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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SHENYANG 000175 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR, PRM, INL, EAP/CM, EAP/K, G/TIP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2017 
TAGS: PREF PREL PINR PGOV KS KN CH
SUBJECT: LATE AUGUST TRIP TO THE DPRK/CHINA/RUSSIA BORDER 
AREA 
 
REF: (A) SHENYANG 28 (B) SHENYANG 145 
 
Classified By: CONSUL GENERAL STEPHEN B. WICKMAN. REASONS: 
1.4(b)/(d). 
 
1.(C) Summary.  Recent visits by the Consul General,s to 
Jilin City, Changchun and the ethnic Korean enclaves near the 
DPRK border offered a window on conditions along the 
Sino-North Korean border.  Senior officials said the economy 
in the border areas had improved and that undocumented 
immigration had abated or was under control.  Other contacts, 
however, admitted that the border was porous, trade stagnant, 
and the DPRK economy stressed by the poor harvest and new 
floods.  End Summary. 
 
2.(U) Taking advantage of a trip to the Third Annual 
Northeast Asia Investment and Trade Expo in Changchun, 
capital of Jilin Province, the Consul General paid brief 
visits to Jilin City and three towns in the Yanbian Ethnic 
Korean Autonomous Prefecture -- Yanji, Tumen, and Hunchun -- 
August 28-September 2.  We were permitted to drive the CG,s 
vehicle only as far as Jilin City, traveling to Yanji by air 
and driving to the other towns accompanied by Foreign Affairs 
Office (FAO) officials in their vehicles (para 14, below). 
 
Yanji 
------ 
3.(C) In an August 30 meeting, Yanbian Party Secretary Deng 
Kai (Han ethnicity) and Vice Governor Li Longxi  (Korean, 
until recently Jilin,s Vice Governor) stressed the growing 
prosperity of their region.  More than USD one billion in 
remittances poured into Yanbian last year, and per capita 
bank balances and consumption spending was as high or higher 
than in Changchun.  They reported that trade with North Korea 
continued to increase, while conditions in the border areas 
had improved from the crisis years of the early 1990s. 
 
4.(C) Yanji Party Secretary Jin Yongmo (Korean) went on in a 
similar vein, at the same time enthralling our FAO handlers 
-- none of whom had ever met the earthy cadre ) with tales 
from his old border haunt of Helong City.  (At one point 
during dinner Jin launched into an impassioned plea for 
Communist Party responsiveness to the needs of the people and 
the imperative to rout out corruption in all its forms.  This 
emboldened one of the FAO officers humbly to request that 
Yanji,s old fleet of small-size &coaster8 class buses be 
replaced with full-sized models, even if profits were 
reduced.  Jin was very receptive.) 
 
5.(C) Taking his cue from his bosses, FAO Chief Xu Zhengbing 
(ethnic Korean) used the occasion of an informal farewell 
dinner to debunk the &inflated8 reports on the number of 
&illegal8 migrants from North Korea reportedly living in 
the area.  At various times during the long event he said: 
&We ethnic Koreans can tell at a glance -- or certainly as 
soon as they open their mouths to speak -- when someone is 
from North Korea.  How could there be tens of thousands of 
such people in Yanji or the Yanbian area without our knowing 
it?  In the early 1990s, North Korean beggars were a common 
sight everywhere.  We used to give them and our relatives 
across the border food and assistance in kind; now we just 
send them money.  There,s a real cash economy in the DPRK 
now and they can get anything they want.  We can tell you the 
real numbers privately, but we can,t condone these wild 
exaggerations from South Korean and other media.8 
 
6.(C) Our FAO hosts also insisted that the Yanbian 
authorities treated any migrants detained on the Chinese side 
humanely.  When we noted our concern over the fate of the 
migrants when they were returned to North Korea, Xu said the 
horror stories regarding harsh treatment were either 
exaggerations or things of the past; the DPRK had become 
quite tolerant.  Xu said his staff had investigated one case 
brought to their attention by the South Korean Embassy in 
Beijing and found the charges to be completely bogus. 
 
¶7. (C) On the road the next day, Ms. Chi Yanhua, a 
Japanese-speaking FAO official from Hunchun who maintains 
frequent contact with relatives in the DPRK and who has 
traveled to Pyongyang recently, sounded a slightly different 
 
SHENYANG 00000175  002 OF 003 
 
 
note.  She said the border was essentially &unguarded8 on 
the Chinese side and that North Koreans came across 
frequently to engage in petty thievery or find work.  Often 
they would steal a cell phone, use it while they were in 
China, then sell it to another migrant before crossing back. 
She recounted one story in which a DPRK &migrant8 had 
pedaled a stolen bicycle 50 kilometers across the border 
together with a his haul of only a few hundred renminbi. 
 
