VZCZCXRO4572
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHAB #1110/01 3041811
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311811Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3696
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABIDJAN 001110 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE 
AF/AS FRAZER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL IV
SUBJECT: COTE D' IVOIRE SCENESETTER FOR D VISIT 
 
 
Classified By: AMB WNESBITT, REASONS 1.4 (b, d) 
 
Overview 
 
¶1.  (C)  Embassy Abidjan warmly welcomes your visit to Cote 
d,Ivoire.  You will be the highest ranking USG official to 
visit Abidjan since 2005 when AF Assistant Secretary Connie 
Newman visited to discuss the peace process. We believe your 
visit will be viewed as a sign of increased USG interest in, 
and perhaps concern about, Cote d,Ivoire.  It will be an 
excellent opportunity for the U.S. to reiterate our desire to 
see Cote d,Ivoire be a peaceful, prosperous, well-governed 
nation that can be a positive force in the region and an 
effective partner in deterring threats such as terrorism and 
drug trafficking.  Ivorians remember fondly the days when 
their nation was a guiding light in the region and most long 
for a return to Abidjan,s golden era.  To move forward, 
however, the country must overcome the stalemate of the last 
five years. 
 
¶2.  (C)  The overall security situation has improved since 
the signing of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA) but 
there is still widespread uncertainty about the future. 
Reportedly the result of direct negotiations between the 
government and rebel forces, the OPA was facilitated by 
President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso and signed by Cote 
d,Ivoire,s two primary protagonists (President Gbagbo and 
now Prime Minister Soro) in March 2007.  It is a viable 
roadmap for the country's emergence from the political crisis 
but the pace of implementation has been slow and 
disappointing.   We hope that your visit will help to shore 
up the government's commitment to following through on 
implementation despite opposition from radical elements in 
each of the respective camps.  The USG is very positively 
viewed in Cote d,Ivoire and your public statements will have 
great influence.  In a poll taken within the last 12 months, 
the U.S. was favorably viewed by 88 percent of Ivorians. 
 
Nationality Issue is Key 
 
¶3.  (C)  The question of nationality or "Ivoirite", is at the 
heart of the stalemate.  A substantial number of individuals 
(estimates range from 300,000 to 3 million) are currently 
undocumented as Ivorians and are thus unable to participate 
fully in Ivorian society where the possession of a national 
ID card governs a broad swath of activities, including 
eligibility to vote and to own land for agricultural 
cultivation.  A majority of those who are undocumented have 
family ties to Burkina Faso and were initially welcomed into 
the northern region of Cote d,Ivoire as much-needed laborers 
in the cocoa sector.  Cote d,Ivoire,s founding father and 
first president Houphouet-Boigny took a very liberal approach 
to integrating this group into Ivorian society; his 
successors (Bedie and Guei) actively promoted a more 
restrictive approach, including changes to the constitution 
that emphasized the national divisions between north and 
south, and between Christian and Muslim.  The 2002 coup 
attempt which quickly evolved into an armed rebellion that 
split the country in two underscored the depth of emotion 
attached to this question. Reunification of the country and 
the restoration of government authority throughout the 
national territory will be difficult to achieve unless the 
issue of nationality is dealt with in a manner acceptable to 
both sides. 
 
¶4.  (C)  The "audiences foraines" or public tribunals called 
for in the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (and several 
previous peace agreements) are intended to facilitate voter 
registration and the eventual issuance of ID-cards to those 
who qualify by providing numerous fora at which persons whose 
births were never registered are issued birth documentation 
(jugements suppletifs).  While there are many legitimate 
administrative difficulties associated with carrying out the 
audiences foraines, Embassy Abidjan,s larger concern is that 
President Gbagbo has yet to demonstrate a firm commitment to 
the success of the audiences foraines.  In both 2005 and 2006 
then Prime Minister Banny took very serious and successful 
steps to get the process underway.  Radical and sometimes 
violent supporters of the President succeeded each time, 
however, in derailing the audiences foraines and stalling the 
overall peace process.  The political stakes are much higher 
for PM Soro as it is his constituency in the North that will 
benefit primarily from these courts. 
 
National Issue Link to Next Presidential Election 
 
¶5.  (C)  So far this year, the government has taken steps to 
facilitate the return of administrative personnel, especially 
judges, to the north and Prime Minister Soro has been visibly 
engaged in efforts to ensure that these personnel will have 
 
ABIDJAN 00001110  002 OF 003 
 
 
the housing, security, and wherewithal they need to operate 
effectively.  As of October 15, 2007, however, only 25 of 65 
audiences foraines sites were operational and the OPA states 
that the audiences will be in operation for three months. 
This time could easily be extended should both sides agree 
but the slow pace of implementation causes many in the north 
to question the government's sincerity.  The Forces Nouvelles 
(New Forces) who maintain de-facto control of the north, have 
stated repeatedly that they will not disarm until the 
question of nationality is satisfactorily addressed; it is 
unlikely they will accept a deeply flawed process.  DDR is 
effectively on hold for this and other reasons. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Many of those opposed to the audiences foraines fear 
the impact on anticipated national elections of adding a 
significant number of new voters in the north, as well as the 
longer term economic implications.  Cote d' Ivoire's 
electorate (there are 60 different ethnic groups in CdIs 
population of 18.7 million) currently breaks down into three 
broad groups; no single party or individual can credibly 
claim majority support.  There is a very strong consensus 
that a new presidential election is a pre-requisite to ending 
the division of the country and restoring a sense of 
normalcy.  The outcome of the audiences foraines will 
therefore have a direct impact on the next presidential 
election.  The key message we should convey to President 
Gbagbo on this topic is the importance of addressing the 
nationality question and the audience foraines process in a 
serious manner if the next presidential election (which he 
clearly hopes to win), is to disperse the air of uncertainty 
that still hovers over Cote d Ivoire.  While Gbagbo has 
derailed earlier audience foraines, he nonetheless wants an 
election that he can win and that will be certified by the 
international community to give him much-sought legitimacy. 
The international community has invested heavily in this 
country's stability and is eager to see results in the form 
of steady, measured progress over the next 6-12 months. 
 
