VZCZCXRO6163
RR RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #1223/01 2951619
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 221619Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8311
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RHMFIUU/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BAMAKO 001223 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
PASS TO USAID FOR AMARTIN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KISL EAID SOCI PHUM IFR PTER PINR PGOV ML
SUBJECT: "WAHHABIS" AND ISLAM IN MALI 
 
REF: A. IIR 7 114 0005 08 
     ¶B. BAMAKO 01170 
     ¶C. BAMAKO 00789 
 
¶1.  Summary:  Some external observers have become 
increasingly concerned over a segment of Malian Muslims 
frequently described as "Wahhabi" (ref A), fearing that those 
so labeled are likely to advance a radical agenda.  This 
concern stems from confusion, rooted in expedient if 
inaccurate labels dating from as early as the French colonial 
era, within Malian society over what the term Wahhabi means. 
Such labels should not be interpreted as evidence of an 
ideological link between Malian "Wahhabis" and Islamic 
extremists.  In Mali those who pray with crossed arms and 
veil female family members are frequently called Wahhabi. 
This group, which refers to itself as "ahl al-Sunna," does 
not follow Wahhabi doctrine and has little, if anything, in 
common with traditional Wahhabism.  Understanding why this is 
so, and what differentiates the al-Sunna from Mali's Sufi 
majority, will improve our ability to reach out to Malian 
Muslims.  Al-Sunna in Bamako, Gao, Timbuktu and western Mali 
freely shared views on Sharia law, treatment of women, 
assistance from Saudi Arabia and other issues.  In nearly all 
respects these views proved identical to those expressed by 
Malian Sufis who are known for practicing a tolerant and open 
form of Islam.  Rather than posing a threat as the Wahhabi 
label implies, the al-Sunna respect the secular institutions 
of the Malian state, express tolerance for other religious 
traditions and have lived peacefully in Mali for more than 60 
years - something that is unlikely to change in the near 
future.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------- 
Islamic Practices in Mali 
------------------------- 
 
¶2.  Nearly all Muslims in Mali are Malikite Sunnis, meaning 
they follow the Maliki school of Islamic law.  Most of these 
adhere to one of three Malikite Sunni Sufi brotherhoods: the 
Quadriyya, Tijaniyya or Hamalliyya (ref B).  A significant 
number of Malian Sunnis, however, explicitly reject Sufi 
doctrine.  Although this group refers to itself as "ahl 
al-Sunna" or "the people of the Sunna," Malians describe them 
as "Wahhabi." 
 
¶3.  Malian al-Sunna, however, have little if anything in 
common with traditional Wahhabis.  They do not practice 
Wahhabi doctrine and do not follow Mohammed abd al-Wahab. 
More importantly, the al-Sunna do not adhere to the Hanbali 
legal tradition - a key trait that characterizes Wahhabism. 
Abdoul Aziz Yattabare, an al-Sunna Imam who directs one of 
the largest medersas in Bamako, described all al-Sunna in 
Mali as Malikite.  Two other well-known al-Sunna Imams, 
Mahamoud Dicko and Mohamed Kimbiri, were hesitant to state 
categorically that every al-Sunna in Mali was Malikite but 
agreed that Yattabare's assessment was largely correct. 
Kimbiri, for instance, joked that he was "more Malikite" than 
his Malikite Sufi colleagues.  Dicko noted that in Mali like 
anywhere else one can find Muslims who borrow from all four 
classic Sunni traditions - Maliki, Hanbali, Shafi and Hanafi 
- but that Malian al-Sunna are generally Malikite. 
 
¶4.  Al-Sunna live throughout Mali and come from a diverse set 
of ethnic backgrounds including Songhrai, Bambara, Malinke, 
Soninke, Sarakole and Peuhl.  While it is relatively easy to 
find al-Sunna in Mali's northern regions of Timbuktu and Gao, 
most of the al-Sunna living in these areas appear to be 
either Songhrai or from southern Mali origins.  Al-Sunna is 
noticeably less popular among northern Mali's Arab and Tuareg 
populations.  There are very few al-Sunna, for instance, in 
the northernmost region of Kidal, which largely adheres to 
the Sufi Quadriyya brotherhood. 
 
-------------------------- 
Al-Sunna Influence in Mali 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5.  Al-Sunna have been in Mali since the 1940s when students 
returning from universities in Egypt and the Arabian 
peninsula brought with them new religious interpretations 
that rejected key Sufi tenets such as the worship of Muslim 
saints, mysticism and initiation rites.  The rejection of the 
core values of popular Sufi brotherhoods was part of a 
broader attempt to return to "true" Islam based on strict 
adherence to the Koran.  Although these students were 
familiar with Wahhabi doctrine, they never regarded 
themselves as Wahhabi nor followed Wahhabism's key tenets. 
 
BAMAKO 00001223  002 OF 004 
 
 
They were, moreover, not adverse to incorporating modern or 
western ideas deemed compatible with Sunni Islam. 
 
