VZCZCXYZ0014
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKO #4442/01 2680855
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 250855Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7879

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 004442 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN A/S ROOD 
USDOE FOR NNSA SAOKI/JGLASER/VMCCLELLAND/JCONNERY/MKRUPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2017 
TAGS: KNNP KHLS TRGY JA
SUBJECT: U.S./JAPAN DISCUSSIONS ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
 
REF: TOKYO 4190 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR THOMAS SCHIEFFER FOR REASONS 1.4(B),(G) 
 
¶1. (SBU) A U.S. delegation led by DOE Deputy Under Secretary 
for Counterterrorism Steven Aoki, met July 18-19 with a 
Japanese interagency group headed by Takeshi Nakane, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Director General, Disarmament, 
Non-Proliferation and Science Department.  The Japanese side 
consisted of 47 representatives from 12 ministries and 
agencies, including the Cabinet Secretariat, the Ministry of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), 
the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and 
Industry/Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), the 
National Police Agency, the Coast Guard, and other emergency 
services agencies.  The meeting objectives were to (1) 
exchange views and discuss the status of U.S.-Japan 
cooperation related to physical protection of nuclear 
facilities and materials; (2) expand efforts in the area of 
emergency response and consequence management to RDD and IND 
incidents; (3) exchange views on the threat posed to Japanese 
nuclear facilities and material; (4) discuss the use of 
simulation and modeling tools to assist in the visualization 
of possible attack scenarios; and (5) discuss Japanese views 
on an Information Exchange Agreement.  Nakane also use the 
meeting as an opportunity to review the effect of the July 
16, 2007, earthquake on the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power 
Station. 
 
¶2.    (SBU) In the aftermath of the earthquake, all seven 
reactors have been shut down and will remain that way pending 
completion of safety checks by the operator and reviews by 
regulators, including NISA (Ref).  Prior to the earthquake, 
three of the seven reactors at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa station 
had been shut down for regularly scheduled maintenance.  The 
seven reactors generate a total of over 8 GW of electricity. 
The total annual power generated in Japan is 241 GW, with 
nuclear supplying a total of 46 GW.  On an annual basis, 
Japan generates approximately seven percent more electricity 
than it consumes.  However, since summer is a peak time for 
energy consumption, there was talk that some idle fossil fuel 
plants might be needed to pick up any energy shortages.)  The 
Japanese side noted there had been a minor radioactive 
release via air and water spillage.  The causes of these 
incidents was under investigation, but in all cases the 
Japanese noted the reported releases were not significant. 
(See reftel for futher information on the status of the 
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear facility.) 
 
¶3.    (C) The Japanese presented a review of their actions to 
improve the physical protection of their nuclear plants. 
Over the past two years, Japan has adopted many new and 
stringent security measures at their nuclear facilities. 
They have fielded a Design Basis Threat that includes 
sabotage and have instituted criminal penalties for divulging 
security related information.  They have enacted new laws in 
support of the International Convention for the Suppression 
of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and other international 
agreements.  The National Police Agency and Cabinet 
Secretariat representatives noted that have also added 
 
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round-the-clock security guards by the Riot Police Unit 
(equipped with automatic weapons) at nuclear facilities. 
They look forward to the next round of bilateral discussions 
on physical protection to be held in Japan later this 
calendar year. 
 
¶4.    (C) The U.S. proposal to conduct a workshop on 
responding to radiological dispersal device (RDD) and 
improvised nuclear device (IND) incidents is under 
consideration by the GOJ.  Nakane stated such a workshop 
involves many ministries, going well beyond the purview of 
those involved primarily in commercial nuclear oversight. 
The attending ministry representatives agreed to review the 
U.S. proposal and Nakane said he would deliver a response in 
the near future. 
 
¶5.    (C) The sides exchanged information and their thoughts 
on the current threat situation.  The U.S. presented a DIA 
briefing on the threat posed to Japanese facilities by North 
Korea, considered low at this time.  The briefing also 
provided possible attack scenarios including possible force 
strength.  The briefing was supplemented by a U.S. 
presentation on a tactical simulation of an attack on a 
hypothetical nuclear facility.  The Japanese talk centered on 
possible Al-Qaida threats.  The Japanese side noted that 
since they are a staunch ally of the U.S. and have 
contributed to the mission in Iraq and Afganistan, they have 
put themselves at risk.  This view was in stark contrast to 
that espoused by the GOJ two years ago, when they doubted the 
 
Al-Qaida threat to their homeland. 
 
¶6.    (SBU) In that light, the U.S. has spoken with Japanese 
counterparts on the use of simulation and modeling tools to 
help visualize possible attack scenarios.  These tools are 
used in the U.S. to supplement current testing methodologies 
(both rules and performance based).  While there was great 
interest, there seemed to be some confusion as to which 
ministry would have the lead on such cooperation.  The use of 
these tools would also be useful in visualizing attack 
scenarios during Japan's upcoming G-8 presidency. 
 
¶7.    (C) Nakane was less hopeful regarding an Information 
Exchange Agreement.  He believes that such an Agreement would 
require Diet approval which would be difficult to get through 
due to the sensitive nature of the information being 
exchanged.  He suggested we continue within the current 
framework and expressed appreciation at the understanding of 
the U.S. 
 
¶8.    (SBU) One new topic discussed was the possibility of 
cooperation in the technology and use of non-lethal force 
during transportation.  The National Police Agency 
representative stated that they needed more time to review 
their use of such technology and that it could be included in 
future technology cooperation efforts. 
 
¶9.    (SBU) This cable was cleared by Deputy Under Secretary 
Aoki subsequent to the delegation's departure. 
Schieffer