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O 301726Z OCT 07
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TO RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 001980 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECUN EU GM
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ANGELA MERKEL'S CRAWFORD VISIT 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. John Koenig for reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
. 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Angela Merkel will arrive at Crawford riding 
a wave of public approval surpassing 70 percent.  Her 
popularity is credited to her effective leadership style, 
Germany's economic growth, and her skill in turning centrist 
appeals on climate change and social issues to her advantage. 
 Despite the weakness of her Social Democratic coalition 
partner (SPD), Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU) 
faces challenges as it enters the second half of the 
legislative term.  German public opinion is edging leftwards 
generally, and widespread skepticism about U.S. policy often 
constrains Merkel's Atlanticist instincts.  Merkel has the 
power to shift public opinion when she engages directly on a 
priority issue.  She has not taken a strong leadership role 
on Afghanistan up to now; there are indications that she may 
soon visit Afghanistan, which could increase her level of 
commitment to our shared goals.  Merkel has shown her 
willingness to be tough with Russia on its foreign policy and 
on its domestic direction.  She will want to compare notes on 
how we are approaching the transition in Russia, and how we 
prioritize key issues where the Russian position is critical 
(such as Iran, Kosovo, the CFE Treaty, and Missile Defense). 
Most importantly from a domestic point of view, we believe 
Merkel will want Crawford to highlight progress on some of 
her signature themes, especially climate change (on which she 
increasingly seems to be staking her chancellorship), but 
also on the Transatlantic Economic Council and possibly the 
Middle East peace process.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------ 
Merkel Still Riding High 
------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C) Angela Merkel remains firmly on top of the German 
political scene as the country's most popular postwar 
politician.  Approximately 80 percent of the public approves 
of her job performance.  Due in large part to her personal 
popularity, her CDU holds a lead of about ten points over the 
SPD in opinion polls.  The path is not completely rosy for 
Merkel, however.  After her international successes at the 
G-8 and EU summits in the first half of 2007, public 
attention increasingly is focused on the domestic front, 
where (despite declining unemployment) many feel that 
Germany's economic "upswing" has eluded most Germans.  Growth 
estimates are being revised downward, from 2.6 percent in 
2007 to 2.2 percent in 2008.  As elections draw closer, 
Merkel increasingly will seek to demonstrate the results of 
her leadership in the international sphere with a particular 
emphasis on binding commitments to address climate change, 
which she has defined as the central issue facing the planet 
that demands common action. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Merkel's Expectations from Crawford 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) With domestic policy-making in the Grand Coalition 
increasingly plagued by partisan rivalry in the approach to 
2009 elections, Merkel will need to maintain her standing 
within the EU and internationally, which has proven 
instrumental in buttressing her domestic popularity.  Climate 
change offers an opportunity not only to satisfy her domestic 
audience, but to elaborate a broader leadership role for an 
EU audience as well.  Merkel is committed to pursuing 
aggressive international measures to meet the challenges of 
global warming.  Her support for mandatory, targeted global 
limits on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and an international 
cap-and-trade regime reflects a deep-seated belief that only 
drastic, concerted efforts on the part of the international 
community can slow -- and ultimately reverse -- the human 
contribution to global warming.  In pursuing activist climate 
change policies, the Chancellor enjoys overwhelmin support 
at home, across the board.  Her unwaverng support for an 
overarching, mandatory framewor of emissions caps could put 
her increasingly atodds with our approaches and could lead 
to more isible disagreements, especially if Germany and 
ther like-minded countries push hard for mandatory global 
GHG targets at the UN Bali Conference in ecember.  Germany 
also plays a particularly key ole as Europeans continue to 
focus on future energy needs.  With a strong political 
mandate to reduce GHG emissions, Merkel recognizes that 
increasing attention to alternative energy sources is 
essential.  Focusing on U.S.-EU cooperative efforts in this 
regard could be an advantageous way to downplay our 
differences. 
 
