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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8146
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0943

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NICOSIA 000729 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: LEADERS' MEETING BRINGS NO BREAKTHROUGHS 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA 685 
     ¶B. NICOSIA 583 
     ¶C. 06 NICOSIA 1088 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (U) SUMMARY:  Fourteen months after concluding a 
framework arrangement to restart stalled Cyprus Problem 
negotiations -- the July 8 or Gambari Agreement, which 
envisioned regular tete-a-tetes of the island's community 
leaders -- RoC President Tassos Papadopoulos and Turkish 
Cypriot "President" Mehmet Ali Talat conducted their first 
follow-on meeting September 5 in the presence of UN Special 
Representative Michael Moller.  At the conclusion of the 
three-hour gathering, Moller issued a terse statement 
claiming the two men had conversed constructively, concurred 
that "the process" needed to commence ASAP, and would reunite 
"at an appropriate time" in the future.  The leaders, too, 
grabbed the microphones, with Papadopoulos first praising the 
constructive tone of the meeting and assuring that further 
contacts would occur.  It was interlocutor Talat's insistence 
in abandoning July 8 principles, the President argued, that 
had prevented the leaders from reaching a real breakthrough, 
however.  Expectedly, Talat's comments differed dramatically. 
 The passage of time worked against a settlement, he 
explained, and the sides' dithering had wasted fourteen 
months.  Talat had presented to Papadopoulos and Moller a 
fast-track proposal in line with the spirit of July 8; Greek 
Cypriots were not "psychologically prepared" for real 
negotiations, he regretfully concluded. 
 
¶2.  (C) Media in both communities deemed the meeting a 
substantive failure and expectedly placed blame on the other 
sides' pigheadedness.  Their arguments echoed those of key 
political leaders on both sides:  G/C editorials argued the 
Turkish Cypriot leadership aimed to torpedo July 8 in hopes 
of reviving the "undemocratic and doomed to fail" Annan Plan, 
while T/C columnists disparaged Papadopoulos for seeking only 
electoral gain, and not actual progress toward a settlement, 
from the Gambari framework.  We expect the President will 
attempt to derive benefit from this meeting taking place, and 
predict a Palace attempt to manage the timing and content of 
future gatherings for maximum political bounce.  As to Talat, 
who so feared providing Papadopoulos that edge that he 
seriously considered refusing the gathering, his proposal for 
a time-limited preparations period leading to full-fledged 
negotiations did not represent a complete abandonment of July 
8, since he has been under significant international pressure 
to live up to his earlier commitment to the agreement.  He 
still faces an uphill battle to convince the international 
community, much less his counterparts across the Green Line, 
of his seriousness toward the arrangement he and Papadopoulos 
agreed to last year.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
July 8 Agreement:  One Step Up and...Three Steps Back 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶3.  (C) For two years following the failed 2004 Annan Plan 
referendum, both Turkish and Greek Cypriots engaged in a 
unseemly blame game, and constructive engagement ground to a 
halt.  Few on either side expected much from the July 2006 
visit of UN Political Under Secretary Ibrahim Gambari.  The 
UN official notched a notable victory, then, in brokering a 
deal on July 8 that committed the communities to work toward 
an eventual Cyprus solution by establishing working groups to 
prepare the ground for settlement negotiations and technical 
committees to tackle daily life issues (Ref C).  Papadopoulos 
and Talat also agreed to meet occasionally to review the work 
of the bi-communal entities.  Like much in Cyprus, however, 
the devil was in the details -- and in the implementation. 
For fourteen months after Gambari's departure, the impasse 
continued and the blame game reached Olympic standards. 
Despite each leader issuing invitations, for example, not a 
single "summit" occurred, due mainly to Papadopoulos's 
insistence that the groups and committees must first be up 
and running.  As to those bodies, despite dozens of meetings 
of the tripartite coordination committee (Moller, plus 
negotiators Tasos Tzionis and Rashit Pertev), the sides 
failed to reach final agreement on their number, names, 
composition, and terms of reference (Ref B). 
 
