VZCZCXRO7989
RR RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHRH #1987/01 2690942
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 260942Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6583
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHHH/OPEC COLLECTIVE
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC 0160
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RHRMAKS/COMUSNAVCENT
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 09 RIYADH 001987 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT OF ENERGY PASS TO A/S KKOLEVAR, A/S KHARBERT, AND 
MWILLIAMSON 
S/CT FOR GFEIERSTEIN AND BAVERILL 
DS/ATA FOR KMALOY 
TREASURY PASS TO A/S CLOWERY 
DHS PASS TO TWARRICK AND DGRANT 
CIA PASS TO TCOYNE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2017 
TAGS: KCIP EPET ENERG PTER ASEC SA
SUBJECT: JOINT WORKING GROUP ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
MEETS IN RIYADH 
 
REF: RIYADH 1954 
 
Classified By: A/DCM David Rundell for reasons 1.4 (b) (c) and (d). 
 
¶1.  This message has been cleared by DOE A/S Kolevar. 
 
---------- 
Summary 
---------- 
 
¶2.  (S)  On September 11, the US-Saudi Joint Working Group 
(JWG) on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) met 
at the Ministry of Interior (MOI) in Riyadh, co-chaired by 
the MOI Director of Modernization Dr. Saud al-Semari, 
and the US Embassy's Economic Counselor Robert Barry Murphy. 
Ministry of Interior Special Advisor and 
Chief of Staff to Assistant Minister of Interior Prince 
Mohammed bin Nayif, Major General Dr. Saad al Jabri 
stressed the need for KSA to have contingency planning in 
place immediately for continued oil operations 
in the event of a terrorist or attack by a neighboring state. 
 He asked the USG to begin to provide resources 
"as early as the next day" to address contingency planning 
issues.  In addition, the JWG members reviewed 
June and September site assessment visits to key energy 
installations, and discussed proposed training 
curriculums for both the MOI and industrial security to be 
conducted by Sandia Labs and the Coast Guard. 
The JWG approved conducting a training needs assessment for 
the recently-established Facilities Security 
Force.  The JWG briefly reviewed the status of a training 
funding mechanisms currently in the legal approval 
process, and approved in principal the establishment of 
technical committees as required on an ad hoc basis. 
 
------------------------ 
Meeting Participants 
------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (C) On the Saudi side, meeting participants included: 
 
-- Dr. Saud al Semari, MOI Director of Modernization and JWG 
Co-Chair 
-- Major General Dr. Saad al Jabri, Special Advisor and Chief 
of Staff to Assistant Minister of Interior 
Prince Mohammed bin Nayif 
-- Col. Saad al Ghamdi, MOI, Facilities Security Force (FSF) 
-- Col. Mohammed Raddadi, MOI, Coast Guard 
-- Fahad al Nefai, MOI, Mubahith 
-- Major Abdullah al Moaner, MOI, Mubahith 
-- Capt. Bandar al Subaie, MOI,  Personal Assistant to Dr. al 
Jabri 
-- Abdullah al Shamrani, MOI, Head of Technical Planning, 
Department Civil Defense 
 
 
On the US side, meeting participants included: 
 
-- Robert Barry Murphy, Embassy, Counselor for Economic 
Affairs and JWG Co-Chair 
-- Kevin Kolevar, Assistant Secretary, Department of Energy, 
Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability 
-- Bruce Averill, Department of State, Senior Coordinator for 
Critical Infrastructure Protection 
-- Shannon Ross, Embassy, Energy Attache 
-- Kevin Maloy, Diplomatic Security/Anti-Terrorism Assistant 
Office 
-- Captain Don Grant, US Coast Guard 
-- Kevin Brown, Commander, US Coast Guard 
-- Randy Rhodes, US Coast Guard 
-- Richard Pacheco, Embassy, Economic Officer 
 
