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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM1386, MINAWI: "WE WILL NOT BE VICTIMIZED"
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07KHARTOUM1386 | 2007-09-04 09:57 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Khartoum |
VZCZCXRO7263
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1386/01 2470957
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 040957Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8391
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001386
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, NEA A/S WELCH
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UN AU SU SA
SUBJECT: MINAWI: "WE WILL NOT BE VICTIMIZED"
REF: A. KHARTOUM 01133
¶B. KHARTOUM 01303
¶C. KHARTOUM 01373
Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (U) See para. 10 for recommendation.
¶2. (S/NF) In a recent meeting with CDA Fernandez, SLM leader
Minni Minawi lamented the loss of international support for
the DPA and warned that "we will not be victimized." While
supportive of enhancing the agreement in the context of
upcoming negotiations brokered by the UN/AU--"DPA Plus," for
example--he vowed to oppose changing the name, a symbolic
shift that would negate the SLM's status as a signatory.
Minawi underscored the importance of U.S. backing for the SLM
and reiterated his request for U.S. facilitation of Saudi
financial support. According to Minawi, important armed
rebel factions remain outside the UN/AU political process,
and politicians continue to manipulate sentiment in the IDP
camps. He predicted that these dynamics would doom the UN/AU
peace process. Minawi described a recent visit to West
Darfur as an example of the potential for Arab-African
reconciliation if the security situation is stable. End
summary.
-----------------------------------------
DPA Fades But "We Will Not Be Victimized"
-----------------------------------------
¶3. (S/NF) Senior Assistant to the President and Sudan
Liberation Movement (SLM) leader Minni Minawi told CDA
Fernandez on September 1 that "the DPA has totally lost the
support of the international community. Everyone is acting
as if it's canceled, and it's negatively affecting us." When
asked if he believed that he and the SLM would be the
scapegoats for a "DPA II" resulting from the UN/AU political
process, Minawi responded: "We will not be victimized. A
'DPA Plus' is ok, but we can't have a new name." (Note:
Discussing a recent meeting between UN Envoy Jan Eliasson and
Minawi in El Fasher, a UN official present at the meeting
told Poloff recently that Minawi had offered to relinquish
the post of Senior Assistant to the President "to make peace
in Darfur" as long as the name of the DPA did not change.
End note.)
----------------------------------
U.S.--and Saudi--Support Essential
----------------------------------
¶4. (S/NF) Minawi underscored the importance of U.S. support
for the SLM. He said he had seen "U.S. fingers" in his
late-July trip to Saudi Arabia--which had laid the foundation
for successful meetings with senior Saudi officials,
including King Abdullah--and asked for an update on Saudi
financial support for the SLM (Refs. A and B). CDA Fernandez
said that the U.S. will continue to press the Saudis and
emphasized that the U.S. still views Minawi's role as
essential to peace in Darfur. Minawi recalled a conversation
with Vice President Ali Osman Taha when Taha had told him,
"We like the Americans. The Americans always tell you (the
rebels) to talk, talk, talk. The Eritreans and the Chadians
say, 'talk and fight.'" (Note: Minawi recounted this same
story in late March after Sudanese security forces killed 10
SLM partisans and ransacked the SLM party headquarters in
Khartoum, which left much of the SLM rank and file agitating
for a return to armed struggle. Minawi may now consider
himself and his movement in similarly dire circumstances
(Ref. C). End note.)
---------------------------------
UN/AU Process Neglects Key Groups
---------------------------------
¶5. (C) Minawi said that the UN/AU have neglected important
armed factions of the Darfur rebels, without whom the
security situation will not improve and the peace process
will fail. The key to a successful process was "who will be
in what position," an issue that the UN/AU had not addressed.
Minawi, however, is working to bring the excluded groups
into political dialogue, particularly a breakaway faction of
the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) led by Abdullah
Banda. He said that the UN/AU, however, has discouraged him
KHARTOUM 00001386 002 OF 003
from doing so. Responding to a question from the CDA, Minawi
welcomed the impending release of former SLM humanitarian
coordinator Suleiman Jamous. Though he characterized Jamous,
JEM, and Sudanese Islamist Hassan al Turabi as "the same
thing," he said it was better that "Jamous be free." He
doubted, however, that Jamous will be able to "guide his
people" into the political process under the truncated UN/AU
timeline.
------------
IDP Politics
------------
¶6. (C) Minawi described the situation in the internally
displaced persons (IDP) camps as "confused" and "manipulated
by Sudan's politicians," for which he blamed Darfur rebel
leaders, such as SLM faction head Abdulwahid al Nur;
opposition parties; and the National Congress Party (NCP).
Broad reconciliation within the Darfur population is
impossible without "the political hands out of Darfur." The
camps are fractured between people who want to return home
and others who do not. Some groups concentrate on security
as their priority while others focus on compensation. A
third group is absorbed by "camp politics," said Minawi.
-----------------------
Tribal Fighting Worsens
-----------------------
¶7. (C) Inter-tribal fighting made it less likely that a peace
agreement under the current UN/AU strategy could succeed, as
Arabs had been left outside the process. The Habaniya were
fighting the Falata, the Maalia fighting the Zaghawa, and the
Tarjum fighting the Rizeigat. Minawi attributed the violence
to former South Darfur governor Al Hajj Attal Mannan's
manipulation of tribal tensions. He inferred that the SLM is
now too weak to fight off the Arab tribes, as it had done in
the past, and said that it has relinquished its traditional
hold over Haskanita.
--------------------------------------
Arab, Non-Arab Reconciliation Possible
--------------------------------------
¶8. (C) Minawi said that reconciliation between Arab and
non-Arab tribes is possible in areas where security has
improved. Pointing to the example of West Darfur, where the
security situation is more stable than that in South Darfur,
he described a recent meeting with Arab and African tribal
leaders in El Geneina. African tribes want to return to
their land, now occupied by Arabs--who fear that the Africans
will kill them if they return. Both groups had accepted
Minawi's suggested compromise that the Africans trade
assurances of security for a return of their land. Minawi
said that such reconciliation programs could occur throughout
the region as the UN-African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)
deploys and can guarantee the agreements.
¶9. (S/NF) Regarding reports that Chadian Arabs were
resettling in Darfur under Government sponsorship, Minawi
said the migration of Arabs had been occurring since at least
1996 and that it was impossible--and irrelevent--to separate
people in West Darfur by nationality as the same African and
Arab tribes lived on both sides of the border. He felt that
reports of highly organized, mass demographic engineering in
Darfur by the Sudanese Government were far-fetched. However,
Minawi said that he had heard reports of "white people in
camps" in the areas of Mukhjar and Mornei during his recent
visit to West Darfur and that Governor Abdulgassem Imam was
investigating. He assumed they could be foreign jihadists
but was not sure. (Note: UN officials and NGO workers have
reported intermittent sightings of foreign Arabs in West
Darfur since March. End note.)
--------------------------
Comment and Recommendation
--------------------------
¶10. (S/NF) Minawi was disheartened that right after his Saudi
trip, Minister of Defense Abdulrahim Mohammed Hussein visited
the same Saudi officials. It would be disappointing if our
friends the Saudis listened more to a key regime hardliner
(who in 2006 called for "jihad, victory, and martyrdom"
against UN troops in Darfur) rather than a pro-Western
peacemaker like Minawi. Embassy recommends that Washington
(NEA and AF) keep encouraging Saudi engagement with Minawi as
an excellent way for Riyadh to support peace in Darfur and an
KHARTOUM 00001386 003 OF 003
improvement in Sudanese-American relations. End comment and
recommendation.
FERNANDEZ