VZCZCXRO0772
RR RUEHGI RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHKM #1419/01 2500948
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 070948Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9331
INFO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0644
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUEHTO/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 0430
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 3339

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KAMPALA 001419 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREF PREL MOPS UG SU
SUBJECT: SENATOR FEINGOLD DISCUSSES NORTHERN UGANDAN ISSUES 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: Senator Russell Feingold met with a wide range of 
government officials, local and religious leaders, military 
officers, internally-displaced persons, UN officials and 
international donors to discuss the current situation in northern 
Uganda during his visit from August 26 to 30.  Feingold traveled to 
Gulu and observed the improved security situation in northern 
Uganda.  His visit coincided with nationwide consultations to 
develop the mechanism for justice, accountability, and 
reconciliation.  End Summary. 
 
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MILITARY OFFICIALS: KEEP PRESSURE ON KHARTOUM AND LRA 
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¶2.  (SBU) On August 27, Senator Feingold met with Minister of 
Defense Crispus Kiyonga and Lt. Gen. Katumba Wamala.  Feingold 
described the level of military cooperation between the United 
States and Uganda as excellent.  He asked Kiyonga about the U.S. 
role in the region.  Kiyonga said that Uganda was concerned that the 
Khartoum Government was re-supplying the Lord's Resistance Army 
(LRA).  He stated that the U.S. helped in the past by discussing 
supply of the LRA with Khartoum.  Kiyonga said that the U.S. could 
be tougher with Khartoum on the issue again.  Lt. Gen. Wamala 
explained that the Ugandan Peoples Defense Force (UPDF) was unable 
to apprehend the LRA leaders because they received protection from 
Khartoum which assisted their movement into Garamba National Park to 
avoid UPDF deployment in southern Sudan. Kiyonga also told Feingold 
that the LRA should not be removed from the Terrorist Exclusion List 
until it demonstrated results in the form of a signed peace 
agreement.  Once the LRA stops re-arming and disarms, then various 
carrots should be considered such as the LRA's removal from 
terrorism lists and the dropping of the International Criminal Court 
warrants.  Kiyonga told Feingold that if the talks fail, the LRA 
should "attract the wrath of the ICC."  He added that there was a 
"three state" arrangement for dealing with the LRA should Kony fail 
to cooperate. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Feingold asked about allegations that the conduct of UPDF 
soldiers in internally-displaced persons camps, or in restricting 
movement.  Feingold was told that there may be "some degree" of 
abuses and Lt. Gen. Wamala said that the Ministry of Defense would 
act on any specific information about abuse of civilians.  He 
acknowledged that the conditions in IDP camps resulted in many 
civilian deaths.  Wamala said that the UPDF was receiving training 
and lectures on human rights from international and domestic 
organizations.  The UPDF's taking of "immediate action" against 
soldiers accused of human rights allegations was now being 
challenged in courts for being too harsh.  He also explained that 
some 40,000 auxiliary forces, known as local defense units (LDU), 
had been recruited to serve alongside the UPDF to provide security. 
Ten thousand LDU members were being kept mobilized until the Juba 
Peace Talks play out.  The rest of these forces were being recruited 
into the police or demobilized.  Kiyonga told Senator Feingold that 
the military was stepping back from handling law enforcement. 
However, with the return of IDPs to or near their homes, the demand 
for police continues to expand.  Police units were being 
reestablished, judges were "circuit-riding" to relieve the massive 
backlog of cases in the north, and the Ministry of Justice was 
training more magistrates. 
 
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GOU NEGOTIATOR: PHYSICAL PEACE BUT NOT PEACE OF MIND 
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¶4.  (SBU) Minister of State for International Relations, Henry 
Okello Oryem, Deputy Leader of the GOU negotiating team and a 
northerner from Kitgum said that the peace process had surpassed 
Uganda's expectations.  The LRA has left northern Uganda and there 
have been no LRA attacks.  The LDUs have become redundant, night 
commuter centers are being closed, and IDPs are returning to or near 
their homes in Lira, Teso, and eastern Kitgum.  Oryem described the 
situation as one of physical peace, but not peace of mind or heart. 
Northerners want the reassurance of a signed peace agreement. 
Returnees were facing challenges such as the lack of services in 
return areas and the inability of camp populations to till land due 
to a lack of experience. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The three categories of LRA members require different 
accountability.  Oryem said that for the GOU, a local reconciliation 
mechanism, such as mato oput, was not enough for the LRA leaders. 
The GOU advocates that Kony, Otti, and the other indictees be tried 
under Ugandan law and undergo some form of local reconciliation.  He 
claimed that Kony and Otti realized that they must face a national 
prosecution in order to avoid the ICC.  The problem was that Kony 
and Otti have not determined the modalities or guarantees that they 
would need to turn themselves over to the GOU.  Non-indicted 
commanders and fighters would likely be subjected to local 
 
