VZCZCXRO7263
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1386/01 2470957
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 040957Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8391
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001386 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, NEA A/S WELCH 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2012 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UN AU SU SA
SUBJECT: MINAWI: "WE WILL NOT BE VICTIMIZED" 
 
REF: A. KHARTOUM 01133 
     ¶B. KHARTOUM 01303 
     ¶C. KHARTOUM 01373 
 
Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
------- 
Summary 
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¶1. (U) See para. 10 for recommendation. 
 
¶2. (S/NF) In a recent meeting with CDA Fernandez, SLM leader 
Minni Minawi lamented the loss of international support for 
the DPA and warned that "we will not be victimized."  While 
supportive of enhancing the agreement in the context of 
upcoming negotiations brokered by the UN/AU--"DPA Plus," for 
example--he vowed to oppose changing the name, a symbolic 
shift that would negate the SLM's status as a signatory. 
Minawi underscored the importance of U.S. backing for the SLM 
and reiterated his request for U.S. facilitation of Saudi 
financial support.  According to Minawi, important armed 
rebel factions remain outside the UN/AU political process, 
and politicians continue to manipulate sentiment in the IDP 
camps.  He predicted that these dynamics would doom the UN/AU 
peace process.  Minawi described a recent visit to West 
Darfur as an example of the potential for Arab-African 
reconciliation if the security situation is stable.  End 
summary. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
DPA Fades But "We Will Not Be Victimized" 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (S/NF) Senior Assistant to the President and Sudan 
Liberation Movement (SLM) leader Minni Minawi told CDA 
Fernandez on September 1 that "the DPA has totally lost the 
support of the international community.  Everyone is acting 
as if it's canceled, and it's negatively affecting us."  When 
asked if he believed that he and the SLM would be the 
scapegoats for a "DPA II" resulting from the UN/AU political 
process, Minawi responded: "We will not be victimized.  A 
'DPA Plus' is ok, but we can't have a new name."  (Note: 
Discussing a recent meeting between UN Envoy Jan Eliasson and 
Minawi in El Fasher, a UN official present at the meeting 
told Poloff recently that Minawi had offered to relinquish 
the post of Senior Assistant to the President "to make peace 
in Darfur" as long as the name of the DPA did not change. 
End note.) 
 
---------------------------------- 
U.S.--and Saudi--Support Essential 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (S/NF) Minawi underscored the importance of U.S. support 
for the SLM.  He said he had seen "U.S. fingers" in his 
late-July trip to Saudi Arabia--which had laid the foundation 
for successful meetings with senior Saudi officials, 
including King Abdullah--and asked for an update on Saudi 
financial support for the SLM (Refs. A and B).  CDA Fernandez 
said that the U.S. will continue to press the Saudis and 
emphasized that the U.S. still views Minawi's role as 
essential to peace in Darfur.  Minawi recalled a conversation 
with Vice President Ali Osman Taha when Taha had told him, 
"We like the Americans.  The Americans always tell you (the 
rebels) to talk, talk, talk.  The Eritreans and the Chadians 
say, 'talk and fight.'"  (Note: Minawi recounted this same 
story in late March after Sudanese security forces killed 10 
SLM partisans and ransacked the SLM party headquarters in 
Khartoum, which left much of the SLM rank and file agitating 
for a return to armed struggle.  Minawi may now consider 
himself and his movement in similarly dire circumstances 
(Ref. C).  End note.) 
 
--------------------------------- 
UN/AU Process Neglects Key Groups 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Minawi said that the UN/AU have neglected important 
armed factions of the Darfur rebels, without whom the 
security situation will not improve and the peace process 
will fail.  The key to a successful process was "who will be 
in what position," an issue that the UN/AU had not addressed. 
 Minawi, however, is working to bring the excluded groups 
into political dialogue, particularly a breakaway faction of 
the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) led by Abdullah 
Banda.  He said that the UN/AU, however, has discouraged him 
 
KHARTOUM 00001386  002 OF 003 
 
 
from doing so.  Responding to a question from the CDA, Minawi 
welcomed the impending release of former SLM humanitarian 
coordinator Suleiman Jamous.  Though he characterized Jamous, 
JEM, and Sudanese Islamist Hassan al Turabi as "the same 
thing," he said it was better that "Jamous be free."  He 
doubted, however, that Jamous will be able to "guide his 
people" into the political process under the truncated UN/AU 
timeline. 
 
