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INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNCFE/CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE IMMEDIATE
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE IMMEDIATE 0191
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C O N F I D E N T I A L VILNIUS 000629 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2017 
TAGS: NATO KCFE PARM PREL ZB RS
SUBJECT: U.S.-BALTIC A/CFE MEETING IN VILNIUS, AUGUST 30 
 
REF: A) STATE 116194 B) STATE 109669 C) USNATO 445 
 
Classified By: CDA DAMIAN LEADER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: U.S. HLTF Representative Deputy Assistant 
Secretary Karin L. Look led CFE consultations with Estonia, 
 
SIPDIS 
Latvia, and Lithuania on August 29 and 30, 2007 in Vilnius, 
Lithuania.  On 29 August with Lithuanian MFA Under Secretary 
Pavilionis and on 30 August with all three Baltic 
delegations, the U.S. delegation explained and argued for the 
U.S. parallel action plan (ref A), sought Baltic support for 
it and, in particular, emphasized the special role of the 
Baltic States in it.  While all three Baltic delegations 
praised the initiative and U.S. leadership in trying to 
achieve the key Alliance goals of Russia,s fulfillment of 
its Istanbul commitments and entry into force of the Adapted 
CFE Treaty (A/CFE), their skepticism regarding Russia,s 
intentions (and thus the U.S. plan,s viability) was 
considerable and to a large extent, unwavering.  DAS Look 
made clear that that while the U.S. too is clear-eyed about 
Russia,s intentions and willingness to work seriously on 
fulfilling its remaining commitments, we also do not believe 
that simply maintaining the status quo is an option that 
would achieve consensus within the Alliance.  Putin,s threat 
to suspend CFE coupled with related Russian assertions 
regarding A/CFE has created a new situation.  We need a way 
ahead on Istanbul and ratification of A/CFE; and we need to 
address who will be limited by A/CFE and how. 
 
¶2. (C) The Baltic States, core concern about the U.S. 
parallel action plan was its proposal for early consultations 
by the Baltic States and Slovenia with,inter alia, Russia on 
accession to Adapted CFE.  The U.S. explained that this 
question appeared to be a core Russian concern despite public 
statements that each of the Baltic States hoped to join the 
Adapted CFE Treaty as soon as possible.  At the outset the 
Lithuanian delegation simply opposed this idea; by the end of 
the second day they appeared to accept the importance of 
Alliance unity with regard to the plan and thus were warming 
to early consultations with CFE parties as proposed in that 
plan. Their less hostile attitude was due, in large part to a 
helpful Estonian message that underscored the need to get the 
conditions right for such consultations.  The U.S. argument 
for the parallel action plan, including our proposal for 
consultations, which gained the most traction was the need 
for Alliance unity.  DAS Look and EUR/RPM Dep Dir Jennifer 
Laurendeau observed that Russia,s focus on the Baltic States 
being part of CFE made it imperative that all three States 
play an early and visible role in the parallel action plan. 
 
¶3. (C) Estonian Head of Delegation Margus Kolga clearly 
understood that the Baltic States will need to play an active 
role; the Lithuanian delegation remained skeptical and 
Latvian Head of Delegation Kaspars Ozolins was unconvinced. 
That said, all three argued that there must be consultations 
within NATO before engaging Russia.  NATO Allies would need 
vocally to support Baltic statements and positions in broader 
consultations.  The Latvian delegation submitted a non-paper 
which called for a NATO Contingency Operations Plan (COP) as 
a prerequisite for launching talks on Latvia,s accession to 
A/CFE (NOTE: Text included in para 21. END NOTE) All three 
delegations requested that the U.S. provide a readout of the 
11 September U.S.-Russia Paris bilateral meeting. It was 
agreed that the U.S. would seek to do so both on the margins 
of the 12 September V-10 in Tallinn with EUR PDAS Volker and 
on the margins of the 13 September HLTF meeting in Brussels 
with VCI DAS Look. End summary. 
 
 
Viability of Parallel Action Plan: the Trouble with Russia 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4. (C) Discussions at the 29 August meeting, chaired for 
Lithuania by MFA U/S Pavilionis, and at the 30 August meeting 
amongst all four delegations, were frank and substantive, 
centering on the U.S.- proposed parallel action plan for 
ending the current stalemate with Russia, and the key role of 
the Baltic States in that plan.  Although all expressed much 
support for U.S. leadership and initiative, they also laid 
out a number of concerns with the viability of the U.S. plan 
largely due to Russian inflexibility. 
 
