VZCZCXRO2009
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1497/01 2670832
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 240832Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8613
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001497 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG, AF A/S FRAZER, S/E NATSIOS 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KREL AU UN SU
SUBJECT: U/S SIDDIQ: TRIPOLI IS THE LAST CHANCE 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001497  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (SBU)  Summary: In a September 23 meeting with CDA 
Fernandez, Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs and the 
Sudanese government's UNSCR 1769 implementation coordinator 
Dr. Mutrif Siddiq called Sudanese support for the resolution 
"unanimous." Any delays or question regarding UNAMID 
deployment were technical, not political, he said. CDA 
commended the Sudanese on their efforts so far to facilitate 
the lengthy, complicated process of bringing 26,000 troops 
through Khartoum and to Darfur. On the Tripoli talks, Siddiq 
said that they presented the "last chance" at peace 
negotiations. A PAE representative also sat in on the 
meeting. End summary. 
 
-------------------------------- 
POSITIVE PREPARATIONS FOR UNAMID 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) During the meeting, CDA welcomed the progress that 
had been made so far in implementing UNSCR 1769: "We're 
seeing some actions as well as words," he noted. CDA cited 
positive movement on issues such as flight clearances and 
visas for AMIS contractor Pacific Architects and Engineer's 
(PAE) camp expansion efforts, and also cautioned that it 
would be an important, yet difficult, task to keep track of 
all the details assoicated with UNAMID's deployment. On the 
issue of Antonov 124s landing in Darfur, Siddiq said that the 
problems were technical as the only airport capable of 
sustaining the plane's weight was Khartoum International. 
"But we've urged the Heavy Support Package engineers to 
expand the El Fasher airport," he said. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The camp expansions were a "rehearsal" for UNAMID, 
CDA said, and the international community wanted and needed 
Sudan's support. "We want to recommend to Washington that 
Sudan is backing its words with deeds, and is making a 
qualitative difference." CDA added that this could be a 
success story for the Sudanese, and could provide an example 
of the Sudanese government taking a positive role in Darfur. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Sudanese overwhelemingly welcomed the hybrid 
force, Siddiq said. Echoing the sentiments of IDPs in Darfur, 
he said, "We want the security and development that comes 
with it." The Sudanese goverment was sometimes perplexed, 
however, by those who said African troops weren't capable of 
the task. The Europeans could provide experts and financial 
assistance, but should not "compete" with African countries 
in providing infantry troops. 
 
---------------------------- 
TRIPOLI IS THE "LAST CHANCE" 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Perhaps a bigger, more complicated issue than UNSCR 
1769 implementation was the upcoming Tripoli meeting, CDA 
said. It was critical to administer the negotiations well, 
and to manage expectations; if talks failed, who would be 
blamed? Siddiq said that if rebel groups sensed that the 
international community was at all skeptical about the talks, 
they would not succeed. Many groups in Darfur were making 
money out of the chaos in the area, he claimed, and the 
Sudanese government was losing both politically and 
financially. While the GoS was being drained of resources by 
Darfur, rebel movements had every incentive to keep the pot 
boiling by their intransigence. Mutriff underscored the 
message he wanted to convey to rebel groups: if they didn't 
join the political process, then they would be considered as 
opposed to peace.  Tripoli was the "last chance" at 
negotiations before Sudanese elections in 2009. CDA noted 
that the US also wanted to send the message that Darfur was 
for all Darfuris (and not only for Fur IDPs). 
 
--------------------- 
CPA MISUNDERSTANDINGS 
--------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) On the CPA, Siddiq complained that few people knew 
the "spirit and the letter" of the agreement. The loss of 
SPLM leader John Garang had been a major blow, and the fact 
that some major SPLM negotiators like Abdulaziz Helou and 
Nhial Deng had left the country had weakened the SPLM's 
understanding of the accord. SAF redeployment from Abyei was 
one example where the international community was following 
only one side of the story, he said. The Sudanese goverment 
was publicly condemned for not redeploying its 3,600 
remaining troops by the July 9 deadline, yet there were still 
JIUs in areas that should have been free of all armed forces. 
The SPLA had removed its troops from eastern Sudan six months 
 
KHARTOUM 00001497  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
late, with reportedly 3,000 "escaped," yet the NCP had not 
made "a fuss" about it. The international community should 
treat Abyei the same way, he suggested. The SPLA had also 
wildly inflated the numbers of troops it still had in the 
Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile areas, and there could be a 
potentially tricky situation when they finally completed 
their withdrawal and the numbers didn't match (since the SPLA 
is being funded for these inflated numbers). With SAF 
withdrawal at almost 90 percent, he noted, surely that is an 
accomplishment. 
 
¶7. (SBU) While agreeing that the SAF was closer to completing 
troop redeployment than the SPLA, CDA stressed that what was 
important now for Sudan was whether the international 
community could say that the country was truly a different 
place than it had been in 2003-2004. "Then we could look 
forward to expanding our partnership," he said. CDA added 
that while there was CPA progress, the political mood was 
"poisonous" and confidence between the two sides needs to be 
rebuilt. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Comment: Undersecretary Siddiq's claim that the 
Sudanese government has no political objections to UNAMID 
deployment is likely exaggerated, but the government -- 
operating in a more than typically inefficient bureaucracy -- 
does seem to be taking constructive steps toward facilitating 
the complicated procedures involved in the force's arrival. 
These efforts will become necessarily more complex and 
intricate as preparations for UNAMID step up in the coming 
weeks and months, and Sudan's compliance with UNSCR 1769 
needs to be carefully monitored. At the moment, however, the 
government seems at least to be matching some words to deeds. 
Key NCP insider Siddiq's "can do" attitude is a plus, though. 
End comment. 
FERNANDEZ