VZCZCXRO2543
PP RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHPOD RUEHPW RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #3310/01 2731115
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 301115Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0642
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4223
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3674

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003310 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT, 
EUR/RPM, INL/CIVPOL 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG, 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A, CG CJTF-82, POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MARR SNAR PGOV AF
SUBJECT: CSTC-A POLICE CENSUS: A FIRST-EVER HEAD COUNT 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (SBU) From August 20 to September 5, Task Force Phoenix 
conducted a survey to verify the existence of Uniform, Border 
and Civil Order police on the ground in Afghanistan, 
comparing Ministry of Interior (MOI) payroll records with 
those present for duty.  The survey reviewed payroll lists in 
81 percent of the police districts throughout the country. 
The other 19 percent of districts were not surveyed, either 
because of their remoteness or security concerns.  The survey 
verified the existence of 76 percent of the 45,731 police 
listed on the payrolls for the districts surveyed:  in other 
words, 76 percent of the police in 81 percent of the 
districts were verified.  On September 23, Combined Security 
Transition Command ) Afghanistan (CSTC-A) Commander Major 
General Robert Cone briefed the international community on 
the results of the survey.  While all acknowledged the limits 
of the methodology, there was general agreement that the 
survey represents the first solid data on police presence in 
the field and that the show rate was much better than many 
had expected based on past anecdotal information.  End 
summary. 
 
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Background 
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¶2. (SBU) In recent months, police development planning has 
been increasingly hampered by uncertainty over the number of 
police on the ground.  MOI personnel and payroll offices have 
reported varying figures for the same district, often 
seriously at odds with claims by local chiefs of police, the 
2007 Tashkil (staffing plan) and the observations of PRT 
officers.  Although unable to provide a convincing account of 
police in service, MOI interlocutors routinely press for 
higher police pay and new allowances (e.g., danger pay and an 
increased food allowance).  Against that backdrop and 
otherwise poor payroll accountability, Law and Order Trust 
Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) donors have been reluctant to 
adopt new commitments.  Within the Security Operations Group 
and an ad hoc Afghan National Police (ANP) Pay Task Force 
chaired by UNAMA, the topic of poor payroll accountability 
festered into open discontent, while some partners in the 
international community (IC) estimated that as few as 40 
percent of police listed in payroll records were actually 
serving, at least in some districts. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Between August 20 and September 5, Combined Security 
Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A) conducted a head 
count of police in most districts, with some assistance from 
IC partners (e.g., the British in Helmand, the Canadians in 
Kandahar and the Dutch in Uruzgan).  Teams visited districts 
with no more than 72 hours notice and compared police by name 
against payroll records, the 2007 Tashkil and MOI personnel 
numbers.  Individual police were physically verified and were 
not counted if on leave, sick, AWOL or deceased.  Teams also 
verified individuals by their police ID cards, where 
available.  Security and logistical considerations in some 
districts precluded visits by census teams.  Surveyors did 
not visit the provinces of Badakhshan, Daikundi, Nurestan, 
Bamyan or Nimroz.  Parts of Badghis, Ghor, Ghazni and Helmand 
were also excluded. 
 
------------------------------ 
Results:  Better than Expected 
------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (SBU) Surveyors were able to account for 76 percent of the 
police on payroll in the districts surveyed:  80 percent of 
the 50,215 Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), 55 percent of 8,748 
 
KABUL 00003310  002 OF 003 
 
 
the Afghan Border Police (ABP) and all of the 518 Afghan 
National Civil Order Police (ANCOP). 
 
¶5. (SBU) Verified AUP numbers in the high-conflict south and 
east were 81 and 85 percent of those on payroll in districts 
surveyed, respectively.  As expected, numbers were even 
higher in Kabul and the central region (where better 
implementation of the Electronic Payments System inhibits 
payroll fraud).  Surprisingly, however, the relatively calm 
north and west did more poorly, with 76 percent of AUP 
verified in the west and 65 percent in the north. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The ABP were particularly difficult to count, owing 
largely to their remoteness:  surveyed districts included 
only 55 percent of those on payroll.  Of those surveyed, 87 
percent were verified as being on duty, or 47 percent of the 
total ABP on payroll. 
 