 
Economic Overview 
 
¶7.  (C)  The lack of a clear resolution to Cote d' Ivoire,s 
political situation has had a predictable negative effect on 
many parts of the economy.  The key issue for the donor 
community, however, has been the lack of transparency and 
reluctance of the Gbagbo government to share data regarding 
revenue from oil and cocoa in particular, and overall 
government spending.  The government's fiscal performance has 
deteriorated over the past five years due to falling revenue; 
pressure to increase crisis-related expenditures, such as 
defense; an eroding tax base, and an increasing lack of 
transparency in the budget.  Spending on health and education 
fell as a share of GDP while discretionary presidential 
spending rose and an undetermined percentage of oil revenue 
has been kept off-budget.  While overall fiscal deficits 
narrowed, domestic and external arrears increased, prompting 
the World Bank, the IMF and the AfDB to suspend engagement 
until July 2007 when an arrears clearance package was 
negotiated, in conjunction with an IFI package for 
post-conflict and DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration) assistance.  Your visit will be an excellent 
opportunity to reinforce to the government of Cote d,Ivoire 
that the USG shares the IFIs and other donors, concerns 
about the lack of transparency and that we support linking 
continued assistance to greater transparency. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Economic activity in general remains sluggish and 
per capita income has slumped. Overall GDP grew by 1.8 
percent in 2006, a slight recovery over 2005; growth in 2007 
is projected to be 2 percent.  This growth can be attributed 
primarily to higher export earning from oil and refined 
products (now $1.3 billion annually, reasonably steady cocoa 
revenues ($1 billion) and proceeds form an expanding 
telecommunications sector.  However, the majority of the 
population is not better off.  Per capita income declined by 
0.6 percent in 2005 and 0.7 percent in 2006; a 0.2 percent 
drop is predicted for 2007.  Economic activity in the north 
of the country remains well below pre-crisis levels. 
Inflation has not been an issue until recently; the average 
consumer price rise was about on-half a percent from 
2004-2006. Rising oil prices have increased transportation 
costs and the exchange rate has accelerated in recent months 
in line with the Euro,s appreciation vis-a-vis the dollar. 
 
¶9.  (U)  The hardships brought on by the division of the 
country, including food insecurity in the north, triggered a 
substantial movement of people from north to south; several 
hundred thousand have been internally displaced since 2002. 
The result has been a significant increase in poverty. 
According to World Bank estimates, the poverty level has 
 
ABIDJAN 00001110  003 OF 003 
 
 
increased 5 percent, from 38.2 percent in 2002 at the onset 
of the crisis to 43.2 percent in 2006. The absence of a 
central government public administration severely compromised 
the delivery of health, education, and other services. 
 
¶10. (SBU)  The cotton and cocoa sectors support some 9 
million people nearly half the population; cotton output 
dropped by more than 50 percent since 2000.  Cocoa output has 
remained essentially stable, hovering at the 1 million ton 
mark since 2000, with a slight dip to 950,000 in the 2002-03 
harvest.  International industry and Ivorian shipping 
companies estimate that up to 200,000 tons of cocoa per year 
have been transshipped through Ghana and Togo to evade 
artificially low prices since 2000, but those numbers appear 
to have come down since 2006.  Modest improvements in 
economic activity have been noted since the signature of the 
OPA, and civil servants are beginning to return but huge 
challenges loom ahead.   Foremost among those will be the 
government's ability to demonstrate to foreign investors that 
both political stability and an investor-friendly environment 
have been restored. It would be helpful for you to highlight 
in your meetings with President Gbagbo and PM Soro that 
getting the economic climate right is as critical to 
restoring investor confidence as political stability. 
 
Bilateral Assistance and Sanctions 
 
¶11.  (C)  Cote d' Ivoire has been under Section 508 sanctions 
since the December 1999 coup that removed Henri Bedie from 
power.  Sanctions were not lifted following the 2000 election 
due to government interference in the election with the 
intent of manipulating the results.  Cote d' Ivoire was 
suspended from AGOA benefits on January 1, 2005, due to an 
Ivorian government decision to violate the UN-monitored 
cease-fire in November 2004 and lack of progress on key 
economic reforms.  A credible election and substantial 
progress in meeting IMF/World Bank transparency goals would 
pave the way for a resumption of aid. In the interim, a very 
small bilateral assistance program focused on electoral 
preparation is directed from USAID's West African Regional 
Program based in Accra. 
 
¶12.  (C)  One of the few very bright spots in the US-Cote d' 
Ivoire relationship has been our PEPFAR program. 
Cote d'Ivoire is one of 15 focus countries that receives 
funds for HIV/AIDs prevention, education, and treatment; the 
USG is by far the largest supporter of HIV/AIDs activities in 
Cote d Ivoire and of the health sector in general. In 2007, 
the PEPFAR program here received $85 million; we expect an 
increase to about $120 million in FY 08.  Ensuring the proper 
use of these funds is a central focus of our PEPFAR team.  We 
have made remarkable strides in terms of expanding treatment 
and ware working to improve joint efforts with the government 
of Cote d' Ivoire to tackle ongoing issues with stigma and 
HIV/AIDs education/prevention activities. 
NESBITT