RIYADH 00001987  002 OF 009 
 
 
-- Bassem Houssami, ConGen Jeddah, Pol/Econ Chief 
-- Pat Willging, Department of Energy 
-- Sarah Magruder, Department of Energy 
-- Rachael Beitler, Department of Energy 
-- Byron Gardner, Sandia National Laboratories 
-- Dominic Martinez, Sandia National Laboratories 
-- Guy Jones, Sandia National Laboratories 
-- Tommy Goolsby, Sandia National Laboratories 
-- Tim Malone, Sandia National Laboratories 
-- Ahmed Abdullat, Embassy, Department of Homeland Security 
-- Patrick Gillis, Embassy, Army Attache 
-- Joel Wiegert, Embassy, Political Military Affairs 
-- Capt. Fink, US Military Training Mission (USMTM) Naval 
Forces Division Chief 
-- Col. Hall, US Military Training Mission (USMTM) Marine 
Forces Division Chief 
 
------------------------------------------- 
MOI Outlines Threats to the Energy Sector; 
Saudi MOI Civil Defense Planning 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (S)  After welcoming remarks by the JWG Co-Chairs and A/S 
Kolevar, Abdullah Al-Shamrani, MOI Head of Technical 
Planning, Department of Civil Defense, briefed the JWG 
participants on the scale and scope of the contingency 
planning.  He highlighted the possible threats within the 
petroleum, refining, petrochemical, power, and related 
industries.  He noted that Riyadh alone had 1312 such 
installations the MOI considered possible terrorist targets, 
while acknowledging some were of much greater priority than 
others.  He outlined the scope of the threat facing energy 
facilities, varying from operational error, conventional 
explosives, hazardous materials (hazmat), to external threats 
from neighboring states.  He stressed the Iranian nuclear 
threat was the most critical external threat confronting the 
oil, power, and petrochemical industries in the region.  He 
emphasized MOI fears that Iran would recruit agents to carry 
out internal sabotage and inflict environmental damage on the 
Kingdom. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Shamrani then outlined the MOI's Civil Defense 
institutional structure, authorized by the 1986 Civil Defense 
Act, and headed by the Civil Defense Council, with the 
Minister of Interior as its lead.  The General Directorate of 
Civil Defense coordinates efforts of the MOI and volunteers, 
and implements emergency management tasks.  The General 
Administration of Civil Protection works to provide food, 
essential medical services, and disaster recovery.  During 
emergencies, Shamrani indicated the MOI coordinates closely 
with the Ministries of Health, Defense, the Red Crescent, and 
municipalities.  The MOI carried out planning for pre, 
during, and post emergency management phases.  The MOI places 
a large emphasis on controlling hazmat threats, due to the 
large number of petroleum and petrochemical industries in the 
KSA, and on plans for water provision, due to the KSA's 
water-limited environment. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Moving Ahead on Contingency Planning 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Kevin Kolevar, the Department of Energy's 
Assistant Secretary for Electricity Delivery and Energy 
Reliability (DOE/OE), opened the US contingency planning 
presentation by noting he was pleased the US and Saudi models 
had much in common.  For a Saudi audience accustomed to the 
energy sector being held in state hands, A/S Kolevar 
explained the US energy industry is entirely private. 
Nonetheless, he noted, government and the private sector 
cooperate in contingency planning, and regularly review their 
 
RIYADH 00001987  003 OF 009 
 
 
plans to decide if they are the most effective possible. 
Kolevar outlined national, regional, and local level 
responses, stating that the manner in which we prepare 
emergencies in the energy sector is relevant for other 
sectors as well. 
 
¶7.  (C)  A/S Kolevar then laid out a USG proposal for a 
series of contingency planning workshops and training classes 
to better prepare the Saudis for a terrorist incident.  These 
could include Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) or 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) first-responder 
training, up through workshops for senior management.  The 
workshops could be held in the US or the KSA, as appropriate 
to the situation. 
 