¶4.  (C) Merkel is competing with a more dynamic French 
President Sarkozy for attention on the international stage 
(his visit to Washington and appearance before a joint 
 
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session of Congress November 7 will not have escaped notice 
here), and Crawford thus offers her the opportunity to remind 
the German public of her key role in international politics 
and Transatlantic relations -- and for us to push her for 
progress on key issues.  Merkel was caught off guard by the 
French proposal for further EU sanctions against Iran, a step 
that presents a challenge to Merkel's -- and Germany's -- 
more cautious and measured foreign policy style.  Merkel 
views Iran nonetheless as a priority and has been strong, 
even though her government often demonstrates a low degree of 
coordination on Iran issues.  Her personal engagement 
therefore is essential to bringing her Government, the German 
business community, and the rest of the EU around; we should 
sketch our vision of diplomatic steps over the coming weeks 
and months and seek to enlist her increased personal 
engagement. 
 
¶5.  (C) Merkel is likely to raise her interest in the Middle 
East and ask what Germany and the EU can do to support the 
U.S. and promote a successful meeting in Annapolis.  Foreign 
Minister Steinmeier, who currently is traveling in the 
region, recently announced an EU Middle East Action Plan, 
which, in part, calls for the EU to provide more development 
and rule-of-law assistance to the Palestinian Authority. 
Saudi King Abdullah will pay a State Visit to Germany 
November 7, and Jordanian King Abdullah will make an Official 
Visit directly thereafter -- Germany wants both visits to 
help connect moderate Arab leaders more closely to the 
Annapolis process. 
 
¶6.  (C) On Afghanistan, Merkel has helped maintain German 
deployments despite considerable public opposition, although 
she has let others do most of the heavy lifting.  The German 
Parliament voted overwhelmingly October 12 to extend the 
ISAF/Tornado mandate and is almost certain to approve renewal 
of the OEF mandate in mid-November.  The Germans have 
restricted their military presence mainly to the relatively 
secure north and have not been willing, for example, even to 
allow German military training teams to accompany their 
Afghan National Army (ANA) units on deployments to southern 
Afghanistan.  Merkel should get a sense in Crawford of how 
important additional German commitments (or flexibility in 
interpreting the German mandate) are to the United States. 
She may seek to have the U.S. continue to shift more of its 
activities, such as training and equipping of the ANA, from 
OEF to ISAF and to improve ISAF's strategic communications. 
 
 
¶7.  (C) Merkel also hopes to capitalize on the success of the 
German EU Presidency, in particular her signature initiative, 
the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC), aimed at reducing 
regulatory barriers to transatlantic trade and investment. 
Merkel is concerned about maintaining the momentum in the TEC 
and fears that the European Commission and upcoming EU 
presidencies (including France) may lose enthusiasm for the 
project.  A six-month review meeting of the TEC will take 
place in Washington on the same day as her Crawford visit. 
Merkel is also concerned about the recent turbulence in the 
German banking sector, partially connected to the U.S. 
subprime mortgage crisis, and the continuing appreciation of 
the Euro, along with rising oil prices.  Together, these 
economic factors are expected to cause Germany's growth to 
slip from 2.6 percent in 2007 to 2.2 percent in 2008. 
 
¶8. (C) The Chancellor may want to review in Crawford the 
agenda for the April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest.  She will 
be keen to hear our views on the role Afghanistan and Kosovo 
may play there.  This is a good opportunity to encourage 
stronger German support on Missile Defense, energy security, 
and cyber security as key challenges facing the Alliance in 
the 21st Century.  While we do not expect the Chancellor to 
raise it in Crawford, it is possible she might note her 
continued interest in German membership on the UN Security 
Council. 
 
¶9.  (C) A successful Crawford visit will strengthen Merkel's 
hand in dealing with her EU counterparts as they address 
critical decisions on Iran, Kosovo, the Middle East, the 
Transatlantic Economic Council, and climate change.  It will 
also strengthen her domestic political standing if she can 
demonstrate concrete benefits to engagement with the U.S. at 
a time when the U.S. image among the German public remains 
unfortunately low. 
KOENIG