VZCZCXRO2900
OO RUEHDBU RUEHDU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
RUEHSR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHFR #3942/01 2630751
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 200751Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0302
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1569
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PARIS 003942 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2017 
TAGS: PREL PREF EAID UNGA MARR SU CD CT FR
SUBJECT: SE NATSIOS DISCUSSES SUDAN, CHAD C.A.R. WITH 
FRENCH OFFICIALS (SEPTEMBER 15) 
 
REF: STATE 128495 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d 
). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  Special Envoy for Sudan Andrew Natsios 
discussed Darfur and related issues with French officials on 
September 15.  Both sides agreed that Abdulwahid el-Nur's 
continued failure to participate in peace talks, including 
the October 27 meeting in Libya, posed serious problems, and 
discussed ways of encouraging his participation, which 
included funding structured in such a way to ensure his 
attendance but to limit his ability to use the funding to buy 
arms.  The French supported SE Natsios's idea to include 
other Fur leaders at the upcoming Darfur talks in Libya. 
Both sides agreed that Libya was not the ideal site for the 
October 27 talks and that there had to be adequate assurances 
that the international community would be allowed a 
sufficient presence at the meeting. 
 
¶2.  (C)  SUMMARY CONTINUED:  The French said that the 
September 21 Darfur meeting on the margins of the UNGA would 
likely feature a broader group of attendees than had the June 
25 Paris meeting.  The two sides agreed on the need for a 
strong UN Special Envoy (currently Jan Eliasson) and that the 
position should perhaps be converted to a full-time job. 
Issues pertaining to South Sudan, while not directly a part 
of the Darfur issue, could not be ignored because of their 
repercussions in Darfur.  Both sides agreed that China was 
playing an increasingly positive role, which should be 
broadened to include North-South issues and the CPA.  The 
French agreed that it might be better to limit Egypt's 
participation in UNAMID (this following an Egyptian offer of 
3,000 troops) as an enhanced "Arab" presence might not sit 
well with Darfurians.  On the EU-led mission for Chad and 
C.A.R., the French noted differences with the U.S. on funding 
Chadian gendarmes who would participate in the mission; the 
U.S. said it would do what it could to encourage Europeans to 
contribute troops, especially Sweden (which the French said 
could be offered command of the EU force if it decided to 
participate and contribute a good share of the necessary 
personnel). 
 
¶3.  (C)  SUMMARY CONTINUED:  The U.S. side raised the issue 
of the imminent departure of AEC Chairman Vraalsen and the 
need to find a good replacement for him.  The French said 
they would study the issue, agreeing on the need for an 
effective AEC to oversee the CPA.  They shared the U.S. 
perception that the AEC was operating under undue 
constraints.  As a final point, both sides agreed on the need 
to bolster the cease-fire mechanism in Darfur and possibly 
establish a cease-fire monitoring mechanism, perhaps to be 
incorporated into UNAMID, in an effort to improve the 
existing cease-fire system, which was continuing to break 
down.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Special Envoy for Sudan Andrew Natsios, accompanied 
by USAID Assistant Administrator for Africa Kate Almquist, 
Embassy Pol Chief Rosenblatt, and Embassy notetaker, met with 
French officials at the MFA on September 15 to discuss Darfur 
and related issues.  Eric Chevallier (Crisis and Conflict 
Advisor to FM Bernard Kouchner), Jean de Gliniasty (MFA AF 
A/S-equivalent), Sylvie Bermann (MFA IO A/S-equivalent), 
Helene Le Gal (MFA AF DAS-equivalent), Charlotte Montel (an 
MFA AF advisor to FM Kouchner), and Frederic Bouvier (MFA 
Sudan Desk Officer) comprised the French delegation. 
 