 
Tumen 
----- 
¶8. (C) Tumen Party Secretary Piao Songlie (ethnic Korean) 
insisted that trade with North Korea was developing steadily 
across the narrow bridge into Onchon on the DPRK side of the 
river, but he was eager to change the subject. Vice Mayor Yan 
Zhihong was somewhat more affable, but he focused on the 
business opportunities in Tumen.  This included a thriving 
vocational training school set up by a Korean-American from 
Los Angeles that brought in children from all over Jilin and 
even Heilongjiang, teaching vocational skills and providing 
assistance in obtaining jobs in South China, Korea, and 
Japan. (See ref A for more details.) 
 
¶9. (C)  During an aside at the Tumen River land port (on the 
bridge at about 10:30 on August 31) the senior border patrol 
officer in charge (apparently an ethnic Han) said traffic was 
slow of late and that rail trade had trailed completely off. 
He noted that trucks from Tumen could only drive as far as 
Namyang, where goods we offloaded onto Korean vehicles.  He 
also said there was a large market in the DPRK port of 
Rajin-Sonbong where packages were broken down for sale and 
distribution elsewhere in the country.  We were on the bridge 
for only about 20 minutes or so, during which one jeep 
crossed ) a returning Chinese vehicle. We left one group of 
three peasants (apparently North Korean) huddled at the 
customs shack on the Chinese side clutching a few cardboard 
boxes of goods. 
 
¶10. (C)  On our way out of Tumen, Ms. Chi pointed out the 
border patrol detention center where DPRK &illegAls8 were 
housed prior to their return to North Korea.  She said it was 
a pity that her repeated attempts to gain permission for us 
to visit the site had failed, since the treatment there was 
really outstanding.  She said she even knew of a Tibetan 
migrant who had pretended to be North Korean so he could 
spend time in the facility and get three square meals and a 
comfortable place to stay until he was found out and sent 
packing. 
 
Hunchun 
------- 
¶11.  (C) Hunchun Mayor Jin Xiangzhen (ethnic Korean) seemed 
more comfortable than his poorer Tumen cousins during a 
meeting and luncheon that trumpeted prospects for development 
of his obviously vibrant city.  On the road back from the 
fortified point where North Korea, Russia and China come 
together at the mouth of the river, we saw three, half-size 
containers coming crossing back into China from the land port 
leading, eventually, to Rason.  Mayor Jin had complained that 
the road was nearly impassable and said he continued to seek 
agreement with the DPRK on funding a road-building project. 
But Hunchun had to use the Rajin-Sonbong port (?) because 
capacity at the Russian port (do you mean Hunchun,s land 
port to Russia?)was also limited. 
 
¶12. (C) At Hunchun,s land port to Russia about 30 minutes 
before closing (4 pm) the same day, we saw two full-sized 
containers just before they crossed into Russia.  Mayor Jin 
had complained about &laziness,8 unnecessary checkpoints 
and paperwork on the Russian side, as well as a lingering 
dispute between the state-owned Russian National Railroad and 
the &private8 investor in charge of the railway to the 
Zarubino port prevented maintenance and expansion of the 
infrastructure.  (A few days later in Changchun, the Russian 
Deputy Consul General said he thought the dispute would be 
settled &soon.8) 
 
Changchun 
--------- 
 
SHENYANG 00000175  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶13. (C) On September 1, Jilin Academy of Social Sciences 
(JASS) President, Doctor Bing Zheng (Han Chinese) told us he 
had noticed a marked improvement in economic conditions in 
North Korea during his second visit to the country in 
December 2006.  At the formal seminars in Pyongyang, the 
North Korean side had even presented data showing that their 
agricultural harvest had reached their targets.  Privately, 
however, Dr. Bing said his contacts admitted the harvest was 
much lower than the previous year, adding that the recent 
floods had dealt a serious blow to the economy.  Dr. Bing had 
postponed until mid-September a JASS-sponsored symposium on 
developments in Northeast Asia so that the DPRK side could 
participate, but he said he had just been informed that the 
scholars had to remain in Korea to help with reconstruction 
activities. 
 
Some Roads Are More Open than Others 
------------------------------------ 
¶14. (C) As usual in this part of China, obtaining approval to 
drive our consular vehicle became an odyssey of its own.  In 
early August, we had requested permission to drive our 
vehicle from Shenyang to all the points in our itinerary, but 
Jilin FAO informed us late in the month that &Beijing8 had 
not approved our driving beyond Changchun.  When we said we 
were going to check with Beijing and hinted we might call off 
the trip, Jilin FAO said they had not really asked the 
central government but based their decision on regulations 
requiring that the Liaoning FAO approve and notify them 
directly.  When we asked Liaoning, they seemed mystified at 
first but then regretfully informed us ) again at the 
eleventh hour -- that they could only secure approval from 
the &relevant authorities8 to drive as far as Jilin.  The 
expressway from Jilin to Yanji was not finished, and they 
said the decision was to ensure our safety.  On the road, our 
contacts told us the expressway is due to open in the autumn 
of 2008.  We can hardly wait. 
WICKMAN