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DE RUEHFR #3808/01 2561428
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O 131428Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0092
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU PRIORITY 0370
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 5958
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 0461
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3783

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PARIS 003808 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2017 
TAGS: PREL PARM MARR NATO KFCE FR GG RU MD
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED CFE TALKS WITH RUSSIA IN FRANCE 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, for reas 
ons 1.4 b and d. 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  EUR Assistant Secretary Dan Fried and an 
interagency team met with Russian DFM Kislyak September 11 in 
Paris to discuss next steps on the U.S. parallel actions plan 
for ending the current deadlock on fulfillment of Istanbul 
commitments by Russia and ratification of Adapted CFE by NATO 
Allies.  Kislyak expressed appreciation both for the parallel 
actions proposal itself and for the U.S. offer to provide 
additional details regarding our plans for rotational 
training in Bulgaria and Romania. 
 
¶2.  (C) Kislyak characterized his comments on the parallel 
action plan as preliminary, warning that while he was not 
prepared to embrace the U.S. paper as written, he recognized 
it as addressing some core Russian concerns, in particular 
regarding Allied ratification of Adapted CFE.  Kislyak 
objected that the approach gave no guarantee of ratification 
by the U.S. and all 30 CFE states, and pushed the idea of 
provisional application of the Adapted CFE Treaty to avoid 
suspension of current CFE by Russia.  Kislyak welcomed the 
suggestion to discuss Baltic accession to CFE.  He said 
flatly that Russia wants to eliminate the flank regime for 
Russia, and keep it for the other signatories. 
 
¶3.  (C) On Istanbul, Kislyak agreed to technical discussions 
in the next two weeks of further steps regarding a 
fact-finding visit to the Gudauta base.  But he stonewalled 
on Moldova, both on the idea of transforming the Russian 
peacekeeping force, and on any movement on further withdrawal 
of Russian munitions, insisting that Smirnov would not let 
that work go forward in the absence of a Transnistrian 
political settlement. 
 
¶4.  (C) Fried pushed Kislyak to accept that parallel actions 
on CFE and Istanbul are the only way to end the current 
deadlock and noted that NATO Allies support the U.S. plan. 
Fried said that if Adapted CFE were provisionally applied 
Russia would have no incentive to complete its withdrawal 
from Moldova and Georgia; and the Senate would never accept 
sidestepping its prerogatives, particularly with Istanbul 
unfulfilled.  He called on Russia to develop an alternative 
if the U.S. idea for transforming the Russian PKF in Moldova 
was insufficient, but said the U.S. did not accept that 
Smirnov dictated Russia,s options.  Fried said the flank 
regime remained critically important for many Allies and the 
Senate would not ratify a Treaty whose core provisions 
appeared to be in dispute.  After the Adapted Treaty had 
entered into force Russia could raise its concerns, but it 
seemed unlikely that such a one-sided proposal as Kislyak 
outlined could be accepted. 
 
¶5.  (C) In addition to expert discussions on Gudauta, Kislyak 
and Fried agreed to try to meet o/a September 21 on the 
margins of Kislyak,s visit to Washington, and on the eve of 
the 2 plus 2 meeting in Moscow, leaving open the possibility 
of a further session as well.  Kislyak also envisions that 
Antonov, the head of their delegation to Germany,s CFE 
seminar October 1-2, would be available for detailed 
discussions. 
 
¶6.  (C) Comment:  The (modest) good news is that despite 
reservations, Kislyak is working off of the U.S. proposal. 
But Moscow perceives divisions in the Alliance on the 
essentiality of fulfilling Istanbul as a prerequisite for 
ratification, and is prepared to exploit them.  Nevertheless, 
Kislyak,s reluctance to accept any of the specifics and his 
hardline stance on the flank regime and Moldova suggests that 
Russia is moving toward suspension come December 12.  The 
need to maintain a vigorous Alliance message of solidarity 
was underscored by A/S Fried in his meetings with the UK, 
France, and Germany on the margins in Paris, and will be a 
core of the U.S. message to Allies at the HLTF September 13. 
 End comment. 
 