----------------------------------- 
The DOE Contingency Planning Model 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Pat Willging, DOE/OE Senior Energy Security 
Advisor, then presented DOE/OE's role in contingency planning 
for the US power and energy industry.  He first noted that 
security measures decrease vulnerability to an attack, while 
contingency planning mitigates consequences when an attack 
occurs.  Both are needed to ensure the continuity of business 
and operations.  Willging emphasized that in the spectrum of 
resiliency of capability, plant managers must carefully 
balance both redundancy and recoverability of operations. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Willging highlighted the partnership between 
government and industry for contingency planning and disaster 
response.  Government responsibilities include continuity and 
response planning, while industry responsibilities include 
operational continuity and response planning.  Both 
government and industry have a shared responsibility for 
coordination, exercising, and putting their plans into 
action.  Willging also emphasized the need for a strong 
inter-agency effort to keep the energy sector functional in 
the event of an emergency.  For example, energy sector 
personnel require functional roads and water systems to 
operate plants.  He underscored the need for the energy 
sector to understand their most critical pieces of equipment, 
and not to confuse these with their most expensive or 
profitable pieces of equipment.  The most critical equipment 
should enjoy the highest level of protection. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Importance of Disaster Planning and 
Exercising as an On-Going Process 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Willging pointed out that exercising for 
disasters is key, stating he personally spends 2-3 months a 
year simulating disasters with federal, state, local, and 
industry partners to ensure disaster response plans could be 
properly executed.  He underscored industry utilizes 
personnel accountability processes to ensure key personnel 
and their families are fully supported during disasters, so 
that the personnel can focus on their jobs - restoring key 
power, refinery, and other facilities - without distraction. 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  Willging advised frequent comprehensive plan 
reviews are needed, with 18 months at most between plans, due 
to changing conditions on the ground.  He advocated 
government and industry engage in gap analyses, for example, 
to clarify which government or industry actor properly has a 
specific area of responsibility.  He advised mitigation 
planning and table top exercises are the next steps in the 
cycle.  Willging wrapped up by highlighting that the cycle of 
comprehensive plan reviews, gap analysis, mitigation 
planning, and tabletop exercises is continuous; when 
 
RIYADH 00001987  004 OF 009 
 
 
government and industry have completed one cycle, they should 
begin another. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Government Can Help Ensure Clear Communication, 
Industry as Partners in Recovery 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶12.  (C)  Abdullah Shamrani, MOI Civil Defense, stated the 
Civil Defense division does not have the industry knowledge 
necessary to control an accident in a refinery or other 
energy facility; they would need industry people to do this. 
Kolevar responded by noting that the US had learned valuable 
lessons in responding to hurricanes in recent years, 
including cases in which the US responses had failed.  He 
stressed the importance overcoming institutional barriers to 
communication.  Working with DHS, DOE has re-vamped 
communication with other agencies.  Most key communication 
barriers were organizational in nature, but some were 
technical.  For example, DOE was working on how to ensure 
communications coverage in hurricane-affected areas. 
 
¶13.  (C) A/S  Kolevar stated DOE has also worked closely with 
industry to emphasize that government must know the status of 
critical facilities and casualties.  Industry has recognized 
neighboring industries matter a great deal more than 
previously thought.  While they may normally be competitors, 
during an emergency, they are partners in recovery, for 
example, sharing assets and personnel to move fuel to 
first-responders. 
 
¶14.  (C)  A/S Kolevar spoke about the appropriate role of 
government in an emergency situation, stating, "we do not own 
the assets, and companies will move out on their own to 
repair their facilities. The appropriate role of government 
is to facilitate, clearing roads, facilitating food and water 
delivery."  He noted that DOE has at times exercised a 
stronger role in the national interest, for example, by 
directing the restoration of power services to a critical 
facility.  Kolevar cautioned, however, such action is often a 
blunt instrument, which may cause other unintended 
difficulties.  Coast Guard Rhodes cautioned that 
first-responders often were not trained to enter facilities 
where terrorists may still be carrying out their attack.  At 
the same time, military or security forces who could respond 
to this threat may lack protective gear and training to enter 
a facility which has been attacked by a biological or 
chemical agent. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Offer of Scenario Planning Workshops 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶15.  (C)  A/S Kolevar stated both US industry and government 
conduct frequent scenario planning exercises, to prepare for 
possible events such as hurricanes, terrorist attacks, 
chemical/biological attacks, etc.  Kolevar stated, "we would 
welcome the opportunity to look at this with you," offering 
MOI the opportunity to work with DOE in a scenario planning 
workshop.  He noted DOE's experience during Hurricanes Rita 
and Katrina, prior to which DOE and industry had simulated 
the loss of 2 of 14 pumping stations on the key East coast 
Colonial pipeline.  Instead, both hurricanes took out 7 
pumping stations, an unprecedented situation.  A/S Kolevar 
noted DOE and industry today regularly exercise the loss of 
50% of pumping capacity, while appropriate modifications have 
been made to the pumping infrastructure to make such an 
occurrence less disastrous in the future. 
 
