VZCZCXRO8797
PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHMU #2207/01 2691855
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261855Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1357
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAGUA 002207 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN, NSC FOR V. ALVARADO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ECON KDEM NU
SUBJECT: CITIZEN COUNCILS - FULL STEAM AHEAD? 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 2185 
     ¶B. MANAGUA 2043 
     ¶C. MANAGUA 1944 
     ¶D. MANAGUA 1783 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4(b,d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  In a September 20 meeting, Citizens' Power 
Councils (CPCs) Managua coordinator Eliaz Chevez asserted the 
National Assembly's (NA) vote to remove authorization for the 
executive to create such entities from Law 290 is "not 
substantial" and that the CPCs will "continue to move 
forward."  Despite this claim, Chevez admitted that 
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) had yet to meet 
to discuss a post-vote strategy, or to set a new date to 
announce the formation of the CPC national cabinet, 
originally scheduled for September 14.  According to Chevez, 
all CPCs -- from the department (state) down to the 
neighborhood level -- have been formed and the CPCs are 
actively working in communities "without resistance."  The 
longer-term impact of the NA's vote on the CPCs is unclear, 
but if the government is unable to channel official programs 
and funding through the CPCs due to the change in law, this 
legal rollback could erode individual incentive and 
participation over time.  Ortega has announced his intention 
to veto the NA's reform of the law.  END SUMMARY. 
 
CPCs - "Business as Usual" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Despite the National Assembly's recent vote to curb 
the official power of the President Daniel Ortega's CPCs by 
striking language from Law 290 (reftel B), Managua CPC 
coordinator Elias Chevez assured us in private that the 
change is "not substantial" and the CPCs will "continue to 
move forward."  However, Chevez noted that the FSLN 
leadership still has not met as a group to develop a response 
strategy.  Chevez commented that the leadership is 
considering several options, including "trying" to have the 
reform declared unconstitutional for restricting citizens' 
rights to organize and express themselves.  (COMMENT: On 
September 24, before departing to the U.S. to participate in 
the UN General Assembly, President Ortega announced that he 
would partially veto the NA's proposed reform to Law 290. 
During his remarks, Ortega accused the NA of contradicting 
the purpose entrusted to it by the Nicaraguan people by 
overturning legislation that would "permit the integration of 
citizens into the Power of the State."  While Chevez had 
indicated that senior FSLN leadership was evaluating its 
options, he did not appear distressed by the NA's vote and 
gave no indication that a presidential decision was imminent. 
 END COMMENT.) 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Given the general level of discomfort with the CPCs 
within Nicaraguan society, we asked Chevez if the CPCs have 
encountered increased resistance from state-sponsored service 
providers (schools, clinics, hospitals, etc.) since the NA 
vote.  Chevez responded that "in practical terms, nothing has 
changed," citing examples where CPCs had recently 
participated in a forum on public safety and would shortly 
conduct anti-dengue joint operations with the Ministry of 
Health. 
 
Awaiting "Opportune Moment" to Announce National Council 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Like First Lady Rosario Murillo - the architect of 
the CPCs - Chevez blamed Hurricane Felix for Ortega and 
Murillo's failure to announce the much anticipated CPC 
National Cabinet on September 14.  When asked if Ortega and 
Murillo had selected a new date, Chevez admitted they have 
not and that Ortega and Murillo are waiting for an "opportune 
moment" to announce the cabinet.  Asked to define an 
opportune moment, Chevez fumbled about for several minutes, 
but failed to come up with cohesive answer.  He did, however, 
insist that the CPCs are fully formed from the neighborhood 
to the departmental level in every department and they are 
ready to install the national cabinet.  (COMMENT:  We 
discount the assertion that the CPC are fully formed and 
functioning throughout the country.  For example, in 
Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast Autonomous Regions, resistance to 
the CPCs has been fierce.  As a result, CPCs have not been 
widely established in either region.  END COMMENT)  
 
CPC Members on Their Own 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Chevez dismissed widespread claims that the 
government is financing the CPCs.  He proudly insisted that, 
despite having no budget, they have managed to organize 
themselves and become a force within civil society very 
quickly.  He remarked that the main priority now is to train 
and strengthen the capabilities of the members.  Asked how he 
would do this without a budget, Chevez made vague reference 
to taking advantage of public events and fora to help educate 
his CPC members and to inject CPC opinion into public 
dialogue. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
¶6.  (C) Ortega's quick decision to move forward with a veto 
despite the unresolved issue discussed at the Chevez meeting, 
may indicate that Ortega senses weakness in the opposition 
created by Eduardo Montealegre's legal troubles and the 
recent defection of ALN deputy Ramiro Silva Gutierrez (Reftel 
A).  Ortega may believe that the ALN / Liberal Constitutional 
Party (PLC) block will not hold firm on a veto-override vote. 
 
 
¶7.  (C) If Ortega's veto stands, the administration no doubt 
plans to continue officially channeling government programs 
and funding through the CPCs -- such as Zero Hunger (Reftel 
C,D) -- giving the individual CPC members power and control 
in communities, and giving the party greater control at the 
grassroots level.  If the NA overrides the veto, the CPC 
members, robbed of program control and funding, as Chevez 
stated, will largely be left to their own devices to both 
train themselves and to devise ways to help in their 
communities (unless of course a friendly foreign power fills 
the gap.)  Such a legal rollback could erode commitment and 
cause members to abandon the CPCs over time. 
TRIVELLI