Abdulwahid el-Nur 
----------------- 
¶5.  (C)  After opening pleasantries, during which Chevallier 
regretted FM Kouchner's absence because of his demanding 
travel schedule, SE Natsios noted Abdulwahid el-Nur's 
continuing refusal to participate in peace talks, notably the 
meeting in Libya scheduled for October 27.  Yet, SE Natsios 
noted, Abdulwahid never offered a coherent plan of us own or 
rationale for his refusal to cooperate.  SE Natsios remarked 
that Abdulwahid's communications system seemed good and that 
he maintained close contact with his associates. 
Abdulwahid's failure to participate could scuttle the talks. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Crisis and Conflict Advisor Chevallier said that the 
GOF met with Abdulwahid frequently.  He noted (and SE Natsios 
agreed) that Abdulwahid continued to enjoy strong popular 
support among Darfurians, particularly among members of the 
Fur ethnic group (70 percent approval).  AF A/S Gliniasty 
noting Abdulwahid's love of "pomp and circumstance," 
 
PARIS 00003942  002 OF 005 
 
 
suspected that he needed money and that if he received 
funding, he might attend the Libya talks.  Providing support 
to him would be difficult for France, Gliniasty commented, 
referring to GOF budget constraints.  AF DAS Le Gal referred 
to information suggesting that Abdulwahid wanted money to buy 
arms, with SE Natsios noting the risk that Abdulwahid could 
take money but still not attend the Libya talks.  Chevallier 
offered the possibility of paying him in installments, or 
making the money available only if Abdulwahid attended the 
talks.  He said that Abdulwahid needed the money to show his 
status and to pay for his travel and communications needs. 
In any case, whatever funding he received must not be used to 
buy arms.  SE Natsios and the French agreed that Abdulwahid 
was adept at finding excuses for his lack of cooperation, 
complaining on the one hand of being excluded and not 
consulted, but then refusing entreaties to participate.  SE 
Natsios noted this his apparent "Messiah complex" had led him 
into intractable positions that he could not change without 
losing standing among his supporters. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Chevallier said that Abdulwahid's demand of 
"security before peace" was not realistic.  Gliniasty said 
the French had repeatedly asked Abdulwahid for a list of 
requirements which, if met, would allow his participation. 
He had offered a paper that Gliniasty said was worthless.  He 
has been asked to provide a second paper, but Gliniasty did 
not expect it to be much better.  He noted Abdulwahid's 
tendency to change his markers, at one point insisting on "a 
certain degree of cease-fire," which then became "a complete 
cease-fire."  Gliniasty said the French had suggested that 
Abdulwahid come up with a reasonable plan the French could 
support so that his attendance at the Libya talks could be 
announced by September 21 (the date of the Darfur Ministerial 
meeting to take place on the margins of the UNGA).  Gliniasty 
was not optimistic that Abdulwahid would do so. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Chevallier commented that, despite all of 
Abdulwahid's baggage, he remained a key element of the Darfur 
problem, with no alternatives to him in clear view.  SE 
Natsios did not completely share this view, noting that there 
were other potential credible representatives, based on his 
recent visit to one large IDP  camp.  Much of the problem 
rested with the Fur, who comprised about 70 percent of those 
in the camps.  When asked who they viewed as their leader, 
responses tended to break on ethnic lines, with Abdulwahid 
enjoying about 65 percent of the vote, in SE Natsios's rough 
estimation. 
 
¶9.  (C)  But so too did Ahmad Ibrahim Diraige, who had gained 
prominence some 25 years previously but who still conducted 
conference calls with Fur leaders.  SE Natsios noted the Fur 
tendency to follow a leader, whereas among the Zaghawa, 
everyone viewed himself as a leader.  Diraige was not a 
likely substitute for Abdulwahid, but his presence worried 
Abdulwahid.  It would be useful if Diraige and others could 
at least be heard in the camps.  AA Almquist noted Khartoum's 
firm control over the media throughout northern Sudan, which 
has also been an issue for disseminating information about 
the DPA.  Chevallier noted that the UN could broadcast in the 
DRC and that this had worked well.  Gliniasty said that 
access to the media could be an agenda item for the September 
21 meeting, with Chevallier adding that he favored SE 
Natsios's idea to broaden Fur representation at the talks in 
Libya to include a range of leaders representing the IDPs. 
 
