VZCZCXRO8722
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #2968/01 2481443
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 051443Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0018
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 002968 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG, 
NSC FOR HARRIMAN 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A, CG CJTF-82, POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2017 
TAGS: PGOV MARR PREL SNAR PTER ECON EAIDCIN AF
SUBJECT: SCENE-SETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE'S 
VISIT TO KABUL 
 
 
Classified By: Charge Christopher Dell, for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
 ¶1. (C) We welcome your first visit as 
Deputy Secretary to Afghanistan, which comes 
at an opportune time to advance our effort 
to establish a self-sustaining multi-channel 
dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
The inauguration in Jalalabad of a discreet 
communications channel between the national 
security advisors offers the two neighbors 
their best opportunity to put aside public 
bickering and explore possible joint 
ventures to counter their common terrorist 
enemy.  Your meeting with President Karzai 
will help us engage him on a focused 
dialogue about security, development, and 
governance.  The last is emerging as the 
most critical area, one where no amount of 
international support can substitute for a 
lack of presidential leadership.  Over 
recent months, the absence of an effective 
government presence in many districts has 
allowed the insurgency to move into new 
areas.  Strong leadership on policing, 
accountable governance, corruption, and 
counter-narcotics would both enhance 
Karzai's credibility and serve as a bulwark 
against further insurgent gains.  Your visit 
is an opportunity to prod him towards 
sustained, high-profile initiatives that can 
address these challenges.  You will also 
want to reinforce our gathering concerns 
about Iran's activities in Afghanistan.  End 
Summary. 
 
------------------------------ 
Karzai's Leadership Challenge 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C) President Karzai benefited 
politically from his successful August 5-6 
Camp David visit and the August 9-12 cross 
border jirga with Pakistan, but he continues 
to face intense pressure from an 
increasingly assertive opposition and a 
resurgent insurgency.  The chorus of 
complaint from Afghans across the country is 
rising and he must show he can deliver on 
security, particularly policing, and provide 
effective and accountable governance.  He 
must balance his inclination to make 
concessions designed to keep his enemies 
inside the tent with more dynamic leadership 
to avoid the growing impression that he is 
too accommodating of warlords, drug lords, 
and corrupt officials.  His strategy of 
balancing interests should not, and need 
not, produce a least-common-denominator 
government.  He can fulfill his mandate to 
lead if he picks his battles and his allies 
carefully and outmaneuvers perceived power- 
brokers by going directly to the people. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Restructuring the Police Means Reforming the 
MoI 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) The Afghan National Police is the 
"face of the Afghan government," and often 
the leading edge of the central government's 
strategic effort to draw insular villagers, 
long-abused minority groups and suspicious 
Pashtun tribals into a national community. 
 
KABUL 00002968  002 OF 005 
 
 
Its root-and-branch restructuring is a major 
focus of the Combined Security Transition 
Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and our 
Coalition partners; however, a corrupt and 
thoroughly dysfunctional Ministry of 
Interior is obscuring the progress we have 
achieved.  Urge Karzai to announce publicly 
before he travels to New York his decision 
to move responsibility for sub-national 
governance out of the dysfunctional Ministry 
of Interior into an office in the Palace, so 
that he will receive plaudits rather than 
questions from donor nations during his 
overseas travel.  He must abandon his 
practice of awarding senior police 
management positions as sinecures to power- 
brokers he wants to cultivate.  Integrity 
and effectiveness must be the guiding 
principles of an entirely transparent senior 
ministerial appointment process.  Karzai has 
heard these messages several times and now, 
at last, appears to be abandoning his 
reluctance to accept them.  We are 
developing for his consideration a detailed 
MoI reform plan.  You should assure him that 
the United States, the international 
community and, most importantly, the Afghan 
people will stand by him in making the tough 
decisions that lie ahead. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Governance: Supporting a Revitalized Afghan 
Social Contract 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Karzai knows his government is being 
judged on its ability to provide security, 
development and governance, including basic 
justice.  Unmet expectations on all fronts 
are fueling opposition movements and 
providing fertile ground for insurgent 
support in an increasing number of 
districts.  Commend Karzai for taking a hard 
look at his ministries and for considering 
consolidation in order to gain efficiency 
and improve performance.  Note that his 
decision regarding the Ministry of Interior 
is only a first step.  He has appointed an 
energetic leader to the sub-governance 
office, but now must grant him and the 
governors the latitude and resources to 
bring effective governance to the provinces. 
 
¶5.  (C) We have told Karzai we want our 
governance programs to support his goal of 
strengthening the partnership between state 
and traditional structures at the local 
level.  Karzai recognizes that government 
must be more responsive to local needs, but 
remains loathe to devolve authority to local 
officials.  Encourage Karzai toward the 
realization that improved government 
performance at the local level depends on 
his willingness to move from a top-down 
command model to a partnering arrangement 
with his provincial governors that allows 
them to dispense resources to local 
community leaders. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Be Courageous to Stop Corruption 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Corruption threatens to undermine 
everything we and Karzai are trying to 
accomplish, and beating Afghanistan's deeply 
ingrained corruption is a long-term 
challenge.  The justice system does not yet 
 