¶5. (C) The Lithuanian delegation used the 29 August bilateral 
meeting for U/S Pavilionis to express his concern that Russia 
would use any NATO flexibility on Adapted CFE ratification 
for further wedge-driving within the Alliance, and produce an 
escalation of Russian demands, but no action on Istanbul.  He 
argued that Russia should fulfill the Istanbul commitments as 
a prerequisite for the Baltic States to move beyond public 
statements to set up consultations and called for a firm 
multilateral Allied approach in a broader context (leveraging 
energy security, trade, and other instruments) to "force" 
Russia into action.    Pavilionis emphasized the familiar 
Baltic concern about the possibility of any discussions about 
the Baltics without the Baltics present.  He said he trusted 
the U.S. but doubted that the U.S. could control the process 
proposed in the parallel action plan (namely with regard to 
Germany and to some extent France) which could result in a 
fractured Alliance. 
 
¶6. (C) The importance of the CFE Treaty to European security 
was echoed by each of the delegations during the 30 August 
discussions, as were concerns with maintaining Allied unity 
and skepticism about Russia,s intentions.  Latvian Head of 
Delegation Kaspars Ozolins, Director of the Security Policy 
Department of the MFA, praised the U.S. idea of a parallel 
action plan as a method to show Russia a way forward that 
helps Moldova and Georgia, while noting the hope that the 
Baltics would also benefit from the process. Ozolins 
cautioned that Russia would string the process along by 
partially fulfilling the requirements of the timeline and 
prolonging negotiations to squeeze further proposals from the 
Allies which would then be taken as promises.  Estonian Head 
of Delegation Margus Kolga, Director General of the First 
Political Division of the MFA, expressed skepticism about 
Russia,s readiness to move forward on Istanbul and their 
commitment to CFE.  Russian behavior and statements could not 
all be explained by upcoming presidential elections, and 
there was a risk that U.S. proposed flexibility might be 
premature.  Lithuanian Head of Delegation (on 30 August), 
Algis Dabkus, Director of the Security Policy Division of the 
MFA, underscored that NATO unity was a key element of the 
process but reiterated Lithuanian concerns with Russian 
intentions and where discussions may lead. 
 
 
Status Quo Not an Option 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶7. (C) DAS Look made clear that that while the U.S. too is 
clear-eyed about Russia,s intentions and willingness to work 
seriously on fulfilling its remaining commitments, we also do 
not believe that the status quo -- simply maintaining the 
NATO position that Allies will not ratify the Adapted CFE 
Treaty until Russia,s remaining Istanbul commitments are 
fulfilled -- is a viable option.  Laurendeau noted that at 
the moment, if no new ideas or steps were agreed, there 
appeared to be little prospect for progress on Istanbul and 
thus, every reason to believe that in the absence of movement 
by Allies on ratification of Adapted CFE, Russia would 
suspend implementation of the current CFE Treaty in December. 
 If we made no attempt to break the stalemate, Look 
explained, that could lead to the possibility of no Istanbul 
commitments fulfilled, no A/CFE on the horizon and the 
current CFE Treaty on life-support come December. 
 
¶8. (C) DAS Look and Laurendeau made the case for why the 
Balts should consider consultations on accession to CFE as a 
way to assist in making this best effort with Russia to get 
the Istanbul commitments fulfilled and CFE preserved.  The 
reasoning behind the parallel action plan was only partly 
directed at Russia:  the U.S. believes that a forthcoming 
NATO message on CFE is also the best way to maintain, and 
sustain, a unified NATO position.  This position will need to 
hold even if Russia does not agree to work with us and 
ultimately the CFE Treaty is placed at risk.  In the event 
our effort fails, all Allies need to believe that it was 
Russia that refused to accept a fair, reasonable and 
pragmatic offer if we are to maintain Alliance unity. 
 
¶9. (C) Dabkus (Lithuania) asked if the USG was sure it would 
be able to control the process of the action plan, noting 
specifically the German plans to hold a conference on CFE 1-2 
October.  DAS Look explained that we have informed Germany 
that the timing for this conference is not good and could be 
counterproductive.  As Germany remains insistent on holding 
it, she said, we will attend and try to steer the process. 
She continued that this serves as a case in point as to why 
it was necessary for the U.S. to seize the initiative in 
developing a substantive plan before other Allies created 
plans that could potentially undermine Russian fulfillment of 
its remaining Istanbul commitments.  (NOTE: The Lithuanian 
delegation seemed to be under the impression that it was only 
Germany that is dissatisfied with the status quo and willing 
to devalue the Istanbul commitments for traction on a new way 
forward. END NOTE) All delegations agreed that it would be 
important to try to define a constructive focus for the 
German conference, perhaps focused on the value Allies all 
place on CFE and the desirability of maintaining the regime. 
 
