VZCZCXRO8389
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #0767/01 2631511
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201511Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6538
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 0040
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUESEN/SKOPJE BETA
RUEHSQ/USDAO SKOPJE MK
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2133
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000767 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SCE (PFEUFFER) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MASS MARR MK KV
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: PRESIDENT ON NAME ISSUE, KOSOVO, 
SECURITY MATTERS, TROOPS FOR GWOT 
 
REF: A. SKOPJE 766 
 
     ¶B. SKOPJE 736 
     ¶C. SKOPJE 698 
     ¶D. SKOPJE 712 
 
Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D). 
 
SUMMARY 
 
¶1. (C) During a September 19 meeting with the Ambassador to 
discuss cohabitation challenges (ref A), President 
Crvenkovski expressed concern that Macedonia might be pushed 
to the wall in its name dispute with Greece before the 2008 
NATO Summit, underscored that there is no difference between 
Skopje and Washington on Kosovo status issues, and agreed 
with the Ambassador that recent criminal incidents in the 
border area with Kosovo did not present a security threat to 
Macedonia.  The Ambassador highlighted the continuing 
importance for Macedonia of demonstrating a constructive 
approach and low media profile on the name issue.  She also 
told Crvenkovski that the U.S. would welcome additional 
Macedonian efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, if that could be 
done without undermining defense reforms and Macedonia's NATO 
membership prospects.  On the name issue, the best we can 
hope for from Skopje, if Athens decides to press for a 
resolution of the dispute prior to the Bucharest Summit, is 
an offer to engage in confidence building measures via 
bilateral talks, and a restatement of its dual name offer. 
End summary. 
 
NAME ISSUE -- TAKE THE HIGH ROAD 
 
¶2. (C) During her September 19 meeting with President 
Crvenkovski to discuss cohabitation challenges (ref A), the 
Ambassador also raised the name dispute with Greece and other 
bilateral issues.  On the name issue, she noted that the 
President generally had in the past acted with restraint in 
responding to statements from Athens regarding the name and 
Macedonia's NATO membership prospects. She encouraged him to 
stick to the high road in dealing with future developments on 
the issue. 
 
¶3. (C) The Ambassador advised that it was best to avoid 
verbal confrontations with Athens and to instead focus on the 
UN process for resolving the dispute.  That would help the 
USG make the case for strict adherence by both sides to the 
1995 Interim Agreement.  She encouraged Crvenkovski to 
consider constructive actions the country could take to show 
that Skopje was being reasonable in its behavior toward 
Greece. It would be important to try to keep the issue out of 
the media spotlight, which could only inflame the situation. 
 
¶4. (C) Crvenkovski said that, in the aftermath of the Greek 
elections, Macedonia was entering a "critical period" that 
would extend to the April 2008 NATO Summit.  His main worry 
was whether UN Special Envoy Nimetz would submit a new 
proposal during that timeframe  which would be unacceptable 
to Macedonia.  If so, he expected Euro-Atlantic attitudes 
toward Macedonia's NATO candidacy to sour; the country would 
be blamed for being inflexible on the matter.  That outcome 
would unjustly "feed Greek arguments" that Macedonia was not 
demonstrating the will to resolve the dispute. 
 
¶5. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador on September 20, FM 
Milososki said that the GOM is considering proposing direct 
bilateral talks with the Greeks, to supplement but not 
supplant the UN discussions under Nimetz.  The direct talks, 
to be held parallel to the UN process, could (subject to PM 
Gruevski's approval) include discussion of 
confidence-building measures such a bilateral commission on 
history textbooks in each country's schools.  Milososki also 
said that he had ordered the MFA not to broadcast the latest 
recognition, by Canada, of Macedonia's constitutional name 
for use in bilateral relations.  Despite the effort, someone 
outside of the MFA, possibly Canada's honorary consul in 
Skopje, had leaked the news to the press.  Milososki added 
that the GOM nevertheless would continue, in its public 
statements, to downplay this development. 
 