KABUL 00002968  003 OF 005 
 
 
function at a level that would allow the 
arrest, conviction and incarceration of 
white collar criminals.  Karzai has tried, 
albeit slowly, to remove some corrupt 
officials; however, the effective impunity 
of the powerful is demoralizing to the 
general public.  Remind him that he needs to 
make a public example of the worst 
offenders, as he did in late 2006 and early 
2007 when he consented to the removal of 
several police chief appointees with 
egregious reputations for human rights 
abuses and corruption.  That will likely 
enrage powerful patrons, but courage in 
combating corruption will win Karzai popular 
support. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Counter-Narcotics: Time for Tough Decisions 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.   (C) Poppy cultivation and opium 
trafficking are growing at alarming rates, 
feeding the insurgency, and undercutting 
development and governance efforts.  The 
2006/2007 poppy season saw the most 
comprehensive counter-narcotics activity to- 
date in Afghanistan, but results have been 
disappointing.  On August 27, UNODC 
announced the latest poppy national 
cultivation figures, which will reach 
193,000 hectares, up from 165,000 in 2006. 
The 2002 figure was 74,000 hectares. 
 
¶8.  (C) Karzai initially responded to the 
announcement by criticizing the 
international community's efforts to 
suppress opium production.  Convoluting the 
facts, he publicly stated that poppy 
cultivation was rising in provinces where 
the Coalition had focused its eradication 
efforts.  Without elaborating, he said 
Afghan solutions would be far more effective 
and that his governors should stop heeding 
international community eradication 
advisors.  Caution Karzai that his 
intemperate remarks may discourage 
international support and funding for opium 
eradication.  Stress the link between poppy 
production and insurgency funding.  Be 
prepared to deflect his contention that the 
impoverished seek opium income out of 
desperation:  Helmand Province is wealthy by 
Afghan standards and has received over $400 
million in U.S. development assistance since 
2002, yet was the source for almost half the 
world's heroin last year.  Urge his full 
engagement in developing a public consensus 
between the Afghan government and the 
international community on a sustained, 
coherent approach to eradication. 
 
--------------------------- 
Working with the Neighbors 
--------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) The August 9-12 Afghanistan-Pakistan 
Peace Jirga exceeded expectations; it began 
a confidence-building dialogue and 
identified areas where sides are willing to 
commit to cooperation.  Afghans' perception 
of the diplomatic success boosted their 
collective self-confidence.  Karzai deserves 
credit for following through on the 
commitment he made to the jirga proposal in 
the White House last November.  Thank him 
for his team's success in nimbly deflecting 
the Pakistani delegation's efforts to 
 
KABUL 00002968  004 OF 005 
 
 
include in the conclusions calls for the 
withdrawal of foreign troops and for direct 
talks with the Taliban.  Tell him we will be 
working with his team as it follows up on 
the more practical bilateral projects 
proposed by the jirga.  Our goals are to 
institutionalize this dialogue and, through 
your inauguration in Jalalabad of a discreet 
communications channel between the two 
national security advisors, allow the two 
governments a more private forum in which 
they can drop their posturing public 
antagonism and begin to coordinate their 
efforts to combat their common terrorist 
enemy. 
 
¶10. (S) Senior Afghan officials have taken 
pains to impress upon us Karzai's desire to 
avoid a "second front" in the West, with 
Iran.  Ahmedinejad's August 14 visit to 
Kabul was scripted as an opportunity for the 
two presidents to get to know one another 
and to discuss binational cooperation. 
Compliment the Afghan Foreign Ministry's 
success in resisting Iranian pressure on 
Karzai to sign a joint security agreement. 
Afghan officials privately acknowledge that, 
despite the visit's positive public 
atmospherics, they do not believe that Iran 
will cease its meddling, stop pressing for a 
security agreement, or refrain from using 
assistance and deportations of Afghans as 
leverage on Kabul.  The head of 
Afghanistan's National Directorate of 
Security privately registered with the 
visitors his government's worries over the 
appearance of Iranian weapons in Taliban 
inventories.  Karzai understands the Iranian 
challenge and is privately concerned, but 
will resist publicly confronting Tehran. 
You will want to convey to him our 
conviction that Iran's machinations can only 
be countered with unambiguous firmness. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The Afghan government and the 
international community launched a process 
in 2005 to encourage economic integration of 
Afghanistan with its neighbors through 
annual conferences.  These meetings bring 
together regional states and donors to 
discuss enhanced cooperation in areas such 
as energy, agriculture, investment climate 
and trade facilitation, with the next 
meeting scheduled for February in Islamabad. 
The potential for regional economic 
cooperation to increase trade and reduce 
Afghanistan's unemployment makes it 
imperative that Afghanistan use this process 
to make headway in removing impediments to 
its goods transiting through Pakistan and 
the region.  Encourage Karzai to capitalize 
on the good feeling engendered by the recent 
jirga to work with Pakistan in achieving 
this goal.  Note the promise for enhanced 
trade links between Central and South Asia 
through the new U.S.-funded bridge linking 
Afghanistan and Tajikistan. 
 
------------- 
The Way Ahead 
------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) With Camp David, the successful 
jirga, the carefully managed Ahmadinejad 
visit, and the Afghan-Tajik bridge opening, 
Karzai has had a good month, but a good 
month guarantees neither a good season nor 
long-term success.  Karzai should use the 
 
KABUL 00002968  005 OF 005 
 
 
momentum established this month to gain 
traction on the tough issues, including 
counter-narcotics, Ministry of Interior 
reform, and sub-national governance.  We 
will continue to provide him resources and 
advice, but Afghanistan needs his 
leadership.  That will require tremendous 
courage on his part, but your visit is one 
more indication of the American people's 
unflagging commitment to him and to 
Afghanistan. 
DELL