 
Role of the Baltic States vis-a-vis the parallel action plan 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶10. (C) All three Baltic States are prepared to continue to 
state publicly their willingness to accede to A/CFE once 
it,s in force, although Lithuania questioned the utility of 
these statements when they have already done so many times 
before.  All were not comfortable with the U.S. proposal for 
consultations with Russia (and others) on accession to A/CFE. 
 They were particularly wary of making clear publicly the 
conditions of their accession prior to entry into force of 
A/CFE. 
 
¶11. (C) Ozolins (Latvia) observed that adding another promise 
(Baltic consultations) to the mix would not entice Russia to 
fulfill its Istanbul commitments.  Russia could use 
consultations to try to split the Alliance by making specific 
proposals for ceilings that are acceptable to some Allies and 
not others.  Linking Baltic consultations to Russia 
rescinding its announcement of suspension could result in 
Russia making Baltic consultations on A/CFE a precondition 
for Russia to move on Istanbul commitments. 
 
¶12. (C) Kolga expressed Estonia's willingness to accede to 
A/CFE when the time comes and willingness to make public 
statements about Estonia's intentions.  He said that it might 
be premature to even discuss consultations with Russia and 
rushing into consultations might back the Baltic countries 
into a corner.  Equipment ceilings and other details could 
only be set through a collective defense strategy; and 
therefore, consultations within the NATO context to determine 
what the Alliance can support must happen before any 
consultations with Russia.  Dabkus (Lithuania) echoed 
concerns about such early consultations noting support for 
the Estonian proposal to start discussions within NATO.  He 
questioned the proposed formats for broader consultations 
since the Joint Consultative Group is a forum where the Balts 
are not States Parties and the NATO Russia Council is a forum 
where Russia is at the table. 
 
¶13. (C) Look and Laurendeau said that Russia,s focus on the 
Baltic States being part of CFE made it imperative that all 
three States play an early and visible role in the parallel 
action plan. Look underscored that the Baltic States have an 
essential role as partners in this pragmatic plan; their role 
directly impacts the ability of the U.S. to lead the process 
and maintain a unified approach.  Look and Laurendeau 
explained that consultations on accession are not the same as 
formal accession negotiations, and perhaps there could be a 
parallel process of intra-Alliance and NATO-Russia 
consultations.  Look emphasized that the consultations 
envisioned could begin with sharing principles related to 
accession to Adapted CFE, rather than specifics (e.g. 
numbers).  The effect would be to give the Baltic States a 
seat at the table as a key player in the Alliance on CFE. 
This would involve taking an active role as a member of the 
Alliance in saving the CFE Treaty, rather than refusing to be 
part of the process.  The importance of Alliance unity to 
retaining a working CFE Treaty, getting Russia to fulfill its 
Istanbul commitments and having an orderly plan for ratifying 
A/CFE was the line of argument that gained the most traction 
throughout the discussions. 
 
 
Baltic Proposal(s) 
- - - - - - - - - 
 
¶14. (C) By the end of the day,s discussions the three were 
no longer adamant in refusing to consider the possibility of 
consultations with Russia on accession, but they had not 
agreed to the idea, either.  All three Baltic delegations 
emphasized that consultations within NATO must occur before 
broader consultations involving Russia; it would be 
imperative that all NATO States support Baltic statements and 
positions in broader consultations.  In the right 
circumstances, if questions regarding the Alliance dimension, 
and an appropriate venue could be worked out, Estonia, and 
Latvia to some degree, appeared willing to consider the 
possibility of broader preliminary consultations which would 
key off of principles underpinning their previous statements 
about their willingness to join CFE.  The Latvian rep 
worried, nonetheless, that Russia might use statements of 
general principles against the Balts to demonstrate their 
"aggressiveness" or turn Baltic commitments into 
preconditions for Istanbul commitments. 
 
¶15. (C) Ozolins (Latvia) presented a non-paper which called 
for a NATO Contingency Operations Plan (COP) as a 
prerequisite for launching talks on Latvia,s accession to 
A/CFE.  It reiterated Latvia's willingness to negotiate 
accession to A/CFE, but stated that acceding to A/CFE should 
not undermine Latvia's National Security.  Full text appears 
in para 21.  Latvia intends to distribute this paper to 
Allies after receiving input from the U.S.  Estonia expressed 
support for the initiative to start contingency planning and 
Lithuania noted the paper was of interest. 
 
