VZCZCXRO7112
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1384/01 2470639
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 040639Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8387
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001384 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2012 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU ER
SUBJECT: ON EVE OF UNSYG VISIT, UN CHIEF DISCUSSES NCP, 
SPLM DYNAMICS 
 
 
Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) Noting that the relationship between Sudan and the UN 
had improved in the last year, the UN Acting Special 
Representative of the Secretary General told CDA Fernandez 
that UNSYG Ban Ki Moon's September 4-8 visit comes at an 
ideal time to sustain momentum on the Darfur peace process, 
pave the way for UNAMID, and raise the profile of the CPA. 
Hardliners and pragmatists in Khartoum view Ban's visit 
differently, with the former seeing a tacit acknowledgment of 
a successful strategy to overcome UNSCR 1706, the latter an 
affirmation for continued engagement with the international 
community.  He warned of the risks of another failed SPLM 
attempt to organize the Darfur rebel groups and called on the 
international community to encourage the SPLM to coordinate 
with the UN/AU political process--and thus head-off Asmara's 
baleful influence on SPLM efforts.  End summary. 
 
-------------------------------- 
UN-Sudan Relations Much Improved 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) On the eve of UNSYG Ban Ki Moon's first visit to 
Sudan, UN Acting Special Representative of the Secretary 
General Taye Brooke-Zerihoun told CDA Fernandez on September 
1 that the UN's relationship with the Khartoum regime "was 
much better than it was one year ago, despite all the 
difficulties."  The Government is now "accommodating" the UN 
on flight and customs clearances, is more open to meetings 
with UN officials, and is implementing the High Level 
Communique on Humanitarian Access, all steps that make it 
possible to build a rapport with the regime leadership.  He 
noted that a year ago, "Sudanese government officials were 
leading demonstrations against the UN.  Now, it is 
different."  While the UN would not ignore some of the 
lingering issues--such as the January 2007 assault on 
humanitarian workers in Nyala and visa restrictions on UN 
employees--the UNSYG's visit came at an ideal time to sustain 
momentum on the peace process, pave the way for the 
UN-African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), and raise the profile 
of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) implementation, 
according to Taye. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Different Prisms: Hard-liners and Pragmatists 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Pragmatists and hardliners view Ban's visit through a 
distinct prism, said Taye.  The former see it as tacit 
acknowledgment of their success in overcoming UN Security 
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1706 in favor of the more recent 
UNSCR 1769 to authorize the UN/AU hybrid peace-keeping force. 
 The latter hope the visit will highlight the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) and underscore the importance of 
improving Sudan's relations with the international community. 
 Ban's first event would be an address to the UN Association 
in Khartoum in order to empower the pragmatists and "bring 
Sudan into the fold," said Taye. 
 
¶4. (C) The ASRSG said that the regime's policies reflect the 
ongoing conflict within the National Islamic Front (NIF), 
which pits the National Congress Party (NCP) against Hassan 
al Turabi's Popular Congress Party (PCP) and pragmatists, 
such as Vice President Ali Osman Taha and National 
Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) Director General 
Salah Ghosh, against hardliners, such as Presidential 
Assistant Nafie Ali Nafie and the Ministers of Defense and 
Interior.  The recent expulsions of the Canadian Charge 
d'Affaires and the country director for CARE "were 
symptomatic of these internal struggles," said Taye. 
Implying that the pragmatists were ascendant, Taye explained 
that "they understand they have to give in here and there, 
and on these expulsions, they conceded."  He believed that 
Vice President Taha "has made a little bit of a comeback" in 
recent months. 
 
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Instability in the SPLM 
----------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) is 
similarly unstable, with three major internal reshuffles in 
the last year, according to Taye.  A reshuffle of cabinet 
 
KHARTOUM 00001384  002 OF 002 
 
 
posts in the Government of National Unity was also on the 
horizon, with Foreign Minister Lam Akol and Presidential 
Advisor Mansour Khalid still poised to swap positions.  The 
SPLM deserved credit for rooting out corruption early in the 
tenure of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS).  The 
economy, however, was "not under control," and Juba looks 
like a "frontier town," with charlatan businessmen from 
Uganda, Kenya, and the Congo driving the economy.  Ban would 
spend one night in Juba--the first overnight by a UNSYG in 
Southern Sudan--and hoped to focus on CPA-related issues 
throughout this trip.  One such issue would be the 
redeployment deadline for the SPLA and Sudan Armed Forces 
(SAF) troops.  Taye suggested that the issue was a "matter of 
terminology:" while the vast majority of SAF forces had been 
redeployed North, demobilized, and relieved of their weapons, 
some were still receiving salaries from Khartoum. 
 
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Another Failed SPLM Initiative for Darfur? 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) The SPLM's attempts to organize a Darfur initiative 
exemplify its disorganization.  According to Taye, First Vice 
President Salva Kiir and Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) 
Vice President Riek Machar are at odds on the SPLM's role, 
and both have been disconnected from the SPLM's Darfur 
Taskforce.  "My money is that they'll fail again, and I don't 
know how they'll take that," said Taye, adding that the 
Darfur rebel movements had lost patience with the SPLM after 
several delayed meetings in Southern Sudan following the 
Arusha conference in late July. 
 
¶7. (C) Taye warned that Eritrea--"who is not happy about the 
UN/AU process"--was using the SPLM for its own purposes. 
Asmara is hosting rebel political leaders "that don't amount 
to much and are bereft of any link to the commanders" and 
hope to utilize the SPLM conference to bring military 
elements under the control of their designated proxies.  The 
international community could not warn the SPLM about 
Eritrea's motives, but the U.S. could emphasize that the SPLM 
coordinate with the UN and AU per the Tripoli Consensus and 
find a narrow role for its initiative under the broader peace 
process.  "They don't have an agenda," said Taye, "they just 
want to be accepted as a genuine player." 
FERNANDEZ