¶7.  (C) Meeting participants included, for the U.S.:  EUR A/S 
Dan Fried, VCI DAS Karin L. Look,  Jennifer Laurendeau, Donna 
Phelan, James Starkey, COL Jon Chicky and LTC Stephen 
Olejasz.  For Russia:  DFM Sergey Kislyak, General Yevgeniy 
Buzhinski, Oleg Burmistrov, Anton Mazur, Vladimir Vinevtsev, 
Russian Embassy poloff Kondratski and Mr. Pavlov.    End 
Summary 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Russian Response to the Parallel Action Plan -- General 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶8.  (C) After greetings from both sides, Fried noted that the 
 
PARIS 00003808  002 OF 005 
 
 
U.S. had developed the parallel actions concept in response 
to Russian concerns related to the CFE Treaty, and that we 
also wanted to see the Treaty modernized (i.e., move to the 
Adapted Treaty, or A/CFE).   He assured Kislyak it was not a 
"take it or leave it" proposal, and expressed the hope that 
before December, we will have reached agreement on the way 
ahead.  Fried invited Russia,s reaction to the U.S. parallel 
action paper, noting that that the U.S. would also present 
more information about our plans for rotational training in 
Romania and Bulgaria, as requested by Kislyak on July 31. 
 
¶9.  (C) Kislyak began his commentary about the U.S. plan by 
noting that it was still under interagency review in Moscow. 
He welcomed the suggestion of a presentation on plans for 
Romania and Bulgaria, noting that there was a lot of 
confusion in Moscow about just what was happening.  He 
welcomed additional information regarding U.S. plans and how 
they related to the NATO commitment regarding deployment of 
"substantial combat forces" in the new NATO states. 
 
¶10.  (C) On the parallel action plan itself, Kislyak said 
this was the first time in recent years that the U.S. was 
willing to engage on CFE.  He highlighted a number of 
specific points in the U.S. paper, noting U.S. readiness: 
- "not to obstruct the willingness of others to ratify" A/CFE; 
- to engage on the question of the Baltic states joining CFE. 
 Here he emphasized that Russia was interested not only in 
their general readiness to join, but in what their specific 
plans for joining the Treaty would be, notably equipment 
ceilings, for example; 
- to discuss the meaning of "substantial combat forces"; 
- to offer financial assistance to Russian withdrawal of 
forces from Georgia and Moldova (although Kislyak suggested 
it was not needed); and 
- to address issues related to the flank regime after entry 
into force of A/CFE. 
 
¶11.  (C) Kislyak also observed that the U.S. paper did not 
contain much detail regarding U.S. plans to ratify the 
Adapted Treaty, a point to which he returned in discussion of 
Georgia and Moldova. 
 
¶12.  (C) Regarding the flank issue, Kislyak went into some 
detail to emphasize Russia,s position that the flank regime 
should be eliminated for Russia, even while it is maintained 
for others.  He also noted that the Baltic States would have 
to enter A/CFE under the constraints of the flank regime. 
Kislyak commented that Russia has tried to understand Turkish 
security concerns regarding the flank, but that Ankara had 
not been able to articulate the basis for their desire to 
retain the regime for Russia.  Kislyak suggested that Turkey 
wanted to retain the flank regime for reasons that had to do 
with other countries; Norway, he argued, should be content 
with the political commitments in effect with regard to 
levels of Russian forces in the north.   Kislyak reiterated a 
point he made in July:  that Russia had no plans for a 
military buildup in the flank region -- it just wants the 
freedom to move Russian forces anywhere it chooses.  Later in 
the meeting, Buzhinskiy reinforced this by noting Russia had 
no security concern about the flank zone; it is a "matter of 
principle." 
 
¶13.  (C) DAS Look responded that it was inconceivable that 
the Senate would ratify the Adapted CFE if it was apparent 
that a core provision of the Treaty was under renegotiation. 
Fried concurred, recalling the point he had made at the CFE 
Extraordinary Conference in June:  after the Adapted Treaty 
entered into force, any nation could raise concerns about its 
provisions.  That said, Fried continued, the Russian position 
that the flank restrictions should be retained for Russia,s 
neighbors, but not for Russia, was so one-sided that it was 
not obvious how it could be agreed.  If it was a question of 
adjusting the flank, as had already been done (twice) at 
Russia,s request, that might find broader sympathy.   But no 
step on this would be possible until after the Adapted Treaty 
had entered into force.   Russia,s other concerns (e.g., the 
"principle" of movement of its forces on its territory) could 
be discussed, as Secretary Gates has said during his trip in 
Moscow earlier in the year. 
 