¶16. (C) U.S. delegation member Lieutenant Colonel Olejasz, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, remarked that the paper raised two key 
issues: individual national security requirements and 
collective alliance responsibilities. Each country needs to 
consider its individual security requirements while also 
assessing collective responsibilities and requirements.  Each 
member has responsibilities to the Alliance and the Alliance 
has responsibilities to each member.  While making clear that 
he does not speak for NATO, LTC Olejasz said that NATO values 
the Baltic States as members of the Alliance and is showing 
strong support with the Air Policing mission.  He said that 
the U.S. has strong relationships with each Baltic country 
and highlighted their efforts to be good partners noting 
their support for and participation in the U.S. led coalition 
in Iraq and NATO led efforts in Afghanistan.  LTC Olejasz 
said that the military supported development of the U.S. 
parallel action plan which serves as a means for NATO to put 
forward a best effort that maintains emphasis on host nation 
consent and continued Alliance solidarity.  Laurendeau 
pointed out that the Latvian non-paper seemed to indicate 
that the security benefits provided by the CFE Treaty regime 
were in Latvia's national interest, which reinforced the 
position that all members of the Alliance should not only 
want this Treaty, but bear responsibility for working 
together to maintain it. 
 
 
Presentation on northern flank forces 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶17. (C) U.S. delegation member James Starkey provided an 
informal presentation on conventional armed forces in the 
Leningrad Military District and the Kaliningrad Oblast' of 
Russia, and in Belarus.  He noted the there had not been any 
significant changes in the forces during the past year, and 
that Russia,s focus remains in the south.  Overall, Russian 
forces have been gradually improving since the mid-1990,s 
because of increased capital investment in facilities, 
increased training, and in recent years, the conversion of 
selected units to contract service.  In the Leningrad 
Military District, active forces include one air assault 
(formerly airborne) division, two separate motorized rifle 
brigades, and one naval infantry brigade, as well as inactive 
brigades.  There are some indications that changes may be 
under way that will lead to a decreased capability to 
activate additional forces.  In the Kaliningrad Oblast,, 
there is a small active force (two low-strength separate 
motorized rifle brigades and one naval infantry brigade), but 
large holdings of tanks, ACV,s and artillery pieces provide 
a latent capability to activate at least three additional 
brigades.  Belarus has a small portion of its combat 
equipment in active units and the capability to create a 
larger force after a period of mobilization and training. 
Ozolins inquired whether the active level of training of the 
airborne division in Pskov was a specific trend or more 
general.  Starkey indicated the high level of training was a 
reflection of increased resources but also noted that 
airborne units train more than most others as they are kept 
at high readiness and usually are the first units deployed in 
a crisis.  Ozolins also asked about Belarusian and Russian 
cooperation on training and procurement.  Starkey responded 
that their air defense systems are integrated, and there is 
some combined training, but that neither has been doing much 
procurement.  Both countries were keeping a substantial 
portion of their forces at a lower level of combat readiness. 
 Starkey estimated it would take more than a month for the 
less ready and inactive units to be brought to full strength 
and trained to be capable of offensive operations. 
 
 
Further Consultations 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶18. (C) Estonian Head of Delegation Margus Kolga said he 
understood that the Baltic States will need to play an active 
role as the Alliance engages Russia on CFE.  Kolga noted 
Alliance unity is key, just as one Alliance voice is key with 
regard to Baltic accession negotiations.  This means it is 
now time to start consultations within the NATO context on 
Baltic accession to CFE.  The Lithuanian delegation remained 
skeptical, with Dabkus affirming that Lithuania is ready to 
support unified alliance approach and to do its part, but 
underscoring they do not want to be held hostage.  As team 
players, Lithuania is open to consultations in NATO, but in 
no rush to hold consultations with Russia.  Latvian Head of 
Delegation Kaspars Ozolins was unconvinced and remained 
particularly concerned with the Baltic role in the timeline. 
Latvia envisions internal consultations first which will in 
turn determine what can be done in a broader context. 
Latvians would like a Washington reaction to their non-paper 
as soon as possible. 
 
¶19. (C) All three delegations requested that the U.S. provide 
a readout of the 11 September U.S.-Russia Paris bilateral 
meeting.  Look agreed that the U.S. would follow up on the 
margins of the 12 September V-10 in Tallinn with EUR PDAS 
Volker and that she would debrief on the margins of the 13 
September HLTF meeting in Brussels. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Listing of delegation members: 
 
-- Estonia: Margus Kolga, Head of Delegation, MFA; Arti 
Hilpus, Deputy Head of Delegation, MFA; Peeter Helme, 
Security Policy Department, MFA; Kristjan Prikk, MOD 
International Cooperation Department; Kai-Helin Kaldas, MOD 
International Cooperation Department; Villu Tamul, Arms 
Control Group of the Estonian General Staff. 
 