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Other Notes 
----------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Placed side by side with both MOI payroll figures 
and the 2007/1386 Tashkil, the survey reveals some striking 
imbalances.  For example, The conflict-riven eastern 
provinces are authorized 8,361 police positions, while MOI 
payroll contains 3,110 individuals, of whom 2,651 were 
physically verified; thus, 32 percent of authorized positions 
were verified as being filled, suggesting severe difficulties 
with recruitment.  (In the south, no less volatile, figures 
were rather better:  against 8,410 authorized positions, MOI 
has 7,688 on payroll, and 6,235 were verified -- thus, 74 
percent of authorized positions were filled.)  In the 
northern provinces, 7,833 positions are authorized, 9,505 
police are paid, and 6,193 were verified, suggesting 
significant payroll irregularities.  The 2007/1386 Tashkil 
authorizes 70,729 police positions in all, excluding the 
11,271 Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) positions. 
 
¶8. (SBU) While the police ID-card program is still struggling 
to register police in some areas, it has made real strides, 
with 64,379 registered and 43,275 cards printed as of 
September 25.  Every region (north, south, east, west and 
central) has some provinces where fewer than fifty percent of 
Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) surveyed held ID cards, and there 
was no penetration of the ID-card program evidenced in 
Nangarhar and Wardak.  Notably, within a single area, units 
sometimes varied widely in ID-card implementation.  For 
example, among ABP in the western region, border police at 
the Herat Airport had 100-percent compliance, while the Sixth 
Brigade Headquarters in the same region had only 18-percent 
compliance. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Context:  Other Reported Numbers 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Afghan police watchers will note that the survey 
does not include ANAP or the MOI headquarters in Kabul. 
While the combined MOI payroll for AUP, ABP and ANCOP plus 
district police officials is 59,876, the UNDP-administered 
Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) reported 
paying 72,470 police between April 2006 and March 2007; 
however, the latter figure includes some 11,074 ANAP (CSTC-A 
figure as of September 15).  As an additional point of 
comparison, DynCorp has trained some 73,262 individuals, 
excluding ANAP and corrected for individuals taking multiple 
courses.  Many of those trained are believed to have gone 
AWOL, and a substantial number have been killed or gone 
missing in action.  (Note:  Thirty to fifty ANP per week are 
reported KIA.  End note.) 
 
 
KABUL 00003310  003 OF 003 
 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Well-Received by International Partners 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) CSTC-A Commander Major General Robert Cone briefed 
the international community on September 23 on the results of 
the survey.  While all acknowledged the limits of the 
methodology, there was general agreement that the survey 
represents the first solid data on police presence in the 
field and that the 80 percent show rate for AUP was much 
better than many expected based on past anecdotal 
information.  IC participants included UNAMA, the EU, EUPOL, 
and representatives from the UK, Australian, Dutch, German, 
New Zealand, Italian and Canadian Embassies.  Questions 
focused on data that this survey was not designed to collect, 
in particular that would permit conclusions to be drawn 
regarding the effectiveness of ANP performance.  The UNAMA 
representative expressed interest in working with CSTC-A on 
subsequent surveys.  The EU Mission DCM welcomed the survey 
and noted that, despite the methodological limitations, the 
results should reassure donors that MOI financial controls 
are effective. 
 
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Comment 
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¶11. (SBU) While conditions in Afghanistan prevented a 
complete survey, this effort represents a significant 
contribution to USG, IC and IROA understanding of policing 
realities.  It was very well received by the international 
community and establishes a new basis for dialogue about 
police assistance.  Follow-on surveys, planned at a rate of 
ten to fifteen percent of the 345 districts per month, 
ensures the continuing utility of these data as a means of 
gauging MOI progress on reform and of assessing the 
effectiveness of police training and mentoring programs. 
End comment. 
WOOD