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DE RUEHJI #0392/01 2550631
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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FM AMCONSUL JEDDAH
TO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 1992
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE IMMEDIATE 0014
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0274
INFO RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 7540

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 JEDDAH 000392 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2027 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PK PREL PTER SA
SUBJECT: SAUDIS UNSURPRISED BY SHARIF'S RETURN; CONCERNED WITH MAINTAINING STABILITY IN PAKISTAN 
 
REF: RIYADH 01...

¶1. (S) SUMMARY.  In Ambassador Fraker's September 11 meeting  with Prince Muqrin, Head of the General Intelligence  Presidency, Muqrin reiterated the SAG's commitment to  accepting Sharif while in exile but added that Sharif had not  heeded Saad Al-Hariri's warning not to return to Pakistan. (NOTE: A source at the Pakistani Embassy in Riyadh maintains  that the SAG assisted in Sharif's return as a favor to  Musharraf.  END NOTE)  He stated that the SAG would restrict  Sharif's movement until after the November Presidential  elections to mitigate the potential for rioting in Pakistan. He believes that the situation will remain tense in the lead  up to the elections.  Prince Muqrin also said that while the  King considers both Sharif and Musharraf friends, he  considers Musharraf the better person to handle anti-terror  issues.  It is clear from Muqrin's private remarks to the  Ambassador and the SAG's public remarks to the press, that  maintaining stability in Pakistan is a strategic interest. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------  MEDIA COVERAGE 
 
¶2. (U) Saudi, English, and Arabic language newspapers  featured prominently on September 11 front page articles on  Sharif's September 10 deportation from Pakistan to Jeddah,  Saudi Arabia.  The media reported that four hours after  Pakistani authorities arrested and charged Sharif with  corruption and money-laundering, they took him to another  plane to return him to Jeddah.  (NOTE: We do not have  confirmation as to whether it was a Saudi or commercial  plane.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶3. (U) Upon Sharif's return, Prince Muqrin and other Saudi  officials received him at the airport.  The press quoted a  diplomatic source as stating that Sharif returned to his  former home -- Suroor Palace -- where he spent most of his  time in exile.  The Director General of the Foreign  Ministry's office in Mecca, Muhammed ibn Ahmed Tayeb, a good  contact of Consulate General Jeddah, reiterated to Arab News  the SAG's commitment to ensuring stability in Pakistan and  highlighted the strength of Saudi-Pakistani relations. 
However, the Saudi Ambassador to Islamabad, Ali Awad Assiri,  was quoted as saying that ""No Saudi diplomat participated in  the negotiations at the airport."" 
 
-----------------  OFFICIAL RESPONSE 
 
¶4. (S) During Ambassador Fraker's meeting with Prince Muqrin,  the Prince first summarized the ten-year agreement, brokered  by Rafiq Hariri, under which Sharif would live in Saudi  Arabia and refrain from participating in Pakistani politics. He added that there was a verbal agreement that after five  years, they would hold negotiations to consider reducing that  ten year period.  Prince Muqrin described how Saad Al-Hariri  warned Sharif not to return to Pakistan, but how Sharif  disregarded the warning and went anyway.  Prince Muqrin  stated that Saudi Arabia is committed to accepting Sharif  during his exile from Pakistan and that he made this clear to  Musharraf on his recent visit to Pakistan where he also met  with the Chief Justice and Prime Minister. 
 
¶5. (S) Regarding Sharif's return, the Prince himself met with  Sharif when he arrived in Jeddah.  According to Muqrin,  Sharif thought he might be arrested, but the Prince gave him  two options -- he could either stay at a palace that had been  prepared for him, or at his home.  He opted to go to his  home.  He stated that there will be some restrictions on  Sharif's activities for a short while, at least through the  November elections, to reduce the likelihood of inciting  rioting among his supporters in Pakistan.  Prince Muqrin also  stated that by accepting Sharif into Saudi Arabia in 1995,  King Abdullah literally saved the former Pakistani Primer  Minister's life.  He said Sharif will remain in Saudi Arabia  until after the Pakistani elections in November. 
 
 
¶6. (S) Prince Muqrin speculated that there is probably an  agreement between Sharif and the Pakistani Chief Justice,  adding that if the Chief Justice grants Sharif the right to  return to Pakistan and Sharif wins, the Chief Justice will 
  JEDDAH 00000392  002 OF 002 
 
  become President.  Prince Muqrin stated that he is almost  certain the Chief Justice will side with Sharif, noting that  he believes the run-up to the November election will be  tense. 
 
¶7. (S) The Prince explained that, as in Lebanon, the  Pakistani constitution requires individuals working within  the government to be outside government for two years prior  to becoming President.  Therefore, a constitutional change  would be required for Musharraf to become President.  The  Prince explained that King Abdullah views both Sharif and  Musharraf as friends, but that he believes that the two  together do not equate to Pakistani security.  The King feels  that Musharraf is the best person to address anti-terrorism  issues within Pakistan.  He joked that the best way to ensure  someone loses an election in Pakistan is for the U.S. to  support him, warning that if the U.S. supports Sharif, he  will be finished politically.  He also said that he thought  there would be a deal between Bhutto and Sharif, but that  they were still negotiating key points. 
 
¶8. (S) Following up on his September 10 conversation with  PolOff (reftel), Second Secretary at the Pakistani Embassy,  Syed Zahir Raza (strictly protect) insisted to PolOff on  September 11 that the Saudis intervened in Sharif's return to  Pakistan as a favor to President Musharraf.  He also noted  that he had heard that the Saudis paid for Sharif's  commercial flight to Jeddah.  He noted that the Pakistani  Ambassador, who was in Jeddah at the time of Sharif's return,  met with him, but could not provide the details of that  meeting. 
 
¶9. (S) COMMENT. It is clear that Saudi Arabia has a strategic  interest in facilitating stability in Pakistan.  While the  SAG denies involvement in negotiating Sharif's return, their  unusual public involvement suggests otherwise.  It is not  their modus operandi, in particular regarding the Chief of  Intelligence, to intervene openly.  In light of the growing  security and military cooperation between Saudi Arabia and  Pakistan, it is clearly in their best interests to do what  they can to prevent destabilization in Pakistan and to ensure  that Musharraf remains focused on anti-terror efforts. END  COMMENT.  FRAKER  "