KAMPALA 00001419  002 OF 003 
 
 
reconciliation mechanisms.  Oryem said that it would be unfair to 
try the women and children who were abducted and forced to fight. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Oryem told Feingold the GOU has let the LRA lead the 
process to ensure that it is satisfied, even though it means 
tolerating discussion of absurd issues.  The GOU has largely 
acquiesced to the LRA but was tough on issues such as power-sharing 
because the LRA does not represent the people of northern Uganda. 
For example, the GOU agreed to restock northern Uganda's decimated 
livestock population, investigate allegations against the UPDF, and 
include issues of human rights and good governance under the 
Comprehensive Solutions part of the agreement.  Both the LRA and the 
GOU will produce reports summarizing the consultations regarding 
accountability and present them when the talks resume in October. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Senator Feingold asked how the Government of Southern 
Sudan mediator and U.N. Special Envoy Chissano were performing. 
Oryem said that Chissano's influence was positive because he was 
balanced and brought relevant experience to bear to overcome LRA 
suspicions about the process.  Initially, the GOU was concerned 
about GOSS Vice President Riek Machar's agenda and focus.  Machar is 
not impartial but they have a big stake in the peace process because 
of the LRA atrocities in southern Sudan. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Uganda continues a dialogue with the Democratic Republic 
of Congo regarding the continued presence of the LRA at Garamba 
National Park.  Oryem also told Feingold that the DRC would not want 
the UPDF to go into Garamba Park to catch LRA.  Oryem stated that 
President Kabila was misinformed and needed to discuss the issue 
outside of Kinshasa.  President Museveni would be meeting Kabila in 
Tanzania on the LRA and border issues.  (Note: The meeting is 
scheduled for September 7, in Arusha.) 
 
¶9.  (SBU) When asked by Senator Feingold about the U.S. role, Oryem 
replied that the GOU welcomed U.S. interventions that were 
low-profile.  Uganda fears a more public U.S. role because it would 
overshadow the talks and "incense" Khartoum and the Arab League. 
Oryem stated that funding for parts of the process, intelligence 
sharing, and logistical assistance, were areas where the U.S. could 
play a helpful role.  Oryem noted that the US could be a "looming 
presence" and that while this should be an African solution it 
should have strong "international support."  Oryem added that 
continued pressure on the LRA would be useful and that the GOU does 
not want the ICC warrants lifted until a final peace deal was 
concluded and implemented. 
 
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT, RELIGIOUS LEADERS, IDPs 
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¶10.  (SBU) Senator Feingold traveled to Gulu and met with local 
elected, traditional, and religious leaders, as well as 
internally-displaced person (IDPs) at Ongako camp.  He first held a 
roundtable discussion with Macmot Kitara, the Deputy Local District 
Chairman, Walter Ochora, the Resident District Commissioner, a 
representative of Paramount Chief Rwot Acana, and Karima Obina and 
Reverend Godfrey Luwom of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace 
Initiative.  The participants welcomed increased U.S. engagement in 
northern Uganda, which they felt was important to keeping the 
negotiating parties on track.  They raised concerns about the LRA's 
delaying tactics and the composition of the LRA's diaspora-based 
delegation at Juba.  The lack of women representatives at the 
negotiations was another concern.  The group noted that attention 
needs to be paid to both Khartoum and Congo, which have influence 
over the situation. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The local leaders agreed that the ICC indictments added a 
new level of seriousness to the peace process, a view not shared by 
the IDPs.  The IDPs expressed concerns that the ICC could still be 
an impediment to the peace process.  Macmot pointed out that the ICC 
only has jurisdiction over crimes committed since 2000 and would not 
cover massacres, such as that at Atiak.  There was initial 
enthusiasm for the ICC because northerners thought the ICC would 
come to Uganda and apprehend the LRA leaders.  When this did not 
happen, skeptism set in that the ICC could not resolve the problem 
on its own.  Local leaders were supportive of amnesty for the LRA as 
long as it did not promote impunity.  Most of the northerners 
believed that a reconciliation process needed to be national in 
nature.  Senator Feingold encouraged participants to view the ICC as 
being effective as long as it did not prevent the successful 
conclusion of the peace process.  The local leaders told Feingold 
that the current peace process has integrity and that the 
facilitators and observers were important factors in the 
negotiations. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) The IDPs requested a reconstruction package similar to 
the one implemented in southern Sudan after the Comprehensive Peace 
 
