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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 003662 

SIPDIS 

NOFORN 
SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS MCAP IZ UK
SUBJECT: CROCKER/PETRAEUS MEETINGS WITH UK DEFENSE 
SECRETARY AND SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIALS, SEPTEMBER 18, 2007 

SIPDIS 

Classified By: Ambassador Robert H. Tuttle, reasons 1.4 b, d 

¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: With Prime Minister Gordon Brown set to 
deliver a widely-anticipated statement on HMG's policy in 
Iraq to Parliament on or about October 10, the UK needs the 
USG to define clearly its expectations for the British 
presence in Iraq as soon as possible, UK Defence Secretary 
Des Browne told U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and 
Commanding General of Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) David 
Petraeus September 18 in London. Over lunch and a follow-on 
meeting, Browne said the UK is frustrated by the lack of 
progress in Basrah, both politically and economically. This 
frustration has led the British to question the entire 
purpose of maintaining a presence there. Petraeus and 
Crocker argued that Basrah's position as Iraq's second 
largest city, combined with its vast oil resources and a 
homogeneous Shi'a community, make its fate critical to Iraq's 
future, and that the UK role in securing that future is 
vital. Petraeus asked that the UK retain its base of 
operations in the south in Basrah, and not move it elsewhere 
in the British sector of Multi-National Division-South East 
(MND-SE). Petraeus said that he would discuss separately 
with UK Chief of Defence Staff Air Marshall Jock Stirrup a 
list of critical tasks for MND-SE. On Basrah's transfer to 
provincial Iraqi control (PIC), Petraeus said that it could 
happen in late fall or winter, depending on how the 
conditions in Basrah evolve, including how the situation with 
Basrah's governor evolves. END SUMMARY. 

U.S. and UK Need to Discuss Expectations 
---------------------------------------- 

¶2. (S/NF) Summarizing the U.S. and UK positions on Iraq, 
Browne said: "We are on the same page on both path and 
message -- although we may have been on different paragraphs 
at different times." He assured Crocker and Petraeus that 
the UK will see its commitments through: "We are not rushing 
for the door." Stressing that he values his close contacts 
with U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, particularly Gates' 
candor, Browne said the time has come for the U.S. and UK to 
enter into detailed discussions on U.S. expectations for the 
UK in the south. Up to this point, he said, Gates and other 
U.S. officials have put off discussions of future Iraq 
strategy until the September 10-11 Congressional hearings on 
Iraq have concluded. Now that the hearings are over, these 
discussions need to take place as soon as possible, to avoid 
giving pundits and the media the opportunity to shape the 
debate in unhelpful ways. 

¶3. (S/NF) U.S./UK discussions on the way ahead in Iraq are 
also vital, Browne said, because PM Gordon Brown will make a 
statement on HMG's Iraq policy soon after Parliament 
reconvenes on October 8. PM Brown is currently planning to 
make the statement on October 10, early enough in the session 
to prevent the opposition parties from getting the upper hand 
on the Iraq debate. PM Brown will need the statement to 
carry a certain amount of substance on issues such as 
assessing Iraqi governmental capacity and defining goals and 
timelines, Browne stressed. Petraeus said the U.S. would be 
happy to work with the UK on this, as it has in the past. 
Browne expressed HMG's hope that the policy discussions would 
not be limited by U.S. domestic events such as the next 
report to Congress by Petraeus and Crocker, currently 
scheduled for March. Crocker noted that he and Petraeus had 
stressed in their testimony that the situation is not 
evolving predictably, or via a timeline, and that the U.S. 
would need to be in Iraq for 
a long time, so that long term planning should be possible. 

UK Role in Basrah 
----------------- 

¶4. (S/NF) The UK needs to continue to base its MND-SE 
operations in Basrah, Petraeus said to Browne. Noting the 
possibility that the UK might consider moving to Talil Air 
Base in Dhi Qar, Petraeus stressed that Basrah itself is 
critically important: it is the second largest city in Iraq; 
90 percent of Iraq's oil wealth flows through it; its 
airfield is critical to MNF-I operations in the south, and it 
serves as a base for special forces operations, intelligence 
operations, ground and air quick reaction forces, air 
medevac, diplomatic elements and PRTs, and manned and 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri 
al-Maliki understands the challenges facing Basrah, Petraeus 
said, as he has demonstrated by appointing General Muhan as 
Head of the Iraqi Security Forces and Major General Jaleel as 
Head of Police. With no sectarian conflict or al Qaida 
presence, Basrah represents an opportunity for Maliki to 
demonstrate how Iraqi central government can liaise with 

LONDON 00003662 002 OF 002 


regional governments; UK support will be critical as Maliki 
achieves this. Crocker said that Basrah is a metaphor for 
the challenges that Iraq faces. Since it has become clear 
that Iraq will not be completely centrally controlled, the UK 
needs to be on the ground to assist the Basrahwis to find 
Basrahwi solutions to Basrahwi problems. 

¶5. (S/NF) The UK has stressed Basrah's importance to Maliki 
from the beginning, Browne said. As a fellow Shi'a, Maliki 
could have taken advantage of Basrah's relative homogeneity 
to reward his people without offending the Sunni. Had Maliki 
recognized this from the onset and at strategic points along 
the way, notably during Operation Sinbad, it would have 
helped enormously, Browne said. Mohan and Jaleel are 
excellent, but they are the exceptions. The rest of the 
Basrahwi political class is corrupt. The economy is 
terrible; young men are joining the Jaysh al-Mahdi out of 
lack of any other opportunity. Officials are not moving on 
proposed British infrastructure projects. All of these 
frustrations have led the UK to question why it maintains a 
role in Basrah at all. Petraeus replied that he would meet 
with Chief of Defence Staff Air Marshall Jock Stirrup after 
the meeting to discuss the list of tasks that the U.S. 
envisions remain in Basrah. He also said he would push key 
MND-SE projects with the Iraqi government (NOTE FROM BAGHDAD: 
General Petraeus met with PM Maliki September 20 and stressed 
the need to help Basrah and discussed the same with DPM 
Barham Salih as well.) 

Basrah Transfer to Provincial Iraqi Control 
------------------------------------------- 

¶6. (S/NF) Basrah should be able to transfer to Provincial 
Iraqi Control (PIC) by late fall or winter, Petraeus said, 
although the decision would have to go through the normal PIC 
process first, which could take some weeks. The issue of 
Basrah Governor Waeli remains unresolved, and that would need 
to be factored in as well, Petraeus said: for example, it 
would not be realistic to PIC at the same time that another 
governor might be taking over, if the situation comes to 
that. Browne pressed for a specific date, or at least 
concrete wording that PM Brown could use in his statement to 
Parliament. 

HMG Attitude Towards Its Performance in Iraq 
--------------------------------------------- 

¶7. (C) Finally, Petraeus asked Browne why the UK seems to be 
beating itself up over its performance in Iraq. Browne 
answered that the Labour Government under Tony Blair and now 
Gordon Brown have been effectively without domestic 
opposition for five years. During that time, the UK media, 
which has appallingly low standards, has taken on the role of 
the opposition, and the constant barrage of criticism and 
misinformation is wearing officials down. Petraeus noted 
that the UK has helped with a number of accomplishments in 
recent months, including orderly handoff of the Basrah Palace 
and State Building and establishment of the Basrah 
Operational Command. 

¶8. (SBU) Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus have cleared 
this cable. 

Visit London's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/london/index. cfm 
LeBaron