¶6.  French colonial authorities were extremely concerned by 
political Islam and religious extremism during the decades 
prior to Malian independence.  In the 1930s, these fears 
focused on the Hamalliyya and Shaykh Hamallah in the western 
Malian town of Nioro du Sahel (ref B).  After Shaykh 
Hamallah's deportation to a French POW camp during WWII and 
subsequent death, the French turned their sights on Malians 
returning from the Middle East whom the French branded as 
Wahhabis.  Several French colonial administrators serving in 
West Africa at the time noted that the traditional definition 
of Wahhabism did not fit the form of Islam practiced by 
Malian "Wahhabis," but these observations were overwhelmed by 
the political expediency of saddling the new religious 
movement with a label linked to backwardness and Islamic 
extremism. 
 
¶7.  Nor were the French the only ones working to discredit 
Malians returning from Egypt and the Middle East.  Because 
this group explicitly rejected Mali's traditional Sufi 
practices as misguided, prominent Malian religious and 
political leaders interpreted the form of Islam they 
practiced as an existential threat and joined the French in 
portraying them as radical, dangerous extremists. 
 
--------------------- 
We Are Not Extremists 
--------------------- 
 
¶8.  Malian al-Sunna still chafe at the Wahhabi label since 
they do not regard themselves as Wahhabi and have little, if 
anything, in common with Wahhabis from the Middle East.  In 
Mali the term has also served as a pejorative since the 
colonial era and is still invoked, often for domestic 
political reasons, to portray the al-Sunna as peddlers of 
foreign extremism. 
 
¶9.  With only a few exceptions, the al-Sunna are now fully 
integrated into Malian society.  In Bamako, Sikasso, Gao and 
Timbuktu al-Sunna leaders work closely with Sufis and hold 
respected posts within organizations like Mali's High Council 
of Islam.  Al-Sunna Imams actively participate in an 
inter-faith religious organization dedicated to combating the 
spread of HIV/AIDS.  Imams Yattabare and Dicko pointed to 
al-Sunna involvement in the Malian economy - many of Mali's 
most important economic operators are reportedly al-Sunna as 
are a good proportion of small-time vendors working in the 
informal sector - to emphasize how al-Sunna are working to 
reinforce Mali's secular institutions.  Al-Sunna are also 
deeply involved in Mali's education sector as medersa 
teachers and administrators - something that cannot be 
overlooked in a nation short on teachers, schools and 
education infrastructure. 
 
¶10.  Imam Yattabare urged Malians and the international 
community not to lump the al-Sunna together with the Wahhabi 
or other extremist groups.  "Muslims are brothers," said 
Yattabare, "but our understanding and world-views are not the 
same.  Our perspective in Mali is different than those in the 
Middle East or even in South Africa.  Failure to make this 
difference will create unintended misunderstandings.  Malian 
al-Sunna are peaceful." 
 
¶11.  Unfortunately, many still fail to make this distinction. 
 Imam Mahamoud Dicko, who directs Mali's Islamic radio 
station from a studio co-located with Bamako's Grand Mosque 
and Islamic Cultural Center, is one example.  Dicko attracted 
significant attention in 2001 after he was quoted in the 
international press criticizing former Malian President Alpha 
Oumar Konare's pro-U.S. ties.  By 2006, these comments 
surfaced in an article in the U.S. Army journal Military 
Review which described Dicko as the leader of a "harder, more 
militant form of Islamic politics (that) has appeared 
recently" in Bamako.  "Coupled with the GSPC's appearance in 
the Sahel," the article continued, "Dicko's anti-U.S. 
campaign might inspire groups like the Tuaregs...to throw 
their lot in with the jihadists." 
 
¶12.  While Dicko is known for his outspokenness, he is 
certainly not the leader of an anti-American campaign.  His 
criticism of former President Konare and current President 
Amadou Toumani Toure centers around his belief that Malian 
political leaders are more responsive to the demands of the 
international donor community than to the needs of average 
Malians who lack food, clean water, health care and 
 
BAMAKO 00001223  003 OF 004 
 
 
educational opportunities.  Opposition leaders, said Dicko, 
will not openly criticize the government because they still 
hold out hope for a government portfolio.  "Me," he said, "I 
am an Imam. I don't need a portfolio." 
 
¶13.  Characterizing al-Sunna as a recently arrived, "harder, 
more militant" form of Islam is incorrect.  Al-Sunna have 
lived peacefully in Mali for more than 60 years and there is 
no indication that this is likely to change.  Dicko, other 
Al-Sunna Imams and simple adherents throughout the country 
appear as committed to Mali's tradition of religious 
tolerance as their Sufi counterparts.  Indeed, some al-Sunna 
may be more committed to religious tolerance in Mali due to 
the marginalization they have experienced because of their 
religious beliefs. 
 