KOSOVO -- NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SKOPJE AND WASHINGTON ON 
STATUS QUESTION 
 
SKOPJE 00000767  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) On Kosovo, the Ambassador said we would keep 
Crvenkovski and the government briefed on developments as 
they unfolded.  Kosovo elections in November would be a 
significant hurdle, and we would want Macedonia to continue 
to play a constructive role as a stabilizing force in the 
region.  It would be important for all parties in Macedonia 
to avoid speculation on possible status-related outcomes, 
especially regarding partition concerns. 
 
¶7. (C) The President agreed that Macedonia needed to 
demonstrate a calm and constructive attitude in responding to 
Kosovo developments.  Talk of partition from any quarter was 
"dangerous and destabilizing."  He assured the Ambassador 
that there was "no difference between Skopje and Washington" 
on the Kosovo status question. 
 
¶8. (C) In his September 20 meeting with the Ambassador, FM 
Milososki volunteered that he has been regularly underscoring 
to EU members the importance of working for a unified 
position on Kosovo status, and of the need for a speedy 
resolution of the status issue after December 10.  MFA State 
Counselor for Multilateral Affairs Svetlana Geleva told us 
the same day that the GOM hopes for a unified EU position 
that would make it easier for Macedonia to also follow the 
U.S. lead when the recognition issue comes up.  She said MFA 
officials also are telling their EU counterparts that the 
large ethnic Albanian minority in Macedonia will make it 
difficult for the GOM to delay recognition much beyond a U.S. 
decision to recognize an independent Kosovo. END NOTE. 
 
SECURITY MATTERS 
 
¶9. (C) Referring to some recent shooting incidents and other 
criminal action in the border region villages of Vaksince and 
Tanusevci (refs B, C, and D), the Ambassador told Crvenkovski 
that we did not view the incidents as presenting a threat to 
Macedonia's security, despite wild local media speculation to 
the contrary, nor did we think the incidents were linked.  We 
were confident that the Ministry of Interior was able to 
operate throughout the country, including in the areas in 
which the incidents had taken place. 
 
¶10. (C) Crvenkovski agreed that the incidents were unrelated, 
and that there were no links between the perpetrators and 
Kosovo, as had been suggested in the local media.  Kosovo 
leaders wanted stability, he said, and would discourage 
actions by Kosovar citizens in Macedonia that could threaten 
stability.  He attributed the incidents more to the rivalry 
between DPA (ethnic Albanian governing coalition partner) and 
DUI (main ethnic Albanian opposition party) than to any 
challenges to Macedonian stability.  He added that neither 
party had tried to communicate with the communities in the 
affected areas to determine and help address their basic 
needs, which were substantial. 
 
TROOP DEPLOYMENTS TO IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN 
 
¶11. (C) The Ambassador thanked Crvenkovski (who as Head of 
State is also Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces) for 
Macedonia's troop contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan.  She 
welcomed his upcoming October visit to Afghanistan to meet 
with Macedonian troops serving with ISAF as a positive signal 
of the country's commitment to democracy and stability in 
Afghanistan.  She added that we very much appreciated the 
deployments.  It was important for Macedonia not to 
over-stretch its capacities in a way that might undermine 
defense reforms and the country's NATO candidacy, but if 
Macedonia were able to contribute any more troops to either 
operation without a negative impact on those reforms, that 
would be welcomed. Crvenkovski took the points on board. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶12. (C) Crvenkovski and the GOM share identical positions on 
the name issue, one of the few substantive areas on which 
they agree.  Neither party has indicated, in any 
conversations with us, that there would be any flexibility on 
the Macedonian side in terms of modifying the country's 
constitutional name if push came to shove with the Greeks 
(the PM's Chief of Staff told us on September 20 that any 
 
SKOPJE 00000767  003 OF 003 
 
 
party here "would commit political suicide" if they changed 
the name).  In our view, the best we can hope for from 
Skopje, if Athens decides to up the ante and press for a 
resolution of the name dispute prior to the Bucharest Summit, 
is an offer to engage in confidence building measures via 
bilateral talks, and a restatement of the willingness to find 
a mutually acceptable name for relations with Greece, 
consistent with dual name approach which the GOM considers 
its "final offer" in the matter. 
MILOVANOVIC