¶4.  (C) It soon became obvious the communities viewed the 
July 8 agreement through different prisms, and sought to 
implement it in varying degrees and speeds.  To Papadopoulos, 
the process represented an opportunity to bury the hated 
Annan Plan, craft a solution "based on different principles," 
and shuck the "intransigent" label that neutral observers 
believed he merited.  Through Tzionis, the G/C side lobbied 
 
NICOSIA 00000729  002 OF 004 
 
 
to create a dozen working groups and committees whose agendas 
were incredibly complex (one, "Governance," included nearly 
sixty items, such as "study federal models currently used in 
Germany, Switzerland, and Belgium").  Turkish Cypriots 
immediately cried foul, claiming the tactics aimed to delay 
the process indefinitely, a point shared by many in the 
international community but ignored by most G/C media and 
opinion leaders. 
 
¶5.  (C) Despite Talat signing his name last summer, he and 
the other Turkish Cypriot leaders never knew quite how to 
manage the July 8 process (on September 6, close advisor 
Hasan Ercakica claimed the T/Cs had wanted something 
different in July 2006 -- Papadopoulos to make public the 
changes his side sought to the Annan Plan -- but they had 
bowed to U.S., UK, and UN "pressure" and approved the 
framework arrangement in a last-gasp attempt to spur movement 
toward a final CyProb solution.  A version closer to the 
truth is that Talat made the July 8 agreement, then got 
slapped by Ankara for reaching a deal that did not pay ritual 
obeisance to the Annan Plan as the touchstone for all CyProb 
diplomacy.)  Frustrated by G/C go-slow tactics, the Turkish 
Cypriots reacted with public statements and later, formal 
letters, essentially seeking the abrogation of the process 
and the immediate resumption of full-fledged negotiations. 
In the arrangement they sought, the Annan Plan would provide 
a basis for talks, which would feature international 
arbitration and timetables.  Greek Cypriots considered the 
proposed changes complete non-starters. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Recent Events Bring Hope for Movement 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) By late spring, few here believed any July 8 progress 
was possible.  Buoyed by his hard-line Cyprus Problem 
strategy, Papadopoulos looked a shoo-in for reelection in 
2008 and seemed unlikely to change tactics soon.  North of 
the Green Line, Talat, in the cross-hairs of the resident 
Turkish military, facing a suddenly emboldened opposition, 
and with his AKP supporters involved in their own battles at 
home, was hamstrung from adopting a more flexible and/or 
conciliatory position.  Two developments portended a possible 
unfreezing, however.  Papadopoulos's governing coalition 
ruptured in July, with one-time collaborator and AKEL General 
Secretary Dimitris Christofias declaring his presidential 
 
SIPDIS 
candidacy.  His re-election no longer assured, the President 
suddenly faced the need to justify that his uncompromising 
positions were bearing fruit.  Talat derived benefit with 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan's convincing win in July's Turkish 
parliamentary elections.  With the Turkish 
nationalist/secularist parties' poor performance, his north 
Cyprus opposition lost confidence and cohesion and the 
military seemed to tone down its rhetoric, giving Talat some 
room to maneuver.  Talk around the water cooler changed to 
the possibility the leaders might actually meet. 
 
¶7.  (C) Moller returned to Denmark for an August vacation, 
but UNFICYP staff took advantage of the small opening and 
pressed community representatives Tzionis and Pertev to 
re-establish their coordination committee meetings.  On 
August 21, they gathered in Moller's offices.  Evidently 
under orders to say "yes," neither had an objection to the 
leaders meeting September 5.  Besides setting the date, the 
two sides' representatives briefly discussed a broad agenda. 
Tzionis reiterated points that Papadopoulos had made in his 
July letter to Talat: the leaders must focus on 
reinvigorating the barely-breathing July 8 process.  Pertev 
added "and focus as well on any/all other aspects of the 
Cyprus Problem."  UNFICYP sought to keep the gathering as 
free-flowing as possible, deliberately avoiding mention of 
any modality likely to cause either man to object or wrangle. 
 