---------- 
Sharia Law 
---------- 
 
¶14.  Doctrinal differences aside, Mali's al-Sunna and Sufi 
communities have nearly identical positions on social and 
political issues.  This includes Sharia law, treatment of 
women, respect for the secular Malian state and tolerance of 
other religious practices.  Although Sufi and al-Sunna 
leaders frequently refer to Sharia law, they admit it can be 
difficult to understand exactly what these references mean. 
Imam Dicko himself said he has difficulty defining Sharia in 
the Malian context.  "Sharia," he asked, "what is it? In a 
country where people don't have enough food to eat or water 
to drink, how are you going to amputate someone's hand?" 
Dicko easily dismissed aspects of Sharia not compatible with 
Malian realities - something a fundamentalist Islamic leader 
is unlikely to do.  Malian references to Sharia appear 
designed rather to encourage individual Muslims to adhere to 
Islamic principles during their daily lives. 
 
¶15.  Al-Sunna and Sufi leaders also oppose a new Family Code 
Law and abolition of the death penalty, two controversial 
bills which President Amadou Toumani Toure recently asked the 
National Assembly to approve.  Although the proposed Family 
Code amendments appear minor to outsiders - the changes would 
allow women to officially register as Head of Household, 
equalize inheritance rights for women, and enable children 
not recognized by their father to use the last name of their 
mother -  Sufi and al-Sunna leaders describe the changes as 
un-Islamic and are united in their opposition.  "In Islam," 
said one al-Sunna Imam, "only men can be Head of Household." 
Al-Sunna and Sufi Imams also oppose abolition of the death 
penalty.  The only clear point of divergence between the two 
religious communities appears to center around the extent to 
which women are veiled.  Sufi leaders advise that women's 
heads should be covered while the al-Sunna advocate a full 
veil which, in some extreme cases, includes a burqha complete 
with black gloves. 
 
------------------------------ 
Saudi Funding, Or Lack Thereof 
------------------------------ 
 
¶16.  Al-Sunna leaders also discussed Saudi funding, or the 
lack thereof.  It is commonly believed that Malians who 
convert to al-Sunna do so after traveling to Egypt or the 
Middle East.  This was certainly the case for the first 
Malian al-Sunna and still holds for some al-Sunna today. 
Many Malian al-Sunna, however, converted while working in 
Central or Southern Africa where they met other Malian 
al-Sunna living abroad.  Consequently, most funding for 
al-Sunna mosques and medersas appears to come not from Saudi 
Arabia but from Malians based abroad (in Africa, Europe or 
the Middle East). 
 
¶17.  In Gao, Timbuktu, and Bamako, al-Sunna Imams described 
Saudi funding as focused only on seed money for start-up 
projects or absent altogether.  In Gao, the leaders of an 
isolationist al-Sunna village (often described by outsiders 
as a hot-bed of strong Wahhabi sentiment) complained that a 
water pump installed by Saudi Arabia, complete with a 
flapping Saudi flag on top, broke down every three months 
(ref C).  Village leaders harbored no expectations of a 
Saudi-based repair initiative.  In Timbuktu, the Imam of an 
impressive al-Sunna mosque-medersa complex in the sand on the 
edge of town received funding not from Saudi Arabia but from 
private Malians based abroad.  The Imam expressed little hope 
for future Saudi funding.  In Bamako Imam Yattabare, the 
Director of one of Mali's largest medersas, said his school 
was built with donations from private Malians and received no 
 
BAMAKO 00001223  004 OF 004 
 
 
support from Saudi Arabia.  He said al-Sunna regarded Saudi 
funding as fleeting with no follow-up. 
 
¶18.  Imam Dicko was even more outspoken on Saudi support for 
Malian al-Sunna.  Dicko complained that Mali's Islamic Radio 
station has received nothing from Saudi Arabia despite a 
personal visit from Mecca's Grand Imam to the radio station 
during the 1990s.  "The Saudis," said Dicko, "prefer to spend 
their money in nightclubs and casinos." 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
Comment: Recalibrating the View of Malian "Wahhabis" 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶19.  As in most countries, prudence dictates that one can not 
dismiss the possibility that Islamic extremism, or the 
potential for it, exists in Mali.  It is important, however, 
to clarify the outlook of a significant group of Malian 
Muslims, routinely described as Wahhabi.  Contrary to popular 
belief, the al-Sunna are not a new phenomenon in Mali.  Nor 
are they inherently anti-American or extremist.  Apart from 
the doctrinal differences that separate them from Malian 
Sufis, the al-Sunna's opinions on issues like Islamic law, 
the treatment of women and religious tolerance are extremely 
close, and in many cases indistinguishable, from their Sufi 
counterparts and fall well within the Malian mainstream. 
Understanding this, and contextual undercurrents attached to 
the Wahhabi label in Mali, will strengthen our ability to 
work with al-Sunna leaders to better focus our outreach 
strategies in Mali. 
LEONARD