¶16.  (C)  Dr. Khalid al Ageel, from the HCIS, stated that, 
"we need information on shut-down and prioritization schemes, 
 
RIYADH 00001987  005 OF 009 
 
 
shut-down procedures, and evacuation from platforms.  Can DOE 
help us with this?"  A/S Kolevar responded positively, and 
said he was encouraged to hear the Ministry of Petroleum and 
Saudi Aramco would also brought into this discussion, as they 
could supply technical information key to these types of 
discussions. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Eastern Province Site Assessment Visits 
March, June 2007 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶17.  (C)  Moving to the assessment portion of the agenda, 
DS/ATA Maloy quickly re-capped the March land-based 
assessment visit to Ras Tanura, Qateef Junction, and Abqaiq 
Plants for the benefit of those who had not been 
present at earlier JWG meetings.  He noted: 
 
Positive Observations: 
 
--Industrial security force preparedness has improved since 
initial assessments.  Safety and security standards, 
and the evacuation procedures are in good shape. 
 
-- Overall physical security has improved with the 
instillation of pipe barriers and perimeter vehicle barriers. 
 
Areas of Concern: 
 
--There is limited integration of security forces.  Planning 
and training exercises need to be a joint effort 
with integrated control centers to help improve 
communication. 
 
-- The DBT process needs to be better implemented at the 
sites.  Performance based security upgrades should 
be implemented. 
 
 
¶18.  (C)  US Coast Guard Capt. Don Grant briefed on the 
Eastern Province (EP) Maritime site assessments conducted 
in June 2007.  This assessment surveyed maritime-side 
critical energy infrastructure in the EP (Ras Tanura and 
Ras al Juaymah), and reviewed Coast Guard capabilities and 
procedures to detect, delay and interdict a terrorist 
threat to these facilities.  Grant indicated that in general 
he was pleased with the preparedness of 
the security forces.  Capt. Grant highlighted positive areas 
and areas for improvement as follows: 
 
Positive Observations: 
 
-- The EP has a highly regulated fishing and recreational 
boating operations. 
 
-- Aramco and the Coast Guard have extensive human visual 
detection of threats. 
 
-- There are frequent Aramco aircraft on patrol. 
 
-- There are high port security standards. 
 
Areas of Concern: 
 
 -- There was a need for more specific and consistent 
identification of critical components within 
Ras Tanura and Ras al Juaymah. 
 
-- Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) AIS was not integrated 
with radar. 
 
 
RIYADH 00001987  006 OF 009 
 
 
-- There was no Coast Guard presence in Port Control. 
 
--  Responding Forces (Aramco/FSF/Coast Guard) have limited 
direct tactical communication. 
 
-- No Blue Force Tracking for Coast Guard. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Yanbu Consultation Visit, September 2007 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶19.  (C)  DS/ATA Maloy provided an overview of the September 
2007 visit to Yanbu Industrial City, and Sandia 
Labs Martinez conducted the land side briefing.  The Yanbu 
Royal Commission provided an overview briefing and 
orientation tour for the team. The team then conducted a 
pre-assessment of the capabilities of security forces 
at Yanbu to detect, delay, and interdict a terrorist threat 
at six sites: the Yanbu Port Authority; Sabtank, 
a maritime petrochemical loading facility; Ibn Rashd, a SABIC 
acetic acid production facility; YANPET, a 
SABIC/ExxonMobil joint venture petrochemical plant; and 
SAMREF, a Saudi Aramco/ExxonMobil joint venture refinery. 
The team viewed access control points, security systems along 
the perimeter, and security and process control 
rooms as part of their overview.  In these Yanbu facilities, 
the team observed good industrial security 
practices.  However, security was not adequate to meet the 
terrorist threat defined in the June design 
basis threat (DBT) workshop. 
 
Positive observations: 
 
--The security forces are integrated.  There is communication 
between the forces on procedures and planning. 
 
-- A continuous row of concrete barriers has been or is being 
installed around the entire industrial complex.  Each 
industrial facility has a continuous fence with razor wire or 
barbed wire outriggers around the perimeter. 
 
