VZCZCXRO2992
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #4634/01 2630929
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 200929Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4008
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 004634 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNO UNMIK FR RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA-FRANCE RELATIONS: AFTER KOUCHNER, BEFORE 
SARKOZY 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns.  Reasons 1.4 (B/D). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner's 
two-day Moscow visit did not bridge the gap in the two 
countries' position on issues such as Kosovo and Iran.   Both 
GOR officials and the French Embassy hope that the early 
October Sarkozy visit will provide an opportunity to narrow 
differences and create a framework for more intensive 
bilateral cooperation, even as France elevates the issue of 
human rights in its bilateral dialogue.  Moscow's 
non-official circles predicted that further progress would 
depend on Sarkozy's willingness to craft a Russia-friendly EU 
agenda.  End summary. 
 
Friends Indeed 
-------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) At a September 18 press conference following his 
one-on-one meeting with FM Kouchner, FM Lavrov, calling 
Kouchner "my friend," termed the Russia-France bilateral 
relationship one of a "special, privileged character." 
Lavrov, a colleague from Kouchner's 1999 - 2001 work in 
Kosovo, covered a wide range of issues including Iran, Iraq, 
Kosovo, the Middle East, Afghanistan and the North Caucasus. 
Lavrov did not spare Kouchner Moscow's dissatisfaction with 
EU actions on key contentious issues such as OSCE, missile 
defense, and NATO, while appealing for a "collective" 
consensus among involved parties, and for avoidance of 
unilateral actions.  French Ambassador Laboulaye told us that 
the Sarkozy Moscow visit, originally planned for October 
10-11, is likely to be moved up to the beginning of the month. 
 
Kouchner:  Man with a Message 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) According to Laboulaye, FM Kouchner came to Moscow to 
deliver a tougher message to GOR leaders.  A key element of 
that message, he noted, was Sarkozy's concern over 
conflicting signals from Putin and the unsuccessful March 
Samara Summit.  Kouchner repeated emphasized that France's 
readiness to work towards closer relations with the U.S. 
would not preclude a close working relationship with Russia. 
At the same time, the Sarkozy government would be more vocal 
on human rights and on the situation in Chechnya.  To drive 
home this point, Kouchner held a breakfast meeting with a mix 
of officials and non-governmental human rights figures and 
opposition political party leaders, gave an interview to Ekho 
Moskvy Editor Aleksey Venediktov, and visited the offices of 
the newspaper where murdered journalist Anna Polikovskaya had 
worked. 
 
Kosovo: Russia's Redline, 
EU's Priority 
------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C) In his public comments, Lavrov lashed out against the 
prospect of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence 
(UDI), warning of a chain reaction in other regions (read: 
Abkhazia) and called the Troika's December 10 deadline 
"artificial" and unacceptable.  Both Deputy Foreign Minister 
Titov and the French Ambassador told the Ambassador September 
19 that "nothing new" emerged from the ministers' 
discussions.  Kouchner made clear that while France and the 
EU preferred a negotiated solution, the EU would be united in 
its position after December 10, without specifying the 
substance of that position.  Lavrov pushed Kouchner on 
whether all 27 member states were inclined to recognize the 
UDI.  Kouchner touched on the idea of a "CIS approach" to 
Kosovo -- a temporary union, leading to a referendum along 
the lines of Serbia and Montenegro -- an idea which he said 
would be broached by EU Troika Envoy Ischinger during his 
September 18-19 London sessions with the Serb and Kosovar 
Albanian delegations. (Titov's broader comments on Kosovo 
reported septel.) 
 
Iran: Weekend Remarks Dominate 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Kouchner's remarks prior to arriving to Moscow on the 
need for preparedness for a war against Iran drew sharp 
criticism from Lavrov, who said, "No modern problem can have 
a military solution."  The Russian FM said that the IAEA and 
the UN should take the lead on the international community's 
"collective" decision on Iran, avoiding "unilateral" 
sanctions.  He insisted that a lesson be learned from the 
Iraq experience which demonstrated the consequences of 
unilateral action.  Kouchner repeated his position: further 
sanctions, and more "precise" sanctions to "show that we are 
serious." 
 
Chechnya Initiative 
------------------- 
 
MOSCOW 00004634  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶6.  (C) French Embassy officials expressed general 
satisfaction with the visit.  One surprise was Kouchner's 
support for the NGO, "Etudes sans Frontieres" to open by 
September 2009 a House of Culture in Grozniy.  Modeled after 
French cultural centers, the house will provide Chechen 
residents with access to information on Europe and language 
training. 
Non-Official Views 
------------------ 
 
¶7.  (C) Worries in Russia about the bilateral relationship 
immediately following Sarkozy's victory subsided in the week 
of the Presidents' meeting at the Heiligendamm G-8.  The two 
men were then portrayed as "similar" -- energetic, practical, 
self-confident. and prone to surprise the public.  Sarkozy 
may not be another Chirac, well-versed in Russian literature 
and with a special fondness of Russia, but it is thought here 
that he may be someone with whom Putin could work.  Our 
contacts highlighted Sarkozy's agility and adroitness in 
securing the Bulgarian medics' release and the French company 
Total's surprise "insertion" into the Shtokman project, 
announced after a Sarkozy - Putin phone call.  Chief Editor 
for Russia in Global Affairs Fedor Lukaynov maintained that 
the two men "understand each other."  While FM Kouchner's 
background, with his previous work in Kosovo and his keen 
interest in Russia's sore spot -- the North Caucasus-- is 
distasteful to the Russian leadership, Sarkozy has managed to 
disarm GOR officials, despite his plan to work more 
cooperatively with the U.S. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Although the policy divisions were wide and clear 
during the Kouchner visit, the budding personal bond between 
the two presidents may well be solidified during Sarkozy's 
visit and be enough to advance the bilateral relationship, at 
least until next May when Putin steps down.  The Russians 
want to view the French EU Presidency in the latter half of 
2008 as the first meaningful opportunity to reassess the 
broader relationship with the EU. 
Burns