Libya Meeting 
------------- 
¶10.  (C)  SE Natsios said that UN Special Envoy for Darfur 
Jan Eliasson was not pleased with Sudan's neighbors and the 
options for holding the GOS-rebel peace talks.  AU Chairman 
Konare had insisted on Libya.  Chevallier said that Konare, 
Sudan President Bashir, and Libya President Qadhafi had made 
the deal, with the AU then pressuring the UN to accept it. 
Chevallier regretted that concerned parties such as France 
and the U.S. had not had a voice in selecting the site for 
the talks.  Gliniasty agreed and said that the selection 
typified Konare's and Qadhafi's tendencies to try to exclude 
the West and UN from Africa.  Le Gal said that there appeared 
to be limits on attendance by observers (U.S., EU, Asia, 
other Africans); SE Natsios said there must be some assurance 
of Western participation.  AA Almquist stressed the 
importance of key powers within the international community 
attending the talks, which had been necessary during the 
cease-fire meetings in N'djamena in order to even convince 
the rebels to participate.  A Western presence could also 
allow leverage and recourse to a balancing mechanism between 
 
PARIS 00003942  003 OF 005 
 
 
the GOS and rebels. 
 
September 21 Darfur Follow-On Conference 
---------------------------------------- 
¶11.  (C)  When asked about the structure of the September 21 
Darfur meeting on the margins of the UNGA, Chevallier 
acknowledged that participation had expanded considerably 
beyond the June 25 Darfur conference in Paris that the French 
had hosted.  Attendees now were likely to include, in 
addition to those present in Paris, Chad, Eritrea, Saudi 
Arabia, G-8 countries, and others.  Chevallier said the 
French wanted the September 21 meeting to replicate the June 
25 meeting in terms of attendees, but that Konare had 
rejected this. 
 
¶12.  (C)  Concerning the UN and Darfur, Chevallier said that 
the UN Special Envoy's position needed to be a full-time 
commitment.  This would help keep the AU from taking over the 
Darfur account.  The French had raised this with current UN 
SE Eliasson.  IO A/S Bermann commented on difficulties the AU 
had been presenting and expressed concerns about Konare.  SE 
Natsios raised Qadhafi as a source of concern.  It was hard 
to determine Qadhafi's ultimate goal and Darfur's part in it. 
 His manipulations were consistent with his notions of 
pan-Africanism but how Darfur specifically played into that 
was not clear.  Chevallier said that all of these concerns 
underlined the need for the UN SE to be a full-time presence. 
 SE Natsios expressed general agreement with Chevallier's 
point, commenting that Eliasson had other duties in Sweden. 
If the UN SE position remained part-time, the SE would have 
to be a strong one.  A weak part-timer would not do. 
Chevallier agreed, saying that he was not proposing a drastic 
change but that the position had to be more effective.  Sudan 
Desk Officer Bouvier observed that Qadhafi would take 
advantage of a weak UN SE, especially if the October 27 talks 
took place in Sirte, access to which would be difficult. 
Both sides again regretted Libya's and Qadhafi's role in the 
talks but noted that it would be quite unlikely for UNSYG Ban 
to change his position on Libya's hosting the talks after 
having made his announcement. 
 
South Sudan 
----------- 
¶13.  (C)  Chevallier asked about the Government of South 
Sudan's role in Darfur.  SE Natsios responded that the GOSS 
was not always helpful and tended to carry out Eritrea,s 
foreign policy with respect to Darfur.  Chevallier said the 
French had spoken with GOSS Vice-President Riek Machar, whom 
he described as "tense" during his recent visit to Paris to 
meet with Abdulwahid.  Gliniasty said that it was perhaps 
fortunate that nothing so far had come of GOSS efforts to 
reach out to Abdulwahid since these efforts were only focused 
on getting him to talks in Juba, not necessarily to UN/AU 
talks in Libya.  Gliniasty urged caution and said that the 
SPLM's position had become ambiguous.  SE Natsios referred to 
the recent North-South confrontation at Abyei, which, if the 
situation worsened, could put the CPA at risk.  This issue 
should not be a part of the Darfur talks but one could not 
ignore matters pertaining to the South in the Darfur context. 
 A failure to implement the CPA would not bode well for 
implementing a Darfur peace agreement. 
 
