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PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #0766/01 2630746
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FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6536
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 0038
RUESEN/SKOPJE BETA
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RHMFISS/CDR TF FALCON
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHSQ/USDAO SKOPJE MK
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000766 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SCE (PFEUFFER) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MK KV
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: PRESIDENT ON COHABITATION CHALLENGES 
 
REF: A. SKOPJE 730 
 
     ¶B. SKOPJE 719 
 
Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4 (b) & (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
 
¶1. (C) President Crvenkovski outlined for the Ambassador on 
September 19 his proposal for working with Prime Minister 
Gruevski to improve cohabitation and to resolve the issue of 
composing the State Judicial Council (SJC), a key NATO 
membership-related task.  Gruevski's initial crude rebuff of 
the proposal risks closing the window of opportunity 
Crvenkovski has opened.  We will press the GOM to show 
greater flexibility in responding to the President's proposal 
which, if implemented, could strengthen Macedonia's NATO 
candidacy. End summary. 
 
COHABITATION -- A STEP FORWARD.... 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Ambassador met with President Crvenkovski, at 
his request, September 19 to discuss cohabitation challenges 
(septel reports on his views on the name issue, Kosovo, and 
security matters).  Crvenkovski started the meeting by 
outlining an initiative he had unveiled on September 17 to 
try to improve cohabitation with Prime Minister Gruevski in 
order to break the deadlock over the composition of the 
15-member State Judicial Council (SJC).  He said he had 
stated his willingness to give up his constitutional power to 
propose candidates for two of the five SJC seats that remain 
unfilled, as long as the government and opposition could 
agree on the appointment of all five SJC positions -- the 
President's two seats and the Parliament's three seats to 
nominate. (NOTE: Of the 15 SJC seats, 10 already have been 
filled. END NOTE.) 
 
¶3. (SBU) In terms of process, Crvenkovski said he had 
suggested starting with the list of the 35 qualified 
candidates who applied, and then working with the leaders of 
the four major parties in the parliament (governing VMRO and 
DPA, and opposition SDSM and DUI) to whittle the list down to 
five final candidates through a process of elimination.  He 
pledged to approve any list of five final candidates, as long 
as they were acceptable to the group of four party leaders, 
were not politically affiliated, and were unlikely to 
exercise political influence on the judiciary. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Crvenkovski also proposed breaking the deadlock on 
appointment of new Macedonian ambassadors to 10 vacant posts 
by agreeing to approve candidates from a list of 106 MFA 
diplomats who meet the qualifications stipulated under the 
Law on Foreign Affairs. He pointed out that, under the law, 
two-thirds of ambassadorial posts overseas are to be filled 
by career diplomats; under the current government, only 10 
percent of ambassadors meet that requirement.  As a result, 
he had agreed to let the GOM select the candidates, including 
for such key posts as NATO and the EU.  He would accept those 
candidates without pre-consultations (even though the law 
required such consultations), as long as they were chosen 
from the list of career diplomats eligible to assume the rank 
of Ambassador. 
 
....AN AWKWARD TANGO, PROTOCOL BREACHES 
 
¶5. (C) Instead of responding to his ideas for breaking the 
logjam, Crvenkovski said (and the media has widely reported), 
PM Gruevski had counterproposed to meet on September 20 to 
discuss the State Judicial Council and other priority issues. 
 The President was not averse to meeting but found the 
proposed timing for the meeting frustrating -- why did 
Gruevski need to wait another two days to act?  Time was 
running out for Macedonia to obtain a favorable EU progress 
report from Brussels, the President added.  "What on the 
Prime Minister's calendar could be more urgent than solving 
these issues?" he asked rhetorically. 
 
¶6. (C) In addition to stalling for three days, Gruevski had 
informed the President in his letter that the President 
should meet the Prime Minister in the latter's cabinet, 
instead of in the President's office, a breach of standard 
protocol (and a further public snug by Gruevski). "Never 
 
SKOPJE 00000766  002 OF 002 
 
 
before in the history of Macedonia," Crvenkovski said, "has a 
President been summoned to a Prime Minister's office." 
Adding insult to injury, the Gruevski proposal had addressed 
the President as "Mr. Crvenkovski," another egregious breach 
of protocol reflecting Gruevski's long-standing refusal to 
accept the legitimacy (confirmed by OSCE and ODIHR at the 
time) of Crvenkovski's 2004 election to office. 
 
NEED TO DEMONSTRATE POLITICAL MATURITY, RESULTS 
 
¶7. (C) The Ambassador said we welcomed President 
Crvenkovski's initiative and agreed that it was unfortunate 
that the GOM had not reacted to the proposal with greater 
dispatch.  We also wanted faster movement on the SJC 
composition, and had told the GOM as much on several 
occasions.  All parties needed to show that the political 
system in Macedonia could function properly.  Crvenkovski 
replied that, even if the meeting with Gruevski failed to 
materialize, he would join the follow-on meeting Gruevski had 
proposed for the same day with SDSM, DUI, and DPA, and to 
which the President had been invited. 
 
A DANGEROUS SCENARIO -- EARLY ELECTIONS 
 
¶8. (C) Responding to a question from the Ambassador, 
Crvenkovski said the reason there had been no progress on 
resolving the SJC issue in the past several months through 
discussions with the opposition, was that Gruevski had 
shifted direction and had instead tried to buy off the 
smaller ethnic minorities with amendments to the electoral 
code (ref A), in exchange for their support for government 
candidates for the SJC.  He had tried to push through the 
electoral code amendments, without consulting the opposition, 
in order to quickly gain support for finalizing composition 
of the SJC. 
 
¶9. (C) These tactical maneuvers were part of Gruevski's plan 
for what Crvenkovski described as a "dangerous scenario" in 
which the Prime Minister would call snap elections in May 
2008, provided Macedonia received a NATO membership 
invitation at the Bucharest Summit.  This, the President 
believed, explained Gruevski's neglect of EU priorities. 
Gruevski had concluded the EU was a distant goal and was not 
focused on it, but this, the President acknowledged, could in 
turn hurt Macedonia's progress on completing NATO tasks.  At 
any rate, the President said, Gruevski believed that NATO 
membership for Macedonia already was a foregone conclusion. 
(NOTE: See ref B for an assessment of the likelihood of early 
elections before/before the Bucharest Summit. END NOTE.) 
 
¶10. (C) The Ambassador replied that such logic, if Gruevski 
bought it, was deeply flawed.  The USG could only support 
Macedonia's NATO candidacy if the country met the membership 
criteria.  No decision on membership had been made yet, and 
in any event Gruevski had to realize that there was a natural 
overlap between EU and NATO membership criteria.  We would 
continue to work with Gruevski and the rest of the GOM, as we 
had been for months, to make this clear and to keep them 
focused on completing the tasks related to their 
Euro-Atlantic integration goals. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶11. (C) Crvenkovski's statesmanlike initiative opens a window 
of opportunity that could improve cohabitation, resolve the 
SJC issue, and strengthen Macedonia's NATO and EU candidacies 
if Prime Minister Gruevski seizes the moment.  Gruevski's 
initial crude rebuff risks closing that window; it could be 
weeks or months -- time which Macedonia cannot afford to lose 
-- before a similar opportunity arises.  We will work with 
the GOM to keep the window open and ensure both sides 
demonstrate the flexibility to capitalize on this opportunity 
to advance Macedonia's NATO bid. 
MILOVANOVIC