-------------------------- 
Georgia and Moldova 
-------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (C) Kislyak observed that under the parallel actions 
concept, one aspect of the U.S. position appeared unchanged: 
the U.S. is still looking for Russia to complete fulfillment 
of the Istanbul commitments first, and only then ratify the 
Adapted Treaty.  (Comment:  it was conspicuous, however, that 
 
PARIS 00003808  003 OF 005 
 
 
Kislyak did not use the meeting to decry continued U.S. 
"linkage" between ratification of Adapted CFE and fulfillment 
of the Istanbul commitments or allow that issue to derail 
broader discussion of the U.S. paper.  End comment.)  He 
suggested that the plan contained new prerequisites for 
fulfillment of the Istanbul commitments, such as the 
requirement to withdraw the pensioners from Georgia.  A/S 
Fried and team immediately and vigorously refuted this 
assertion, noting that the paper made no mention of 
"pensioners."  Fried pointed out that Russia asserts the base 
at Guduata has been closed; we are suggesting an 
international fact-finding visit as a way to establish the 
facts of the situation.  The U.S. paper starts with a 
fact-finding visit and ends with Russian-Georgian agreement. 
 Laurendeau said it was actually Russia that had provided the 
basic facts regarding its presence at Gudauta:  Russia said 
it had peacekeeping forces at the base, as well as four 
helicopters; Georgia said that this presence did not have its 
consent.  That is the issue, not pensioners.   Fried 
suggested that this was why a fact-finding mission could be 
helpful. 
 
¶15.  (C) The Russian team shot back that they wanted a 
fact-finding mission to "resolve" the issue, not just engage 
in "military tourism."  Fried said Georgia and Russia would 
both have to agree on the terms of reference, and noted that 
Laurendeau would shortly meet with Georigan officials to 
discuss the issue next week.  In the end, Kislyak agreed to 
work by U.S. and Russian experts on terms of reference for a 
fact-finding visit to Gudauta; it was agreed that the U.S. 
would inform Russian Amb Chernov and CFE expert Mazur of the 
results of Georgian-U.S. discussions, so that next steps 
could then be identified. 
 
¶16.  (C) On Moldova, Kislyak complained that the idea of 
replacing the Russian peacekeeping force with an 
international force is a new requirement.  He argued that 
this would be changing the format of a force that is legally 
present in a particular capacity, and was not prepared to 
consider this ahead of a political settlement of the 
Transnistrian conflict.  Fried pointed out that the 5 2 talks 
were making no progress and indicated that our suggestions 
for an international peacekeeping force were an attempt to 
find a creative way to break through the logjam.  From the 
U.S. perspective, we considered it a concession:  this was a 
solution that would permit Russian troops to remain, while 
also allowing fulfillment of the Istanbul commitments related 
to Moldova.  Fried suggested that we could work out the 
concept of such a force bilaterally, or in a multilateral 
context -- as long as Russia was willing to engage.  If this 
did not meet Russia,s needs, Fried urged Kislyak to offer an 
alternative suggestion.  In the end, Kislyak was not willing 
to discuss this point further. 
 
------------------------- 
Assessing the Allies 
------------------------- 
 
¶17.  (C) When it became clear that Russian forces in Moldova 
would be a sticking point, DAS Look pointed to the upcoming 
meeting of the NATO HLTF (Thursday, September 13), and our 
hope for reporting to Allies on positive Russian engagement 
on the parallel action plan.  She pointed out that our plan 
was to pursue discussions on ratification plans with Allies, 
with a view toward early action as outlined in the U.S. 
paper, and noted that Allies would be reluctant to develop a 
concrete agreement on ratification timelines if she could 
only report that Russia was willing to engage on one aspect 
(Georgia) of the plan.  Kislyak then noted that he had been 
having his own consultations with NATO states, and that he 
was fully aware of their plans for ratification.  Kislyak 
claimed that the U.S. position on CFE (not to ratify A/CFE 
until after the Istanbul commitments are fulfilled by Russia) 
is not one that all NATO Allies agree with, and he implied 
the U.S. was bullying dissenters into agreement.  Fried noted 
that the Alliance has discussed this issue, and will continue 
to do so, and all have agreed that the Istanbul commitments 
must be fulfilled (before the A/CFE can be brought into 
force).  He pointed out that the parallel actions plan 
reflected significant movement from the U.S. (and NATO) and 
that we had hoped it would allow Russia to move forward also. 
 The bottom line was that we needed parallel action, 
including from Russia, for this approach to work and for us 
to preserve the benefits of CFE. 
 
¶18.  (C) Kislyak replied that Russia had already made a 
proposal, in putting its six points on the table.  Fried 
noted that we have addressed those points and asked for 
concrete suggestions for getting beyond where we are today. 
 