China 
----- 
¶14.  (C)  SE Natsios commented on China's increasingly 
helpful role, which had so far been restricted to Darfur.  It 
would be useful to involve China in the CPA.  Chinese Special 
Representative for Darfur, Liu Guijin, had noted that GOSS 
President Salva Kiir had gone to China in July and reportedly 
surprised PRC officials by saying that "all of Sudan's oil is 
in the South," a point not lost on PRC President Hu.  The PRC 
position was thus evolving, SE Natsios believed, and China 
was becoming increasingly worried about the possibility of a 
North-South separation in 2011, which could affect its 
various commercial arrangements. 
 
Egypt and Darfur 
---------------- 
¶15.  (C)  Gliniasty asked SE Natsios's views on Egyptian 
involvement in Darfur, describing the recent statement to the 
French by Egypt's Ambassador that Egypt was ready to 
contribute 3,000 troops to UNAMID, but that the UN had 
indicated that it did not want/need Egyptian troops. 
Instead, there seemed to be a need for helicopters.  SE 
Natsios replied that he could understand the UN's reluctance, 
based on the likelihood that Darfurians would resent the 
 
PARIS 00003942  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
presence of "Arab" elements among the peacekeepers perceived 
to be favorable to the GOS.  There was general agreement that 
consideration of an Egyptian role in Darfur should take this 
factor into account. 
 
EU Operation in Chad and C.A.R. 
------------------------------- 
¶16.  (C)  Chevallier said that on September 14, the French 
had circulated a new draft UNSC Resolution to SC members, 
which, he said, took into account U.S. concerns about the 
previous draft, largely over the issue of funding Chadian 
gendarmes who would take part in the mission.  SE Natsios 
expressed U.S. support for the operation, and remarked that 
he had done so publicly after consultations in Germany.  Such 
an operation would send a strong signal to Bashir. 
Chevallier noted the operation's deterrent role with respect 
to the Sudan side of the borders. 
 
¶17.  (C)  Chevallier said that the main obstacle concerned 
funding the Chadian gendarmes, with the U.S. preferring that 
funding come from voluntary contributions rather than 
assessments.  For the French, however, finding resources 
would be difficult, even though the U.S. had indicated that 
it would make a strong voluntary contribution.  The European 
Commission had told the French it could provide money for 
training and recruiting the gendarmes but not for equipment 
or salaries.  Chevallier said that he hoped this issue could 
be resolved early in the week of September 17, with a 
solution in place before the September 21 Darfur meeting in 
New York.  We noted that USG experts in Washington were aware 
of U.S.-France differences on this issue and were working 
hard to resolve the matter. 
 
¶18.  (C)  As for the operation itself, Chevallier said that 
Qadhafi was not causing problems because Chad President Deby 
supported it.  The mission enjoyed EU political support. 
However, work would have to be done to secure troop 
commitments.  Chevallier said France would provide over half 
the troops ("we don't want the mission to be TOO French") and 
was canvassing other Europeans for contributions.  He said 
that the U.S. could play a useful role in encouraging 
Europeans to provide troops.  Austria was reluctant but he 
believed that the Netherlands, Poland, Norway, and especially 
Sweden could be persuaded.  He stressed Sweden's key role. 
The UK and Germany were unlikely contributors because of 
their commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan.  SE Natsios said 
that the U.S. would do what it could to encourage troop 
contributions and that he would try to discuss the matter 
with Carl Bildt.  Chevallier confided that France was 
considering offering Sweden command of the force if it came 
aboard and offered troops. 
 
Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) 
------------------------------------------ 
¶19.  (C)  SE Natsios raised the AEC, its oversight of the 
CPA, and the imminent departure (December 1) of Chairman Tom 
Vraalsen, and he and AA Almquist discussed the problems 
Vraalsen and the AEC had been having (which Vraalsen 
discussed with DepSec Negroponte on September 5 (reftel)). 
There was a need to ensure that a competent replacement for 
Vraalsen succeeded him.  AA Almquist noted the likelihood 
that Norway would seek to offer a replacement, and discussed 
complications posed to the AEC's operations by the National 
Congress Party (NCP), which had to agree (along with the 
SPLM) to anything the AEC proposed.  Le Gal said the French 
had the impression that Vraalsen was effectively rendered 
unable to speak his mind.  AA Almquist agreed that the AEC 
had become very constrained, making it difficult to oversee 
the CPA, but that the AEC mechanism still, at least, brought 
people to the table.   The demise of the AEC could have 
unforeseeable effects on the CPA, North-South issues, and 
even the Libya talks.  AA Almquist noted Kenya's interest in 
South Sudan but that Kenya tended to defer to Khartoum 
because of IGAD-related issues. 
 
¶20.  (C)  Gliniasty asked how France could help.  AA Almquist 
said the two most important issues for the international 
members were finding a replacement for Vraalsen and improving 
AEC procedures in order to ensure the AEC's independence. 
France was not a member of the AEC, but the EU had observer 
status and so France's input would be important in that 
regard.  Chevallier said the French would study the issue. 
Bouvier thought that if the Darfur peace process worked, it 
could serve as a model for reinvigorating the CPA.  AA 
Almquist said that Italy was considering a high-level 
meeting, perhaps at ministerial level, in Rome to review 
 
PARIS 00003942  005 OF 005 
 
 
implementation of the CPA.  She said that reinvigorating the 
CPA process could also serve to help address all of Sudan's 
problems.  AA Almquist predicted that the U.S. would raise 
the issue of CPA implementation on September 21, although the 
issues surrounding the AEC would most likely be discussed in 
a smaller side meeting.  Bouvier said the French planned to 
put these issues on their own agenda for the meeting. 
 
Darfur Cease-Fire 
----------------- 
¶21.  (C)  Gliniasty said that as a final point he wanted to 
raise the failure of the cease-fire in Darfur, which the 
French had discussed with Konare, who had asserted that the 
cease-fire was good but needed to be improved.  However, in 
Gliniasty's view, the cease-fire was breaking down, with 
chaos ensuing.  If the political talks yielded results, one 
of them should be on the cease-fire, and any provisions on an 
improved cease-fire should be implemented quickly.  Konare 
had said that what was needed was an information network to 
allow the center to know what was happening and who was 
responsible.  Gliniasty said the French were considering 
proposing the establishment of a cease-fire monitoring 
mechanism to monitor and to respond to violations, and would 
raise this for discussion at the September 21 meeting. 
Bouvier said that a good mechanism would allow better 
understanding of events on the ground.  SE Natsios pointed 
out a recent incident where it appeared that Khalil Ibrahim's 
forces had killed 40 police, in part to prove that he still 
played a role and that the cease-fire commission had little 
authority.  Bouvier said that UNAMID could incorporate 
cease-fire monitoring issues within its area of 
responsibility. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
¶22.  (C)  The discussion with the French was productive and 
positive, with both sides expressing general agreement on all 
issues and offering constructive suggestions on ways to move 
forward.  The only significant point of divergence concerned 
the Chad/C.A.R. UNSC resolution and the issue of funding the 
Chadian gendarmes.  The French were willing to discuss all 
issues and were eager for USG views as we approach the 
September 21 meeting, which the French will have a strong 
hand in running, although it will be formally sponsored by 
the UN and AU.  Along with several other indications we have 
received since the arrival of the Sarkozy government, this 
meeting demonstrated a very positive attitude on the part of 
the French to work with the USG on issues of shared concern. 
END COMMENT. 
 
¶23.  (U)  SE Natsios has cleared this message. 
 
 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
 
Stapleton