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OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0754/01 2571400
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141400Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8168
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0948
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000754 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/ERA, IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU SW FI
SUBJECT: SWEDES' CYPRUS MUSINGS:  CHANNEL THEIR INTEREST 
PRODUCTIVELY 
 
REF: NICOSIA 729 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Our UK counterparts share our skepticism 
about the timing of Sweden's emerging proposal on Cyprus.  A 
formal proposal at this stage runs the risk of backfiring and 
allowing President Papadopoulos and the other candidates in 
the presidential race to shift to the international community 
the onus for a solution, as well as the blame for the lack of 
progress under the UN-brokered July 8 agreement.  A fresh 
proposal now may also further irritate divisions within the 
EU over Turkey's accession negotiations, which for now appear 
to be on track.  That said, there are measures in the 
near-term which could encourage progress under the July 8 
process, and lay the groundwork for a strong push to reach an 
overall Cyprus settlement following the February 2008 
presidential elections.  End Summary. 
 
PROPOSED SWEDISH INITIATIVE ON CYPRUS 
 
¶2.  (C) UK Deputy High Commissioner Rob Fenn was well aware 
of Swedish FM Bildt,s desire to engage more actively on the 
Cyprus issue, but in our September 13 meeting with him, he 
was surprised to learn of some of the ideas being considered 
by the Swedes, e.g., replacing SRSG Moller.  Like us, the UK 
High Commission is frustrated by the lack of progress since 
former U/SYG Gambari brokered the July 8, 2006 agreement 
between President Papadopoulos and Turkish Cypriot leader 
Talat, and lack of results from their first meeting in 14 
months on September 5.  Fenn noted that this heated 
presidential campaign period is not the time to launch major 
new proposals.  The Swedish initiative to bring together 
"like-minded" countries would likely play to Papadopoulos's 
political advantage, as well as highlight divisions within 
the EU over Turkey.  Fenn expected that Turkey would soon 
open at least one or possibly two more chapters of the Acquis 
in its accession negotiations, and that the upcoming EU 
review of Turkey's progress did not pose any imminent threat 
to keeping those negotiations on track. 
 
¶3. (C) Despite serious concerns about the outlines of the 
Swedish proposal, the UK does want to keep FM Bildt engaged 
and active on the Cyprus issue, given his strong support for 
Turkey's accession negotiations and his stature within the 
EU.  A "brainstorming breakfast" on the margins of UNGA 
meetings might be useful.  It could encourage the UNSYG to 
make a statement following his meeting with President 
Papadopoulos (and again following his separate meeting with 
Talat) noting the lack of progress and the need for both 
leaders to get serious about producing meaningful results 
within the July 8 framework.  A brainstorming session could 
also look ahead to February 2008 and consider options for 
engaging the victor of the tight three-way presidential race 
to reinvigorate negotiations for a final settlement to the 
Cyprus issue. 
 
¶4.  (C) Fenn advised us that the Brits were having an 
internal debate on whether or not to use the roll-over of 
UNFICYP's mandate in December to exert pressure on 
Papadopoulos.  We told him that any attempt to fiddle with 
the mandate now would certainly backfire and hand 
Papadopoulos a huge political gift, which would let him run 
against the international community instead of talking with 
the electorate about their future.  If efforts or initiatives 
to re-energize negotiations after presidential elections 
faltered next spring, then the next roll-over in June could 
be the right time to get serious about considering 
substantive changes to UNFICYP's mandate. 
 
NEAR-TERM MEASURES 
 
 
¶5.  (C) In our view, there are opportunities to encourage 
progress on the Cyprus issue in the near-term, including: 
 
-- a proposed meeting between U/S Burns and President 
Papadopoulos on the margins of UNGA; 
 
-- a statement from the UNSYG following each of his meetings 
with Papadopoulos and Talat, exhorting them to make good and 
produce results from their July 8, 2006 agreement; we see 
such statements as aimed at not letting Talat squirm out of 
his July 8 commitments, while not letting the legalistic 
Papadopoulos suggest that the process has carved-in-stone 
rules which Talat is violating; 
 
-- a forward-looking "brainstorming session" on the margins 
 
NICOSIA 00000754  002 OF 002 
 
 
of UNGA, urging both parties to "find a way forward" in the 
process, while contemplating possibilities for re-energizing 
negotiations following February presidential elections. 
 
COMMENT: THE TIME WILL BE RIPE - BUT NOT NOW 
 
¶6.  (C) The Swedes, interest, ideas, and activism on Cyprus 
are admirable, but their timing is off.  Contrary to their 
current views, the time for meaningful, substantive progress 
on the Cyprus will be especially ripe after the February 
presidential elections.  Elements of any initiatives -- old 
or new -- would vary depending on which of the three 
candidates ends up as the winner.  A UN assessment mission, a 
report and/or recommendations to the UN Security Council, a 
new SRSG, or possible changes to UNFICYP,s mandate in June 
2008 are only some of the ideas which Sweden, the U.S., the 
UK, and other like-minded countries might consider when the 
local "givens" become clear. 
 
¶7.  (C) The current lack of progress on the July 8 process is 
putting pressure on Papadopoulos and the other two candidates 
to proffer their own ideas on the way ahead and differentiate 
themselves in this tight race.  Each of them must now explain 
to voters how they would achieve a solution to the Cyprus 
issue, though by nature, they would prefer to shift the blame 
to Ankara, foreign interference, the U.S., and UK. 
Meanwhile, Talat apparently has neither the interest nor the 
support from Ankara to make bold or modest moves on the July 
8 process until after the elections at least.  For the time 
being, our proposed near-term measures represent the best way 
to lay the foundation for a renewed push on the Cyprus issue 
next spring. 
SCHLICHER