PARIS 00003808  004 OF 005 
 
 
Kislyak complained that there is also an Istanbul commitment 
by NATO states regarding ratification of A/CFE that has not 
been met -- it is unfair to focus only on commitments by 
Russia.  Fried reiterated that we have discussed this at 
length with Allies: they support the U.S. position and think 
the parallel actions plan is a good way forward.  Kislyak 
then asked whether the U.S. would consider provisional 
application of A/CFE.   Fried and Laurendeau rejoined that 
provisional application seemed likely to derail, probably 
permanently, fulfillment of the Istanbul commitments. 
Buzhinskiy replied that they would be accomplished "if 
(political) conditions allow."  Look said that any effort to 
provisionally apply that Adapted Treaty would likely be 
rejected by the U.S. Senate and could preclude ratification 
by many Parliaments.  Fried agreed.  He reiterated Look,s 
point that NATO Allies were unlikely to engage on 
ratification as outlined in the plan, unless Russia has 
agreed to the parallel action concept. 
 
--------------- 
JCS Briefing 
--------------- 
 
¶19.  (C) Joint Staff rep LTC Steve Olejasz provided an 
overview of Joint Task Force - East (JTF-E).  It will provide 
a rotational training presence to conduct bilateral and 
multilateral training with Romania and Bulgaria, and other 
partners.  Questions from the Russian team focused on the 
anticipated size of U.S. deployments and whether equipment 
would be left in place between deployments.  Olejasz said 
that deployments could be up to the level of one brigade, 
split between the two countries.  In the near term activities 
would be at the battalion level.  He noted that U.S. 
deployments would be subject to inspection under CFE Section 
VIII and Vienna Document provisions.  He said that Russia has 
been briefed before and that we would work with Romania and 
Bulgaria to provide transparency about these activities.  He 
emphasized that deployments would be in accordance with arms 
control agreements. 
 
- Fried sought to put these U.S. activities into perspective: 
 CFE,s flank provisions had the effect of restricting 
equipment that could be deployed into the region -- that was 
one advantage to Russia of CFE.  But it was also true that 
U.S. equipment levels in Europe simply were not such as to 
accommodate large deployments into Romania and Bulgaria. 
 
- Fried asked Olejasz how much equipment the U.S. had in 
Europe right now; Olejasz responded that U.S. equipment 
levels had dropped dramatically since the 1990s.  Right now, 
the U.S. only has 130 tanks on the continent (less than 
CFE,s limit for temporary deployment in the flank, which is 
153 tanks).   Body language suggested that Kislyak and 
Buzinskiy got the point:  Russia,s articulation of the 
implications of the U.S. presence in Romania and Bulgaria was 
overstated.  Kislyak noted that JTF-E sounds less threatening 
than Russia originally supposed, but they will remain 
interested in future plans and rotations. 
 
------------------ 
Looking Ahead 
------------------ 
 
¶20.  (C) Discussing opportunities for further engagement, 
Fried and Kislyak agreed that, in advance of the 2 plus 2 
meeting in October, they would try to meet on September 21, 
when Kislyak expects to be in Washington, and again on the 
eve of the  2 2.  Kislyak suggested that the German CFE 
seminar in Berlin on October 1-2 might be another opportunity 
-- Antonov will lead the Russian team and he could meet with 
U.S. reps on the margins.  (Fried noted that the U.S. team 
was likely to include VCI A/S DeSutter and EUR PDAS Volker.) 
 This was in addition to expert discussions relating to 
Georgia. 
 
¶21.  (C) Fried reiterated that if Kislyak did not like the 
U.S. proposal on Moldova, Russia should come up with an 
alternative idea and we would be willing to discuss it.  The 
important thing is to get away from the standard repetition 
and move forward.  Kislyak indicated that the parallel action 
plan might be a way forward if it has the right content.  He 
said the Russian movement toward suspension of CFE was a 
wake-up call, but noted that December 12 need not be the end 
of constructive discussion. 
 
¶22.  (C) Fried observed that we could not be sanguine about 
the calendar.  It would be far more difficult to find 
solutions to these issues once the political context had 
changed, as it would if Russia took the step of suspending 
 
PARIS 00003808  005 OF 005 
 
 
its implementation of the CFE Treaty.  Suspension of a major 
Treaty is a very serious action.  It was not just Russian 
constraints that would vanish if Russia destroyed the CFE 
regime.  Such Russian action would have implications for 
Allied constraints as well.  Fried noted that the security 
portion of the NATO-Russia Founding Act was significantly 
premised on full adherence by all partners to the CFE Treaty: 
 CFE was a main focus of the text.  We needed to think 
carefully about the choices made in the next weeks, and push 
to resolve our differences constructively -- and soon. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
 
Stapleton