 
Venezuelan activities, including conventional weapons 
purchases.  "Of course," replied Santos, noting he had 
resisted efforts by his Armed Forces to buy single-purpose 
conventional weapons with 'wealth tax' funds for defense 
spending.  Still, Colombia was "very worried" about events in 
Venezuela, including weapons acquisitions.  Santos 
specifically cited Russian SU-30 fighter jets and Venezuelan 
manufacture of AK-103 assault rifles as most problematic. 

---------------------- 
Fast-tracking FMS Buys 
---------------------- 

¶5. (C)  ViceMoD Pinzon expressed his appreciation for 
Embassy MILGP advice on allocation of wealth tax proceeds, 
saying the assistance was "very helpful and helped shape the 
end package."  MOD Santos explained the GOC strongly wished 
to spend the bulk of the funds (about USD 3.5 billion over 
four years 2007-10) through the FMS system, but to do so the 
GOC wanted a commitment to fast-track the processing of such 
purchases.   Santos indicated he would bring up this point 
personally with Secretary Gates. 

-------------------------------- 
Nationalization and Funding Cuts 
-------------------------------- 

¶6. (C)  The Ambassador explained his task to draft a mutually 
acceptable plan to transfer U.S. assets and funding to the 
GOC.  At this juncture, he said, the Embassy and GOC could 

plan the transition themselves or wait for the U.S. Congress 
to do it for them.  In the former case they would be in a 
better position to limit the damage from reduced funding. 
While acknowledging these points, Santos pointedly 
underscored the GOC's view that the USG had moved the 
goalposts on Colombia with premature cuts.  The GOC had 
believed funding was committed to 2010. 

----------------------------- 
Resolving 'Bumps in the Road' 
----------------------------- 

¶7. (C)  MOD Santos acknowledged we must deal with political 
realities, noting that current bumps in the bilateral 
military relationship consisted more of style than of 
substantive issues.  In conclusion, the Ambassador asked that 
when the two governments disagree the MOD flag big issues and 
offer alternative ways forward.  Santos agreed and said he 
looked forward to this way of doing business. 


Brownfield 

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