¶8.  (C) A short burst of optimism quickly gave way to 
reality, however, as the two communities voiced their aims 
and redlines for the upcoming meeting.  In the Turkish 
Cypriot community, only Talat's CTP saw potential progress 
stemming from the meeting, with General Secretary Omar 
Kalyoncu telling us September 5 that "we always want to 
negotiate, and never shy from a meeting.  Let's see what this 
one brings."  Opposition figures adopted a more pessimistic, 
even combative stance.  Democratic Party (DP) Number 2 
Ertugrul Hasipoglu the same day blasted Papadopoulos's 
sincerity, claiming the President was unlikely to cede an 
inch.  "What will he want to discuss?  Minority rights for 
Turkish Cypriots?  Osmosis?  They'll never give up absolute 
authority over the RoC, so what's the point?" 
 
¶9.  (U) Greek Cypriot media also downplayed the September 5 
 
NICOSIA 00000729  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
meeting's likelihood for success, focusing on "unreal" 
Turkish Cypriot expectations.  While Papadopoulos sought to 
implement the July 8 agreement by establishing the envisaged 
committees and working groups, Talat allegedly would seek 
regular leaders' meeting regardless of progress at the 
working level.  In so doing, he would "downgrade the process 
without burying it."  Timetables and international 
arbitration also topped Talat's wish list, G/C media claimed, 
a recipe for further deadlock. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
And They're Off...Sides Meet September 5 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) UNFICYP had real fears that non-substantive 
modalities, such as the order of arrival and flying of flags 
on the leaders' limos, might derail the meeting.  A flurry of 
telephone diplomacy evidently resolved the tiffs, and the men 
arrived at Moller's official residence the afternoon of 
September 5.  After three-plus hours, the SRSG emerged and 
issued a short statement.  "Constructive engagement" best 
characterized the leaders' conversation, Moller claimed.  The 
two men had concurred that "the process" (not the July 8 
process) must commence immediately, and had discussed other 
topics related to a final CyProb settlement.  Finally, Talat 
and Papadopoulos had agreed to continue to meet under the 
auspices of the United Nations, and would reunite at an 
"appropriate time" to continue the talks. 
 
¶11.  (U) Upon returning to their respective HQs, the leaders 
applied their spins.  While the Greek Cypriot side had 
insisted on a strict interpretation of the July 8 agreement 
and its fundamental aim of "preparing the ground for future 
negotiations," Papadopoulos asserted, Talat had proposed 
deviations from the agreement that sought to minimize the 
roles of the committees and working groups.  Attempts by the 
T/C side to speed the process would result only in reaching 
dead-ends more quickly.  The RoC President voiced his 
intention, however, to continue meeting with Talat in hopes 
of breaking the impasse, the end goal being a CyProb solution 
"built on a different base."  The passage of time reduced 
hopes of finding a workable federal solution, Talat countered 
publicly.  Instead, he proposed "fast-track" preparations, 
with a handful of committees deliberating key issues like 
governance, security, and EU relations for a period of two 
months.  Afterward, the leaders would commence face-to-face 
discussions aimed at a final solution.  Explaining his 
failure in winning Papadopoulos's buy-in for the re-worked 
process, Talat claimed the G/C side was not psychologically 
prepared to negotiate in earnest. 
 
----------------------------- 
Truth Somewhere in the Middle 
----------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) UNFICYP Political Officer (and official notetaker) 
Tim Alchin confirmed the leaders had behaved cordially and 
professionally during the three-hour get-together, a positive 
in itself.  While expressing a common desire to move forward, 
they had failed to agree on next steps, however.  No 
follow-up looked imminent, since Papadopoulos soon would 
depart for New York and UNGA.  Talat had focused on modifying 
the process (his own words) by introducing the aforementioned 
deadlines for the committee work.  In his view, the fact that 
14 months had passed without visible progress was proof the 
"bottom-up" approach -- driven by the working-level groups -- 
could not successfully drive the negotiations.  Talat also 
sought Papadopoulos's commitment to aim for a solution by the 
end of 2008. 
 