-- Latvia: Kaspars Ozolins, Head of Delegation, MFA; Raimonds 
Oskalns, Deputy Head of Delegation, MFA; Diana Krieva, 
Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Division, MFA; Janis 
Garisons, MOD Crisis Management and Mobilisation Department; 
Sintija Visnevska, MOD Defense Policy and Planning 
Department; Liga Mikucevska, National Armed Forces Joint 
Headquarter Arms Control Department; Ieva Jirgensone, NATO 
Permanent Mission. 
 
-- Lithuania: Algis Dabkus, Head of Delegation, MFA; Donatas 
Ziugzda, Deputy Head of Delegation, MFA; Andrius Krivas, NATO 
Division, MFA; Jonas Daniliauskas, Non-proliferation and 
Disarmament Division, MFA; Dovydas Spokauskas, Arms Control, 
Non-proliferation and Disarmament Division, MFA; Martynas 
Lukosevicius, Arms Control, Non-proliferation and Disarmament 
Division, MFA; Robertas Sapronas, MOD International Relations 
and Operations Department; Liutauras Kavoliunas, Major of the 
Armed Forces. 
 
-- United States: DAS Karin L. Look, Head of Delegation; 
Jennifer Laurendeau, Deputy Head of Delegation; Kathryn 
Ducceschi, Military Advisor to Department of State; Jeff 
Gibbs, Legal Advisor to Department of State; Hugh Neighbour, 
Chief Arms Control Delegate, U.S. Mission to the OSCE; Steve 
Olejasz, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Peter Perenyi, Office of the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe-NATO; James 
Starkey, CFE Expert for Department of State; Joe King, 
Defense Attache to Lithuania; Lauren Charwat, Regional 
Affairs Officer; Michael Dickerson, Political Officer. 
 
¶21. (C) BEGIN TEXT OF LATVIAN NON-PAPER: 
 
LATVIA CONFIDENTIAL RELEASABLE TO ESTONIA, LITHUANIA, US 
 
*Latvia,s reflection on prospective negotiations on 
accession to Adapted CFE Treaty* 
 
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) is an 
important mechanism for European security.  It is a 
cornerstone of conventional arms control and confidence 
building in Europe.  Hence efforts should be made to maintain 
and observe the CFE regime.  Keeping the CFE Treaty in force, 
however, should be prime responsibility of States Parties to 
the Treaty.  Burden of maintaining the CFE regime can not be 
shifted to non-member states. 
 
Latvia notes that on a number of occasions it has expressed 
its readiness to negotiate potential accession to the Treaty 
as soon as Istanbul commitments are fully implemented and 
other corresponding provisions are in force.  Simultaneously, 
Latvia shall give due consideration to the terms and 
conditions under which it may proceed to negotiations on the 
accession to the Treaty. 
 
*Acceding to the CFE regime should not undermine Latvia,s 
national security.* 
 
Based on the principle of collective security and defense, 
Latvia expects support from its Allies in case of military 
crisis.  CFE Treaty on the other hand sets restrictions on 
armed forces and military equipment to be deployed on the 
territory of Latvia thereby directly affecting Latvia,s 
national security.  In addition, changes to the immediate 
vicinity of Latvia,s borders constitute its security 
concerns.  Thus, the terms under which Latvia accedes to the 
Treaty must take into account the potential deployment of 
Alliance,s forces on our territory that are adequate to the 
security needs of Latvia. 
 
Since accession to NATO, the Baltic States have requested 
Contingency Operations Plan (COP).  Latvia sees as one of the 
prerequisites for launching talks on Latvia,s accession to 
the CFE Treaty the elaboration of NATO COP.  Eventually the 
NATO COP will form a basis for estimating the "territorial 
ceilings" for Latvia under CFE Treaty. 
 
Furthermore taking into account latest changes in the 
security environment ni Latvia,s neighborhood, Latvia would 
see a need for closer cooperation in the field of capability 
development of Latvian Armed Forces that require additional 
financial means. 
 
LATVIA CONFIDENTIAL RELEASABLE TO ESTONIA, LITHUANIA, US 
 
END TEXT OF LATVIAN NON-PAPER. 
 
¶22. (U) DAS Look has cleared this cable. 
LEADER