-- Most of the facilities had two lines of detection along 
the perimeter, with lights and CCTV cameras. 
 
-- There appeared to be good communication between the 
industrial security forces, FSF, and operators within 
each of the security control centers. Security forces where 
equipped with two-way radios and land lines. 
 
Areas of concern: 
 
-- There are minimal internal delay barriers. 
 
--The current security systems in place at the Yanbu 
Industrial sites does not meet the new high level 
threat developed during the June 2007 DBT workshop.  A 
vulnerability assessment for each facility should 
take place using the June 2007 DBT. 
 
--There is no armed helicopter interdiction capability. 
 
¶20.  (C)  The JWG team generally noted the Yanbu facilities 
seemed to enjoy better integration between industrial 
security, the FSF, the Coast Guard, and Border Guard than 
observed in the Eastern Province.  Our Saudi counterparts 
explained the western region has less divisive tribal 
influences, and a generally more cooperative atmosphere. 
Additionally, the Yanbu Royal Commission appears to have 
allow the various industries and agencies a structure and 
forum for collaborating.  The interlocutors noted that the 
influence of Saudi Aramco, so dominant in the Eastern 
 
RIYADH 00001987  007 OF 009 
 
 
Province, is noticeably less in Yanbu, apparently also 
leading to greater cooperation on the security front. 
 
¶21.  (C)  USCG Captain Grant presented the maritime 
observations for the September 2007 Yanbu visit, summarized 
below: 
 
Positive observations: 
 
-- There was a Coast Guard presence in the Port Control Tower. 
 
-- Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA): Radar was integrated with 
AIS displays at Port control. 
 
-- There were high Port Security Standards. 
 
Areas of Concern: 
 
-- There was a need for more specific and consistent 
identification of critical components within the crude oil 
and refined product berths (as in the Eastern Province). 
 
-- MDA: Coast Guard lacks Blue Force Tracking. 
 
-- Coast Guard patrolling with weapons mounted and loaded is 
mission-dependent. 
 
-- Coast Guard lacks armed helicopter interdiction capability. 
 
-- Responding Coast Guard forces have limited direct tactical 
communications. 
 
-- Coast Guard practices limited field training and exercises. 
 
-- Coast Guard has no positive control boarding teams for 
large commercial vessels. 
 
USMTM) representative Capt. Fink added that NAVCENT was 
training the Royal Saudi Naval Forces (RSNF) in interdiction 
capability.  Coast Guard Col. Raddadi added that the Saudi 
Coast Guard had carried out several exercises since the last 
JWG meeting had made recommendations to that effect, its 
teams becoming more effective with each subsequent exercise. 
 
 
--------------------------- 
Ramping Up Training for the 
Facilities Security Force 
--------------------------- 
 
¶22.  (SBU)  Sandia Labs Byron Gardner presented a briefing on 
the Sandia Labs training curriculum for MOI management, 
stressing that it is designed to help them build a 
performance-based security system.  Gardner reviewed the 
content and intended audiences for courses which we plan to 
implement for both the industrial security forces and the MOI 
over the next several months. 
 
¶23.  (S)   The discussion then turned the new Facilities 
Security Force which the MOI is recruiting for the protection 
of critical installations, such as energy, power, and water 
sites.  Dr. al Jabri indicated the MOI has recruited 8000 new 
FSF soldiers this year, and plans to recruit 10,000 by year's 
end.  Dr. al Jabri stated the Assistant Minister of Interior 
Prince Mohammed bin Nayif had discussed FSF recruitment and 
training with Vice-President Cheney, and Cheney had agreed 
the US would support the Kingdom in providing equipment and 
training for the FSF. 
 