KAMPALA 00001419  003 OF 003 
 
 
Agreement was signed in 2005.  Other requests included supporting 
IDPs and returning ex-combatants at an equitable level.  There was 
fear that the ex-combatants would have access to more benefits 
through formal disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and 
re-integration processes than their victims in the IDP camps.  The 
local leaders and the IDPs said that reintegration and compensation 
packages should go to affected communities, not individuals.  The 
local leaders emphasized the importance of rehabilitating 
livelihoods.  Specific needs identified by local leaders and IDPs 
included civilian policing, roads, and health, and education 
infrastructure and personnel.  Local leaders felt strongly that the 
GOU must take ownership of the return process and that civilian 
rule, local governance structures and the rule of law in general 
needed to be substantially upgraded.  When Senator Feingold asked 
whether the IDPs preferred the UPDF or civilian police for security, 
there was unanimous support for the civilian police. 
 
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INTERNATIONAL DONORS: DIVISION OF LABOR ON LRA ISSUES 
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¶13. (SBU) Senator Feingold met with representatives of the U.K., 
Norway, The Netherlands, Canada, and Ireland on August 29.  Feingold 
was interested in their views on the peace process, the ICC, and the 
role the U.S. should play.  The Netherlands Charge suggested that 
the U.S. has a comparative advantage over European missions because 
it can influence President Museveni when needed and has the ability 
to collect intelligence on the ground situation.  The U.K. High 
Commissioner, Francois Gordon, said that those countries that signed 
the Rome Statute could not make judgments on the proposed solutions 
or mechanisms developed by the parties to deal with accountability. 
He noted that a suspension of the warrants by the U.N. Security 
Council would be a palatable option for Kony, who does not trust the 
ICC, but understands the role of the UNSC.  The Norwegian Ambassador 
described Norway's support for the ICC, but debate within the 
Norwegian ministries over peace and justice issues.  The U.K. 
supported keeping the LRA on the U.S. Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL) 
because it keeps pressure on them to sign a peace deal.  The TEL 
gives the U.S. the means to go after those in the diaspora that were 
supporting the LRA.  The U.K. does not have an equivalent mechanism. 
 Norway withdrew its support for the European Union terrorist list, 
which deals with money transfers and immigration issues, so that it 
could have more flexibility in talking to groups like the LRA. 
There is a division of labor on the LRA issues that appears to have 
emerged within the international community. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Later the same day, representatives from Ireland and 
Canada explained the origins of the Juba Initiative Fund (JIF)and 
the division of labor that has emerged between donors there.  Aine 
Hearns, Ireland's High Commissioner said that the JIF has been used 
to pay the operational expenses of the GOSS Secretariat, and 
allowances, hotels, airfares, and per diems for the LRA.  The 
initial fund experienced significant problems, including 
mismanagement, but the donors have now engaged KPMG to handle the 
finances.  She also said that the JIF donors do not work directly 
with the LRA but through Machar.  In her view, the longer there was 
no fighting, the more difficult it would be for the LRA to return to 
war.  Canadian consul Bryan Burton said that donor plans for the 
post-agreement phase needed to be looked at more closely.  National 
reconciliation would be needed and was not being addressed at this 
point.  Aine Hearns said that the U.S. has been fully supportive and 
engaged on the process.  Feingold asked how the newly appointed 
Senior Advisor for Conflict Areas could be utilized.  Aine Hearns 
stated that currently, coordination by donors in Kampala was 
excellent and that sharing of information and labor have become 
critical in order to not send any mixed messages to the parties. 
She stressed the importance of continued, close coordination. 
 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶15.  (SBU) Throughout his visit, Senator Feingold emphasized the 
U.S. Government's commitment to the peace process and reconstruction 
of northern Uganda.  He saw firsthand the challenges ahead: the 
deployment of civilian police to replace the military; the wide 
range of opinions on justice, accountability, and reconciliation; 
and the infrastructural and resource needs for returning 
populations.  Reporting on his meeting with President Museveni 
follows in septel. 
 
¶16.  (U) Senator Feingold cleared this message. 
BROWNING