¶13.  (C) Conversely, Papadopoulos had lobbied for a stricter 
following of the July 8 process and follow-on (November 2006) 
Gambari bridging proposal.  He rejected any and all fixed 
timeframes, insisting that subsequent leaders' meetings 
depended on progress at the working level.  A 2008 solution 
presented no problems to the President, but Papadopoulos 
argued that Talat's two-month preparation period was 
insufficient to tackle re-unification's numerous and complex 
components.  The minimalist statement Moller issued 
characterized well the inability of the sides to reach any 
real agreement, Alchin concluded. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Meeting to Prove Politically Beneficial? 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (C) Embassy contacts within the G/C community were 
unsure whether Papadopoulos would score electoral points from 
the meeting.  Polakis Sarris, who shepherded the President's 
 
NICOSIA 00000729  004 OF 004 
 
 
successful 2003 run and plays a similar part now, claimed it 
was still too early to gauge its impact.  If the public 
perceived the process was leading nowhere, Papadopoulos might 
even lose votes.  He personally thought he could spin the 
results positively, however.  DIKO President Marios Karoyian, 
a Papadopoulos protege who nonetheless has butted heads with 
the President lately, called the September 5 gathering an 
electoral non-event.  If it led to progress in the 
negotiations, Papadopoulos benefited, but if it failed, the 
President would receive no blame.  It was crystal-clear that 
Talat deserved credit for the current impasse, Karoyian 
reasoned, a "fact" the G/C electorate understood. 
 
¶15.  (C) "TRNC Spokesman" and Talat adviser Hasan Ercakica 
confirmed that Talat had feared providing the hated 
Papadopoulos an electoral boost by agreeing to the meeting. 
Eventually, however, his "President" had determined that the 
negatives of refusing the get-together outweighed the 
negatives of boosting Papadopoulos's chances.  While Turkish 
Cypriots undoubtedly hoped Christofias or Ioannis Kasoulides 
would unseat Papadopoulos in February, they saw a possible 
backfire in attempting to influence the G/C elections, and 
would "play our own game, not theirs" in the run-up. 
Ercakica revealed Talat's unhappiness with the meeting's 
outcome, and later argued that only a renewed U.S. or 
"Western" push could dislodge the Greek Cypriots from their 
hardened positions. 
 
---------------- 
What Comes Next? 
---------------- 
 
¶16.  (C) COMMENT:  While hesitant to rubbish the leaders' 
meeting -- their first get-together in 14 months IS cause for 
some rejoicing -- we're equally reluctant to claim it 
represents much more than the first of a thousand steps.  The 
sides, after all, proved unable even to schedule a follow-on 
meeting or issue a serious statement.  In looking for 
positives, we're left with Talat's latest plan for a handful 
of working groups to tackle substantive issues over a 
time-limited preparation phase.  It would seem he received a 
taste of reality, of what the Greek Cypriots, UN, and 
international community might actually expect (in comparison, 
his April 2007 letter to incoming UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon, in which 
he sought immediate recommencement of full-fledged 
negotiations on the basis of the Annan Plan, complete with 
strict timetables and international arbitration, won derision 
from all parties.)  We would hope Papadopoulos and company 
give consideration to the proposal and seek changes that meet 
their needs while also addressing Talat's. 
 
¶17.  (C) Much more likely is the President continuing to 
insist on a stricter interpretation of the July 8 agreement, 
seeking to control the negotiation's timing and progress for 
maximum political gain.  To that end, we expect Papadopoulos 
to trumpet the leaders' meeting and "active political 
process" at his UNGA speech in two weeks. 
SCHLICHER