¶24.  (C)  Dr. al Semari provided an overview of training 
being provided to the FSF currently, through Pakistani 
 
RIYADH 00001987  008 OF 009 
 
 
military and other international involvement.  Sandia Labs 
Guy Jones then presented a proposal for a 2-week Training 
Needs Assessment for the FSF, to be conducted both in Riyadh 
and on the ground at the temporary FSF training site in 
Mecca.  The proposal was well-received, and was approved. 
Sandia Labs Gardner stated Sandia was prepared to begin 
training cooperation immediately.  Dr. Saad pointed out the 
need to resolve funding mechanisms quickly, to allow FSF 
training cooperation to begin in earnest.  The interlocutors 
concluded that S/CT Averill would be responsible for 
shepherding through the final conclusion of the funding 
documents.  JWG Co-Chairs Dr. al Semari and Robert Murphy 
agreed to meet weekly. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Progress on DBT Policy Document 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶25.  (C)  Dr. Khalid al Ageel reported on the progress of the 
adoption of the design basis threat (DBT) policy document 
since the  June DBT workshop conducted by Sandia Labs.  Dr. 
al Ageel noted the document classified critical facilities 
throughout Saudi Arabia  (petroleum, water, power, and 
petrochemical facilities) as Tier, I, II, and III.  Since 
July, the document had been translated, and circulated among 
the HCIS and intelligence communities.  However, SAG 
consultants were still reviewing the document, and it was 
unclear when it would be adopted as a national policy 
document.  On a separate but related track, al Ageel noted 
that the MOI's High Commission on Industrial Security (HCIS) 
would promulgate new industrial security standards next 
month, which for the first time would attempt to incorporate 
anti-terrorism standards.  (Note: The MOI's HCIS is 
responsible for writing and implementing industrial security 
standards for firms in key sectors such as energy, 
petrochemicals, water, and power, until now all largely 
state-controlled sectors.  New draft industrial security 
standards have been in circulation and revision for more than 
a year.  End note.) 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Moving Ahead to the Next JWG; 
Deepening the JWG Organization Structure 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶26.  (C)  Dr. Saud al Semari opened the discussion on the 
structural development of the JWG, remarking on the need for 
increased administrative support for the JWG on both the 
Saudi and US sides, as tasks and commitments become more 
complex.  He proposed December for the next JWG, and 
indicated, "our highest priority is contingency planning" for 
this meeting.  The JWG members agreed that the Co-Chairs 
could designate committees as needed on an ad-hoc basis to 
handle specific technical issues, e.g., contingency planning, 
training, etc. 
 
---------------------- 
Frangible Ammunition 
---------------------- 
 
¶27.  (C)  Sandia Labs' Guy Jones conducted a discussion of 
frangible ammunition.  He stated that several US 
manufacturers make this type of ammunition, which turns to 
powder when it strikes hard surfaces, minimizing possible 
damage to petroleum facilities.  However, it remains 
extremely effective against human adversaries.  Jones urged 
the MOI to invest in performance testing of the ammunition, 
as with all new equipment to be deployed at critical 
facilities. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
RIYADH 00001987  009 OF 009 
 
 
Dr. al Jabri Underscores Threat to Energy Industry 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶28.  (S)  During the JWG meeting, Dr. Saad al Jabri, the 
senior MOI official present, continued to reiterate the 
threat facing the Saudi energy industry.  He stated, "We are 
facing a serious threat.  This is an urgent matter and we 
must act now.  We have identified more than twenty 
nationalities involved in the terrorist threat against us. 
The threat has not relented, we are just seeing a new type of 
threat.  All plans are now targeting the oil industry.  I 
cannot emphasize enough the gravity of the situation." 
Reflecting on the state of Saudi contingency planning, al 
Jabri admitted their plans are not complete or comprehensive. 
 He expressed concern that the attack on Abqaiq is a 
prototype of what could happen next. 
 
-------- 
Comment 
-------- 
 
¶29.  (S)  In our assessment, Dr. al Jabri is fully on target 
to be gravely concerned that the Saudi MOI has not fully 
addressed contingency planning for petroleum operations in 
the event of a serious terrorist incident or attack by a 
neighboring state.  This JWG meeting was our first 
opportunity to see the MOI's own baseline "contingency 
planning" efforts.  Unfortunately, these plans dealt almost 
exclusively with civil defense aspects of an  industrial 
accident or attack, focusing on the security and health of 
the population.  While civil defense planning is a core 
governmental function, the MOI does not appear to have begun 
to grapple with Dr. al Jabri's principal concern, what DOE 
would term "resiliency of capability" of petroleum and other 
critical installations in the face of Iranian attack or 
internal sabotage.  Fortunately, MOI is openly requesting 
assistance to address this serious gap. 
 
FRAKER