------------ 
IDP Politics 
------------ 
 
¶6. (C) Minawi described the situation in the internally 
displaced persons (IDP) camps as "confused" and "manipulated 
by Sudan's politicians," for which he blamed Darfur rebel 
leaders, such as SLM faction head Abdulwahid al Nur; 
opposition parties; and the National Congress Party (NCP). 
Broad reconciliation within the Darfur population is 
impossible without "the political hands out of Darfur."  The 
camps are fractured between people who want to return home 
and others who do not.  Some groups concentrate on security 
as their priority while others focus on compensation.  A 
third group is absorbed by "camp politics," said Minawi. 
 
----------------------- 
Tribal Fighting Worsens 
----------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Inter-tribal fighting made it less likely that a peace 
agreement under the current UN/AU strategy could succeed, as 
Arabs had been left outside the process.  The Habaniya were 
fighting the Falata, the Maalia fighting the Zaghawa, and the 
Tarjum fighting the Rizeigat.  Minawi attributed the violence 
to former South Darfur governor Al Hajj Attal Mannan's 
manipulation of tribal tensions.  He inferred that the SLM is 
now too weak to fight off the Arab tribes, as it had done in 
the past, and said that it has relinquished its traditional 
hold over Haskanita. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Arab, Non-Arab Reconciliation Possible 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Minawi said that reconciliation between Arab and 
non-Arab tribes is possible in areas where security has 
improved.  Pointing to the example of West Darfur, where the 
security situation is more stable than that in South Darfur, 
he described a recent meeting with Arab and African tribal 
leaders in El Geneina.  African tribes want to return to 
their land, now occupied by Arabs--who fear that the Africans 
will kill them if they return.  Both groups had accepted 
Minawi's suggested compromise that the Africans trade 
assurances of security for a return of their land.  Minawi 
said that such reconciliation programs could occur throughout 
the region as the UN-African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) 
deploys and can guarantee the agreements. 
 
¶9. (S/NF) Regarding reports that Chadian Arabs were 
resettling in Darfur under Government sponsorship, Minawi 
said the migration of Arabs had been occurring since at least 
1996 and that it was impossible--and irrelevent--to separate 
people in West Darfur by nationality as the same African and 
Arab tribes lived on both sides of the border.  He felt that 
reports of highly organized, mass demographic engineering in 
Darfur by the Sudanese Government were far-fetched.  However, 
Minawi said that he had heard reports of "white people in 
camps" in the areas of Mukhjar and Mornei during his recent 
visit to West Darfur and that Governor Abdulgassem Imam was 
investigating.  He assumed they could be foreign jihadists 
but was not sure.  (Note:  UN officials and NGO workers have 
reported intermittent sightings of foreign Arabs in West 
Darfur since March.  End note.) 
 
-------------------------- 
Comment and Recommendation 
-------------------------- 
 
¶10. (S/NF) Minawi was disheartened that right after his Saudi 
trip, Minister of Defense Abdulrahim Mohammed Hussein visited 
the same Saudi officials.  It would be disappointing if our 
friends the Saudis listened more to a key regime hardliner 
(who in 2006 called for "jihad, victory, and martyrdom" 
against UN troops in Darfur) rather than a pro-Western 
peacemaker like Minawi.  Embassy recommends that Washington 
(NEA and AF) keep encouraging Saudi engagement with Minawi as 
an excellent way for Riyadh to support peace in Darfur and an 
 
KHARTOUM 00001386  003 OF 003 
 
 
improvement in Sudanese-American relations.  End comment and 
recommendation. 
FERNANDEZ